The Snowball作者Alice Schroeder在2008年時於維京尼亞大學舉辦的Value Investing Conference演講

以下是YT視頻轉錄後翻譯

I mentioned earlier that Ken Schuvenstein did double duty. It was on our first panel, while John McFarlane, who was also on the panel, is going to do a little double duty right now as well. What I didn't tell you about John, I told you that he was COO of tutor investments, but I did not tell you, as I'm proud to say, that he has an MBA from the Darden School. And in fact, yeah, yeah. [ Applause ] And in fact, he's currently serving at the chair as the chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Darden School Foundation. So, John has served the school in many different ways. And for this conference, the reason I want John to come up now is that he is heavily responsible for getting Alice Schroeder to come here tonight. So let's welcome John back up to introduce Alice. [ Applause ] >> Thank you, Ken. It's a great pleasure to be here. And before I introduce Alice to you, I'd like to thank both Carl and Bob and their respective staff's Everett and David. And in particular, Dan Anglin and John Griffin from the McIntyre School for putting this together. This really is what Darden McIntyre should be doing to enhance their brand and scope. And so this is a wonderful way to start. And I look forward to watching this grow. And in that vein, as Alice and I were walking into the theater, this afternoon, we looked at it and said, you know, that looks an awfully like, a lot like the Orphanium theater and Omaha. And for those of you who have been to the Berkshire Hathaway meetings, that is over 10 years ago, you know exactly what that is. And so we used to go to the meetings when shareholders could fit into that theater, which was probably about the size, maybe a little bit larger. Of course, that was before the B shares. And so we've been going back for years and watch it move my great to Arksaban and then ultimately the Quest Center. And to Carl and Bob, I look forward to coming back to this conference and the future in J.P.J. Arena. So well done. Before I get to my comments about Alice, most of you guys probably know more than I'll say about her. That is those of you who are under 30 because she has a Facebook fan page.
我之前提到肯·舒文斯坦身兼二職。那是我們的第一場小組討論，而同樣參與該場討論的約翰·麥克法蘭，現在也將要稍微兼任一下雙重角色。關於約翰，我還沒告訴各位的是——雖然提過他是導師投資公司的營運長——但讓我自豪地補充，他擁有達頓商學院的 MBA 學位。事實上，沒錯，沒錯。[掌聲] 而且他目前正擔任達頓商學院基金會理事會主席。因此，約翰以多種方式為母校服務。而這次會議中，我之所以想請約翰現在上台，是因為他對邀請愛麗絲·施羅德今晚出席貢獻良多。讓我們歡迎約翰再次上台介紹愛麗絲。[掌聲] >> 謝謝你，肯。非常榮幸能來到這裡。在向各位介紹愛麗絲之前，我要感謝卡爾和鮑伯，以及他們各自的團隊成員艾佛瑞特與大衛。特別是麥金泰爾學院的丹·安格林和約翰·葛里芬籌辦這場活動。這正是達頓與麥金泰爾學院為提升品牌與影響力應做的事，而今晚是個絕佳的開端。 而我期待著看到它的成長。順帶一提，今天下午當愛麗絲和我走進劇院時，我們看著它說，你知道嗎，那看起來非常像奧馬哈的奧芬尼姆劇院。對於那些參加過波克夏·海瑟威會議的人來說，那是十多年前的事了，你們一定知道我在說什麼。我們以前參加會議時，股東們還能擠進那個劇院，大概就是這個大小，或許稍微大一點。當然，那是在 B 股之前的事了。多年來，我們一直回去參加會議，看著它從我的偉大搬到阿克斯班，最後到探索中心。卡爾和鮑勃，我期待著未來在 J.P.J.競技場再次參加這個會議。做得真好。在我談論愛麗絲之前，你們大多數人可能比我更了解她。特別是那些 30 歲以下的人，因為她有一個臉書粉絲頁面。

And which I can't, I can't view because my kids won't let me or my wife be on Facebook. So, but so you guys already know more than I do about Alice. And I'll attempt to fill in for those of us who are over 30, 40, 50, 60. Rarely do practitioners have the opportunity to watch the undisputed master of their discipline in real time. We are truly fortunate to live in the age of Warren Buffett. As Rare is to have the work of a master, chronicled in exacting detail during their lifetime. Alice Schroeder accomplished just that with snowball. In 838 pages, she provides unique insight into the individual who has largely shaped the field of value investing over the past three to four decades. And for that, Alice were deeply indebted to you for your work. Alice's career began in accounting. While working for Fastby, she drafted some of the most important accounting standards affecting the insurance industry. She subsequently moved onto investment banking and ultimately, as many of you know, to research at Morgan Stanley, where she became institutional investors top ranked property and casually insurance industry analyst. It wasn't that capacity that she met Warren, and as a result of a strong mutual respect, he granted her full access to his papers, to his family and friends to write his biography. It makes snowball so special in my opinion, are in combination for distinguishing characteristics. First of all, Alice is very deep understanding of finance and the insurance industry. Secondly, the unprecedented access that she had to warn and his work, thirdly her persistence and attention to detail and fourthly and most importantly, the integrity with which she undertook the task. Based upon our countless conversations over the past several years, I can assure you that she was relentless and her verification of fact. And for those of you who've read the book or at least flipped through it, the footnotes are certainly testimony to that. That's surprisingly, after a little more than a month on the shelves, Snowball is now ranked by Amazon as the number one business publication or business book of 2008. So it's getting the recognition that's deserved for those of you who have read it, you know, why. So without further ado, it's my pleasure to introduce to you, Alice Schroeder. [ Applause ]
而我卻無法，無法觀看因為我的孩子們不讓我和我妻子上 Facebook。所以，但你們大家對 Alice 的了解已經比我多。我會試著為我們這些超過 30、40、50、60 歲的人補充一些。從業者很少有機會實時觀看他們領域中無可爭議的大師。我們真的很幸運能生活在華倫·巴菲特的時代。同樣罕見的是，能夠在大師有生之年，以精確的細節記錄其工作。Alice Schroeder 通過《雪球》一書做到了這一點。在 838 頁的篇幅中，她提供了對這位在過去三、四十年間極大塑造了價值投資領域的個人的獨特見解。為此，Alice，我們對你的工作深表感激。Alice 的職業生涯始於會計。在為 Fastby 工作期間，她起草了一些影響保險業最重要的會計準則。隨後，她轉戰投資銀行，最終，正如你們許多人所知，進入摩根士丹利從事研究，成為機構投資者頂級排名的財產和意外保險行業分析師。 她並非以那樣的身份認識華倫，而是基於雙方深厚的相互尊重，他給予她完全的權限接觸他的文件、家人及朋友，以便撰寫他的傳記。在我看來，讓《雪球》如此特別的，正是這些特質的結合。首先，愛麗絲對金融與保險業有著極其深刻的理解；其次，她獲得了前所未有的機會近距離觀察華倫及其工作；第三，她對細節的堅持與關注；第四點也是最重要的，她以無比的誠信擔負起這項任務。根據我們過去幾年無數次的對話，我可以向你保證，她在事實查證上毫不鬆懈。對於那些已經讀過或至少翻閱過這本書的人來說，書中的註解無疑證明了這一點。令人驚訝的是，上市僅一個多月，《雪球》已被亞馬遜評為 2008 年排名第一的商業出版物或商業書籍。這本書正獲得它應得的認可，讀過的人自然明白原因。那麼，不再多說，我很榮幸為大家介紹——愛麗絲·施羅德。[掌聲]

John, thank you. Thank you so much for that wonderful introduction. And thank you all for having me here at the University of Virginia and all of the people who were so welcoming. It's really terrific, but I especially want to say thank you to John because he was very modest in not playing up his role, but he was one of my important sources in writing the Snowball because of his role at Solomon Brothers as the Treasurer. And I found one of the things that occurs when you write a biography as you do get a lot of conflicting information. And John was my sounding board, I would call him and say, these two people have said this and that which one should I believe and he would tell me. And I trusted him so he was an invaluable resource and also gave me a lot of great facts and information.
約翰，謝謝你。非常感謝你那精彩的介紹。同時也感謝維吉尼亞大學的各位邀請我來到這裡，以及所有熱情歡迎我的人們。這真的非常棒，但我特別想對約翰說聲謝謝，因為他非常謙虛，沒有強調自己的角色，但由於他在所羅門兄弟公司擔任財務主管的職位，他是我撰寫《雪球》時的重要消息來源之一。我發現寫傳記時會遇到的一件事，就是會得到許多相互矛盾的資訊。而約翰就像是我的共鳴板，我會打電話給他說，這兩個人說了這樣那樣的話，我該相信誰，而他會告訴我。我非常信任他，所以他是一個無價的資源，同時也提供了許多寶貴的事實和資訊。

It's a real privilege to come before you tonight to talk about Warren Buffett, especially at this time of financial turmoil and crisis. As you all know, Warren Buffett is the only person of our time who's managed to accomplish his wish of becoming so rich that when he writes a check, it's the bank that bounces. These days it doesn't take quite so large a check to make the bank bounce, but it's interesting to see that when it does happen, it's Warren Buffett that they run to to cover the overdraft. He is really a singular figure in these times. And when I started working on the Snowball, of course, things were very different. The internet bubble had just imploded and it was just after the aftermath of in-run and I never anticipated anything like this occurring, but I knew what he was like. Of course, much of the importance of him is that his ideas and principles haven't really changed in 50 years. So I thought that writing a book about him would actually be a fairly simple matter. When you ask, Warren, a question he always had the answer. And I would present him with a business problem. He always would have the solution, so the job was just to write it down. What I didn't realize was how quickly I would encounter something called severites law, which is that the cause of problems is solutions. So having asked all my questions, having listened to his stories and having gotten all of his solutions very quickly, I was presented with a problem, which was that I had far more solutions, material questions, answered than I knew what to do with. And I began casting about for a way to construct a narrative to come up with how to put together a book about this man's life that would be meaningful and present instead of ideas. And I had a few attempts that failed, but I thought you might like to hear about them. So here's my first shot at it. The story began with a journey through the life of a 78-year-old man.
今晚能在這裡與各位談論華倫·巴菲特，尤其是在這段金融動盪與危機的時刻，實在是一項殊榮。眾所周知，華倫·巴菲特是當代唯一實現了「致富到開支票會讓銀行跳票」願望的人。如今要讓銀行跳票已不需開出那麼大面額的支票，但有趣的是，當這種情況發生時，人們總是跑去找華倫·巴菲特來彌補透支。他確實是這個時代的獨特人物。而當我開始撰寫《雪球》時，情況當然大不相同。網路泡沫才剛破滅，那是在擠兌風波剛結束後，我從未預料到會發生像現在這樣的情況，但我了解他的為人。當然，他的重要性很大程度上在於，他的理念和原則在 50 年間幾乎未曾改變。因此我原以為寫一本關於他的書會是件相當簡單的事。當你向華倫提問時，他總有答案。我會向他提出商業難題，他總能給出解決方案，所以我的工作只是把它們記錄下來。 我未曾意識到的是，自己竟會如此迅速地遭遇所謂的「解決方案悖論」——問題的根源往往來自解決方案本身。於是，在提出所有疑問、聽完他的故事並迅速獲得他所有的解答後，我面臨了一個難題：手頭累積的解決方案與實質問題的答案遠超過我能消化的程度。我開始四處尋找方法，試圖構築一個敘事框架，將這位先生的人生故事編織成一本有意義的著作，呈現具體經歷而非抽象概念。雖然幾次嘗試都未能成功，但我想各位或許會想聽聽這些過程。以下就是我的第一次嘗試：故事從一位 78 歲老者的人生旅程開始展開。

It traveled back through the decades, tracing and uncovering a common truth that lies at the core of the most powerful investment philosophies, teachings and models in the world. What you will learn today is the single secret underlying law of the snowball, a set of principles based on the most powerful law in the universe. All that we're in by fit ever accomplished or attained in the business of life was done in full accordance with this most powerful law. Using this simple universal law, the snowball offers the knowledge of how to create intentionally, intentionally and effortlessly, I joyful life. This is the secret, the secret to everything, the secret to unlimited happiness, love, health and prosperity. This is the law of attraction, the secret of Warren Buffett. Okay, well, I passed on that idea. I thought it was not too good, but somebody else went there. So my next attempt, the snowball's action kicks off in modern day New York where a blood stain copy of the intelligent investor is found symbolically laid at the foot of the New York Stock Exchange. The quest for the holy grail of investing led to a search that spanned the globe from lended to Los Angeles, leaving a gruesome trail of interview subjects behind his evidence. The result was an exhaustively researched page-turner about a secret investing cult. Cover-ups of ancient mistakes and savage vengeance against those who tried to capture the holy grail for themselves.
它穿越數十年回溯，追蹤並揭示了一個核心真理，這個真理存在於世界上最強大的投資哲學、教導與模型的核心之中。你今天將學到的是雪球效應背後唯一的秘密法則，這是一套基於宇宙中最強大法則的原則。我們在商業與生活中所達成或獲得的一切成就，都是完全遵循這條最強大的法則而實現的。運用這條簡單的宇宙法則，雪球效應提供了如何有意、輕鬆且愉快地創造生活的知識。這就是秘密，關於一切的秘密，關於無限幸福、愛、健康與繁榮的秘密。這就是吸引力法則，華倫·巴菲特的秘密。好吧，我放棄了那個想法。我認為它不夠好，但其他人卻採用了。因此，我的下一次嘗試，雪球的行動在現代紐約展開，在那裡，一本沾有血跡的《智慧型股票投資人》被象徵性地放置在紐約證券交易所的腳下。 對投資聖杯的追尋，引領了一場從倫敦到洛杉磯橫跨全球的探索，沿途留下了令人毛骨悚然的訪談對象與證據軌跡。最終成果是一本經過徹底研究、令人手不釋卷的秘辛，揭露了一個神秘的投資教派。其中包含對古老錯誤的掩蓋，以及對那些企圖獨佔聖杯之人所施加的殘酷報復。

