Insightful Investor Podcast interviewed Steven Romick：Value Quality and Adaptability on Oct. 7, 2025

《洞見投資者》播客於 2025 年 10 月 7 日專訪史蒂芬·羅米克：價值、品質與適應力
 
Welcome to the insightful investor podcast, a weekly series that seeks to share industry, investment, and market insights. Learn more about our show at insightfulinvestor.org. [Music] I'm excited to have Steven Romack join us on the podcast today. Steven is the co-managing partner of first-pecific advisors or FPA and the long-time steward of the FPA crescent fund. Recognize for his go anywhere philosophy and 32-year track record. FPA manages about $20 billion as of June of this year. Steven, welcome and thank you for joining us.
歡迎收聽《洞見投資者》播客，這是一個每週系列節目，旨在分享產業、投資與市場洞見。更多節目資訊請至 insightfulinvestor.org。[音樂] 今天很榮幸邀請到史蒂芬·羅米克加入我們的播客。史蒂芬是 First Pacific Advisors（FPA）的共同管理合夥人，也是 FPA 新月基金的長期管理者。以其全方位投資哲學與 32 年卓越績效著稱。截至今年六月，FPA 管理資產規模約達 200 億美元。史蒂芬，歡迎並感謝您參與我們的節目。


Thanks Alex, happy to be here. Let's start at the beginning. How did your passion for investing develop? And where do you feel like your core investment believes originated? You know, passion is interesting because I think passion was really didn't come right away. I think that I'd interest and I think I had a natural, you know, proclivity for, you know, attaching myself to the mathematics of invests and looking at tearing apart, you know, the balance sheets and, you know, all of the franchises.
謝謝亞歷克斯，很開心來到這裡。讓我們從最初開始談起：您對投資的熱情是如何培養的？您認為自己的核心投資信念源自何處？其實「熱情」是件有趣的事，因為我認為熱情並非一蹴可幾。我最初是產生興趣，覺得自己天生就對投資數學有種親和力，喜歡拆解資產負債表、分析所有企業特許經營價值。

And I think it was fun, but I was terrible at it at the beginning. I came out of undergrad and was offered a job by gentleman named Jeff Nathan who said, "Do you have tired of unlearning MBAs?" And so let me train you. But here I am with a Bachelor of Science Education. It took a couple of finance courses, you know, thrown into, you know, thrown to the walls of the first day at the end of the office and given a stack of perspectives that I kid you not was too feet high to take home and read and I didn't know what the heck I was doing. And so it developed relatively slowly. You know, I wouldn't got my CFA to try to teach myself, you know, along the way to try and, you know, self educate along with, you know, his self.
我覺得那段經歷很有趣，但一開始我表現得很糟糕。我大學畢業時，有位名叫傑夫·內森的紳士提供我一份工作，他說：「你對那些需要重新學習的 MBA 課程感到厭倦了嗎？讓我來培訓你吧。」但當時我只有教育學士學位，只修過幾門金融課程。第一天上班就被扔進辦公室深處，拿到一疊公司簡介——說真的，那疊資料有兩英尺高，要我帶回家閱讀，而我根本不知道自己在做什麼。所以我的成長過程相對緩慢。後來我考取了特許金融分析師資格，試著自學進修，一路摸索著自我提升。

But it really began back when I was in junior high school and I began to invest with my grandfather and then some friends said, you know, buy this, buy that, sort of buy some stocks and it was really no more than gambling at the time. But, you know, because of that I learned really on that, you know, and I only made money at the very beginning. It was like, you know, a clock's right twice a day and I got that clock right. And, but I learned, no, I just didn't like losing money. And as I got better at it, the core beliefs, as you asked about really, you know, it's foundation, it's just my distaste for losing money.
但這一切其實要追溯到我國中時期，當時我開始跟著祖父學習投資，後來有些朋友會說「買這個、買那個」，慫恿我買些股票，那時候根本就跟賭博沒兩樣。不過正因如此，我從中學到了教訓——說來有趣，我只有最初幾次賺到錢，就像失準的鐘每天也會準兩次，而我剛好碰上那兩次。但後來我領悟到，說穿了就是我不喜歡虧錢的感覺。隨著投資技巧漸趨成熟，你剛才問的核心信念，其根基其實就是這種對虧錢的厭惡。

