《洞見投資者》播客於 2025 年 5 月 6 日專訪鮑伯·盧贊：資產擔保貸款的下跌保護機制
Welcome to the insightful investor podcast, a weekly series that seeks to share industry, investment and market insights. Learn more about our show at insightfulinvestor.org. [MUSIC] Joining me on the podcast today is Bob Luzon. Bob is the co-founder managing partner and portfolio manager at White Park Capital Partners. Which is a private credit investor manager that specializes in asset based lending, which will spend a lot of time on today. White Hawk is best known for its creative and flexible approach to providing liquidity to borrowers who may not have access to traditional financing.
歡迎收聽《洞見投資者》播客，這是一個每週系列節目，旨在分享產業、投資與市場洞見。更多節目資訊請瀏覽 insightfulinvestor.org。[音樂] 今天節目嘉賓是鮑伯·盧森。鮑伯是白鷹資本合夥公司的共同創辦人、管理合夥人兼投資組合經理。該公司專精於資產擔保貸款領域的私募信貸投資管理，這正是我們今天要深入探討的主題。白鷹資本以其創新靈活的融資方案聞名，為無法取得傳統融資的借款人提供流動性支援。
Bob, thank you for joining us today. Sure thing, it looks good to see you. Get to see as well. Let's go back to the beginning. You have a relatively unique approach in the investment world. What was the path that led you to focus on asset based lending? And what drew you to this corner of the market? You know, I've been doing lending in the middle market space, my entire career dating back to the early 90s. And the first decade or so, I was more of a cash-low lender.
鮑伯，感謝你今天參與節目。不客氣，很高興見到你。我也很榮幸。讓我們回溯最初，你在投資界採取了相當獨特的策略。是什麼樣的經歷讓你專注於資產擔保貸款？又是什麼吸引你進入這個市場領域？你知道的，我自 90 年代初入行以來，整個職業生涯都在中型企業貸款領域。前十年左右，我主要從事現金流貸款業務。
Trying to find companies that were good companies that probably didn't need the cash, but could show that they could pay it off. So that was my first form rate into lending. And then at the turn of the century around 2000, I went to what I always refer to as the dark side, but started doing more workouts and restructurings. And realized, well, what you do when the cash flow evaporates. And started really focusing on how to get your money back. And really leaning more on assets than cash. And converting those assets into cash to pays off.
當時我試圖尋找那些本質良好、可能並不急需資金，但能證明自身償債能力的企業。這是我最初涉足貸款領域的方式。到了世紀之交的 2000 年左右，我轉向了我常戲稱為「黑暗面」的領域，開始更多處理債務重組與企業重整案件。這段經歷讓我深刻體悟到——當現金流枯竭時該如何應對。我開始真正專注於如何回收資金，並更加倚重資產而非現金流，透過將這些資產變現來完成債務清償。
So I'd say around 2001, 2002, that's where I made the shift. And first, I was starting to just look at it as a recovery mechanism. But what I recognized with the door in that period of time, is there still a lot of really good companies out there, just because they were in that situation at that moment in time, didn't necessarily mean they were bad companies. So we started looking at them. And I did more on the offensive. Started lending directly into those situations because of the assets, not because of cash flow.
大約在 2001 至 2002 年間，我完成了這個轉型。起初，我只是將其視為一種資金回收機制。但在那個時期處理案件的過程中，我意識到市場上仍有許多優質企業——它們只是剛好在那個時間點陷入困境，並不代表本質不佳。於是我們開始以更積極的態度審視這些企業。我轉向採取攻勢策略，直接基於資產價值（而非現金流）對這類特殊情境企業提供融資。
And I stayed with it. I really started to understand the asset values, the liquidation models. And really done it for the last 20 plus years. I know you have a stronger version to losing money. A lot of investors do. But a lot of investors are willing to take more risk for higher returns. There are certain experiences that shaped or overall risk mindset and investment philosophy when you look backwards. Yeah, I mean, look, I have always thought about it. And I think people no one likes to lose money. Don't.
而我堅持了下來。我真正開始理解資產價值、清算模型。過去二十多年來，我確實一直在做這方面的工作。我知道你對虧錢有更強烈的反感，很多投資者都是如此。但也有很多投資者願意為了更高的回報承擔更多風險。當你回顧過去，會發現某些經歷塑造了我們整體的風險心態和投資哲學。是的，我一直都在思考這個問題。我認為沒有人喜歡虧錢，真的不喜歡。
Yeah, I'm not like unique in that in that form. But I kind of look at it from the perspective of people are coming to us because they need some assistance. And I've seen that throughout my career. And if we're willing to provide that, I shouldn't be penalized for it. Somebody shouldn't be able to jump in front of me. Somebody shouldn't be able to take the asset to collect the further out. If we're willing to step in at that last moment to try to allow the company transition or to save itself, then I shouldn't be penalized for it. So I shouldn't be able to, I shouldn't do my money. So we structure everything around that.
是的，在這方面我並不特別。但我從這個角度來看：人們來找我們是因為他們需要一些幫助。在我的職業生涯中，我見過很多這樣的情況。如果我們願意提供這種幫助，我們不應該因此受到懲罰。不應該有人能插隊到我們前面，也不應該有人能把資產拿走繼續追索。如果我們願意在最後一刻介入，試圖讓公司過渡或自救，那麼我們不應該因此受到懲罰。所以我們不應該、也不能虧錢。因此我們所有的結構都是圍繞這一點設計的。
And there are a lot of situations that I can go back in decades ago where it just didn't seem right that somebody would step in, do the right thing, and then be penalized for it. So everything that I do is a very, you know, a very keen eye to make sure that doesn't happen, but also to give the opportunity or the flexibility to the borrow or the company to succeed, to succeed on their business plan and give them the capital to do that. If they don't succeed, that's okay. I'm okay with that because I have those assets, right? Is there reason you focus on middle markets? I would say because the larger the company gets, the more people are interested in it. It takes the same amount of time and effort to do a small call at a $10 million loan, as it is a $500 million. So people will focus on the $500 million loan because you can make more money on it because of the volume. So the middle market sector is probably anywhere from 5 or 10 depending on who's defining it up to $2,2,5,300 million in deal sizes. And that can range in a company that does $100 million in revenue up to $2 billion a year in revenue. So the smaller deal sizes are really what is more attractive to us because there are less competitors in that sector. Yeah, which obviously allows you to get better terms for your investors. That's right.
而且有很多情況可以追溯到幾十年前，當時似乎不太合理，有人介入做了正確的事，卻因此受到懲罰。所以我所做的一切都非常謹慎，確保這種情況不會發生，同時也給予借款人或公司機會和靈活性，讓他們能夠成功執行業務計劃，並提供他們所需的資金來實現目標。如果他們沒有成功，那也沒關係。我可以接受，因為我擁有那些資產，對吧？你為什麼專注於中端市場呢？我會說，因為公司規模越大，對它感興趣的人就越多。處理一筆 1000 萬美元的貸款和一筆 5 億美元的貸款，所需的時間和精力是一樣的。所以人們會專注於 5 億美元的貸款，因為由於金額龐大，可以賺更多的錢。因此，中端市場的範圍大約是 5 到 10（視定義者而定），交易規模可達 2.25 億至 3 億美元。這可能涵蓋年收入 1 億美元到 20 億美元的公司。 因此，較小的交易規模對我們來說更具吸引力，因為在這一領域競爭者較少。是的，這顯然能讓投資者獲得更好的條件。沒錯。
Which is really important. It's not necessarily always about terms, it's about structure sometimes. So terms are key, it's what gets our returns, but it's the same point you need to structure in such a way to protect yourself, to protect the downside. So not everybody's aware of asset based lending, would you describe the landscape, who the borrowers are, who the lenders typically are, and how it essentially differs from lending based on cash flows. Every company has an asset, cash is an asset, accounts are suitable, inventory, machinery equipment, real estate, recurring revenue streams, brand names, those are all assets. And every company has at least one, if not several of them. When a company is generating cash flow, and that's probably 95 plus percent of the lending market, those structure transactions based on how much they can afford to borrow, based on that leverage, on the amount of cash that they generate. When companies are no longer able to generate cash flow or sufficient cash flow, it kind of pushes them away from that market and into the arms of other types of lenders. Those lenders could be, you know, someone like ourselves who say, "Hey, look, you have these assets, we'll lend you more capital or provide more liquidity to you because we're willing to, we'll lend against the value of those assets." Not necessarily the book value that you have on your statements, but it would be more of a collateral liquidation value. So we'll do an analysis to determine what, if I had to sell it as a lender, that asset, how much can I get for it, and then I'll lend money against that. So typically you would see, and it probably started a long time ago before I was even involved in this, the retail sector is a big ABL barware. Simply because if you think about it, all that inventory and all the stores is an asset, and it turns very quickly. They may not generate cash flow throughout different seasons of the year, but there certainly a lot of asset value inside the company. So they became predominantly asset-based borrowers. So when you think about that, when we got involved in my partner done on an I, we looked at it and said, "Well, it's not just inventory retail inventory, it could be any asset, and we should be able to structure it the same way." And think about like trucking equipment, people will far-run money to purchase trucks. That's the same process. You're taking that truck, that asset, it's a lean asset, a title asset, and we can lend against it. So if you don't pay us back, we could take that truck drive-a-down street and sell it at an auction. So we're always constantly looking from that perspective of what's the liquidity, the asset pool, and that's how much we can lend to you.