In the end, I found the grail guarded by an ancient 78-year-old heretic, buried deep in a maze of files under a pyramid in Qat Plaza. I love that idea, but then there was this guy named Dan Brown who went ahead and used it before I got there. So I was sure, however, that somewhere hiding in Qat Plaza there was a holy grail because I spent 2,000 hours with Warren Buffett. I did get to go through all his files and I got to ask him all of the questions and business problems that I wanted to. I thought there had to be a holy grail because I had heard from so many investors a little bit of irritation might not be the right word, but Warren always says that it's very simple.
最終，我發現聖杯由一位 78 歲的古老異端守護著，深埋在卡達廣場金字塔下的檔案迷宮中。我原本很鍾愛這個構想，但後來有位叫丹·布朗的傢伙搶在我之前用了這個點子。不過我依然確信，在卡達廣場的某處必然藏有聖杯——因為我曾與華倫·巴菲特相處了 2000 個小時。我確實翻遍了他所有的檔案，也問盡了所有我想請教的商業難題。我認為聖杯必然存在，因為我從太多投資者口中聽聞（或許用「些微惱怒」來形容並不精準），但華倫總說這一切其實非常簡單。

There's a few simple principles. If you were only working with a smaller amount of money, he could earn 50% returns a year. Well, I've had a lot of people say to me, you know, I am working with a smaller amount of money. If it is really that simple, why am I not earning 50% returns a year? So the question is, is it just that Warren Buffett is a genius? Is it just that we're all dumb or is the truth somewhere in between? And I think the truth is somewhere in between. I was sure that hiding somewhere in his office was the holy grail.
有幾個簡單的原則。如果你只操作較小金額的資金，他一年可以賺取 50%的回報。嗯，有很多人對我說，你知道，我操作的資金量比較小。如果這真的那麼簡單，為什麼我一年賺不到 50%的回報？所以問題是，難道只是因為華倫·巴菲特是個天才嗎？還是我們都太笨了，或者真相介於兩者之間？我認為真相介於兩者之間。我確信在他的辦公室某處藏著聖杯。

In fact, while Warren is brilliant and he is definitely different from everybody else, there is something more to it because he does have a way of making the difficult look easy. And he also has a hard time understanding or perhaps even admitting how hard he works. It's sort of like asking a fish to describe water. And there are some concepts that are so ingrained in him and so embedded in him that he doesn't really understand them himself. He's just, they've been there for so long, for example, take the rule that he follows about asset turnover. Quote, no real investor likes to trade. It is never pleasant to part probably forever from an old friend, unquote.
事實上，雖然華倫聰明絕頂且確實與眾不同，但這背後還有更深層的原因——他總能讓困難的事情看起來輕而易舉。而且他自己也很難理解、甚至不願承認自己工作有多拼命。這就像要求一條魚描述水是什麼感覺。有些概念在他心中根深蒂固到連他自己都無法真正理解，它們存在得太久了。舉例來說，他奉為圭臬的資產周轉原則：「真正的投資者都不喜歡交易。與老友永遠分離從來不是件愉快的事。」

Okay, well, that probably sounds like something that Warren would say, right? Or it sounds like something that Ben Graham would say. But it's not. It's from a book called "Bine Salesmanship" by Townsend, which Warren read when he was seven years old. So, and he asked for this book for Christmas, by the way. And whenever he reads a book, especially as a child, he usually read them four or five times and memorize them. So some of these ideas have been so ingrained in him from an early age.
聽起來很像是華倫會說的話對吧？或者像是班·葛拉漢的語調。但其實這句話出自湯森所著的《推銷聖經》——華倫七歲時讀的書。順帶一提，這還是他主動要求當聖誕禮物的。他從小就有個習慣，每讀一本書總要反覆啃個四五遍直到背下來。所以這些觀念從孩提時代就深深刻進了他的骨子裡。

It's hard to know whether they're innate, whether he invented them, or whether he picked them up from sources like this when he was very young. But he got a lot of reinforcement at a very early age. Now for those of us who didn't, the question is, you know, what in Warren's papers and mental files will help us be better investors, even though we can't be the next Warren Buffet? I did find some things, but let's first start with reviewing there's four concepts that you hear over and over, that are kind of the basics of value investing. And they are intrinsic value, and especially applying the Phil Fisher qualitative investing concepts to intrinsic value, second ignoring the Mr. Market Manic Depressive Behavior. Third is the performance drag of too much turnover and too much diversification. And fourth is the Ben Graham margin of safety concept, which arguably is the most important idea ever developed in investing. And all of these are very important, but when I studied and spent so much time with Warren Buffet, what I actually saw is that he invests and applies his investing. He uses these concepts, but what he actually does is a little bit different.
很難確定這些是天生的、是他發明的，還是他很小時候從類似這樣的來源學來的。但他在很小的時候就得到了很多強化。對於我們這些沒有這種經歷的人來說，問題是，你知道，在華倫的文章和思維檔案中，有哪些能幫助我們成為更好的投資者，即使我們無法成為下一個華倫·巴菲特？我確實發現了一些東西，但讓我們先從回顧四個概念開始，這些概念你反覆聽到，可以說是價值投資的基礎。它們是內在價值，特別是將菲爾·費雪的定性投資概念應用到內在價值上；其次是忽略市場先生躁鬱症般的行為；第三是過多交易和過度分散投資帶來的績效拖累；第四是本·格雷厄姆的安全邊際概念，這可以說是投資領域中發展出來的最重要的理念。所有這些都非常重要，但當我研究並花了很多時間與華倫·巴菲特相處時，我實際看到的是他投資並應用他的投資方式。他使用這些概念，但他實際所做的有點不同。

And so I'd like to do his take you on a little bit of a journey using a specific investment that he, I did not write about in the book. It was cut for length. And I illustrate principles that I talk about in the book, but it's a little bit too technical in it, too high level, to have been put into the snowball, which is for more of a mass audience. And also, just as an overview, I should just say that so much of Warren's success has come from just in training himself into good habits. And it's worth just saying that because he always says that the chains of habit are too light to be felt until they're too heavy to be broken. And he's talking about bad habits.
因此，我想帶你們踏上一段小小的旅程，透過一個特定的投資案例來說明，這個案例他在書中並未提及，因為篇幅關係被刪除了。這個例子闡述了我在書中討論的原則，但內容有點過於技術性，層次太高，不適合收錄在《雪球》這本面向大眾的書中。另外，作為概述，我應該指出，華倫的成功很大程度上來自於他培養出的良好習慣。這一點值得強調，因為他常說：「習慣的鎖鏈輕得難以察覺，直到它們重得無法打破。」而他指的正是壞習慣。

But it was Aristotle who said that we are what we repeatedly do, and that excellence is not an act but a habit. Warren is a creature of habit. He's the ultimate creature of habit. His first habit was hard work. And I write over and over in the book about the fact that he was at the securities exchange commission digging up documents before they were electronically available. He was down at the state insurance commission in the bells at the basement looking up vials. He was knocking on doors of businesses talking to the management when they were saying you're a pest go away. He was sending down mounen around the state buying up shares of national American insurance. He was always thinking and working.
但亞里斯多德曾說過，我們就是我們重複做的事，卓越不是一種行為，而是一種習慣。華倫就是習慣的產物。他是終極的習慣生物。他的第一個習慣就是努力工作。我在書中反覆提到，他在證券交易委員會挖掘文件，那時這些文件還沒有電子版。他在州保險委員會的地下室裡，埋頭查閱檔案。他敲開企業的大門，與管理層交談，即使他們說你是個麻煩，快走開。他派人到全州各地收購美國國家保險的股份。他總是在思考和工作。

And a lot of his work was not obvious. It was not repetitive or routine. What he was doing, he was always thinking what more can I do, especially what more can I do to get an edge on the other guy. Now importantly, I know a lot of people will point out that a lot of what he did you can't do these days because either the information is so available electronically that everybody has it or it's insider information that would be illegal to use. But the principle of the hard work that he did is still the same that I was talking to somebody earlier and we were just sort of talking in awe of how hard Warren Buffet worked. And the fact that most people would not work that obsessively but for those few who do, there was a reward. And the main thing that he worked out was learning.
他的許多工作並不顯而易見。這些工作並非重複性或例行公事。他所做的每一件事，總是在思考「我還能多做些什麼」，尤其是「我還能如何比別人更勝一籌」。重要的是，我知道許多人會指出，他當年的許多做法如今已不可行，因為相關資訊要麼已電子化公開、人人皆可取得，要麼屬於內線消息，若加以利用將屬違法。但他努力工作的原則至今未變——早先我與人交談時，我們還帶著敬畏談論華倫·巴菲特工作有多麼拚命。事實上，多數人不會如此沉迷工作，但對那些少數願意這麼做的人，回報是存在的。而他鑽研出的最重要心得，就是學習。

The guy is as Charlie Munger puts it a learning machine. And his learning has been cumulative. It's been a tremendous advantage to him in business. He's got this mental file cabinet that's been built up starting when he was a very small child sitting in his stock broker father's office reading the financial statements and descriptions and descriptions and studying of thousands of businesses and dozens and even hundreds of industries over and over and over. This is really why when people call him with a business proposition he can say yes or no instantly because he's got that file cabinet in his mind that is so deep. It does help to have a photographic memory or near photographic memory which he has but at the same time, that learning is the second part of what makes him more in Buffet. And the learning was cumulative. I think that's worth mentioning too that he's chosen to learn in a field where the knowledge adds and builds on top of each other. And so I think we could all be better investors for knowing that.
正如查理·芒格所言，這傢伙是台學習機器。而他的學習是累積性的。這在商業上為他帶來了巨大的優勢。他從很小的時候就開始建立這個心智檔案櫃，當時他坐在股票經紀人父親的辦公室裡，閱讀財務報表和描述，一遍又一遍地研究數千家企業和數十甚至數百個行業。這就是為什麼當人們向他提出商業提案時，他能立即說出是或否，因為他腦海中的檔案櫃是如此深入。擁有像照相機般的記憶力或接近照相機般的記憶力確實有幫助，他確實擁有這項能力，但同時，學習是使他更像巴菲特的第二部分原因。而且這種學習是累積性的。我認為這也值得一提，他選擇在一個知識相互疊加和累積的領域學習。因此，我認為我們都可以因為知道這一點而成為更好的投資者。

Well, up to this point there's not any great mystery to it. I think everybody knows that Warren Buffet has or everyone who's read the snowball knows how hard he's worked and how much learning he's done. But there are three other factors to his success that I would like to talk about and focus a little bit differently than he normally explains the way he invests and that is handicapping compounding and the margin of safety. These are three concepts that work together. He uses them in a slightly different way than he would think of describing them publicly. They're all discussed in the book and I'd like to take you through a little case study on an investment called Midcontent tab card company. This was a private investment that he did in his personal portfolio and just kind of show you how I saw him invest based on his personal files and what he actually does. And then I'll update that to the present day. This company was an outgrowth of IBM. And as you all know, in the 1950s Warren did not use computers.
到目前為止，這並沒有什麼大不了的奧秘。我想每個人都知道華倫·巴菲特擁有什麼，或者讀過《雪球》的人都知道他有多麼努力以及他學了多少東西。但是，我想談談他成功的另外三個因素，並且以與他通常解釋投資方式略有不同的角度來聚焦，那就是障礙、複利和安全邊際。這三個概念是相輔相成的。他使用這些概念的方式與他公開描述時的想法略有不同。這些都在書中討論過，我想帶你們看一個叫做 Midcontent 製表卡公司的投資案例研究。這是他個人投資組合中的一項私人投資，我只是想根據他的個人檔案和他實際的做法，向你們展示我如何看待他的投資方式。然後我會將這個案例更新到現在。這家公司是 IBM 的衍生產物。正如你們所知，在 1950 年代，華倫並沒有使用電腦。

But he was very aware of them. IBM was the only computer company of any size or importance at that time and Warren's and Katie and her uncle Fred had decided to invest in control data, which was a startup company that was going to compete with IBM. Katie's brother who was Bill Norris was founding control data because he wanted to create a business he thought IBM was slow and bureaucratic and Warren told Katie and Fred not to invest in control data. He said to them, "Don't do it. Who needs another computer company?" Those were his famous last words. They invested in control data anyway and they made a huge amount of money. And what was notable about this incident is that Warren told him not to invest because he actually knew a lot about IBM. He'd been studying IBM since 1952. It had been in court embroiled in any trust case for being a monopoly.
但他對這些非常清楚。當時 IBM 是唯一一家規模龐大且舉足輕重的電腦公司，而華倫、凱蒂和她的叔叔弗雷德卻決定投資一家新創公司——控制數據公司，這家公司打算與 IBM 競爭。凱蒂的兄弟比爾·諾里斯正在創立控制數據公司，因為他認為 IBM 動作遲緩且官僚作風嚴重，想要創辦一家企業。華倫告訴凱蒂和弗雷德不要投資控制數據公司，他對他們說：「別這麼做。誰還需要另一家電腦公司？」這些成了他著名的遺言。然而，他們還是投資了控制數據公司，並且賺了一大筆錢。這件事的特別之處在於，華倫之所以告訴他們不要投資，是因為他實際上對 IBM 了解甚多。自 1952 年以來，他一直在研究 IBM。當時 IBM 因壟斷問題捲入了一場反托拉斯案件的訴訟中。