Do you feel like you were born with that focus on protection against permanent impairment of capital? Or do you feel like you learned it and it stuck through experience and study? I don't know if I was born with it, but I certainly received an inoculation at a young age. And so I don't don't tell RFK about that. But, you know, be that it's at May. I think that, you know, that not losing money vaccine, you know, that I had in early age was really very big part of it. But I also think, you know, it's a pressure in mentality, just like, well, it can all go away tomorrow, you know, kind of lives with me a little bit.
你覺得這種對資本永久損失的防範意識是與生俱來的嗎？還是透過後天學習和經驗累積形成的？我不確定是否天生如此，但確實在小時候就接種了某種「預防針」——不過可別讓 RFK 知道這件事。總之在我年幼時接種的這種「避免虧損疫苗」，確實發揮了極大作用。但我同時認為，這也是一種心理壓力，就像隨時懷抱著「一切可能明天就化為烏有」的念頭，這種想法始終如影隨形跟著我。

I'm not really sure why. There are scientific studies to suggest that it takes a number of generations for the your DNA to actually get back to what was before, some kind of traumatic event that your four bears might have had. But I do think that my success over time was driven by something a little bit different than maybe most. I mean, success is often driven by this blind ambition. And there's me, which is really somebody was so fearful of failing that I worked my butt off to ensure that I wouldn't. I'd probably employed a similar work ethic as those who have that inherent need to win. So I thankfully ended up in the same place. And I guess that could also feed into this notion of minimizing losses and permanent and permanent capital because if you're so focused on not losing, that is just a very different orientation. Yeah. But if you sell yourself up not to lose, but create the optionally to win, some of those options are going to hit. So, you know, you can, your returns are driven over time, not just by what you own, but what you don't own. And so, avoiding, you know, these mistakes can be a big driver of your of your return. I think that that, I mean, minimize the mistakes in terms of the absolute number of mistakes is where is the loss for a mistake?
我也不太確定原因為何。有科學研究指出，需要經過好幾個世代，你的 DNA 才能真正恢復到經歷某種創傷事件前的狀態——比如你的祖先可能遭遇過的困境。但我確實認為，長期以來驅動我成功的因素，可能與多數人不太一樣。怎麼說呢，成功往往來自那種不顧一切的野心。而我的情況則是，因為極度害怕失敗，所以拚命努力確保自己不會失敗。我付出的努力程度，大概和那些天生就渴望勝利的人不相上下。所以很幸運地，最終我達到了相同的成就。我想這也呼應了「最小化損失與永續資本」的理念，因為當你如此專注於避免失敗時，這本身就是一種截然不同的思維取向。沒錯。但如果你設定目標不是為了不輸，而是創造贏的可能性，總有些機會能被你抓住。所以說，長遠來看，投資回報不僅取決於你持有什麼，更取決於你「不持有」什麼。因此，避開這些錯誤決策，很可能成為推動你投資回報的重要關鍵。 我認為，我的意思是，盡量減少錯誤的絕對數量，因為每個錯誤都會帶來損失。

And I think that's uh, that thing that's really key. You talked about your investment philosophy DNA. What would you describe that and and maybe how your core beliefs have or haven't changed over the past 30 years? I have my core haven't changed. The one, you know, as I said and you brought up, I hate to lose money. One important way is to protect capital and one way to do that is to make sure that you be an appropriate price for an asset. And the only thing that's really changed since I'd been in business is that I'm less willing to own lower quality businesses. But at my core, I'm really the same person has been, you know, I've evolved as an investor over the years, uh, but it might, my core hasn't changed.
我認為這點非常關鍵。你談到了你的投資哲學 DNA。你會如何描述這一點，以及過去 30 年來你的核心信念是否有所改變？我的核心信念從未改變。就像我說的，你也提到了，我討厭虧錢。保護資本的一個重要方法，就是確保以合適的價格購買資產。我入行以來唯一真正改變的是，我越來越不願意持有低品質的企業。但從本質上來說，我還是同一個人，你知道，這些年來我作為投資者確實有所成長，但我的核心信念從未改變。