這點非常重要。這不一定是關於條款，有時候是關於結構。所以條款是關鍵，它們決定了我們的回報，但同樣重要的是，你需要以某種方式構建結構來保護自己，防範下行風險。不是每個人都了解資產基礎貸款，你能描述一下這個領域的情況嗎？借款人是誰，貸款人通常是誰，以及它與基於現金流的貸款本質上有何不同。每家公司都有資產，現金是一種資產，應收帳款、存貨、機械設備、房地產、經常性收入流、品牌名稱，這些都是資產。每家公司至少擁有一種，甚至多種。當一家公司產生現金流時，這可能佔貸款市場的 95%以上，這些交易結構是基於他們能夠負擔多少借款，基於那個槓桿，基於他們產生的現金量。當公司不再能夠產生現金流或足夠的現金流時，這會將他們推向其他類型的貸款人。 那些貸款機構可能是，你知道的，像我們這樣的人，他們會說：「嘿，看，你有這些資產，我們會借給你更多資金或提供更多流動性給你，因為我們願意根據這些資產的價值來放貸。」不一定是你在財務報表上的帳面價值，而更多是作為抵押品的清算價值。所以我們會進行分析來確定，如果我作為貸款方必須出售那項資產，我能從中獲得多少，然後我會根據那個金額來放貸。所以通常你會看到，而且這可能在我參與之前很久就開始了，零售業是一個很大的資產基礎貸款（ABL）領域。簡單來說，如果你想一想，所有那些庫存和店鋪裡的商品都是資產，而且周轉非常快。它們可能不會在一年中的不同季節產生現金流，但公司內部確實有很多資產價值。因此，它們主要成為了以資產為基礎的借款人。 所以當你思考這一點時，當我們參與到我合夥人的一項投資時，我們審視後認為：「這不僅僅是零售庫存，它可以是任何資產，我們應該能夠以同樣的方式進行結構化。」想想像是貨運設備，人們會貸款購買卡車。這是相同的流程。你拿那輛卡車作為資產，它是有留置權的資產、有產權的資產，我們可以以此為抵押放貸。所以如果你不還款，我們可以開走那輛卡車，在街上開到拍賣會賣掉。因此我們總是從這個角度不斷審視：資產池的流動性如何，這決定了我們能借給你多少錢。
But it really, it's down to any type of company, and any type of industry, we'll just take a look at the asset, we'll determine the value, and we'll provide liquidity to that value. A similar to a car loan or even a mortgage? Yeah, exactly. So, you know, we don't necessarily lend to consumers, but think about your residential mortgage the same exact way. The banks lend you upwards of 9,500 percent against that house's value, right, the fair market value. I do the same thing, but with business assets.
但實際上，這適用於任何類型的公司和行業，我們只需評估資產，確定其價值，然後根據該價值提供流動性。類似於汽車貸款或甚至房貸？沒錯。你知道，我們不一定貸款給消費者，但想想你的住宅抵押貸款，原理完全相同。銀行會根據房屋的公平市場價值，借給你高達 95%的貸款額度，對吧？我做的是同樣的事，只是對象換成了商業資產。
With a wider margin of safety, I'm sure. Yeah, because you think about the residential market, it's a extremely liquid market, depending on the time of the cycle, right, but there's always buyers and sellers in that market on a daily basis. The assets that I would deal with are not necessarily as liquid. So, even if it were a distribution center, there may be several buyers for it who are interested in, but I'm not going to sell it tomorrow. It's probably going to take six to nine months to find the right buyer at the right price. So, that liquidity model has to be countered, you know, taking into account when you provide money against it. So, staying high level, fixed income typically involves four main risks. There's interest rate risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, and as those inflation as well. How do these risks manifest in asset based lending? We look at the world a little bit differently. I don't need, I don't need the economy to be humming along. I don't need interest rates to be low. I don't, I don't even need the company to succeed to get my money back. And when we underwrite our transactions, we're removing all of those risks. If those risks exist and something needs to happen in order for me to recover on my loan, we wouldn't do the low. So, every underwrite that we enter into, we look at it as if the company is going to fail and no longer exist tomorrow. And that's the complete opposite of how I was taught credit and how we teach credit today. We teach credit today to understand, well, you know, are they a good management team or is it a good business plan? Where are they in their market? You look at all these factors to determine why it's a good company.
有了更大的安全邊際，我當然確定。是的，因為你想想住宅市場，那是一個流動性極高的市場，取決於週期的時間點，對吧，但那個市場每天總是有買家和賣家。而我會處理的資產流動性未必那麼高。所以，即使是一個配送中心，可能也有幾個買家對它有興趣，但我不會明天就賣掉它。大概需要六到九個月的時間才能找到合適的買家並談到合適的價格。因此，在提供資金時，必須考慮到這種流動性模式。那麼，從高層次來看，固定收益通常涉及四種主要風險：利率風險、信用風險、流動性風險，以及通膨風險。這些風險在資產擔保貸款中是如何體現的？我們的視角有點不同。我不需要經濟蓬勃發展，也不需要利率處於低點，甚至不需要公司成功運作才能拿回我的錢。當我們承作交易時，我們會排除所有這些風險。 如果這些風險存在，而我需要採取某些行動才能收回貸款，我們就不會進行這筆低利貸款。因此，我們在審核每一筆貸款時，都會假設這家公司明天就會倒閉、不復存在。這與我過去所學的授信觀念，以及現在我們教導的授信方式完全相反。現在的授信教學會問：這是不是一個好的管理團隊？是不是一個好的商業計畫？他們在市場中的定位如何？你會檢視所有這些因素來判斷為什麼這是一家好公司。
Our credit committee is exact opposite. You know, this is a bad company. They're obviously coming to us because they're not generating cash flow. Maybe it's the management team, maybe it's the industry. It could be a variety of factors, but that should not impact whether we get our money back or not. And if it does, we pass. We even do, you know, lending into industries that deal with commodities. And we remove the commodity risk from that transaction. So that if, you know, I'll use, you know, coal or oil and gas, people kind of run away from it because it calls a four-letter word. But there's great risk in the pricing of those commodities. If I need oil to be 75 dollars a barrel, for me to get repaid, I'm not going to do the transaction. We actually got involved in that industry when oil was, you know, trading at $25 a barrel. Well, that's, you know, how do you make money? Well, it's not about the oil. It's about the asset. And the asset for us in that case is not the commodity.
我們的信貸委員會恰恰相反。你知道，這是一家糟糕的公司。他們顯然來找我們是因為他們沒有現金流。可能是管理團隊的問題，可能是行業的問題。可能有多種因素，但這不應該影響我們是否能收回資金。如果會影響，我們就不做。我們甚至會，你知道，向涉及大宗商品的行業放貸。而且我們會從交易中剔除大宗商品的風險。這樣一來，如果，你知道，我舉個例子，比如煤炭或石油和天然氣，人們往往會避開這些行業，因為它們被視為高風險。但這些大宗商品的價格確實存在巨大風險。如果我需要石油價格達到每桶 75 美元才能收回資金，那我就不會進行這筆交易。實際上，我們是在石油價格每桶 25 美元時進入這個行業的。那麼，你知道，怎麼賺錢呢？其實關鍵不在於石油本身，而在於資產。對我們來說，在那種情況下，資產並不是大宗商品。
So it's more transportation equipment, things like that. Yeah, because all the factors you described earlier impact cash flow. So if you're depending on the cash flow that I get paid back, then you have to worry about all the factors and influence the cash flow. And in your case, your focus on the asset. So you effectively remove the risk of all those other factors. And don't get me wrong. I love cash flow. Cash flows, what page of back? Cash flow generated by the operations is ideal.