And Warren studied its financials even though by then he'd already declared IBM outside his circle of competence. He felt that even though IBM might have to be broken up someday that its monopoly was so overwhelming. And of course he likes monopoly businesses to compete with it would probably be feudal. So what happened was that IBM did actually settle with the Justice Department. As part of that settlement it was required to divest of a business making tab cards. Now I can't really see you very well but there must be a few people who could throw their hands up in the air that are old enough to know what a tab card is. Can anybody know what a tab card is? Yes, I see two people. Okay, that dates me. Okay, so a tab card is before computers were digital they actually read off of punch cards. They were called Marksons cards. But these were big decks of cards that had holes punched in them and they would be stuck in the computer and they would be read manually by they were not manually they were not electronic. They were sent mechanically through the computer. So this company was formed because IBM had to divest of this business. It was an incredibly profitable business. In fact because these cards were trivial compared to the mainframe computers that IBM sold, it marked them up to get more than a 50% profit margin. This was IBM's most profitable business. So Wayne Eves and John Cleary who were two friends of Warrens saw that IBM was going to have to divest in this business and they thought we're going to buy a carole press which was the press that makes these cards and we're going to compete with IBM because we're based in the Midwest, we can ship faster, we can provide better service. And they went to Warren and they said should we invest in this company and would you come in with us and Warren said no? Well why did he say no? He didn't say no because it was the technology company. He said no because he went through the first step in his investing process and this is where I think what he does that's very automatic but isn't well understood. He acted like a horse handy camper and the first step in Warren's investing process is always to say what is the odds that this business could be subject to any kind of catastrophe risk that could make it just fail. And if there is any chance that any significant amount of his capital could be subject to catastrophe risk, he just stops thinking no and he won't go there. And it's backwards the way most people invest because most people find an interesting idea, they figure out the math, they look at the financials,
而華倫研究了它的財務狀況，儘管那時他已經宣稱 IBM 超出了他的能力圈。他覺得即使 IBM 有一天可能被迫拆分，其壟斷地位仍然強大到難以撼動。當然，他喜歡壟斷企業，因為與之競爭很可能徒勞無功。後來的情況是，IBM 確實與司法部達成了和解。作為和解的一部分，IBM 被要求剝離一個生產打孔卡的業務。現在我看不太清楚你們，但現場肯定有幾位年紀夠大的人能舉手表示知道什麼是打孔卡。有人知道打孔卡是什麼嗎？好的，我看到有兩個人。這下暴露我的年紀了。好吧，打孔卡是在電腦數位化之前，用來讀取穿孔卡片的東西。它們被稱為馬克森卡片。這些是一大疊打孔的卡片，會被插入電腦中，不是手動也不是電子讀取，而是機械式地通過電腦讀取。這家公司之所以成立，是因為 IBM 被迫剝離這項業務。這曾是一項極其賺錢的生意。 事實上，由於這些卡片與 IBM 銷售的大型主機相比微不足道，IBM 便提高其售價以獲取超過 50%的利潤率。這曾是 IBM 最賺錢的業務。因此，華倫的兩位朋友韋恩·伊夫斯和約翰·克利里看出 IBM 將不得不剝離這項業務，他們認為可以購買一台卡羅爾印刷機——用於生產這些卡片的機器，進而與 IBM 競爭，因為他們立足於中西部，能更快發貨、提供更優質的服務。他們去找華倫，問他是否該投資這家公司，並邀請他一起加入，但華倫拒絕了。為什麼他會說不？並非因為這是一家科技公司，而是因為他遵循了自己投資流程的第一步——這一步在我看來他做得非常自然，卻鮮為人知。他像個謹慎的賭徒般行事，而華倫投資流程的第一步永遠是評估：這項業務遭遇任何可能導致其徹底失敗的災難性風險的機率有多大。 而如果有任何可能，他的大部分資本會面臨災難性風險，他就會立刻停止考慮，絕不涉足。這與大多數人的投資方式恰恰相反，因為多數人會先找到一個有趣的想法，然後計算數字，查看財務報表，

they do a projection and then at the end they ask themselves okay what could go wrong. Warren starts with what could go wrong and here he said a startup business competing with IBM could fail. Nope sorry and he didn't think another thing about it but Wayne Eves and John Clarie went and had any way they started up this business and within a year they were printing 35 million tab cards a month. So that at that point they needed to buy more carole presses they came back to Warren and they said we need money would you like to come in. Okay so now Warren is interested because the catastrophe risk element of the equation is gone. They are competing successfully against IBM. So he asked them the numbers and they explained to him that they are turning their capital over seven times a year. So at Carroll press cost 78 thousand dollars every time they run a set of cards through and turn their capital over they're making over 11 thousand dollars. So they're basically their gross profit on a year on a press is enough to buy another printing press. At this point Warren is very interested they're not profit margins or 40 percent.
他們先做了一個預測，然後在最後問自己：好吧，可能會出什麼問題。華倫一開始就問可能會出什麼問題，他在這裡說，一家與 IBM 競爭的新創企業可能會失敗。不，抱歉，他沒有再想這件事，但韋恩·埃夫斯和約翰·克萊爾還是去做了，無論如何他們創辦了這家公司，不到一年，他們每月就能印製 3500 萬張打孔卡。所以在那個時候，他們需要購買更多的卡羅爾印刷機，他們回來找華倫，說我們需要資金，你願意加入嗎？好吧，現在華倫感興趣了，因為方程式中的災難風險因素已經消失了。他們正在成功地與 IBM 競爭。所以他問了他們的數字，他們向他解釋說，他們每年資本周轉七次。所以每次他們運行一組卡片並周轉資本時，卡羅爾印刷機的成本是 7.8 萬美元，他們能賺超過 1.1 萬美元。所以基本上，他們一台印刷機一年的毛利足以再買一台印刷機。此時華倫非常感興趣，他們的利潤率不是 40%。

It's like the most profitable business that he's ever had the opportunity to invest in. Notably people are now bringing Warren special deals. It's 1959 he's been in business for two and a half years running the partnership. Why are they doing that? It's not because they know he's a great stockpicker they don't know that. He hasn't yet made that record. It's because he knows so much about business and because he started so early that he has a lot of money. So this is something interesting about Warren Buffett. By 1959 people were already bringing him special deals like they're still doing today with Goldman and GE. He decided that he would come in and invest in this company, midcontinent tab card company, but interestingly he did not take Wayne and John's word for it because the numbers they gave him were really enticing. But again he went through and he acted like a horse handy capper. Now here's another point of departure from what almost anybody else would do. Everybody that I know or new as an analyst would have created a model for this company and would have projected out its earnings and would have looked at its return on investment and dotted out in the future. Warren didn't do that. In fact, in going through hundreds of his files I've never seen anything that resembled a model. What he did is he did what you would do with a horse. He figured out the one or two factors that could make the horse succeed or fail.
這就像是他有機會投資過最賺錢的生意。值得注意的是，人們現在開始給華倫帶來特別的交易。那是 1959 年，他經營合夥企業已經兩年半了。他們為什麼這樣做？不是因為他們知道他是個出色的股票挑選者——他們並不知道這一點。他還沒有建立那樣的紀錄。而是因為他對商業了解甚多，而且因為他很早就開始，所以擁有很多錢。這就是關於華倫·巴菲特有趣的一點。到了 1959 年，人們已經開始給他帶來特別的交易，就像他們今天仍然與高盛和通用電氣所做的那樣。他決定投資這家中陸製表卡公司，但有趣的是，他並沒有完全相信韋恩和約翰的話，因為他們提供的數字確實很誘人。然而，他再次像個賽馬預測專家一樣仔細審查。這裡又有一個與幾乎所有人做法不同的地方。我所認識或知道的任何分析師都會為這家公司建立一個模型，預測其收益，查看其投資回報率，並對未來進行推測。 華倫並沒有那樣做。事實上，在翻閱了他數百份檔案後，我從未見過任何類似模型的東西。他所做的，其實就是你會對一匹馬做的事。他找出了能讓這匹馬成功或失敗的一兩個關鍵因素。

In this case it was sales growth and making the cost advantage continued to work. Again he took all the historical data, quarter by quarter for every single plant. He got this similar information as best he could from every competitor they had and he failed pages with little hinge scratches of all this information and he studied that information. Then he made a yes-no decision. He looked at it, they were getting 36% margins. They were growing 70% over 70% a year on a million of sales. That was where the historic numbers looked at them in great detail, just like a horse handicapper studying the tip sheet. Then he said to himself, "I want a 15% return on 2 million of sales."
在這個案例中，關鍵因素是銷售增長和維持成本優勢的持續運作。他再次收集了所有歷史數據，逐季分析每一家工廠的表現。他盡可能從所有競爭對手那裡獲取相似的資訊，並在紙上密密麻麻地記錄下這些數據，仔細研究。然後他做出了一個是非分明的決定。他審視這些數據，發現他們的利潤率達到 36%，年銷售額從 100 萬開始以超過 70%的速度增長。這些歷史數據被他像賽馬賭徒研究賠率表一樣詳盡分析。最後他對自己說：「我希望在 200 萬的銷售額上獲得 15%的回報。」

Then he said, "Yeah, I can get that and he came in as an investor." What he did is he incorporated his whole earnings model and compounding, just kind of cash flow into that one sentence. I want 15% on 2 million of sales. Why 15%? Because weren't as not greedy. He always wants a mere 15% day one return on investment and then it compounds from there. That's what all he's ever wanted. He's happy with that. You're not laughing.
接著他說：「沒錯，我能搞定，然後他以投資者身份加入。」他所做的就是把整個收益模式和複利效應，簡單來說就是現金流，全都濃縮進那句話裡。我要在 200 萬銷售額中拿到 15%。為什麼是 15%？因為他並不貪心。他總是第一天就想要 15%的投資回報率，然後從那裡開始複利增長。這就是他唯一想要的。他對此很滿意。你沒在笑。

What's wrong? And it's a very simple thing. There's nothing fancy about it. And I think that that's another important lesson because he's a very simple guy. He doesn't do any kind of discounted cash flow models or anything like that. For decades, he just says, "I want a 15% day one return on my investment and I want it to grow from there." That out. And the $2 million of sales was pretty simple too. It had a million.
有什麼問題嗎？這其實非常簡單，沒什麼花俏的。我認為這是另一個重要的教訓，因為他是個非常簡單的人。他不做任何折現現金流模型之類的東西。幾十年來，他只是說：「我第一天就要 15%的投資回報，然後從那裡開始增長。」就這樣。而那 200 萬的銷售額也很簡單。它有一百萬。

It was growing 70%. There was a big margin of safety built into these numbers. It had a 36% profit margin. He said, "I'll take half that." He ended up putting $60 million dollars. I'm sorry, $60,000. I'm thinking more modern terms. He ended up putting $60,000 of his personal non-partnership money into this company, which was about 20% of his net worth at the time.
當時成長率達 70%。這些數字背後有著很大的安全邊際。公司擁有 36%的利潤率。他說：「我拿一半就好。」最終他投入了 6000 萬美元。抱歉，是 6 萬美元。我腦中想著現代的金額單位。他最終將個人非合夥資金中的 6 萬美元投入這家公司，約佔當時他淨資產的 20%。

He got 16% of the company stock plus some subordinate notes. The way he thought about it was really simple. It was a one step decision. He looked at historical data and then he had this generic return that he once on everything. It was a very easy decision for him. He relied totally on historical figures with no projections. I think that that's a really interesting way to look at it because I saw him do it over and over in different investments. So what happened? Well, the company changed his name to data documents. He owned the investment for 18 years.
他獲得了公司 16%的股份加上一些次級票據。他的思考方式非常簡單，是個一步到位的決定。他查看了歷史數據，然後套用自己慣用的通用回報率標準。對他來說這是個非常容易的決定。他完全依賴歷史數據，不做任何預測。我認為這種思考方式非常有趣，因為我看過他在不同投資中反覆運用。後來發生了什麼？這家公司更名為數據文件公司。他持有這項投資長達 18 年。

He ended up putting another million dollars into it over time. It was bought out by Dick to Graff in 1979 and he earned a 33% compounded return over the 18 years that he owned the investment. So it was not too bad. And that was typical. I gave you this example in part because it was the other time besides Geico that he got a fill-fisher-type growth company and a Ben Graham-like price. It was the most vivid example of that that I found. But it was a private investment and there's not a lot of public information about it available. So fast-forwarding a little bit, why he thinks so much about catastrophe. Firestones law forecasting is always on his mind. Firestone said that chicken little only had to be right once.
他最終又陸續投入了一百萬美元。這筆投資在 1979 年被迪克賣給了格拉夫，在他持有這 18 年間，獲得了 33%的年化複合回報率。所以表現還不算太差。這算是典型例子。我之所以舉這個例子，部分原因是除了蓋可保險之外，這是他另一次以接近班傑明·葛拉漢式的價格，買到像飛魚釣者型成長公司的機會。這是我找到最鮮明的案例。但這是筆私人投資，公開資訊不多。稍微快轉一下時間，為何他如此重視災難預測？火石法則的預測總縈繞在他心頭。火石說過，小雞仔只需要對一次就夠了。

And that's always the first thing that we're in things about. And so why is Berkshire Hathaway today not dealing with some of the problems that other people are? Because we're in past on investing in a lot of things that he could have because the first question he always asked himself is what's the cat risk? And if the business or investment has cat risk, then he just says no. We could probably get into an interesting discussion about some things like AIG. That was a stock that I was wrong on for a long time until I finally turned around. But he never invested in AIG because of the cat risk. He brought in Bearstones and Lehman and he never invested in them because of the cat risk. And he saves himself a lot of time and energy this way. Because if you ask yourself the cat risk question first, then you don't have to do any of the other work.
而這總是我們在考慮事情時的首要問題。那麼，為什麼今天的波克夏·海瑟威沒有遇到其他人面臨的一些問題？因為我們過去在投資許多事物時，他總是先問自己一個問題：這有什麼災難性風險？如果這項業務或投資存在災難性風險，他就會直接說不。我們或許可以就一些像 AIG 這樣的事情展開有趣的討論。這是一支我長期以來都看錯的股票，直到最後我才改變看法。但他因為災難性風險而從未投資過 AIG。他提到了貝爾斯登和雷曼兄弟，也因為災難性風險而從未投資它們。這樣做為他節省了大量的時間和精力。因為如果你首先問自己災難性風險的問題，那麼你就不需要做任何其他的工作了。

All those pages of numbers historical data. So because Warren is basically focused on efficiency, that's why he does that. And he's also very good at being realistic. And once he figures out that something does have the cat risk, he never ever kids himself and tries to talk himself out of changing a decision. So today, when you think about what's happening right now, deals like GE and Goldman Sachs, people are still bringing him special deals that nobody else can get. He's still making sure they don't have the cat risk as best he can.
所有那些數字歷史數據的頁面。正因為華倫基本上專注於效率，這就是他這麼做的原因。而且他也非常擅長保持現實。一旦他發現某件事確實存在貓風險，他絕不會自欺欺人，也不會試圖說服自己改變決定。所以今天，當你思考現在發生的事情時，像通用電氣和高盛這樣的交易，人們仍然帶給他那些別人無法獲得的特殊交易。他仍然盡其所能確保這些交易沒有貓風險。