Some would describe you as a value investor. How do you define value especially regarding this notion of a margin of safety? I think you actually answer the question in your question is to us, to me, value is just investing with a margin of safety period. It doesn't mean buying companies that deep discounts to book value. It means that an asset you think is worth 100, you can buy it, you know, add a discount to that, where you're able to absorb the risk of potentially being wrong and have retained the optionality of being right. I think is a terrific way. And you know, to make money every time in the past, as I said, it was more accepting of of lower quality businesses. And I have a protection of the balance sheet. Now, solid book value is support adjusted for hidden real estate value and such. But with so much disruption from technological innovation today, many, many cheap companies are seen or have seen their their businesses disintermediated. And this is increased our focus on higher quality businesses. Balance sheet prediction is good, but all else equal, give me a better quality business at a great price. That makes sense.
有些人會形容你是一位價值投資者。你如何定義價值，特別是關於安全邊際這個概念？我認為你其實在問題中已經回答了——對我們、對我而言，價值就是帶著安全邊際的投資，句號。這不代表要買進那些遠低於帳面價值的公司。而是當你認為某項資產價值 100 元時，你能以折扣價買進，讓自己既能承受可能判斷錯誤的風險，同時保留判斷正確時的獲利空間。我認為這是極佳的方式。正如我所說，過去每次賺錢的方法，往往是接受品質較低的企業，但依靠資產負債表作為保護。當時穩固的帳面價值經過隱藏房地產價值等調整後仍具支撐力。然而在科技創新帶來大量顛覆的今日，許多廉價企業的商業模式已被瓦解或面臨中介化。這使我們更加聚焦於高品質企業。資產負債表的預測固然重要，但在其他條件相同時，我寧願以優惠價格投資更優質的企業。這很合理。

So obviously, there's times when your investment decisions diverge from consensus, do you view that as being deliberately contrarian or does it just stem from a more intuitive conviction about what is value? I don't know that it's intuitive and we certainly aren't deliberately contrarian. You know, the crowd is isn't always wrong. We are able sometimes to develop a very in view that other investors might be less accepting of or would prefer to wait to see all things evolve and try and time it'll look better. We know we're not good at timing. And so we're willing to look across, you know, the cast of the worth, when things are bad, you know, sometimes hard to envision, you know, getting up and climbing that hill to get to the other side.
顯然，有時候你的投資決策會偏離市場共識，你認為這是刻意逆向操作，還是單純源自對價值更直覺的信念？我不認為這是直覺，我們也絕非刻意逆向操作。要知道，群眾並非總是錯誤的。有時候我們能形成某種觀點，而其他投資者可能較難接受，或寧願等待局勢明朗再擇機進場——畢竟時機好的時候一切看起來都會更樂觀。但我們很清楚自己並不擅長抓時機。因此我們願意縱觀全局，在價值浮現時採取行動。當情況糟糕時，有時確實難以想像要如何起身翻越那座山抵達彼岸。