所以這更像是運輸設備之類的東西。沒錯，因為你之前提到的所有因素都會影響現金流。如果你依賴的是我能收回的現金流，那麼你就必須擔心所有這些因素及其對現金流的影響。而在你的情況下，你關注的是資產。這樣你實際上就排除了所有其他因素的風險。別誤會，我喜歡現金流。現金流是什麼的基礎？由營運產生的現金流是最理想的。
It's the number one source of repayment for anybody and even including ourselves. But it's all about liquidity for us. It's about making sure there's enough liquidity in the system of the company throughout the process of our loans and making sure there's enough liquidity in the asset itself so that I can convert it into ultimately cash. So it is about cash don't get me wrong. But it doesn't need to generate cash flow for us to be rebate. So in that regard, asset based lending is often described as asset rich cash flow poor companies that can't get traditional loans. So you talked about retailers falling into this category. Are there other industries or sectors that are typical borrowers? The answer is no, I think retail is probably the one industry that kind of stands out. All other industries are driven off of cash flow metrics. Now we do, we kind of move when industries are out of favor or when companies are underperforming. So it's not a wholesale, hey, this industry trucking is 100% asset based. It's not. It tends to be when cash flow tightens. Leverage goes from three times to six times and all of a sudden the banks or the other leverage provider wants out. So we go in, we take a look at the asset values and we evaluate their true worth and then we provide the liquidity that way.
這是任何人，甚至包括我們自己在內的首要還款來源。但對我們來說，關鍵在於流動性。重點在於確保在我們貸款的整個過程中，公司系統內有足夠的流動性，並確保資產本身有足夠的流動性，以便最終能將其轉換為現金。所以，歸根結底還是關於現金，別誤會我的意思。但它不需要為我們產生現金流來獲得償還。因此，從這個角度來看，資產擔保貸款通常被描述為適用於那些資產豐富但現金流不足、無法獲得傳統貸款的企業。你提到了零售商屬於這一類別。還有其他行業或部門是典型的借款者嗎？答案是否定的，我認為零售業可能是最突出的一個行業。其他所有行業都是基於現金流指標來運作的。我們確實會在行業不受青睞或公司表現不佳時採取行動。所以這不是一個全面的情況，比如說運輸業百分之百依賴資產擔保貸款，並非如此。這往往是在現金流緊張時發生的情況。槓桿比率從三倍上升到六倍，突然間銀行或其他槓桿提供者就想退出。 因此我們會進場評估資產的真正價值，然後以這種方式提供流動性。
So it's not several industries that are all just ABL borrowers like retail. retail is just a different animal altogether. It's interesting. Why you just described? So if you look at the landscape of lenders in traditional credit managers typically do well in strong economies and struggle in downturns. And then you have the distress managers who look for bargains in bad environments. But your approach seems to avoid needing either of those scenarios. Would you walk us through that lending model? Yeah, that's a good point. Like right now, this is a good environment for us.
所以並不是所有產業都像零售業那樣純粹是資產擔保貸款(ABL)的借款人。零售業完全是另一回事。這很有趣。你剛才描述的狀況是？如果你觀察貸款機構的格局，傳統信貸管理公司通常在經濟強勁時表現良好，而在經濟下滑時掙扎。然後還有專門在惡劣環境中尋找便宜貨的困境資產管理公司。但你的方法似乎不需要依賴這兩種情境。能否帶我們了解這種貸款模式？是的，這個觀點很好。就像現在，對我們來說就是一個很好的環境。
Right? Banks are pulling back. That means more people need to borrow money from other sources. There's a lot of uncertainty in the markets whether it be tariff issues, interest rates, it could be logistic type issues. It all kind of plays into the instability in the capital markets and that that that causes more opportunities for us. We certainly do better when this type of market occurs or there's a recessionary type market because it really is driven off of when the capital market start to pull back. So when the largest lenders out there who are the banks start to provide less capital, it opens up more opportunities for us. The toughest market for us is when interest rates are really low and the economy is humming along and the banks are throwing out money left and right in a good way.
對吧？銀行正在縮減放貸。這意味著更多人需要從其他來源借錢。市場上存在許多不確定性，無論是關稅問題、利率波動，還是物流類型的問題。這些都加劇了資本市場的不穩定，而這為我們創造了更多機會。當這類市場情況出現或經濟衰退型市場來臨時，我們確實表現得更好，因為這正是資本市場開始退縮的時候。所以，當市場上最大的貸款機構——銀行開始減少資金供應時，就為我們打開了更多機會。對我們來說最艱難的市場情況是利率非常低、經濟蓬勃發展，銀行四處大舉放貸的時候。
No, don't give it wrong. But it just means there's less opportunity for us. Even a mediocre company in that environment can obtain capital, a cheaper form of capital from the bank. But in markets like this, the banks are taking a look at and saying, hey, look, we'd like the pair back on our exposure and that's where we get involved. And we helped them. We partner with them in a lot of situations like that. So this is a really good environment for us.
不，別誤會。這只是意味著我們的機會減少了。在那樣的環境下，即便是平庸的公司也能從銀行獲得資本，一種更便宜的資本形式。但在這樣的市場中，銀行會審視並表示，嘿，我們希望減少我們的風險敞口，而這就是我們介入的時機。我們幫助他們。在許多類似情況下，我們與他們合作。因此，這對我們來說是一個非常好的環境。
And again, if it's driven off of the fact that cash flow is declining, that's okay for us. If there's assets in the company, we'll end against those assets. So it's definitely a better environment when the markets are softer than when they're not. But there's always bad management teams and there's always industries out of favor. So even in good times, our portfolio still performs very similar. And you know, our ability to deploy capital is equal. Are there any typical characteristics of companies that fit into your buy box? I would say that when we look at companies that fit more in our box than others, it pertains to companies with fixed assets.
再說一次，如果是由於現金流下降所驅動的，對我們來說沒問題。只要公司有資產，我們就會以這些資產為基礎進行貸款。因此，當市場較為疲軟時，這絕對是一個更好的環境。但總會有管理不善的團隊和不受歡迎的行業。所以即使在好時光，我們的投資組合表現仍然非常相似。而且你知道，我們部署資本的能力是相同的。那麼，有哪些典型特徵的公司適合你們的投資範圍？我會說，當我們審視哪些公司更適合我們的範圍時，這與擁有固定資產的公司有關。
So companies that have assets that are less liquid than others. The banks are always very comfortable lending against accounts receivable and inventory because those assets turn quite often and they tend to lend more on revolver type loans and those assets tie very closely with that. We lend on term loans and those term loans are tied more towards the fixed assets and the tenor of that, the life of that asset. So it's certainly definitely more towards a the less liquid assets, even think like real estate, something that's long-lived. One thing that I find interesting is your strategy is unusual in that expect to return is actually increase during economic downturns, which is pretty different from most managers in credit. Would you talk us through how that works? Yeah. So everything to us is based on the credit agreement and that's a contract between us and the world.
因此，擁有流動性較低資產的公司。銀行總是對應收帳款和存貨放貸感到非常放心，因為這些資產周轉相當頻繁，它們傾向於提供更多循環型貸款，這些資產與之密切相關。我們則提供定期貸款，這些貸款更多地與固定資產及其期限、資產壽命掛鉤。所以這顯然更偏向於流動性較低的資產，甚至可以想到像房地產這樣長期存在的資產。我發現有趣的一點是，你們的策略與眾不同，因為預期回報實際上在經濟低迷時期會增加，這與大多數信貸經理的做法大相徑庭。你能跟我們談談這是如何運作的嗎？是的。對我們來說，一切都基於信貸協議，那是我們與外界之間的合約。
When companies that we deal with because they're less liquid or they're generating less cash flow, they tend to bump along the bottom a little bit, bump against their business plan and that business plan causes them to come back to the table. Every time they come back to the table with us is another opportunity for us to tighten our structure, improve on our exposure to the company. When I say improve means reduce our exposure or risk, but also to generate additional income and that is income comes in the form of fees or additional points that would that we would generate based on the company needing some flexibility to that contract to that credit agreement. So whenever a company enters into a default or needs need something from us as the lender, it's going to come at some price and that price will either be tighter structure and/or increase pricing. And when companies and we'll talk a little bit about this I'm sure, but some of the companies that we deal with have gone into bankruptcy. And when a company goes into bankruptcy, that's a default in our document and we charge the default rate of interest. So another two or three percent gets added to what's owed to us and driving that return on our transaction higher. Obviously bankruptcy can be messy. It can be adversarial, it can be unpredictable. You don't know who the judge is going to be, you don't know who the other creditors may be. What are the biggest risks you face in these types of situations and how do you typically manage through that? The two risks that we really have no control of is the judge.