He's making a bet there on the management, but also his own reputation as an investor. Or to some extent, can cat prove these deals. And they're giving him a 10% guaranteed return. And that's the minimum. But he's going to get his 15%. He still wants the 15%. At times he's taken less and lowered his standards. And he's usually been sorry when he has. And when it comes to the market as a whole, he uses somewhat the same technique. He recently said that he finds the stock market attractive now. In his 1999 Sun Valley speech, he talked about investing in the market when the stock market's value was between 70 and 80% of GDP. It's somewhat the same method because at that level, he's obviously the whole stock market's not going to go to zero. He's got a huge margin of safety built into that. He just has the 15% return and the 2 million included a huge margin of safety versus how fast mid-con a towncard company was actually growing and the margins that it was actually getting. And so he's put his margin of safety into the return expectations. And he's using only historical data.
他在那裡對管理層下注，同時也押上了自己作為投資者的聲譽。或者在某種程度上，貓能否證明這些交易。他們給了他 10%的保證回報，這是最低限度。但他想要的是 15%。有時他會接受較低的回報並降低標準，而通常當他這麼做時，他會感到後悔。當談到整個市場時，他使用了某種程度上相同的方法。他最近表示，他認為現在的股市很有吸引力。在他 1999 年太陽谷的演講中，他談到了當股市價值佔 GDP 的 70%到 80%時投資市場。這在某種程度上是相同的方法，因為在那個水平上，顯然整個股市不會歸零。他在這方面建立了巨大的安全邊際。他僅僅擁有 15%的回報，而那 200 萬已經包含了相對於中康鎮卡公司實際增長速度及其實際獲得的利潤率的巨大安全邊際。因此，他將自己的安全邊際融入了回報預期之中，並且他只使用歷史數據。

He's gone back in years and years and years of data to arrive at the conclusion that again in probabilities, he's handicapping that it's the right price to buy. And he doesn't really care if it goes up or down or up or down for the next year or two. He just knows that at this price, the odds are that it will do well. I do think it's really amazing that right now, three weeks later, there are pundits out there who are saying that the greatest living investor of our time and possibly ever is wrong for having made these investments and having predicted that the stock market is a buy right now. It is really ironic and interesting that somebody who, as far as I know, has never been wrong and making a prediction that people who make wrong predictions every day and have been in the past wrong and saying he's wrong or out there once again saying that he's wrong. And also I think it's worth mentioning because we're talking about this handicapping concept, something else.
他回溯了多年、多年、多年的數據，得出結論認為，再次以概率來看，他正在評估這是買入的正確價格。而他真的不在乎接下來一兩年它是漲是跌、漲是跌。他只是知道，以這個價格來看，機率上它會表現良好。我確實認為這真的很驚人，現在，三週後，有專家在那裡說，我們這個時代甚至可能是史上最偉大的在世投資者因為做出這些投資並預測股市現在是買入時機而錯了。這真的很諷刺且有趣，據我所知，一個從未出錯的人做出預測，而那些每天預測錯誤、過去也曾出錯的人卻說他錯了，或者再次在那裡說他錯了。另外，我認為值得一提，因為我們正在討論這個評估概念，還有其他事情。

This is just a little quote from the Intelligent Investor, which is that the margin of safety is always dependent on the price paid. If as we suggest, the average market level of most growth stocks is too high to provide a margin of safety for the buyer, then a simple technique of diversified buying in this field may not work outside as factually. And that obviously applies to the market as a whole. And one thing I think that more and more about that should get a huge amount of credit for and a round of applause for is never having advocated dollar cost averaging because it's wrong. It's led many people off a cliff. It's not right to buy the market in any price and you've never heard him suggest that anybody should do it. And I think she should get a lot of credit for that.
這只是《智慧型投資者》中的一小段引述，內容是說安全邊際總是取決於支付的價格。如果如我們所建議的，大多數成長股的平均市場水準過高，無法為買家提供安全邊際，那麼在這個領域採用分散投資的簡單技巧，實際上可能不會奏效。這顯然適用於整個市場。有一點我越想越覺得應該給予極大讚譽和掌聲的是，從未提倡過定期定額投資法，因為那是錯誤的。它讓許多人走向了懸崖。在任何價格買入市場都是不對的，你也從未聽過他建議任何人這麼做。我認為這一點應該給予她極大的肯定。

So in the end, I'd like to say thank you for listening to. This story and I hope it gives you a little bit of insight into how he thinks, but it's also indefensible. There are certain things about him that are a mystery and will never be explainable. And there's one thing about him that you can emulate, but only if it comes from the right place inside you. It's been said and this came early to warn that the only person really qualified to advise you as to what you can do is yourself. He calls this his inner score card. You know yourself better than anyone else does. You and you alone know how determined you are to make a success of any undertaking.
最後，我想說謝謝你們聆聽這個故事，我希望它能讓你們稍微了解他的思考方式，但這同時也是無法辯護的。關於他的一些事情始終是個謎，永遠無法解釋。而有一點你可以效仿，但前提是它必須發自你內心正確的地方。有人說過——這個警告來得很早——真正有資格建議你能做什麼的人只有你自己。他稱這為他的內在計分卡。你比任何人都更了解自己。只有你自己知道，你有多麼決心要讓任何事業成功。

And in the last analysis about 90% of being successful in business is that indefensible thing which for a lack of a better name we call guts. And that is from the book a thousand ways to make a thousand dollars. Thank you and I'd be very happy to take any questions now. Thank you Alice to have our first question. Hi I'm Joshua Langsam. I'm a first year student from Darden. Your book has been extremely well received. Do you have plans for a future work? And if so, what subject might you look to cover and why? Okay, I do.
歸根結底，商業上成功的約 90%是那個難以言喻的東西，我們姑且稱之為膽識。這句話出自《一千種賺一千美元的方法》一書。謝謝，現在我很樂意回答任何問題。謝謝 Alice 讓我們提出第一個問題。嗨，我是 Joshua Langsam，達頓商學院的一年級學生。您的書獲得了極大的好評。您有計劃未來再寫作嗎？如果有，您會考慮涵蓋什麼主題，為什麼？好的，我確實有。

I'm sure that I'll write another book. I don't expect to write another biography similar to this one because a subject were the following this one. I can't think of what would be. I have enough material to write a very interesting investment book and I would be very likely to be writing about some of what I talked about tonight. But I've thought about some other ideas and it's best to just kind of keep them here. Hey, yes. Hey, Alice and thank you for the insights in the book. One of the things I thought was interesting is giving your background is an insurance analyst and his experience with a guy go. When he stepped in in the early 70s, it was considered, and I think you mentioned in the book, he said to somebody, "I might have put money to work where I could lose all of it." But also if I remember correctly, you talked about how he said to Solomon, he said, "The God for you know what, I'll backstop this." So although that sounds contradictory, it also sounds like maybe he was gaming it because he could recapitalize it if they had their signal if they still had a durable competitive advantage, even net of their gross liabilities. Is that the right interpretation that I missed something? I think there was a similarity between the two situations in both cases he knew that his reputation was the backstop. He said I put something into a situation where I could lose all my money tomorrow, but honestly, the margin of safety was himself.
我確信我會再寫一本書。我不指望再寫一本類似這樣的傳記，因為接下來的主題會是這樣的。我想不出會是什麼。我有足夠的材料來寫一本非常有趣的投資書，而且我很可能會寫一些今晚談到的內容。但我也考慮過其他一些想法，最好還是把它們留在這裡。嘿，是的。嘿，愛麗絲，謝謝你在書中的見解。我認為有趣的一件事是，考慮到你的背景是一名保險分析師，以及他與某個人的經歷。當他在 70 年代初介入時，這被認為是，我想你在書中提到過，他對某人說：「我可能把錢投在可能會全部虧光的地方。」但同樣，如果我沒記錯的話，你也談到他對所羅門說的話，他說：「你知道嗎，我會支持這個。」所以雖然這聽起來矛盾，但也許他是在玩遊戲，因為如果他們有信號，如果他們仍然擁有持久的競爭優勢，即使扣除他們的總負債，他也可以重新資本化。 我是否錯過了什麼，這樣的解讀正確嗎？我認為這兩種情況之間存在相似性，在兩種情況下，他都清楚自己的聲譽是最後防線。他說，我把資金投入一個明天可能血本無歸的處境，但說實話，安全邊際就是他自己。

And with Solomon, I don't think he knew he'd have to call upon it, but basically he was selling his reputation to them, and that's why he got the high price. And in the end, he actually had the region and pulled that reputation out and used it. Something that was very painful for him. I don't think he ever thought he would have to do it, but I think that's what the situation is actually having common. He was the margin of safety. Okay, thanks.
至於所羅門，我不認為他當時預料到會需要動用這份聲譽，但基本上他是把自己的名聲賣給了他們，所以才獲得高價。最終，他確實擁有這份聲譽並動用了它。這對他而言是非常痛苦的經歷。我不覺得他曾想過自己會走到這一步，但我認為這正是兩者實際上的共通點。他本身就是那個安全邊際。好的，謝謝。

Anybody else? I have one, Laura. I guess. A lot of Berkshire's success has come from Warren Buffett's partnership with Charlie Munger. Can you describe the dynamics of that and how that contributes to the company's success? Yeah, historically, Charlie Munger was somebody who kind of kept Warren on the straight in era because he's one of the few people that really will challenge Warren's thinking. Warren is sort of awe-inspiring, and there aren't a lot of people who will tell him that he's wrong, and Warren does not listen to advice.
還有其他人嗎？我有一個問題，勞拉。我想。波克夏的成功很大程度上來自於華倫·巴菲特與查理·蒙格的合作關係。你能描述一下這種互動的動態，以及它如何促成公司的成功嗎？是的，從歷史上看，查理·蒙格是那種能讓華倫保持正直的人，因為他是少數真正會挑戰華倫想法的人之一。華倫有點令人敬畏，沒有多少人會告訴他他錯了，而且華倫不聽取建議。

I mean, he really doesn't even listen to advice from Charlie. He has the saying, "When I get up in the morning, I look in the mirror," and at that point, everybody's had their say. And that's the truth. He really, I mean, you should try giving him advice. I have, believe me, you see it. You literally see his eyes kind of go off into some weird direction. He does not listen. So Charlie is somebody that he actually listens to. In the early days, of course, that changed Warren's investing style because Charlie kept getting him to focus on good companies, quality companies, good companies, quality companies, these days, they're social friends. Charlie doesn't have any role at all in running Berkshire, and he kind of makes jokes about that, but they're social friends. Step to the mic. What messages and teachings that Mr. Buffett gives to younger folks like me and just call the students in general, thank you. Well, I think that the most important thing that he tells students that I've heard him say that I hope people really listen to is to follow your passion to do what you really want to do and not waste time with resume filling jobs. And not work for anybody who makes your stomach turn because you can't really get ahead that way. It may seem like it for a while, but in the end, the odds are better if you really love what you're doing that you'll really, really succeed. So. All you have to do is walk to the mic. John McFarlane is a good for a question. Thank you. Question, I mean, this is something really surprised me and you touched on it, Alice.
我的意思是，他甚至不太聽取查理的建議。他有句名言：「每天早上我照鏡子時，」那一刻就代表所有人的意見都已說完。事實就是如此。真的，我是說，你該試試給他建議。相信我，我試過，你會看到。你真的會看到他的眼神飄向某個奇怪的方向。他根本不聽。所以查理是少數他真正會聽的人。早年當然這改變了華倫的投資風格，因為查理不斷讓他專注於好公司、優質企業，這些年來他們成了社交朋友。查理在波克夏的營運上完全沒有任何角色，他還常拿這開玩笑，但他們是社交朋友。請到麥克風前。巴菲特先生給像我這樣的年輕人以及學生們什麼訊息和教誨？謝謝。嗯，我認為他告訴學生最重要的事——這是我聽他說過且希望人們真正聽進去的——就是追隨熱情，做你真正想做的事，別把時間浪費在填充履歷的工作上。 不要為任何讓你反胃的人工作，因為那樣你不可能真正出人頭地。短期或許看似可行，但長遠來看，若真心熱愛所做的事，成功的機率會大得多。所以，你只需走向麥克風。約翰·麥克法蘭準備好提問了。謝謝。問題是，這點確實讓我驚訝，愛麗絲，你剛才也提到了。

You know, having watched how painful the song and experience for war and was, were you surprised that he invested in Goldman? And why do you think he did it? I was a little surprised because he's taking some of the same risks. So I think he's had a longer time to get to know Goldman's management over decades and I think he's more comfortable that he understands the inner workings of that bank, but it's still an investment bank. I think that Warren has been impulsive once or twice in his career in Solomon was a case where he fell in love with John Goodfrent. Warren loves Goldman's management. He's getting another rich premium to do it, just like with Solomon.
你知道，目睹了戰爭及其帶來的痛苦經歷後，你是否對他投資高盛感到意外？你認為他為何這麼做？我有些驚訝，因為他承擔了類似的風險。我想他花了更長時間去了解高盛的管理層，經過數十年的觀察，他對該銀行的內部運作更加放心，但它終究是一家投資銀行。我認為華倫在職業生涯中曾有一兩次衝動之舉，所羅門就是個例子，當時他迷上了約翰·古特弗倫特。華倫欣賞高盛的管理團隊，這次他同樣獲得了豐厚溢價，就像當年的所羅門一樣。

I do think the one factor that's different is that Goldman is going to be transformed into a de-leveraged commercial bank and it's going to be operated with different regulation. And that is enough of a factor that I could say, okay, I can understand this. But yeah, it is kind of similar. Yes, that's, yeah, and that's the other problem is that he really doesn't, Warren doesn't love paying people to begin with. I mean, that's something that he does, I won't say reluctantly, but you hear him say, so and so it would take three people to replace them and then that's true and then they wonder, why am I not getting paid three times as much?
我確實認為有一個不同的因素在於，高盛將轉型為去槓桿化的商業銀行，並將在不同的監管下運作。這一點足以讓我說，好吧，我可以理解這一點。但沒錯，這在某種程度上是相似的。是的，就是這樣，而另一個問題是，他其實並不——華倫一開始就不喜歡付錢給別人。我的意思是，這是他會做的事，我不會說他不情願，但你聽他說過，要取代某人需要三個人，這是事實，然後他們會想，為什麼我的薪水沒有三倍那麼多？