And sometimes we're just that conviction that we will get there, we're not exactly clear on the time frame, but as long as we can get there, we believe that that our RR even it takes, you know, 70 years instead of four years, for example, and we can still have a good IR and that circumstance. You know, that works out to work out quite well. Sometimes we all we offer just spaces to look longer term. It is interesting how long term that it seems to me the definition has changed over time. It feels like it's shorter, long term is shorter term now that it was maybe five years ago or ten years ago. Is that your sense? Oh, for sure. I mean, I think it's true across society. I mean, I've, I have four daughters and my two youngest daughters are, you know, even the midst of this, the, you know, came up in the social media generation. My older two didn't. And that short term misinformation is really, you know, significant. Like, you know, if it didn't happen, you know, if I have some recorded for posterity, it didn't happen it seems. And, um, everything has to happen. If it's going to be good, it has to happen by tomorrow. There's no willingness, it seems, a generationally. It's not just speaking to my daughters, generationally, to, to do the work from what it takes to really invest that intellectual capital. Your human capital, the energy is to just exceed over over ten years and focus longer term, you know, on that. And we, you know, never, one, two, um, be those people who just demand success tomorrow. We know it doesn't happen immediately. Yeah. And I guess in some ways, being patient could actually be an advantage, because maybe other investors are less patient and it creates an opportunity. Yeah. And I think that's actually, I think that really is a significant statement today, because I think that with so many people like me have been put out to pasture because they've become less relevant as investors. Maybe they, some of them might have been more dogmatic.
有時候我們就是有那種信念，覺得終將達成目標，雖然對時間框架不太明確，但只要能到達終點——即使要花 70 年而非 4 年——我們相信在這種情況下仍能獲得良好的投資回報。這種長期視野往往能帶來相當好的結果。有趣的是，我感覺「長期」的定義隨著時間不斷改變，現在的「長期」似乎變得比以前更短了，可能比五年前或十年前定義的期限還要短。您有同感嗎？ 確實如此。我認為這是整個社會的普遍現象。我有四個女兒，兩個小女兒成長於社交媒體世代，而兩個大女兒則不是。短期化的錯誤觀念影響真的很深遠——彷彿事情若沒被記錄下來流傳後世，就等於沒發生過。而且所有事情都必須立竿見影，如果要有好結果，明天就必須實現。這世代似乎普遍缺乏等待的意願。 這不僅是對我女兒這一代的期許，更是需要付出心力才能真正積累智慧資本。你的人力資本與精力必須持續投入超過十年，並專注於更長遠的目標。我們從來不當那種只追求立即成功的人，因為深知成就無法一蹴可幾。在某種層面上，保持耐心反而能成為優勢——或許正因其他投資者較缺乏耐心，反而創造了機會。我認為這在當今尤其意義重大，畢竟有太多像我這樣的投資人因逐漸失去市場影響力而被邊緣化，其中部分原因可能來自過於固守教條。