當我們與那些流動性較低或現金流較少的公司打交道時，這些公司往往會在底部徘徊一段時間，與其業務計劃產生摩擦，而這種業務計劃會促使他們重新回到談判桌前。每次他們與我們重新談判時，都是我們進一步收緊結構、改善對該公司風險敞口的機會。我所說的改善意味著減少我們的敞口或風險，同時也能產生額外收入，這些收入以費用或附加點數的形式出現，這是基於公司需要對信貸協議的某些靈活性而產生的。因此，每當一家公司違約或需要我們作為貸款方提供某些幫助時，這都會帶來一定的代價，這種代價要麼是更嚴格的結構，要麼是更高的定價。我們稍後肯定會談到這一點，但我們所處理的一些公司確實已經進入破產程序。當一家公司破產時，這在我們的文件中即構成違約，我們將收取違約利率。 因此，我們應得的金額又增加了兩到三個百分點，這使得我們在這筆交易中的回報更高。顯然，破產可能會很混亂。它可能是對抗性的，也可能是不可預測的。你不知道法官會是誰，也不知道其他債權人可能是誰。在這種情況下，你面臨的最大風險是什麼？你通常如何應對這些風險？我們真正無法控制的兩個風險之一就是法官。
We don't know where the company can file and you don't know which judge is going to get appointed. So that's an unknown and you can't do anything about it. But judges are judges. They follow the rule of law. So as long as we're living inside the bankruptcy code, we should be fine. But always know that I would say the overwhelming majority of the judges will always err on the side of the employee. So as long as we're taking care of the employees and managing our credit to make sure that the employees are covered, we should be fine. The other one that is who the undecured creditors, who the creditor committee will be and how much they'll fight and how much they'll hold up a bankruptcy process.
我們不知道公司可以在哪裡申請破產，也不知道會指派哪位法官。所以這是一個未知數，你對此無能為力。但法官就是法官。他們遵循法律。因此，只要我們遵守破產法的規定，我們應該就沒問題。但要知道，我會說絕大多數法官總是會偏向員工一方。因此，只要我們照顧好員工，管理好我們的信貸以確保員工得到保障，我們應該就沒問題。另一個風險是無擔保債權人是誰，債權人委員會將由誰組成，他們會如何抗爭，以及他們會如何拖延破產程序。
We kind of go into every loan, assuming that it's going to go into bankruptcy. Now 75, 80% of our loans do not. They all perform and they pay us off as planned either through refinance or some other process that they were attending to do. The 20% that have not have gone into bankruptcy, we prepare for it the day one. And we use bankruptcy counsel to write our credit docs. Not necessarily because a corporate attorney can't provide that service, but we want to make sure that our document lives inside the bankruptcy codes day one. So that when a company does if and does file for bankruptcy, we're not concerned about our credit document, we're more concerned about liquidity. And we can focus on liquidity with the company, either providing additional liquidity to run a process or making sure that the company can live inside the existing liquidity through cash collateral, use their own cash to run that process. So for us it's not about oh my gosh the company, the house on fire and we need to get everything out. We already have planned for that and we already know the escape routes. And the escape route again is through the asset conversion. A lot of companies and some companies have restructured inside bankruptcy and have emerged.
我們在處理每一筆貸款時，都假設它最終會走向破產。目前，我們 75%到 80%的貸款並未如此。它們都按計劃執行，無論是通過再融資還是其他他們正在進行的程序，最終都償還了我們的貸款。而那 20%未能避免破產的貸款，我們從第一天就做好了準備。我們聘請破產法律顧問來撰寫我們的信貸文件。這並不是因為公司律師無法提供這項服務，而是我們希望確保從第一天起，我們的文件就符合破產法的規定。這樣，當一家公司如果真的申請破產時，我們不必擔心我們的信貸文件，我們更關心的是流動性。我們可以與公司一起專注於流動性問題，無論是提供額外的流動性來運作程序，還是確保公司能夠通過現金抵押利用現有的流動性，使用自己的資金來運作這一程序。因此，對我們來說，問題不在於「天啊，公司著火了，我們需要把一切都搶救出來」。我們已經為此做好了計劃，並且已經知道了逃生路線。而逃生路線再次是通過資產轉換來實現的。 許多公司以及部分企業已在破產程序中完成內部重組並成功脫離破產狀態。
And that's fine, that's perfectly fine with us. And that's our strategy, meaning that we're not alone to own and we're not alone to liquidate. We're more of a transitional or a rescue loan provider. And if that loan helps provide you what you need to do to transition to their side great, if it doesn't back to my earlier comment, we shouldn't be penalized for that. We're here to help. We're not here to take the company from me. We're out here to liquidate the assets unless need be, unless there's no other alternative. But bankruptcy doesn't scare us. You know over the last decade or so, we've had 20 or so companies go into bankruptcy and about 15 of them have liquidated. We've collected 100% back of what we've world through that liquidation process and the others restructured and emerged. It sounds very counterintuitive to think as a lender. You don't mind the person, the company that you're lending to goes bankrupt and because of penalties and fees and other add-ons, you might actually make more if they go bankrupt. It just sounds very counterintuitive.
這對我們來說完全沒問題，這正是我們的策略所在。我們並非單純追求所有權或急於清算，而是扮演過渡性融資或救援貸款的提供者角色。若這筆貸款能協助企業順利轉型至彼岸，那再好不過；若未能如願，正如我先前提到的，我們不應因此受罰。我們在此是為了提供協助，而非奪取公司控制權。除非別無選擇，否則我們不會輕易啟動資產清算程序。破產對我們而言並不可怕。過去十年間，我們經手約 20 家企業進入破產程序，其中約 15 家最終清算完畢。透過清算程序，我們已全數回收所有應收款項，其餘企業則完成重組並重生。作為放貸方，這種思維聽來或許違反直覺——您竟不介意借款企業破產？甚至可能因違約罰金、費用及其他附加條款，在企業破產時獲利更多。這確實聽起來極其矛盾。
Yeah, I think credit was always, hey, you're a fine in a good company. And fortunately, or unfortunately, these companies are not good companies, but we're still lending to them. You can't be afraid of the bankruptcy process. You need to use it and live inside it to make sure that you can recover. So that's what we do. The fact that we get paid more, look, it's a lot of work. We spend more time on it. And I believe that we're being compensated for that time. And to be honest, the added risk of having to go through that process, that added risk is not being paid through the normal process, but actually selling the assets and collecting that way. Everything that is in there is contractual. So it's not like we're being paid or selling the asset for a greater value and keeping that upside potential. We don't do that. There are other lenders that do that, but we don't. We're owed a dollar. If we sell it for two, we take a dollar and the dollar goes back into the estate. So it's a different approach.
是的，我認為信貸始終是這樣，嘿，你在一個好公司裡表現不錯。而幸運或不幸的是，這些公司並不是好公司，但我們仍在向它們放貸。你不能害怕破產程序。你需要利用它並在其中運作，以確保你能夠收回資金。這就是我們所做的。事實上，我們獲得更多報酬，聽著，這需要很多工作。我們在這上面花費更多時間。我相信我們因此得到了相應的補償。坦白說，必須經歷這個過程所帶來的額外風險，這種額外風險並不是通過正常程序獲得報酬，而是實際出售資產並以這種方式收回資金。所有這些都在合約中規定。所以並不是說我們因為出售資產獲得更高價值而保留這部分潛在上漲收益。我們不這麼做。有其他貸款機構會這樣做，但我們不會。我們應得一美元。如果我們以兩美元賣出，我們拿一美元，另一美元則歸還給資產池。所以這是一種不同的做法。
We're not here to make a double off of that. We do make our returns. But again, they're all contractual. And they're agreed to the day we lend the company in the money. So as a lender, if bankruptcy doesn't cause capital impairment, what is the risk of permanent impairment of capital? You know, the risk for us tends to be more fraudulent activity. And it's fraudulent, fraud on the asset. You can have fraud in your financial statements all day long, but if the asset is accurate, that's where our concern comes into play.