I mean, the people who work for a Berkshire Hathaway are not paid wall streeters or even like they might make somewhere else. So when he started being on the board of Solomon, he was just stunned at the way people in Wall Street are paid and really almost with a moral kind of repugments at it. And there were some justification to that because it's a heads, they win, tails, they don't lose situation. So Goldman, yeah, I mean, he's not on the board and somehow he's reconciled himself to this. Yeah. Now as we talked about this a little the other day, but given the deep dive you did with both Buffet and Berkshire and given your background and the insurance industry, I don't know the industry that well, but it certainly appears the company's trading and a meaningful discount to the group. What do your thoughts? It just seems like the tremendous disconnect, particularly the way you describe the company and they don't take cat risk. Is it just connect for me? What am I missing? Well, I always found as now is that the way Berkshire traded and the actual value of the company didn't have much connection to each other, they're just wasn't a connection. And particularly it was rare that you ever saw and I think this is true of stocks in general. Companies that don't, there's not a penalty for taking excessive risk, which also means there's not a reward for taking less risk. The only way you see it is over a long period of time where a company like Berkshire is able to build its book value and that weren't at the same time don't go back to go. So you see these other companies that are losing billions of dollars because they've taken the risk, their stocks are getting killed, what Berkshire isn't. So to some extent they're not going backwards. In terms of the value, it's trading at what you could argue as a discount to its fair value.
我的意思是，為波克夏·海瑟威工作的人，他們的薪酬並非華爾街水準，甚至可能不如在其他地方賺得多。所以當他開始擔任所羅門兄弟的董事時，他對華爾街人士的薪酬方式感到震驚，幾乎帶著一種道德上的厭惡。這確實有其道理，因為這是一種「正面我贏，反面我不輸」的局面。至於高盛，沒錯，他並不在董事會，但不知怎地他已經接受了這一點。是的。我們前幾天稍微談到這個，但考慮到你對巴菲特和波克夏的深入研究，以及你在保險業的背景——我對這行業不太熟悉，但這家公司顯然是以相對於同業顯著的折價在交易。你怎麼看？這似乎存在巨大的脫節，特別是你描述公司的方式，而且他們不承擔巨災風險。是我理解有誤嗎？我漏掉了什麼？嗯，我一直以來都發現，波克夏的交易方式與公司的實際價值之間沒有太多關聯，它們之間就是缺乏聯繫。 特別是，你很少看到——我認為這對股票來說普遍適用——那些公司不會因為承擔過度風險而受到懲罰，這也意味著承擔較少風險並不會獲得回報。唯一能看出這一點的方式是經過很長一段時間，像波克夏這樣的公司能夠累積其帳面價值，同時不會倒退。所以你會看到其他公司因為冒險而損失數十億美元，它們的股價暴跌，而波克夏卻沒有。因此，從某種程度上來說，它們並沒有倒退。就價值而言，你可以說它目前的交易價格低於其公平價值。

It's not the cheapest it's ever been, but it's certainly not getting the premium that you might think that may be because of orange age. Please. I was interested in hearing more about your relationship as a research analyst and some of the content of your research reports specifically your philosophy for evaluation of Berkshire. That kind of thing. Well, it's been five years since I've done any research on Berkshire, but I had a model that I used where I basically valued the flow of the company and looked at its future growth and then in effect added that to the book value or put a PE on the rest of the earnings. It was a very, you know, I suggest that people use their own growth assumptions because it could be anything. I don't have it in front of me, but I believe it's published on the internet if anybody would like to have a copy of it. Yes. Alice, I'm really interested in your view of the managers of Berkshire and the ability of Berkshire to retain them after Warren Buffett. Yeah. A lot of them are actually quite old and they won't be retainable anyway, you know, because they're it's time for them to be retired. And there's some that I think are hanging around because they like working for Warren. So that's going to be a very significant challenge that the next CEO will face. Now they've got successors that they've identified for Warren.
這並不是它歷來最便宜的價格，但也絕對沒有像你可能因為「橙色時代」而想像的那樣享有溢價。請繼續。我很有興趣聽聽你作為研究分析師的關係，以及你研究報告中的一些具體內容，特別是你在評估波克夏時的哲學。這類事情。嗯，我已經有五年沒有對波克夏進行任何研究了，但我曾經使用過一個模型，基本上是評估公司的現金流，並觀察其未來增長，然後實際上將這些加到帳面價值上，或對其餘收益應用市盈率。這是一個非常...你知道的，我建議人們使用他們自己的增長假設，因為這可能是任何情況。我手邊沒有這個模型，但我相信如果有人想要一份副本的話，它已經在網上發表了。是的。愛麗絲，我對你對波克夏管理層的看法，以及波克夏在華倫·巴菲特之後留住他們的能力非常感興趣。是的。他們中的許多人實際上已經相當年長，無論如何都無法留住，你知道的，因為他們是時候該退休了。 有些人之所以留下來，是因為他們喜歡為華倫工作。因此，這將是下一任執行長面臨的一個非常重大的挑戰。現在他們已經為華倫確定了接班人。

I think another challenge, the next CEO will face is are those the right people because he's let the managers name their own successors. You know, it's going to be a challenge. It really a lot of it depends on who they pick. They could make a great or a terrible decision of choosing the next CEO, the board could. Hi, I'm Joseph Matthew my first director at Darden. Not at the risk of getting too granular. Kind of interested in the scratch notes that you were talking about and the one case you're talking about. If someone who was who is very quantitatively oriented and knows Excel looked at that and put it into a model, do you think that people could understand what's going on inside Warren's head when he's trying to value a company and then try and actually replicate that? Yes, I mean what you would see is a column that said sales and a column that said expenses and a column that said profits and it would have Kentucky plant, you know, Louisville plant, Kansas City plant, this plant, that plant and it would have first quarter, second quarter, third quarter, fourth quarter, and then it would end with the last quarter that was reported. That's what it is, that's all it is. And that the difference from a model is it would not add the quarters up and it would not project anything into the future, nothing.
我認為下一位執行長將面臨的另一個挑戰是，這些人選是否合適，因為他讓經理們自行提名繼任者。你知道，這將會是個挑戰。很大程度上取決於他們選擇誰。董事會可能做出選擇下一位執行長的絕佳或糟糕決定。嗨，我是約瑟夫·馬修，我在達頓的第一位導師。在不至於過於細分的風險下，我對你提到的草稿筆記和你談到的那個案例很感興趣。如果一個非常注重量化分析且精通 Excel 的人看了那些筆記並將其建模，你認為人們能理解華倫在評估一家公司價值時的思考過程，並嘗試實際複製嗎？是的，我的意思是，你會看到一欄標示銷售額，一欄標示支出，一欄標示利潤，然後會有肯塔基廠、路易斯維爾廠、堪薩斯城廠、這個廠、那個廠，以及第一季、第二季、第三季、第四季，最後以最近報告的那一季作結。就是這樣，僅此而已。 而與模型的不同之處在於，它不會將季度相加，也不會對未來做出任何預測，完全沒有。

So in other words, he looked at what had been reported and he said they've had a million in sales, they've earned this many thousand. I want this much. They've earned this. I want this. But yes, no. That's the decision. And the margin of safety. I mean, there's a saying, let me call it to mine. I think it's from the intelligent investor that the margin of safety, the purpose of the margin of safety is to render a forecast unnecessary. Yeah. Let's do one more question. Now, I'm a little bit of a different note. A number of political pundits are throwing out Mr. Buffett's name as a potential candidate for the next secretary of treasury under President electobama. For me experience with Mr. Buffett, do you really think this would be something he would be willing to leave, Berkshire, for that is to take a role in Mr. Bomba's cabinet? He would have to be shot with a blowdark and dragged and changed to Washington to do this. I think they've already sort of sent my announced to the candidates are and the reason he's not one of them is because he would never ever, he would never be taken away from Berkshire. He would never spend his day in meetings. He would never let somebody else schedule his time. But there's going to be a kitchen cabinet of informal advisors. He did that for Schwarzenegger, held to for Obama. Okay. All right. Alice, I want to thank you so much. I mentioned earlier a couple of things. One was that we have gifts for all our presenters, but they weren't going to receive those in real time.
換句話說，他審視了已公布的數據後表示，他們有百萬銷售額，賺了這麼多錢。我要這麼多。他們賺了這些。我要這些。但沒錯，就這樣決定了。至於安全邊際，我想引用一句話——或許出自《智慧型投資人》——安全邊際的存在，就是為了讓預測變得不再必要。好，我們再談一個問題。現在換個話題，不少政治評論員將巴菲特先生列為歐巴馬當選總統後下一任財政部長的潛在人選。根據你與巴菲特先生共事的經驗，你認為他真會願意離開波克夏，去擔任歐巴馬內閣的職務嗎？除非被人用吹箭射中、五花大綁拖去華盛頓，否則他絕不可能答應。我想他們已經公布候選人名單了，而他不在其中，正是因為他永遠、永遠不會離開波克夏。他絕不願意把時間耗在開會上。 他從不讓他人安排自己的時間。但會有一個非正式的顧問團。他為阿諾·史瓦辛格這樣做過，也為歐巴馬維持這個模式。好的。愛麗絲，非常感謝妳。我稍早提到幾件事，一是我們為所有講者準備了禮物，但不會即時贈送。

We're making an exception in your case. So we do have a small gift for you. I also said early when we started the conference that Mr. Jefferson, as we referred to him, would be very proud of what we're doing here as part of his academic village in his university. He also said in a relationship he had with another of our forefathers. Some 200 years ago, I don't think the parallel between Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger would work, but had very interesting relationship with John Adams. And he once told John that I cannot live without books.
我們為妳破例。所以確實準備了小禮物。會議開始時我也提過，我們所稱的傑佛遜先生，會為我們在他學術村與大學裡進行的活動感到驕傲。200 年前他與另一位開國元勳的關係中曾說過——雖然我不認為華倫·巴菲特與查理·蒙格的類比適用——但與約翰·亞當斯確實有段耐人尋味的交情。他曾告訴約翰：「沒有書我活不下去。」

And I think that's appropriate. This gift has that quote replicated. And we thank you so much for being with us. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much. [APPLAUSE]
我想這很合適。這份禮物複製了那句名言。非常感謝妳的參與。謝謝。謝謝。非常感謝。[掌聲]

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以下是富途文章轉發（一開始是在富途上看到的）

週末讀物 | 18年年化33%！《滾雪球》作者詳解巴菲特一筆鮮爲人知的個人投資，完整還原他的真實決策邏輯

來源：聰明投資者

在談論禾倫·巴菲特時，很多人習慣聚焦在那些耳熟能詳的標籤：長揸、價值投資、複利奇蹟。但如果想真正理解，他爲什麼能持續幾十年擊敗市場，僅靠這些表面印象遠遠不夠。

2008年，《滾雪球》作者愛麗絲·施羅德（Alice Schroeder）在弗吉尼亞大學價值投資會議的一場演講中，詳細還原了巴菲特一次非常經典且鮮爲人知的私人投資——中部穿孔卡公司（Midcontinent Tab Card Company）。

作爲巴菲特的傳記作者，她曾有機會近距離接觸巴菲特及其最核心的圈子，擁有獨一無二的觀察視角。

這場演講真正與衆不同之處在於：施羅德特別強調了巴菲特作爲賠率評估者的思考邏輯。

與一般人想象的不同，巴菲特的成功，並不是依靠複雜模型或者超前預測。他像一個賽馬下注師，第一步永遠是問自己：這項投資有沒有災難性風險？如果有，立即拒絕，不再浪費時間。

這種極端注重賠率評估和風險排查的思維方式，是他投資方法的出發點，也是他在長期戰役中屹立不倒的根基。

在這場演講中，愛麗絲·施羅德也特別強調了巴菲特鮮爲人知的一面：

他從不建複雜財務模型，只關注最核心的幾組數據；

他設定15%的初始回報率作爲底線，追求合理賠率，而不是貪婪幻想；

他靠持續學習和累積知識，構建了一個龐大的「資料檔案櫃」，使得判斷決策迅速且準確。

更重要的是，這裏揭示了巴菲特極少對外強調的一條原則——不要被打回原點。

無論是投資單一公司，還是評估整個市場，他始終把安全邊際作爲第一要務，把容錯率放在最優先的位置。正是這種思維，讓他能在每一次風暴中守住基本盤，等待新機會。

今天，當很多人還在熱衷於建模、預測、追逐風口時，也許我們應該重新審視這場演講背後所呈現的投資智慧。

就像愛麗絲·施羅德最後所說的：真正決定成敗的，是那份發自內心的內在記分卡，以及一次又一次堅持正確做事的習慣。

非常讓人過癮的一個案例分享！

以下是演講和問答部分，聰明投資者精譯分享給大家。


1、巴菲特養成的那些好習慣

今天能來到這裏，尤其是在這樣一個金融動盪、危機四起的時刻，來談論禾倫·巴菲特，對我來說是一種真正的榮幸。

正如大家所知道的，巴菲特是我們這個時代唯一一個真正實現了自己願望的人——富到當他開一張支票時，是銀行跳票了，而不是他自己跳票。（笑）

他在今天這個時代，確實是一個獨一無二的存在。

當我開始着手寫《滾雪球》的時候，時代背景非常不同。那時互聯網泡沫剛剛破裂，安然事件也剛過去不久。

我當時完全沒預料到，會遇到今天這樣一場席捲全球的金融危機。

但我知道巴菲特的本質是什麼，他的觀念和原則，在五十年裏幾乎沒有改變過。

我花了整整2,000個小時與巴菲特相處，翻閱了他所有的文件，問了他所有想問的問題，探討了無數商業難題。

巴菲特總是說投資很簡單，只要掌握幾個簡單的原則，如果資金規模小，他甚至可以做到每年50%的回報率。

但很多人都對我說：「我資金規模也不大啊！如果真的這麼簡單，爲什麼我賺不到50%的年回報？」（笑）

所以問題來了：到底是巴菲特天賦異稟？還是我們其他人太笨？又或者，真正的答案，其實在兩者之間？

我的結論是：真相，就藏在中間。

我確信，在禾倫的辦公室某個角落，一定藏着一隻「聖盃」。事實上，儘管禾倫非常聰明，也確實與常人不同，但這裏面還有更深一層的東西。

他總能把複雜的事情做得看似輕鬆，而且，他自己其實很難真正意識到，或者說承認，自己到底有多努力。

就像讓一條魚去描述水一樣——那是它生存的環境，早已習以爲常了。對禾倫·巴菲特來說，有些觀念已經深深地融入了他的骨子裏，他自己可能都未必能清晰地意識到。

這些理念在他心中扎根得太早、太牢。

舉個例子。

關於資產週轉，他有一條規則，「真正的投資者並不喜歡頻繁交易，因爲永遠告別一個老朋友，總是不那麼愉快。」

聽起來是不是很像禾倫自己說的話？或者像本傑明·格雷厄姆（Ben Graham）說的？

但實際上，這句話出自一本叫《債券推銷術》（Bond Salesmanship）的小冊子，作者是湯森德（Townsend）。禾倫七歲時讀到這本書，而且是他自己在聖誕節時指定要的禮物。