Sometimes it's just, I mean, I'm not going to underestimate good fortune that, you know, over the years that we've been in the right place more than we've been in the wrong place. But that has made it a little bit less competitive for us in the one end, but also interesting with all of these pod shops and, you know, momentum players and ETFs and so much money shifting from from active to passive. When there is selling, it can happen really quickly. When there's that loss of conviction, it really can create a tremendous opportunity. I think that and that might be more of our future than it has been in our past, which is actually a, you know, could, it makes me feel a little more optimistic. But where I sit and, you know, here at first specific advisors, I know you've emphasized the importance of continuous learning. How do you decide when to be dogmatic, as you said, versus adaptable? And where's the line between maintaining core beliefs and evolving as markets change? I don't think I ever said I want to be dogmatic. I mean, we never want to be dogmatic. We don't operate with preferred knowledge and we know that. So that perfect, we don't have that perfect knowledge of industries, businesses, many other than all continually evolve. There's always a regular flow of information, you know, that we must consider, some of it confirming, some of it discomforting. So we therefore must always be adaptable. And so when you talk about our core beliefs, I mean, that, that hasn't changed. We have never been so dogmatic as to say, who are right in the world's wrong? I guess the line is core beliefs in terms of margin of safety, minimize the risk of permanent perinocapital, and then adaptable in terms of just about everything else. Is that accurate? Yeah, that's that could be also as part of the question I didn't answer to it. You talked about evolving with, you know, that line between maintaining core beliefs and evolving with the markets. I mean, both can be true. I just don't think they're mutually exclusive, you know, circumstances. You can have a core belief, and yet you still need to evolve with the market.
有時候，說真的，我不會低估運氣的重要性——這些年來，我們處在正確位置的次數遠多於錯誤位置。這一方面讓我們面臨的競爭稍少些，但另一方面，隨著這麼多對沖基金、動能交易者、ETF，以及大量資金從主動投資轉向被動投資，情況也變得很有意思。當賣壓出現時，可能轉瞬即至；當市場信心潰散時，反而會創造絕佳機會。我認為這或許會成為我們未來更常見的契機，相比過去而言——說實話，這反而讓我更樂觀些。 不過就我的立場來說，在 First Specific Advisors 這裡，我知道您強調過持續學習的重要性。您剛提到該如何決定何時該堅持原則、何時該保持彈性？在市場變動中，堅守核心信念與時俱進的分界點又在哪裡？ 我從未說過要固守教條。說真的，我們從來不想墨守成規。我們清楚自己並非全知全能，也始終以此自惕。 正因如此，我們對產業和企業的認知永遠無法臻至完美——萬物皆在持續演變。資訊如潮水般不斷湧來，有些令人振奮，有些則使人不安，這些都必須納入考量。因此我們必須始終保持彈性。當談及核心信念時，這點從未改變：我們從不固執地認為「舉世皆非唯我獨是」。若要用一句話總結，就是在安全邊際與避免永久性資本損失這兩大核心信念站穩腳跟，其餘萬事皆須保持靈活應變。這樣說準確嗎？沒錯，這其實也回應了剛才未盡的問題。您提到如何在堅守核心信念與順應市場變化間取得平衡，我認為兩者本可並存，絕非互斥。即便懷抱核心信念，仍須與市場脈動共同進化。

So markets can throw out different things to you at different points in time. We were able to buy interest rate caps when rates were, you know, at all time, lows. And that's something we had never done previously. We were able to, you know, we bought, we may have only ever made one currency investment, and we bought puts in the end, you know, more than a decade ago. We were willing to, you know, it was very binary as but it was a very, very small amount of capital. That was invested that if it paid off would offer us a very asymmetric rate of return to the risk that we assumed and the capital invested.
市場在不同時間點會給你帶來不同的機會。我們曾在利率處於歷史低點時買入利率上限合約，這是我們過去從未做過的操作。另外，我們可能只做過一次外匯投資——大約十多年前買入了賣權。這筆交易具有二元特性，但投入的資金規模極小。當時我們的想法是：若這筆投資成功，將能為我們帶來與承擔風險和投入資本極不對稱的超額回報。

And that actually we were lucky and it did pay off in the time. But as any time you start, you know, using derivatives, they've got to, there's a, there's an expiration date attached to it. So you've got to not only be right, be right in that time frame. So sometimes you could, you could be dead right. You could just, you know, it could happen, you know, the day after, you know, your, your options expired. Right. Yeah, and also in terms of the evolution in the, in the beginning of our conversation, you talked about how just even the, the notion of margin of safety has evolved from maybe just pure financials to the quality of that business. Yeah. I mean, I always was, I always hoped for business quality. But I was just, I was able to buy 30 years ago businesses that, you know, had the great protection of the balance sheets, you know, buy companies, you know, at a below book value. And it was, it was great. I was, it wasn't worried about that that disinformation that is really been happening the last, you know, 20 years, because I've done the logical innovation.
事實上我們當時很幸運，而且確實在那段時間獲得了回報。但就像任何時候你開始使用衍生性金融商品時，它們都附帶著到期日。所以你不僅要判斷正確，還必須在特定時間框架內判斷正確。有時候你可能完全判斷正確，但偏偏就在你的選擇權到期後的隔天才發生預期中的情況。對。 另外在我們對話開頭談到的演變部分，你提到就連安全邊際的概念也從原本單純關注財務數據，演變到現在還要考量企業品質。確實。我一直以來都希望追求企業品質，但在 30 年前，我能夠買到那些資產負債表極具保護性、帳面價值折價的公司。那時候真的很棒，我完全不用擔心過去 20 年來真正發生的那些虛假資訊問題，因為我始終堅持邏輯創新。