我們來這裡不是為了從中賺取雙倍利潤。我們確實獲得回報，但這些都是契約性的，且在我們借錢給公司的那一天就已經達成協議。因此，作為貸款人，如果破產不會導致資本減損，那麼資本永久減損的風險是什麼？對我們來說，風險往往更多來自於欺詐行為。而且這種欺詐是針對資產的。財務報表可以整天造假，但如果資產是準確的，那才是我們真正擔心的問題所在。
We do a lot of work on the front end to determine that. Typically, fraud in the asset is it doesn't exist. And so we do a lot of work to make sure that it does. A lot of it is eyes on. You know, a company that's performing and borrowing against the assets, maybe 25, 30% of the assets actually are seen. And then it just everything else is just extrapolated from that. When we get into a transaction, we see up to 90% of the value of the asset. That may be 100% of the asset, 99% of the asset itself, or it could be 50% of the asset. But we're really looking for the value. So we'll look at and have eyes on and we pay people to do that if we're not doing it ourselves. And then we monitor and we're looking at it all the time. So that the asset can't be sold out without us. And mostly because we'll title the assets and they can't sell without us releasing it. So a lot of work is done on the front end, on the diligent side, and on the structuring side, to make sure that the asset and any fraud can be minimized and mitigated. The other time where you can be impaired on an asset is if it's lives.
我們在前端做了大量工作來確定這一點。通常情況下，資產中的欺詐行為是指資產並不存在。因此我們做了許多工作來確保資產真實存在。很多時候需要實地查看。你知道，一家營運良好並以資產抵押借款的公司，實際上可能只有 25%到 30%的資產會被查驗，其餘部分都是從這些查驗中推斷出來的。當我們進行交易時，我們會查看到資產價值的 90%。這可能是資產的 100%、99%，或者只有 50%。但我們真正關注的是價值。所以我們會查看並實地驗證，如果不是我們自己進行，我們會付錢請人去做。然後我們持續監控，隨時關注。這樣資產就無法在我們不知情的情況下被出售。主要是因為我們會對資產進行產權登記，沒有我們釋放，他們就無法出售。因此，我們在前端、盡職調查和結構設計方面做了大量工作，以確保資產和任何欺詐行為都能被最小化和緩解。另一個可能導致資產受損的情況是如果資產是有生命的。
So think about livestock, think about plants, nurseries, things like that, poultry. Anytime there's a live nature to the asset, you need to guard against that permanent loss because something can happen to it. And we've seen that time and time again in the nursery business. We've seen entire flocks get wiped out because of disease. We haven't lended to those sectors. Have we been shown to the sectors? Yeah, we have. But it's really hard to get comfortable with something.
所以想想牲畜、植物、苗圃之類的，還有家禽。只要資產具有生命特性，你就需要防範永久性損失，因為它們可能會發生意外。我們在苗圃業看過太多這樣的例子，見過整群家禽因疾病全軍覆沒。我們沒有貸款給這些產業。我們有看過這些產業嗎？有的。但要對這類資產感到放心真的很困難。
Unless there's 100% insurance back against that. It's a tough transaction for us to do. Because that that impairment risk is real. It's interesting. So you have companies that you're lending to that have a hard time getting money from others. And you presumably charge a reasonable yield for that and interest rate for that. Yet the risk of loss, you could argue, is even lower than traditional lending. It's very interesting how that exists. Yeah, you know,
除非有百分之百的保險作為後盾，否則對我們來說這是很難進行的交易。因為這種減損風險是真實存在的。這很有趣。你借錢給那些難以從其他管道獲得資金的公司，而你對此收取合理的收益率和利率。但可以說，損失的風險甚至比傳統貸款還要低。這種現象非常有趣。是啊，你知道的，
I've seen a lot of numbers out there and they talk about default rates and loss rates on different types of loans. And they show a loss rate on ABL and I, and then I look back into the information and they weren't ABL loans. They were real cash loans and they were secured by the equity of the company, not the assets. So very, very low loss rates on ABL loans for sure. They certainly are dealing with the higher risk companies, higher risk performing companies because of that cash flow. And so yeah, it's a little counterintuitive when you think about it. But it's a lot of work.
我看過很多數據，它們談論不同類型貸款的違約率和損失率。當它們顯示 ABL（資產擔保貸款）的損失率時，我回頭查閱資料發現那些根本不是 ABL 貸款，而是實質現金貸款，並且是以公司股權而非資產作為擔保。因此，ABL 貸款的損失率確實非常非常低。當然，由於現金流問題，這些貸款確實面對較高風險的公司、營運風險較高的企業。所以，仔細想想這有點違反直覺。但這確實需要投入大量工作。
You know, they report monthly. They don't report quarterly and just send in financial statements in a compliance sheet that says yes, we're only 2.8 times levered and our coverage test is 3 times. That's not what our companies do. They report monthly. They're reporting their cash. They're reporting their assets. Those assets are tested based on what we call a borrowing base. What we lend against. And they're reporting their financials.
你知道嗎，它們是每月報告，不是每季報告，也不是只遞交財務報表和一份合規表格，上面寫著「是的，我們的槓桿比率只有 2.8 倍，覆蓋率測試是 3 倍」。我們的客戶企業不是這樣運作的。它們每月報告，報告現金狀況、資產狀況。這些資產會根據我們所謂的「借款基礎」（我們放貸的依據）進行測試。同時它們也會報告財務狀況。
So we're seeing the company's performance on a monthly basis, not 45 days after quarter end. So when the company is tied on liquidity, we know it the day they're tied on liquidity. It's not a wait and see and it will house the company doing what they're going to report to us next month. We'll find out. Well, we know we talked to our companies all the time. So it's a high touch strategy. Not going to have 100 names in the portfolio. We've got, you know, somewhere between 25 and 30.
因此我們能按月追蹤公司表現，而非季度結束後 45 天才得知。當公司面臨流動性緊縮時，我們當天就能掌握狀況，無需被動等待下個月的財報揭露。透過高頻率接觸策略，我們持續與投資企業保持對話。這種模式決定了投資組合不會超過百家公司，目前維持在 25 至 30 家的精簡規模。
They turn all the time as we're adding one or two on, one or two are coming off. So once you get build up to that 25 or 30 number, it just seems to be the right. If I added five more people, what I have 50, probably not. That's why we don't add five more people. It just doesn't, there's no need for it. The size and the value and the volume is all right there. So as a lender and as an investor, you have the opportunity to earn attractive yields with pretty good downside protection.
投資組合持續動態調整，每新增一兩家企業就會相應退出同數量。當規模達到 25 至 30 家時，便自然形成最佳平衡。若強行擴充至 50 家，不僅無此必要，也違背運作邏輯——現有規模已能充分體現價值與交易量優勢。作為放貸方兼投資者，這種模式讓您能在享有優渥收益的同時，獲得相當可靠的下行風險保護。
And so if that downside seems limited, why are there more lenders competing in this space? Are there, are there a barriers to entry? Look, I think you need to know what you're doing from a liquidation standpoint, from a valuation standpoint. And it goes back to what I was taught 30 plus years ago. Why is this a good loan? And the only time that we can say it's good loan is because the liquidation value, the assets cover it.
因此，如果下行風險看起來有限，為什麼會有更多貸款機構在這個領域競爭？是否存在進入障礙？聽著，我認為你需要從清算和估值的角度清楚自己在做什麼。這又回到了我 30 多年前學到的：為什麼這是一筆好貸款？唯一能讓我們斷言這是好貸款的原因，就是清算價值——資產足以覆蓋貸款。
You can't say it because the companies are good company. We've had investors where they've called up and said, "Hey, you've lent money to a bankrupt cool company. Are you crazy?" No. No, I'm not. My collateral is accounts receivable, which pays in 15 days from all the investment grade power companies in the eastern side of the US. So no, I'm not worried about it. And they stopped calling. And then the company merchant bankruptcy and we get paid off and our returns were what they were.