要知道，他小時候讀書，通常是一本書要讀四五遍，直到幾乎能背誦爲止。

很多觀念早早就在他心裏根深蒂固。很難區分哪些是他天生擁有的，哪些是小時候讀書時吸收的。

他在極早的年紀就不斷地得到這些觀念的強化。

那對我們這些沒有從小接受這種訓練的人來說，問題變成了：在禾倫的筆記和他腦中的知識庫裏，有哪些東西可以幫我們成爲更好的投資者？

我確實找到了一些線索。

但在講這些之前，我想先回顧一下，價值投資中反覆出現的四個核心概念：

第一，內在價值，尤其是結合菲利普·費雪（Phil Fisher）提出的定性分析方法，應用在評估內在價值上；

第二，忽略市場先生的情緒波動；

第三，過度換手和過度分散導致的收益拖累；

第四，也是最重要的一點，安全邊際，本傑明·格雷厄姆提出的，可能是投資史上最重要的思想。這些概念當然都很重要。

但是，當我親身花大量時間觀察禾倫·巴菲特時，我發現，他雖然遵循這些原則，但他真正的投資方法，跟一般人理解的還是有些不同的。

所以接下來，我想帶大家走一小段旅程，通過一個具體的投資案例，來展現他實際是怎麼做決策的。

這個案例在《滾雪球》裏沒有寫進去，因爲篇幅所限被刪掉了。

它其實很好地說明了書裏提到的某些原則，但本身太技術化，太高階，不太適合大衆讀者。

在正式講這個案例之前，還有一個重要的前提要說清楚，禾倫的大部分成功，源自於他長期養成的好習慣。

這點一定要強調。

他經常引用的一句話是，「壞習慣的鎖鏈，在感覺不到時就已經牢牢套在你身上了。」

當然，他指的是壞習慣。

而亞里士多德更早就說過，「我們所反覆做的事情，造就了我們自己。卓越，不是一次性的行爲，而是一種習慣。」

禾倫·巴菲特就是典型的習慣性動物。他養成的第一個習慣是勤奮工作。

在《滾雪球》一書中，我反覆寫到他早年是怎麼工作的：

他會到美國證券交易委員會（SEC），親自翻閱紙質檔案，那時還沒有電子數據庫；

他跑到州保險監管部門的地下室裏，查閱沉重的文件；

他會一個一個敲企業的門，親自找管理層交談——哪怕被人嫌棄，說「你是個麻煩精，走開」；

他還指揮助手丹·莫南（Dan Monen）在內布拉斯加州各地到處奔走，悄悄收購國家美國保險公司（National American Insurance）的股票。

他始終不停地思考：「我還能多做點什麼？我還能怎樣獲得比別人更多的優勢？」

當然，現在很多事情在今天已經不可複製了。信息已經電子化了，人人都能查到；而當年巴菲特掌握的一些信息，現在也可能被歸爲「內幕消息」，不能再使用。

但勤奮主動挖掘信息、尋求競爭優勢這個基本原則，今天依然成立。

今天早些時候，我還和一位朋友聊到，禾倫·巴菲特那種近乎執着的工作投入，普通人是無法想象的。

但對於那些真正能夠持續做到的人，市場最終會給予回報。

禾倫·巴菲特真正打磨出來的最重要能力是學習。

就像查理·芒格形容的，他是一個學習機器，而且他的學習是累積性的。這種不斷累積的學習，給他在商業上帶來了巨大的優勢。

禾倫從很小的時候開始，就坐在父親的證券經紀辦公室裏，一頁一頁地讀財務報表，研究成千上萬家企業的描述，反覆琢磨，涉及幾十、上百個不同行業。

這就是爲什麼，今天當有人向他推介一個生意時，他能幾乎瞬間做出判斷：「可以」或者「不可以」。

因爲他的腦海中，已經建立了一個龐大的、深不可測的資料檔案櫃。當然，有一副接近照相記憶的天賦是有幫助的，而他確實有這種接近天才的記憶力。但更重要的是，這種龐大的知識儲備，是他不斷學習、不斷積累的結果。

而且，他選擇的是一個知識可以層層累積、不斷疊加的領域。在投資這個領域裏，每學到一點東西，都不會白費，都可以成爲下一次決策的基礎。

這一點，對我們每一個想成爲更好投資者的人來說，都是值得深思的。

講到這裏，其實還沒有太多神祕感。

讀過《滾雪球》的人都知道，禾倫·巴菲特是如何刻苦工作、持續學習的。

但我想補充的是，除了這些，他成功的原因還有另外三個核心因素，而且我想用一個跟他平時公開描述略有不同的角度來講：賠率評估、複利效應、安全邊際，這三個概念，是禾倫在投資時互相配合使用的核心武器。

他實際運用的方法，跟他對外解釋的版本，有一些微妙而重要的不同。

這三個概念，在《滾雪球》中我都有涉及。

但今天，我想帶大家通過一個具體的投資案例，來看他是怎麼實際應用的。

這個案例是中部穿孔卡公司（Midcontinent Tab Card Company），一筆禾倫用個人資金（而不是合夥基金）做的私人投資。


2、一個鮮爲人知的經典案例

在進入案例之前，簡單介紹一下背景：

在1950年代，禾倫並不用計算機，但他非常清楚計算機產業的發展。

當時的 $IBM Corp (IBM.US)$ ，是唯一一家規模可觀、具有行業地位的計算機公司。

禾倫的姑媽凱蒂和她的丈夫弗雷德，打算投資一家新成立的公司控制數據公司（Control Data），這家公司由凱蒂弟弟比爾·諾里斯（Bill Norris）創辦，目的是要挑戰IBM。

諾里斯認爲IBM過於遲緩、官僚，想自己幹一番事業。

禾倫勸凱蒂和弗雷德不要投資Control Data，他對他們說：「誰需要另一家計算機公司呢？」

這句話後來也成了人們經常拿來調侃他的「經典名句」（話說太早，結果被打臉）。因爲凱蒂和弗雷德最終還是投了這家公司，而且賺了很多錢。

這個故事特別有意思的是，禾倫之所以勸他們不要投資，不是出於無知，恰恰是因爲他對IBM了解得非常深。

自1952年起，禾倫就開始系統研究IBM，當時IBM正因爲涉嫌壟斷被美國司法部起訴。

雖然他很早就把IBM劃出自己的能力圈，但他仍然詳細研究了這家公司的財務狀況。

他認爲：即使未來有一天IBM被司法部拆分；即使面臨外部競爭；IBM強大的壟斷地位依然幾乎不可動搖。

而禾倫一向喜歡壟斷型企業。所以他推斷，去挑戰IBM，基本上是徒勞無功的。

然後發生了什麼？

IBM最後與司法部達成和解。根據和解協議，IBM被迫剝離掉一部分業務——穿孔卡業務。

穿孔卡是什麼？在數字計算機普及之前，計算機是通過讀取打孔卡來運作的。這些卡片上打了很多孔，通過機械方式送入電腦，被機器讀取。

穿孔卡業務，在IBM龐大的業務體系中，只是很小的一部分，但因爲它幾乎沒有成本，所以毛利率極高——超過50%。

實際上，這是當時IBM利潤率最高的業務！

而且正因爲穿孔卡看似無關緊要，所以IBM在價格上有很大的加價空間。

禾倫的兩位朋友，韋恩·伊夫斯（Wayne Eves）和約翰·克利裏（John Cleary），看到了機會。

他們知道IBM不得不出售穿孔卡業務，於是計劃買下一臺Carroll印刷機（專門製作穿孔卡的機器），然後在中西部地區與IBM展開競爭。

這就是中部穿孔卡公司的由來。

韋恩·伊夫斯和約翰·克利裏說服禾倫，「我們可以更快交貨，服務也更好。」

他們問禾倫，你覺得我們應該投資這家公司嗎？你願不願意跟我們一起進來？

禾倫回答了一個字：不。

那爲什麼他說「不」呢？

並不是因爲這是科技行業。真正的原因是，他按照自己投資流程中的第一步進行了判斷，而這也是我認爲他最自然、但外界最容易誤解的一部分。

禾倫像一個賽馬下注師那樣行事。

他的投資第一步，永遠是：「這個生意有沒有可能因爲某種災難性風險而徹底失敗？」

如果有，即便只是小概率，他也會立刻停止思考，直接拒絕。

而且這是與大多數投資者完全相反的順序：大多數人是先發現一個有趣的想法；然後去算賬、看財務、做預測；最後才問一句：「會不會出什麼問題？」

但禾倫一開始就問，「什麼地方可能出問題？」

在這個案例裏，他的判斷是，一家初創企業，直接挑戰IBM？失敗的風險太大。

所以他乾脆利落地拒絕了。拒絕之後，他也不再繼續思考這件事。

但是，韋恩和約翰還是自己推進了這家新公司。

一年之內，他們已經做到每月印製3500萬張穿孔卡，生意非常成功。

到了這個時候，他們需要擴產，需要買更多的Carroll印刷機。於是他們又去找禾倫：「我們需要資金擴張，你要不要進來？」

這一次，禾倫感興趣了。

因爲災難性風險的因素已經消除了，他們已經在市場上成功地對抗了IBM。

於是禾倫開始問他們要詳細的數字。

他們告訴禾倫，公司資本週轉速度是一年7次，每台Carroll印刷機的成本是78,000美元，每次跑一輪卡片，能賺超過11,000美元。

相當於一年一臺機器賺的錢，足夠再買一臺新機器。

禾倫聽了非常感興趣。

他們的凈利潤率高達40%，這幾乎是禾倫遇到過的最賺錢的生意之一。

值得注意的是，到了1959年，禾倫已經經營他的投資合夥企業兩年半，開始有人主動送特別機會給他了。

但此時，還沒有人知道他是一個偉大的股票投資者，他還沒有建立起那種響亮的投資記錄。

大家找他，是因爲他對商業了解極其深刻，而且他起步早，手上已經有了相當可觀的資金。

所以這是禾倫·巴菲特非常有趣的一點：

早在1959年，就像今天高盛、通用電氣找他一樣，已經有人開始給他送上特別交易機會了。

最終，他決定投資這家公司。

不過，有趣的是：他一開始並沒有接受韋恩和約翰提出的條件。

當然面對韋恩和約翰給出的數字非常誘人，禾倫最後還是動心了。他依然按照賽馬下注師的方式來思考，而這又是他和幾乎所有其他投資者最大的不同。

我認識的大部分分析師，遇到這種機會，通常會怎麼做？

他們會建立一個詳細的模型，預測這家公司的未來盈利，計算投資回報率，做出一套完整的未來預期。

但禾倫不是。他從不做這種模型。事實上，我翻閱過他成百上千份投資檔案，從來沒見過任何類似財務模型的東西。

他做的是：像賽馬下注師那樣，只挑出一兩項最關鍵的因素，判斷這家公司能否成功。

在這家公司的案例裏，這兩個關鍵因素是：銷售增長和成本優勢能否持續。

然後，禾倫把每一個工廠的季度數據全部蒐集起來，一筆筆記錄下來。同時，他儘可能收集了所有競爭對手的類似數據。

他手工在幾頁紙上密密麻麻寫滿了這些信息，仔細研究。

最後，他給出的是一個是/否的決策。

當時的數據是：利潤率36%，年增長率超過70%，銷售額從100萬美元開始快速增長。

他非常詳細地研究了這些歷史數據，就像一個下注者反覆研究每一匹賽馬的戰績單。

然後，他對自己說，我希望在200萬美元的銷售額上，獲得15%的回報。

他判斷可以做到，於是決定投資。

注意，他在這句話裏，實際上已經把整個盈利模型、複利效應、貼現現金流分析全部濃縮進去了。

爲什麼是15%？因爲禾倫一貫的心態就是：不貪心。

他總是希望能夠獲得15%的初時回報（Day One Return），然後在這個基礎上讓收益複利增長。

這就是他一直以來的目標。他對此感到非常滿足。

（現場沒有笑，愛麗絲還半開玩笑問：「大家怎麼都沒笑呢？」）

而且，這個200萬美元的銷售額目標其實也很簡單，當時他們已經有100萬美元的銷售額，正以70%以上的速度增長，利潤率36%。

他保守起見，只取一半利潤進行評估，所以整體有着很大的安全邊際。

最後，禾倫用自己私人賬戶（不是合夥企業的錢）投資了60,000美元，大約是他當時個人淨資產的20%。

他拿到了這家公司16%的股權，外加一部分次級債券（subordinated notes）。

他的思考過程非常簡單明瞭：看歷史數據；判斷有沒有15%初始回報；判斷有沒有災難性風險；然後做出決策。

整個過程中，沒有任何未來預測，沒有複雜的模型推演。

而且，我在研究他其他投資檔案時，也看到他一遍又一遍地以類似的方式做決策。

那麼後來發生了什麼呢？

這家公司改名爲數據文件公司（Data Documents），禾倫持有這筆投資18年，期間陸續又追加了大約100萬美元。到1979年，公司被皮克託格拉夫公司（Pictograph）收購。

這筆投資給禾倫帶來了年化33%的複合回報率，持續了18年。

成績相當驚人！

我之所以選這個案例，是因爲這是禾倫在GEICO之外，另一筆非常典型的案例，以本傑明·格雷厄姆式的低價，買到菲利普·費雪式的成長型公司。

這是我能找到的最生動的例子之一。

不過由於這是一筆私人投資，所以公開資料非常少。


3、巴菲特投資決策的思維邏輯

順便快進到今天。

爲什麼禾倫總是那麼警惕災難性風險？因爲，他心裏一直牢記着Firestone的「災難預警定律」，源自金融投資圈的一句老話：小概率災難只要發生一次，就足以顛覆一切。

禾倫永遠把這個教訓銘刻在心。

所以爲什麼今天的 $伯克希爾-A (BRK.A.US)$ （Berkshire Hathaway）沒有像很多其他公司一樣深陷危機？原因就在這裏。

禾倫之所以能避免很多投資災難，是因爲他總是堅持一個基本原則：第一步就問自己，有沒有災難性風險？如果答案是「有」，他就立刻拒絕，不再繼續思考。

比如說， $美國國際集團 (AIG.US)$ （AIG），我自己當年也曾誤判過很長一段時間，直到後來才醒悟。但禾倫從來沒有投資過AIG，就是因爲它有災難性風險。

還有貝爾斯登（Bear Stearns）和雷曼兄弟（Lehman Brothers），別人曾經拿這些公司向他推薦，但他也從未投資過，理由同樣是災難性風險。

通過這種方法，禾倫節省了大量的時間和精力。因爲如果一開始就排除了災難性風險，就不需要再去翻那些成堆的數據和歷史資料了。

這也是因爲禾倫非常注重效率。

而且他有一個很厲害的特質：一旦認定某個項目有災難性風險，他絕不會自欺欺人、也絕不會試圖說服自己改變初衷。

放到今天來看，爲什麼別人還在源源不斷地給他送特殊交易？像這次高盛和通用電氣這類交易。

禾倫依然堅持，盡最大努力避免災難性風險。他下注的對象，不只是公司管理層，還有他自己的投資聲譽；

這些交易，基本都保證了10%的最低迴報率，而禾倫最終還是想拿到15%的回報率。

當然，有時候他也會降低標準，接受稍低一點的回報。但每當他這麼做的時候，往往事後都會後悔。

而在整個市場層面，他也是用類似的思路來做判斷的。

比如最近，他說他覺得現在的股市具有吸引力。

這跟他1999年在太陽谷（Sun Valley）演講時講的一樣：當股市總市值與GDP的比例在70%到80%之間時，他認爲整體市場是值得投資的。

這是同樣的邏輯：整個股市當然不會歸零，在這個價格水平上，他有巨大的安全邊際。就像當年穿孔卡公司那樣，有高利潤、高增長，他還故意用更保守的預期來要求自己。

無論是買單個公司，還是買整體市場，禾倫的方法本質上沒有變過：只使用大量歷史數據，不做複雜預測；先問災難性風險；只在賠率合適時下注；接受短期波動，但着眼長期賠率。

我覺得真的很驚人。

就在我們今天交流的幾周前，市面上還有很多評論員在指責禾倫，說他這次投資高盛、GE，買入股票，判斷錯了。

但諷刺的是，這些評論員自己天天做錯誤預測，卻轉過頭來批評一個幾乎從未在重大預測上出錯的人。

在這裏，講到賠率評估（handicapping）時，我想引用一段出自《聰明的投資者》的話：安全邊際始終取決於你支付的價格。

如果大多數成長股的整體市價太高，無法爲買家提供足夠的安全邊際，那麼單純的分散投資策略，在這個領域也可能不會帶來理想的結果。

這段話其實不僅適用於個股，也適用於整個市場。

而禾倫·巴菲特有一點應該得到更多掌聲：他從來沒有鼓勵投資者「定投指數」。因爲盲目定投市場，不管價格高低，一直買入，是錯誤的做法。它曾經把無數投資者推向了懸崖。

而你從來沒聽禾倫建議過這種方式，這一點，他值得被高度肯定。

最後，我想說的是：謝謝大家耐心聽完這個故事。我希望這能讓你們對禾倫·巴菲特的思考方式有更深入的一點理解。

當然，巴菲特有些特質是無論多麼細緻分析都無法完全解釋清楚的。

他有一些東西，是神祕的，無法言傳的。有一件事，是大家可以向禾倫學習的，但前提是，它必須發自你內心深處。

有人說過，這一點禾倫很早就明白了：真正有資格告訴你能做到什麼的人，只有你自己。

他把這個稱爲自己的內在記分卡。

你比任何人都更了解自己，只有你自己才知道，你在一項事業上成功的決心到底有多強。

歸根結底，商業成功大約有90%依賴於一種難以名狀的東西，我們只能勉強用一個詞來稱呼它：膽識。

這段話出自一本書，叫做《賺一千元的一千種方法》（A Thousand Ways to Make a Thousand Dollars）。

謝謝大家。


4、問答環節

問題1 請問你未來有寫作新書的計劃嗎？如果有的話，你會想要寫哪方面的主題？爲什麼？

 愛麗絲·施羅德 我確定我還會再寫一本書。

不過，我不打算再寫一本像《滾雪球》這樣的傳記了。因爲要找到一個可以接續禾倫·巴菲特這樣重量級的人物，實在太難。

不過，我手上有足夠的素材，完全可以寫一本非常有趣的投資類書籍。

很可能會涉及我今晚分享過的一些內容。

當然，我還有一些其他想法，不過目前還是先保留在心裏吧。

（實際上直到現在，愛麗絲·施羅德沒有再出版新的書籍。超越自己的經典，確實太難了。）

問題2 愛麗絲，我注意到你有保險分析師的背景，而禾倫自己也有過GEICO的經驗。

在1970年代他介入GEICO時，據你在書裏提到的，他曾對別人說過：「我可能投了筆錢進去，明天就可能全賠光。」

但同時，我記得你也寫過，他當時對所羅門兄弟的古德弗蘭德說過：「我會給你們兜底。」

這聽起來好像有些矛盾，但又感覺禾倫是在精心佈局——只要一家企業的競爭優勢還在，即使短期負債問題嚴重，他也有能力再注資，把它重新做起來。

我的理解對嗎？還是我漏掉了什麼？

愛麗絲·施羅德 你的理解基本正確。

無論是GEICO還是所羅門，其實兩者有一個相似之處：在這兩種情況下，禾倫都知道，他的聲譽，就是最後的安全邊際。

他說過自己投入到一個可能明天就賠光的錢的局面中，但實際上，他心裏知道，真正的安全墊，就是他自己。

在所羅門案中，他一開始並沒有預料到自己真的需要動用這張聲譽王牌。

但後來事實證明，他必須親自出面，用自己的聲譽去挽救局面。這對他來說是非常痛苦的經歷。他本來並不希望走到這一步。

所以這兩次案例的共同點就是：當一切都不確定時，禾倫·巴菲特自己，就是最終的保險。

在很多情況下，他甚至不會聽取查理的意見。他有一句話是：「我每天早上照鏡子，那一刻起，所有人的意見就結束了。」

這是真的。你要試試看給他提建議，我試過，相信我。你會看到他的眼神突然飄到某個奇怪的地方——他根本不會聽。

所以，查理是他真正願意傾聽的人之一。尤其是在早期，查理影響了禾倫的投資風格，一直在引導他關注優質企業，關注高質量的公司。

而現在，他們更多是社交上的朋友了。查理在伯克希爾的經營中並沒有任何實質性角色，他自己也常常開玩笑說這一點，他們更多是私下裏的朋友關係了。

問題3 請問巴菲特先生會給像我這樣、或者給大學生們怎樣的建議呢？

愛麗絲·施羅德  我聽他最常給學生們講的一點，也是我希望大家認真聽進去的，就是：追隨你的激情，去做你真正熱愛的事情。

不要浪費時間在那種只是爲了填充簡歷的工作上，也不要爲那些讓你感到討厭的人打工。因爲你不可能在這種環境下真正取得長遠的進步。

也許短期內看起來沒問題，但從長期來看，如果你熱愛自己的工作，成功的概率會大得多。

問題4 這個問題我之前也和愛麗絲聊過，讓我很驚訝，經歷了所羅門事件的痛苦後，禾倫爲什麼還會投資高盛呢？你怎麼看？

 愛麗絲·施羅德  我也有點驚訝。因爲這裏面確實存在一些相似的風險。

不過，禾倫這次認識高盛的管理層已經幾十年了，他對這家銀行內部運作的理解要深入得多，所以他感覺更有把握。當然，高盛依然是一家投行，這一點沒有變。

我覺得禾倫一生中確實有那麼一兩次衝動的投資，所羅門就是一個例子，他當時非常喜歡約翰·古德弗蘭德。

而在高盛這裏，他同樣非常喜歡管理層，同時這筆投資也給了他豐厚的回報，就像當年的所羅門一樣。

不過，高盛正在轉型成一家去槓桿化的商業銀行，未來會受到更嚴格的監管。這一點，是我能夠理解他投資高盛的重要原因。雖然整體上，兩者還是有些相似的地方。

順便提一句，這也是他當年討厭法學院的原因之一。

禾倫本來就不喜歡給人開高薪。他經常說：「如果一個人能頂仨人用，那是真的厲害。」但接着問題來了，爲什麼他不拿三倍工資呢？

在伯克希爾，員工的薪資水平既比不上華爾街，也比不上其他很多地方。尤其是他進入所羅門董事會後，簡直被華爾街的薪酬體系驚到了，甚至有點道德上無法接受。他看到了一種「贏了自己拿走，輸了也不用負責」的局面。

至於高盛，禾倫沒有在董事會，所以他大概已經自己消化了這種矛盾吧。

 問題5 作爲研究過伯克希爾的專家，尤其也有保險行業背景，你怎麼看伯克希爾的股價似乎相對同業打了折？

 愛麗絲·施羅德 我在做分析師的時候就發現，伯克希爾的股價走勢和公司的實際價值之間，從來沒什麼關係。二者基本上是脫節的。

其實不僅僅是伯克希爾，很多公司也一樣。

在市場上，承擔過多風險的公司通常不會因此受到懲罰，相應地，也就沒有因爲控制風險而獲得獎勵。你只有在很長的時間跨度裏，才能真正看出區別。

伯克希爾之所以能不斷積累賬面價值，靠的是禾倫和查理堅持的一條原則：「不要被打回原點。」

你會看到，其他一些公司因爲承擔了過大的風險，最終損失了數十億美元，股價也暴跌。但伯克希爾沒有犯這樣的錯誤。他們至少沒有往後倒退。

至於估值，現在的伯克希爾股價，確實是低於其內在價值的。雖然不是歷史上最便宜的時候，但肯定也沒有得到它應有的溢價。這種情況，或許和禾倫的年齡有關。

問題6  我對你之前做研究分析師時的經歷很感興趣，特別是你在寫伯克希爾的研究報告時，是用怎樣的估值方法的？能分享一下嗎？

 愛麗絲·施羅德  當然。雖然已經有五年沒做伯克希爾的研究了，但當時我的方法是這樣的：在做伯克希爾的估值時，我會單獨對它的「浮存金」部分進行評估，預測未來增長潛力，並將這部分價值加回到公司的賬面價值上；至於剩餘的正常盈利部分，則通過市盈率（P/E）的方法進行估算。

當然，我也建議投資者根據自己的預期來調整增長假設，因爲未來的增速本身是有很大不確定性的。

我現在手頭沒有那份模型，但應該能在網上找到發佈過的版本，如果有興趣的話，可以去查閱一下。

 問題7 愛麗絲，你怎麼看伯克希爾的管理團隊？未來在沒有禾倫·巴菲特之後，公司有能力留住這些經理人嗎？

 愛麗絲·施羅德 實際上，伯克希爾現在的很多高管都已經很老了，本來也留不住太久了，是到了該退休的年紀了。

還有一些人，之所以還留在崗位上，很大程度上是因爲喜歡爲禾倫工作。所以未來這將是接班人面臨的一個重大挑戰。

雖然公司已經確定了接班人選，但我認爲，下一個CEO還需要面臨另一個問題：這些接班人是否真的合適？

現在的安排是，（旗下公司的）管理者自己挑選自己的繼任者。這一點，未來會不會成爲隱患，還很難說。

能不能選對人，將決定伯克希爾未來走向成功還是失敗。

問題8 我特別想聽聽你剛才提到的禾倫的草稿筆記。如果一個擅長Excel、很會做建模的人，把他的這些筆記拿去建個模型，能不能復現出禾倫腦子裏的思路？能不能理解他怎麼給公司估值的？

愛麗絲·施羅德  可以的。你會看到，他的筆記其實就是三列數據：銷售額、支出、利潤。

上面會寫着，比如肯塔基工廠、路易斯維爾工廠、堪薩斯城工廠……每一個工廠下面對應着1958年第一季度、第二季度、第三季度、第四季度的數據，一直填到最近一個已披露季度的數據。

但和普通的財務模型不同的是——這些數據不會被加總，也不會被外推到未來。屬於標準的零預測。

他的思考方式是這樣的：這家公司過去銷售了多少錢？賺了多少錢？那我需要的回報是多少？他們能做到嗎？可以還是不可以？能的話就投資，不能的話就放棄。

就是這麼簡單。然後，再留出一個足夠的安全邊際。

有一句話，出自《聰明的投資者》：安全邊際的目的，就是讓預測變得不重要。

這就是禾倫的方法。

問題9 換一個角度來問。最近不少政治評論員在討論，說巴菲特先生可能成爲奧巴馬總統當選後下一任財政部長的候選人。

從你對巴菲特先生的了解來看，你覺得他真的有可能願意離開伯克希爾，去出任奧巴馬政府的職務嗎？

 愛麗絲·施羅德 嗯……如果要讓他去的話，恐怕得用麻醉吹箭把他擊倒，然後再用鎖鏈把他拖去華盛頓。

我想其實現在已經半官方地公佈了財政部長候選人名單，而巴菲特之所以不在名單上，原因很簡單，他永遠不會離開伯克希爾。

他絕不會把一天的時間都耗在開會里，也絕不會讓別人來安排他的日程。

不過呢，他會作爲「幕後智囊圈」提供建議，就像他之前爲施瓦辛格和這次爲奧巴馬做的那樣。

 

=====

以下是爬文找到的QA內容

Alice Schroeder Q&A Transcript || Value Investing Conference (2008)
愛麗絲·施羅德問答實錄 || 價值投資大會 (2008 年)

"So much of Warren’s success has come from training himself into good habits," said Schroeder. "Warren is a creature of habit. He is the ultimate creature of habit."
"華倫的成功很大程度上來自於他培養出的良好習慣，"施羅德說道。"華倫是個習慣的產物。他是終極的習慣產物。"
Apr 29, 2025  2025 年 4 月 29 日

Back in 2008, Alice Schroeder took the stage on the opening night of that year’s Value Investing Conference at the University of Virginia — and delivered a glimpse into the captivating mind of Warren Buffett.
2008 年，愛麗絲·施羅德在維吉尼亞大學舉辦的價值投資大會開幕之夜登台——讓眾人得以一窺華倫·巴菲特那令人著迷的思維世界。