你不能因為公司本身是好公司就這麼說。我們遇過投資者打電話來質問：「嘿，你們借錢給一家破產的酷公司，瘋了嗎？」不，我沒瘋。我的抵押品是應收帳款，這些帳款會在 15 天內由美國東岸所有投資級電力公司支付。所以不，我一點都不擔心。後來他們不再來電，而那家公司宣告破產後我們全數收回款項，投資回報一如預期。
People don't want to address that. They don't want to see the company that's on the front page of the Austrian Journal because they're going to file for bankruptcy. They don't want to have to address that. Why are you lending to a company that's family? And it's okay. I've learned about it 25 years ago that there are good companies out there. And there are good deals even against those, some of those that are bad companies because those asset values. Now a lot of people, they're taught cash alone. So if they can't pay you back from operate cash law from operations, it's not a good loan. It's been drummed into our brains ever since the beginning of time on credit. You know, those are the management team of good character. Well, most of our guys don't. They're not good. They're not good managers to start with. And some of them don't have good character. Does it make it a bad loan? No, because they've got a thousand or 1200 tractor trailers over there that I can put in my name, entitled under my name, and I can sell them tomorrow if I need to. So yeah, do I trust the guy? No, I don't. But that's why I structure along the way I do. So people don't think that way. They're all thinking about, well, if they can't pay you back, then it's a bad loan. Well, most of my companies can't pay me back yet. I get paid back. Right.
人們不願意面對這個問題。他們不想看到那家登上奧地利期刊頭版的公司，因為他們即將申請破產。他們不想去處理這個問題。為什麼你要貸款給一家家族企業？這沒關係。我 25 年前就學到，世界上有好公司。即使面對那些不好的公司，也有好的交易，因為那些資產價值。現在很多人只被教導現金流。所以如果他們無法從營運現金流中償還你，這就不是一筆好貸款。從信貸誕生之初，這一點就被灌輸進我們的腦海。你知道的，那些是有良好品格的管理團隊。但我們大多數的客戶不是。他們一開始就不是好的管理者。其中一些人甚至品格不佳。這就讓貸款變壞了嗎？不，因為他們那邊有一千或一千兩百輛拖車，我可以把它們登記在我的名下，歸我所有，如果我需要的話，明天就可以賣掉。所以，是的，我信任那傢伙嗎？不，我不信任。但這就是為什麼我按照我的方式來構建貸款。所以人們不會那樣想。 他們都在想，如果對方還不了錢，那就是一筆壞帳。但其實我投資的大多數公司目前都還無力償還。最終我還是能收回款項的，對吧。
So it's just a different mentality. And I think a lot of companies, they're not going to staff up and say, well, wow, you got to deal with three companies in bankruptcy this year. That's a bad year. No, we make more money when they're in bankruptcy. That's a good year. Right. So it's a different it's a different mentality. And I'm kind of happy it is the way it is that people don't come into the market. And those that have tried, they're just they kind of look at it and say,
這完全是不同的思維模式。很多公司不會因此增派人手，然後說：「哇，今年要處理三家破產公司，真是糟糕的一年。」不，對我們來說，公司破產反而賺得更多，那是好年頭。所以這是一種截然不同的心態。我其實挺高興市場現狀如此，讓其他人不輕易進入。那些嘗試過的人，看了之後往往會說：
I, I don't want to talk about these credits anymore. Well, then don't, I'll do them. Right. And that's really what's happening. It's really interesting because you're effectively not really lending to the company, you're lending effectively to the asset. And you're underwriting the asset as opposed to the company, which is very different from the way it's traditionally done. Yeah. Think about there's a whole mark out there for equipment leases, right?
「我、我不想再談這些信貸了。」那就別談，我來接手。實際情況正是如此。這現象很有趣，因為你本質上不是借錢給公司，而是借錢給資產。你在對資產進行評估，而非公司本身，這與傳統做法大相逕庭。想想看，設備租賃市場可是有一整塊領域呢，對吧？
That's exactly what they're doing. They're they own the equipment. It's in their name. And they're getting monthly payments against it. It's no different than that. Now they take the asset when the equipment back if they're not paying. So it's no different than us. We're just a little bit, I would say, our deals are structured more on the loan side versus the leeside. We don't only equipment they do.
他們正是這麼做的。設備歸他們所有，登記在他們名下，並且他們每月從中獲得付款。這與我們的做法並無二致。如果對方不付款，他們就會收回設備資產。所以和我們沒什麼不同。只是我們的交易結構更偏向貸款方而非租賃方。我們不只做設備，他們也是。
So it's a little bit of a new ones, but the end result would be the same. Yeah. And you don't have to buy those assets. You can just lend against them. That's right. Do you think that this unique opportunity exists, partly because so much attention is paid to the yield on these loans while the underlying risks are often overlooked or just generally misunderstood? Perception is plays a large part in it. I think people do perceive that our loans are riskier because of the types of companies that we deal with. I would agree that the companies are riskier than some other other companies that are out in marketplace. I disagree on the risk level.
所以這算是比較新的做法，但最終結果會是一樣的。沒錯。而且你不需要買下那些資產，只要對它們放貸就行。確實如此。你認為這種獨特的機會存在，部分原因是否在於人們過度關注這些貸款的收益率，而往往忽視或普遍誤解了其潛在風險？認知在其中起了很大作用。我認為人們確實覺得我們的貸款風險更高，因為我們合作的企業類型。我同意這些企業比市場上其他一些公司風險更高，但我不同意對風險程度的判斷。
Now there's a lot of work that goes into it to mitigate those risks. And we spend a lot of time monitoring throughout. These are not loans that you put in your drawer and you just collect the coupon. These are loans that you're hands on. We have relationships with every single one of our borrowers. It doesn't mean that we're going to go out and have a beer with them, but their relationships because we're their finance partner. They may not like the outcome all the time, but at the end of the day we need to work together to resolve the issues that hand, which are underperformance or payback of the facility.
為了降低這些風險，我們投入了大量工作進行風險緩解。整個過程中我們也花費大量時間進行監控。這些不是那種放進抽屜就能坐收利息的貸款，而是需要親力親為的貸款項目。我們與每一位借款人都保持著緊密聯繫——這不代表我們會出去和他們喝啤酒，而是基於我們作為其融資夥伴的關係。雖然他們未必總是滿意最終結果，但當面臨設施表現不佳或還款問題時，我們必須共同協作解決問題。
I'm okay that people look at us and think that our portfolio is much riskier than theirs. If all of my companies cash logos is zero tomorrow, I can still go home and I sleep at night. I don't worry about it. If I were cash-a-lender and all my companies went to zero, I would lose a lot of money. I just would. I've experienced that. I've seen it before when I was a cash-look guy. It just happens.
我完全接受別人認為我們的投資組合比他們風險更高。即使我投資的所有公司明天現金流歸零，我依然能安心回家睡覺，毫不擔心。但如果我是純現金放貸人，遇到所有借款企業倒閉的情況，我將會損失慘重——這是必然的。作為曾經的現金放貸者，我親身經歷過也見證過這種情況的發生。
There's nothing you can do about it. We've never had, and our, as risky people think our portfolio is in the companies, we've never had a payment of the fall. When you see the defaults tick up in the market, the default rates are now 3.5%. That's because somebody had a bond or a convertible note or some other debt structure and they didn't make a payment. Our borrowers don't do that. I think that says a lot. Now 75% of my loans have a default.
你對此無能為力。我們從未經歷過，而且我們——正如那些風險偏好者所認為的——在投資組合中的公司裡，我們從未遭遇過付款違約。當你看到市場上的違約率上升時，目前的違約率是 3.5%。那是因為有人持有債券、可轉換票據或其他債務結構，而他們未能按時付款。我們的借款人不會這樣做。我認為這說明了很多。現在，我的貸款中有 75%出現了違約。
They missed a covenant. That's why we structure things the way that we do. You know, maybe they didn't report something on time. That's just another opportunity for us to increase our yield because they have to come to us. They need us to release that. But they're not missing a payment. Even when the company is going to bankruptcy, they still pay as cash interest. That part of that bankruptcy code, that part of our asset, every company that goes in a bankruptcy, has an opportunity to present a plan of reorganization to the court. We can't stop that. That's fine. I don't, we're not looking to stop that. But they need to use the assets of the company to effectuate that plan of reorganization. Well, I'm the leanholder on those assets. They need to use those assets. They need to compensate me. So we receive adequate protection payments because we're adequately covered by the value of those assets when a company is in bankruptcy. They still need to pay as interest.