Drawing on her 2,000+ hours spent with Buffett while researching and writing The Snowball, she also unveiled insights into the legendary investor that go far beyond the pages of her acclaimed biography. Enjoy!
憑藉她為研究和撰寫《雪球》一書與巴菲特共度的 2000 多個小時，她還揭示了這位傳奇投資人遠超這本廣受好評傳記頁面之外的洞見。敬請欣賞！

John Macfarlane: As Alice [Schroeder] and I were walking into the theater this afternoon, we looked at it and said, “You know, that looks an awful lot like the Orpheum Theater in Omaha.” For those of you who have been to the Berkshire Hathaway meetings over ten years ago, you know exactly what that is.
約翰·麥克法蘭：今天下午當我和愛麗絲[施羅德]走進劇院時，我們看著它說：「你知道嗎，這看起來和奧馬哈的奧菲姆劇院非常像。」對於那些十年前參加過波克夏·海瑟威股東大會的人來說，你們一定知道我在說什麼。

We used to go to the meetings when shareholders could fit into that theater, which was probably about this size [or] maybe a little bit larger. Of course, that was before the B shares. So we’ve been going back for years and watched it migrate to Ak-Sar-Ben and then ultimately the Qwest Center.
我們以前參加股東大會時，股東們還能擠進那個劇院，大概就是這個大小[或]可能稍微大一點。當然，那是在 B 股發行之前。所以我們多年來一直參加，看著大會地點先遷至阿克薩本，最後落腳奎斯特中心。

Before I get to my comments about Alice, most of you guys probably know more than I’ll say about her. That is, those of you who are under 30 because she has a Facebook fan page — which I can’t view because my kids won’t let me or my wife be on Facebook.
在我開始談論愛麗絲之前，你們多數人對她的了解可能比我即將說的還要多。也就是說，那些 30 歲以下的你們，因為她有一個 Facebook 粉絲頁面——我無法查看，因為我的孩子們不讓我和我妻子使用 Facebook。

So you guys already know more than I do about Alice — and I’ll attempt to fill in for those of us who are over 30, 40, 50, [or] 60. (Laughs)
所以你們對愛麗絲的了解已經比我多——而我將嘗試為我們這些超過 30、40、50、[或]60 歲的人補充一些資訊。（笑）

Rarely do practitioners have the opportunity to watch the undisputed master of their discipline in real-time. We are truly fortunate to live in the age of Warren Buffett. As rare is to have the work of a master chronicled in exacting detail during their lifetime. Alice Schroeder accomplished just that with The Snowball. In 838 pages, she provides unique insight into the individual who has largely shaped the field of value investing over the past three to four decades — and for that, Alice, we’re deeply indebted to you for your work.
從業者很少有機會實時觀察到他們領域內無可爭議的大師。我們非常幸運生活在華倫·巴菲特的時代。同樣罕見的是，能夠在大師有生之年，以精確的細節記錄其工作。愛麗絲·施羅德通過《雪球》一書做到了這一點。在這 838 頁中，她提供了對這位在過去三到四十年間極大影響價值投資領域的個人的獨特見解——為此，愛麗絲，我們對你的工作深表感激。

Alice’s career began in accounting. While working for [the Financial Accounting Standards Board], she drafted some of the most important accounting standards affecting the insurance industry. She subsequently moved onto investment banking and ultimately, as many of you know, to research at Morgan Stanley where she became Institutional Investor’s top-ranked property and casualty insurance industry analyst. It was in that capacity that she met Warren and, as a result of a strong mutual respect, he granted her full access to his papers [and] to his family and friends to write his biography.
愛麗絲的職業生涯始於會計領域。在為[財務會計準則委員會]工作期間，她起草了一些影響保險業最重要的會計準則。隨後，她轉戰投資銀行業，最終，正如許多讀者所知，進入摩根士丹利從事研究工作，並成為《機構投資者》雜誌評選的財產與意外險行業頂級分析師。正是在這一職位上，她結識了華倫，基於彼此深厚的相互尊重，華倫給予她全面接觸其私人文件[及]家人朋友的權限，以撰寫其傳記。

What makes The Snowball so special in my opinion are, in combination, four distinguishing characteristics: First of all, Alice’s very deep understanding of finance and the insurance industry. Secondly, the unprecedented access that she had to Warren and his work. Thirdly, her persistence and attention to detail. And fourthly — and most importantly — the integrity with which she undertook the task.
我認為《雪球》之所以如此特別，在於它結合了四項鮮明特質：首先，愛麗絲對金融及保險業的深刻理解；其次，她獲得與華倫及其工作前所未有的接觸機會；第三，她的堅持不懈與對細節的關注；最後——也是最重要的——她執行這項任務時所秉持的誠信原則。

Based upon our countless conversations over the past several years, I can assure you that she was relentless in her verification of fact. For those of you who have read the book — or at least flipped through it — the footnotes are certainly testimony to that.
根據我們過去幾年無數次的對話，我可以向你保證，她在事實核查方面是不遺餘力的。對於那些讀過這本書——或者至少翻閱過的人來說，書中的腳註無疑是這一點的明證。

Not surprisingly, after a little more than a month on the shelves, The Snowball is now ranked by Amazon as the #1 business book of 2008. So it’s getting the recognition that it deserves. Those of you who have read it, you know why.
毫不意外的是，《雪球》上架僅一個多月後，現在已被亞馬遜評為 2008 年排名第一的商業書籍。因此，它正在獲得應有的認可。那些讀過它的人，你們知道為什麼。

So, without further ado, it’s my pleasure to introduce to you Alice Schroeder.
那麼，閒話少說，我很榮幸地向大家介紹愛麗絲·施羅德。

Alice Schroeder: John, thank you so much for that wonderful introduction — and thank you all for having me here at the University of Virginia and all of the people who were so welcoming. It’s really terrific.
愛麗絲·施羅德：約翰，非常感謝你那精彩的介紹——也感謝大家邀請我來到維吉尼亞大學，以及所有如此熱情歡迎我的人。這真是太棒了。

I especially want to say thank you to John because he was very modest in not playing up his role. He was one of my important sources in writing The Snowball because of his role at Salomon Brothers as the treasurer.1
我特別想感謝約翰，因為他非常謙虛，沒有誇大自己的角色。由於他在所羅門兄弟公司擔任財務主管的角色，他是我撰寫《雪球》時的重要消息來源之一。

I found that one of the things that occurs when you write a biography is that you do get a lot of conflicting information and John was my sounding board. I would call him and say, “These two people have said this and that. Which one should I believe?” And he would tell me — and I trusted him. He was an invaluable resource and also gave me a lot of great facts and information.
我發現撰寫傳記時會遇到的一個情況是，你會得到許多相互矛盾的資訊，而約翰就是我的共鳴板。我會打電話給他說：「這兩個人說了這樣和那樣的話，我該相信誰？」而他會告訴我——我信任他。他是一個無價的資源，同時也提供了許多寶貴的事實和資訊。

It’s a real privilege to come before you tonight to talk about Warren Buffett, especially at this time of financial turmoil and crisis. As you all know, Warren Buffett is the only person of our time who’s managed to accomplish his wish of becoming so rich that when he writes a check, it’s the bank that bounces. (Laughs)
今晚能在這裡談論華倫·巴菲特，尤其是在這個金融動盪與危機的時刻，實在是一種殊榮。如各位所知，華倫·巴菲特是我們這個時代唯一實現了自己願望的人，他變得如此富有，以至於當他開出支票時，跳票的是銀行。（笑聲）

These days, it doesn’t take quite so large a check to make the bank bounce — but it’s interesting to see that, when it does happen, it’s Warren Buffett that they run to to cover the overdraft. He is really a singular figure in these times.
如今，不需要那麼大的一張支票就能讓銀行跳票了——但有趣的是，當這種情況發生時，他們會跑去尋求華倫·巴菲特來彌補透支。在這個時代，他確實是一個獨特的人物。

When I started working on The Snowball, of course, things were very different. The internet bubble had just imploded and it was just after the aftermath of Enron. I never anticipated anything like this occurring — but I knew what he was like and, of course, much of the importance of him is that his ideas and principles haven’t really changed in fifty years.
當我開始撰寫《雪球》時，情況當然大不相同。網路泡沫才剛破滅，安隆案餘波未平。我從未預料到會發生這樣的事——但我了解他的為人，而他的重要性很大程度上在於，他的理念和原則五十年來幾乎未曾改變。

I thought that writing a book about him would actually be a fairly simple matter. When you ask Warren a question, he always had the answer. When I would present him with a business problem, he always would have the solution. So the job was just to write it down.
我原以為寫一本關於他的書會是件相當簡單的事。當你向華倫提問，他總有答案。每當我向他提出商業難題，他總能給出解決方案。所以我的工作只是將這些記錄下來。

What I didn’t realize was how quickly I would encounter something called Sevareid’s Law, which is that the cause of problems is solutions.2 So, having asked all my questions and having listened to his stories and having gotten all of his solutions, very quickly I was presented with a problem, which was that I had far more “solutions” material — questions answered — than I knew what to do with.
當時我沒意識到的是，自己會這麼快就遇到所謂的「塞瓦賴德定律」——問題的根源正是解決方案本身。於是在問完所有問題、聽完他的故事、獲得全部解答後，我很快面臨一個難題：手頭「解決方案」的素材（即已回答的問題）遠多到不知如何取捨。

I began casting about for a way to construct a narrative, to come up with how to put together a book about this man’s life that would be meaningful and present a set of ideas. I had a few attempts that failed, but I thought you might like to hear about them. Here’s my first shot at it: “The story began with a journey through the life of a 78-year-old man. It traveled back through the decades, tracing and uncovering a common truth that lies at the core of the most powerful investment philosophies, teachings, and models in the world. What you will learn today is the single, secret, underlying law of The Snowball, a set of principles based on the most powerful law in the universe. All that Warren Buffett ever accomplished or tamed in the business of life was done in full accordance with this most powerful law. Using this simple, universal law, The Snowball offers the knowledge of how to create — intentionally and effortlessly — a joyful life. This is the secret. The secret to everything. The secret to unlimited happiness, love, health, and prosperity. This is the Law of Attraction, the secret of Warren Buffett.”
我開始思索如何構建一個敘事，想辦法將這位男子的一生編撰成一本有意義且能呈現一系列理念的書。我有過幾次失敗的嘗試，但我想你可能會想聽聽這些嘗試。這是我第一次的嘗試：「故事始於一位 78 歲男子的人生旅程。它回溯數十年時光，追蹤並揭示了一個共同真理，這個真理位於世界上最強大的投資哲學、教誨與模型的核心。你今天將學到的是《雪球》單一、秘密且根本的法則，這套原則建立在宇宙中最強大的法則之上。華倫·巴菲特在人生事業中所達成或馴服的一切，都完全遵循這條最強大的法則。運用這條簡單而普遍的《雪球》法則，就能獲得如何有意且毫不費力地創造快樂人生的知識。這就是秘密。一切事物的秘密。無限幸福、愛、健康與繁榮的秘密。這就是吸引力法則，華倫·巴菲特的秘密。」

Okay, well, I passed on that idea. I thought it was not too good, but somebody else went there.3
好吧，我放棄了那個點子。我覺得它不怎麼樣，但有人卻採用了。

My next attempt: “The Snowball’s action kicks off in modern-day New York where a bloodstained copy of The Intelligent Investor is found symbolically laid at the foot of the New York Stock Exchange. The quest for the Holy Grail of investing led to a search that spanned the globe from London to Los Angeles, leaving a gruesome trail of interview subjects behind as evidence. The result was an exhaustively researched page-turner about a secret investing cult, coverups of ancient mistakes, and savage vengeance against those who tried to capture the Holy Grail for themselves. In the end, I found the Grail guarded by an ancient 78-year-old heretic, buried deep in a maze of files under a pyramid in Kiewit Plaza.”
我的下一個嘗試：「《雪球》的故事從現代紐約展開，一本染血的《智慧型股票投資人》被象徵性地放置在紐約證券交易所的台階上。對投資聖杯的追尋引發了一場橫跨倫敦至洛杉磯的全球搜索，沿途留下了令人毛骨悚然的受訪者遺跡。最終成果是一本經過詳盡研究、令人手不釋卷的驚悚作品，揭露了一個秘密投資教派、掩蓋古老錯誤的陰謀，以及對企圖獨佔聖杯者的殘酷報復。最終，我在基威特廣場金字塔深處的檔案迷宮中，發現了由一位 78 歲異端守護者看守的聖杯。」

I loved that idea, but then there was this guy named Dan Brown who went ahead and used it before I got there.4 (Laughs)
我超愛這個構想，但後來有個叫丹·布朗的傢伙搶在我前面用了它。（笑）

I was sure, however, that somewhere hiding in Kiewit Plaza there was a Holy Grail — because I spent 2,000 hours with Warren Buffett. I did get to go through all of his files and I got to ask him all of the questions and business problems that I wanted to.
但我確信，基威特廣場某處確實藏著聖杯——因為我花了 2,000 小時與華倫·巴菲特相處。我確實翻遍了他所有的檔案，也能隨心所欲地向他提出任何商業問題。

I thought there had to be a Holy Grail because I had heard from so many investors a little bit of — irritation might not be the right word — but Warren always says that [investing is] very simple. There are a few simple principles. And if you were only working with a smaller amount of money, he could earn 50% returns a year.
我原本以為一定存在某種聖杯，因為我從許多投資者那裡聽到了些許——或許用「煩躁」這個詞不太準確——但華倫總是說[投資]非常簡單。有幾個簡單的原則。如果你操作的資金規模較小，他一年可以獲得 50%的回報率。

Well, I’ve had a lot of people say to me, “I am working with a smaller amount of money. If it is really that simple, why am I not earning 50% returns a year?” (Laughs) So the question is: Is it just that Warren Buffett is a genius? Is it just that we’re all dumb? Or is the truth somewhere in between?
嗯，很多人對我說：「我操作的資金規模較小。如果真那麼簡單，為什麼我一年賺不到 50%的回報率？」（笑）所以問題是：是因為華倫·巴菲特是個天才嗎？是因為我們都太笨了嗎？還是真相介於兩者之間？

And I think the truth is somewhere in between.
而我認為真相介於兩者之間。

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