他們違反了一項契約條款。這就是為什麼我們會這樣設計結構。你知道，也許他們沒有按時報告某些事情。這對我們來說只是另一個提高收益的機會，因為他們必須來找我們。他們需要我們來解除那個限制。但他們並沒有拖欠付款。即使公司即將破產，他們仍然會支付現金利息。破產法的那部分規定，我們資產的那部分權益，每一家進入破產程序的公司都有機會向法院提交重組計劃。我們無法阻止這一點。這沒關係。我不，我們並不打算阻止這一點。但他們需要使用公司的資產來實施那個重組計劃。而我是那些資產的留置權人。他們需要使用那些資產，就必須補償我。因此，我們會收到充分保護付款，因為當公司處於破產狀態時，那些資產的價值充分保障了我們。他們仍然需要支付利息。
And that's part of the process. So even when we go into bankruptcy, we're still paid cash interest. And that's why I think our investors like it because we distribute all of our income to our investors on a quarterly basis. So if my company stop paying me cash interest, then I'm not distributing. And that's not our plan. I'm a cash pay guy. If my company can't pay me cash interest, I don't want to lend to them. That's a bad, that's a risk. That's a bad sign. That there's no liquidity in the system to pay me.
這也是過程的一部分。所以即使我們進入破產程序，我們仍然能收到現金利息。這就是為什麼我認為我們的投資者喜歡它，因為我們每季度將所有收入分配給投資者。所以如果我的公司停止支付我現金利息，那麼我就不會進行分配。這不是我們的計劃。我是個現金支付的人。如果我的公司不能支付我現金利息，我就不想借錢給他們。那是個壞兆頭，那是個風險。這表明系統中沒有流動性來支付我。
And if it's a cash alone, they can't pay you. Well, that's worse. Have these second turn around and foreclosed on the assets and sell them if I need to. It sounds like the reason the opportunity exists is that there's negative headline risk or optics of lending to companies that are in trouble. And then there's a lot of work to lend to assess the assets, to lend based on those assets. And then eventually, if you have to liquidate the assets. So there's a specialization there as well that also keeps the competition up. Yeah, definitely. I mean, we talk to every one of our borrowers every month and some of the multiple times. And they need us. And it's important for us to understand what's going on. That's how you stay on top of a of a bad performing company. And that's how you stay on top of the asset values. And we, you know, we structure everything around the assets first and foremost. And once that clears that hurdle for us internally, then we structure around the performance of the business. So that way, we get them to the table every opportunity we can.
而如果只有現金，他們就無法支付給你。嗯，那更糟。讓這些第二順位的貸款轉而對資產進行止贖，並在必要時出售它們。聽起來這個機會存在的原因是，向陷入困境的公司貸款存在負面的頭條風險或形象問題。然後還需要做很多工作來評估資產，並基於這些資產進行貸款。最終，如果你不得不清算這些資產。所以這裡也有專業化的問題，這也使得競爭保持在一定水平。是的，絕對是。我的意思是，我們每個月都會與每一位借款人交談，有些人甚至多次。他們需要我們。對我們來說，了解發生了什麼很重要。這就是你如何掌控一家表現不佳的公司。這就是你如何掌握資產價值。我們，你知道的，我們首先圍繞資產來構建一切。一旦這在我們內部通過了那個門檻，我們就會圍繞業務的表現來構建。這樣，我們就能抓住每一個可能的機會讓他們坐到談判桌前。
Have you noticed an increase in competition compared to when you first started investing in ABL? I'd be lying if I didn't say yes. I think certainly in the marketplace, private credit is a, is a, a fan favorite, right? So a lot of people are raising money to put money into the private credit. Most of private credit is capitalizing. We have seen a number of smaller shops open up over the last decade. Us being one of them ten years ago to do this. And I think it's more out of a necessity because the banks had pulled back in this market and it created a hole for a lot of these borrowers. So I would say yes, it has, but the overwhelming majority have have focused on the retail sector, which has allowed us to capture a lot of the market outside that. There's a perception that ABL is primarily for distress companies that that we've talked about. But the market may be broadening. Did you see the profile of ABL borrowers evolving? Definitely. In this environment, I definitely see better companies, better performing companies. So that's that mediocre group of companies that could get capital when times are really, really strong.
你是否注意到與最初開始投資資產擔保貸款（ABL）時相比，競爭有所增加？如果說沒有，那就是在說謊。我認為在市場上，私人信貸無疑是，是，是大家的最愛，對吧？所以很多人都在籌集資金投入私人信貸。大多數私人信貸正在資本化。過去十年間，我們看到許多小型機構如雨後春筍般成立。我們就是十年前其中之一。我認為這更多是出於必要性，因為銀行在這個市場上退縮，為許多借款人留下了空缺。所以我會說是的，競爭增加了，但絕大多數機構都集中在零售業，這讓我們能夠佔據該領域以外的大部分市場。有一種看法認為 ABL 主要是針對我們討論過的困境公司。但市場可能正在擴大。你有看到 ABL 借款人的輪廓在演變嗎？絕對有。在當前環境下，我確實看到了更好的公司，表現更優異的公司。就是那些在景氣非常好的時候能夠獲得資本的中等水平公司群體。
They start to come into my, my market a little bit more. I probably have more companies today that generate free cash flow than I did five years ago and it's a function of that. So more companies are using it as a way to generate additional liquidity and additional capital to expand to grow. So we've got a couple of companies that are growing and because they're pouring all their money back into their business, the banks are not comfortable. There's not enough liquidity in the system. So they've approached us and they've got asset value and they're buying more assets with this cash that it only enhances our coverage metrics. So definitely we're seeing better companies and more. Companies that wouldn't typically come to the ABL market to borrow money. Which is good.
他們開始更多地進入我的市場。比起五年前，我現在可能有更多公司能產生自由現金流，這正是這種情況的結果。因此，更多公司將其作為一種方式來產生額外的流動性和資本，以擴張和成長。我們有幾家正在成長的公司，因為他們將所有資金重新投入業務，銀行感到不安。系統中的流動性不足。所以他們來找我們，他們擁有資產價值，並且正在用這些現金購買更多資產，這只會增強我們的覆蓋指標。因此，我們確實看到了更多更好的公司。那些通常不會來 ABL 市場借錢的公司。這很好。
I'm happy to see it. How do you see the rule of technology such as AI or data analytics evolving and asset based lending both for underwriting and also for risk management? Yeah, I'm not sold out yet. I think from the underwriting perspective, I still, I'm an old school, newspaper type of guy. I kind of think you need to analyze it and figure it out. So I'm not quite there yet for someone to somebody who can spread numbers for me all day long, but I still think you need that person to figure it out. Make sure the numbers are accurate and where they're coming from. From the monitoring side, look, I think this is more important than everything. And getting in the room, sitting down in the borrowers, talking with the borrowers, understanding their business. I can read it as much as I want and we use it to kind of do research and whatnot, but there's nothing that is better than face-to-face interaction getting it live from the horse's mouth. Do I think it can help in certain aspects of lending? I do absolutely. We've seen it throughout the years. The banks have employed it through residential mortgages and lending and stuff like that where it's, I would quote, "wrote," but it's all just data-driven and data-point-driven. And it's data input. For us, it's a little bit more analytical and understanding trying to understand what the business is all about. The asset side, it's still hitting the auction, seeing who's buying it, seeing what they're paying, understanding that market. There's nothing like getting into a live auction room and seeing who's actually doing the buying and how large their wallet is when they walk in. It's here to stay. It's growing no doubt, but from our perspective, when companies are not the best performers, that's what's sure what AI is going to teach you if you got to figure it out yourself. And it sounds like there's a qualitative aspect that is hard for the computers to take over. It's trying, trust me, it's definitely trying. We see it a lot on the legal side, certainly in the documentation and precedents and the searches and whatnot. It's definitely helpful. There's no doubt. You still have to interpret it, and you still have to understand it and evaluate it. I think it's helpful.
我很高興看到這一點。你如何看待人工智慧或數據分析等技術規則的演變，以及資產基礎貸款在承銷和風險管理方面的應用？是的，我還沒有完全被說服。從承銷的角度來看，我仍然是一個老派、報紙型的人。我認為你需要分析並弄清楚。所以我還不太相信有人可以整天為我整理數字，但我仍然認為你需要那個人來弄清楚。確保數字是準確的，並且知道它們的來源。從監控的角度來看，我認為這比一切都重要。進入房間，坐在借款人身邊，與借款人交談，了解他們的業務。我可以隨心所欲地閱讀，我們用它來做研究之類的事情，但沒有什麼比面對面的互動、直接從當事人那裡獲取資訊更好的了。我認為它能在貸款的某些方面提供幫助嗎？我絕對認為可以。這些年來我們已經看到了這一點。 銀行已經透過住宅抵押貸款和借貸等方式運用它，我會說是「寫入」的，但這一切都只是數據驅動和數據點驅動的。而且這是數據輸入。對我們來說，這需要更多的分析和理解，試圖了解業務的本質。在資產方面，它仍然涉及參與拍賣，觀察誰在購買，看他們支付多少，理解那個市場。沒有什麼比進入一個實時的拍賣室，看看誰在實際購買，以及他們進場時錢包的厚度更能說明問題的了。這已經成為常態。毫無疑問，它正在成長，但從我們的角度來看，當公司表現不佳時，這就是人工智慧要教會你的事情，如果你得自己弄明白的話。聽起來有一個質性的層面是電腦難以取代的。它在嘗試，相信我，它絕對在嘗試。我們在法律方面看到很多，特別是在文件處理、先例和搜索等方面。它絕對有幫助。這一點毫無疑問。你仍然需要解讀它，仍然需要理解和評估它。我認為它是有幫助的。
I just don't think it's replacing for us anyway. We live in a highly uncertain economic environment. You have persistent inflation, high interest rates, geopolitical risks. Are you adjusting your underwriting standards or portfolio construction given this backdrop? People always ask us about diversification and concentrations and I adhere to it all. We focus on the impact of everything and now we're going through this whole tariff exercise with our portfolio. How does it impact the asset? If it increases liquidity or decreases liquidity, that asset pool, that's how we attack it. Our first question out to our borrowers was not how does this impact you?
我只是不認為這對我們來說是替代方案。我們身處一個高度不確定的經濟環境中。持續的通膨、高利率、地緣政治風險環伺。在這樣的背景下，你們是否調整了核貸標準或投資組合結構？人們總是詢問我們關於分散投資和集中度的問題，而我完全遵循這些原則。我們關注每件事的影響，現在我們正在對整個投資組合進行關稅審查。這會如何影響資產？如果它增加或減少流動性，那個資產池，這就是我們處理的方式。我們向借款人提出的第一個問題並不是這會如何影響你？
What's your liquidity? Where is it today? Where do you see it? 30 days from now? What in your business could possibly change by what's going on in the marketplace that will impact your liquidity? We started there with them about two or three weeks ago. Everybody was fine. Obviously some companies always struggle with liquidity, so I had nothing to do with this. But then the next question was, "Where are the assets?
你的流動性如何？現在處於什麼位置？30 天後你預期會在哪裡？市場上發生的任何變化，有哪些可能影響你的流動性？我們大約兩三週前就從這些問題開始與他們討論。當時每個人都沒問題。顯然有些公司總是面臨流動性問題，所以這與當前情況無關。但接下來的問題是：「資產在哪裡？」
How are they impacted by this? Where are the buyers?" We did that, not necessarily with the companies, but we did that reach out to our contacts in the auction market and the secondary market with the appraisers and talk to them about the assets. What's happening to the secondary market of those assets and do we need to make any adjustments in the credit agreement based on that? Our portfolio today, other than the retailers, the retailers will have some impact. But again, our first question to them was liquidity. The inventory there, we're not worried about the value. There may be a point or two one way or the other, but it's always about liquidity and what that does to liquidity for the retailer. But the rest of our companies, other than one, are not too impacted today. But we do focus on that. Again, we start with liquidity and we go to the asset and we go back to the business and say, "Okay, how does this impact the business and how does that translate into virtual liquidity and then into the asset pool?" Most of our assets are domestically domiciled. Very rare that we'll have anything that's overseas. So far, so good, the secondary market is holding pretty firm. All of them.
他們受到什麼影響？買家在哪裡？」我們確實這麼做了，雖然不一定是直接與公司聯繫，但我們確實透過拍賣市場和二手市場的聯繫人，與評估師們討論了這些資產的情況。這些資產的二手市場現狀如何？我們是否需要據此調整信貸協議？目前我們的投資組合中，除了零售商會受到一些影響外，其他公司幾乎沒有太大衝擊。不過，我們首先詢問他們的仍是流動性問題。對於庫存，我們並不擔心其價值，可能會有小幅波動，但關鍵始終在於流動性以及這對零售商流動性的影響。除了其中一家公司外，我們的其他企業目前受到的影響不大。但我們確實密切關注這一點。我們從流動性出發，審視資產狀況，再回到業務本身，思考：「這對業務有何影響？這如何轉化為虛擬流動性，進而影響資產池？」我們的大部分資產都在國內，極少有海外資產。到目前為止，二手市場表現相當穩定，所有資產皆是如此。
Well, Bob, I appreciate you sharing all your insights, describing your unique approach that lending. I think it's very interesting and how far listeners enjoyed it as well. Thank you. Alex, thank you. It was continued and yeah, we'll chat soon. Thanks for listening. We hope you enjoyed this episode. Please visit our website at InsightfulInvestor.org to access past shows and learn more about our podcast. If you have questions, feel free to email us at info@InsightfulInvestor.org. And if you enjoyed the discussion, please subscribe to this podcast to ensure you don't miss future episodes. And don't forget to forward today's conversation to others you think would enjoy listening. This podcast is provided for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. All opinions expressed by podcast participants are solely their own opinions and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of evoked advisors, their affiliates or companies feature. Due to industry regulations, participants on this podcast are instructed not to make specific trade recommendations, no reference past or potential profits. And listeners are reminded that security is trading, commodity trading, and alternative investments are complex and carry risks of substantial losses as such. They are not suitable for all investor. Listeners should be aware that guests featured on the Insightful Investor may have current or past associations with evoked advisors or the host, including as an investment manager of a private fund opportunity by evoke or access through an affiliated evoke fund or as a client. Participation as a guest on the podcast should not be perceived as an endorsement or testimonial with respect to evoked advisors, the podcast host, or their services. Similarly, the inclusion of a guest on the podcast does not imply that evoked advisors or the host endorses the guests or any company with which they may be affiliated or employed.
好的，鮑勃，非常感謝你分享所有的見解，描述了你獨特的貸款方法。我覺得這非常有趣，相信聽眾們也同樣享受其中。謝謝你。亞歷克斯，謝謝。我們會繼續保持聯繫，是的，我們很快會再聊。感謝大家的收聽。希望你們喜歡這一集的內容。請訪問我們的網站 InsightfulInvestor.org，收聽過往節目並了解更多關於我們的播客資訊。如果有任何問題，歡迎發送郵件至 info@InsightfulInvestor.org 與我們聯繫。如果你喜歡這次的討論，請訂閱這個播客，以確保你不會錯過未來的節目。別忘了將今天的對話轉發給其他你認為會喜歡收聽的人。本播客僅供資訊參考，不應被視為法律、商業、投資或稅務建議。播客參與者所表達的所有觀點僅為其個人意見，不一定反映被提及的顧問、其附屬機構或特約公司的觀點。由於行業法規的限制，本播客的參與者被指示不得提供具體的交易建議，也不得提及過去或潛在的利潤。 聽眾須知，證券交易、商品交易及另類投資具有複雜性且可能導致重大損失風險，因此並不適合所有投資者。聽眾應注意，《洞見投資者》節目中出現的嘉賓可能與受提及的顧問公司或主持人存在現有或過往關聯，包括作為由該顧問公司發起的私募基金機會之投資經理，或透過其關聯基金參與，抑或作為客戶身份。嘉賓參與節目不應被視為對該顧問公司、節目主持人或其服務的背書或推薦。同樣地，節目邀請嘉賓出席並不意味著該顧問公司或主持人認可該嘉賓或其可能隸屬或受雇的任何企業。
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