And I guess that disintermediation and competition goes to protecting capital, right? Because you're thinking about permanent impairment of capital. How do you relate that to just regular market volatility and the price going up and down? Great question, because I mean, stocks can trade any price in any given day, based on whatever animal spirits, you know, may have taken over the market or an industry or a specific company, however, that doesn't suggest anything as to how a company and its stock price might perform over time.
我想去中介化和競爭有助於保護資本，對吧？因為您考慮的是資本的永久性損失。您如何將這點與普通的市場波動和價格漲跌聯繫起來？這個問題很好，因為我的意思是，股票在任何一天都可能以任何價格交易，取決於當時主導市場、產業或特定公司的市場情緒。然而，這並不代表公司及其股價隨時間推移的實際表現會如何。

We really try and shut out that daily noise. Volatility today doesn't say anything about a price tomorrow. It's like using a thermometer to predict the future. I look at my window and look at the cinematic at beach and it's 75 degrees in sunny, but tomorrow might be 65 degrees in raining. So we really just volatility doesn't really tell you much of anything. And volatility often, you know, I think people will use it as a measure of risk. And we think that's, you know, not appropriate, at least for us, but I see how it is a measure of risk for a lot of people, because a lot of people just use volatility, you know, and it will, and thoughts rather volatility will affect them in a way that causes them to to get in or out of the market or individual stocks. It scares investors in and out of stocks. The market going up, we got to buy, we're going down, we got to sell. So, and then you talk about a permanent permanent capital, which is really something very different, because to matter, in the stocks, we're going up and down in any given day, you know, over a period of time, but you don't have to, you know, nobody's telling you have to sell it as soon as we don't have any leverage, and the banks I'm going to have a margin call.
我們真的努力屏蔽那些日常雜音。今日的波動性完全無法預測明天的價格。這就像用溫度計預測未來一樣。我望向窗外，看著海灘的電影場景，此刻是華氏 75 度的晴朗天氣，但明天可能變成華氏 65 度的雨天。所以波動性其實無法告訴你太多訊息。而且波動性經常被人們當作風險指標，我們認為這並不恰當，至少對我們而言是如此，但我理解為何許多人將其視為風險衡量標準，因為很多人確實只關注波動性，而這種波動思維會影響他們進出市場或個股的決策。它嚇得投資者在股市中進進出出——市場上漲時急著買進，下跌時慌忙拋售。 接著你談到永久資本的概念，這確實是截然不同的思維，因為無論股票在特定日子裡如何漲跌，隨著時間推移，關鍵在於我們沒有使用任何槓桿，也沒有人強迫你必須立即賣出。而我將會收到銀行的保證金追繳通知。

But so I really think that you're not forced to realize the loss. You know, sometimes it is appropriate to realize let's go back to that question of being dogmatic, and you know, we don't want to be dogmatic. Sometimes you just have to realize, you know, we were wrong. You know, and so, you know, while a loss should have nothing to do, you know, a permanent permanent should be because of you either made a mistake or, or you have, you, your thesis has changed. Some of the information is I talk about the flow of information has come through, and you did your initial work and, and your initial work guided you to buy in something, or got it us to buy in something. And yet, new work suggests that we, you know, the information flows changed, and there's new competition, you know, that's out there, for example, and that company might not offer the unit volume that it once, growth that it once had it might not have, the margins that it once had it might require a lot more capex to me, even maintain their place amongst their peers.
但我真的認為你並非被迫要認列虧損。你知道嗎，有時候認清事實是恰當的 - 讓我們回到那個關於教條主義的問題，我們都不希望變得固執。有時候你必須承認，我們當初的判斷是錯誤的。所以，雖然虧損本身不該是決策依據，但永久性的損失要嘛是因為你犯了錯，要嘛是你的投資論點已經改變。就像我常談到的資訊流動性，當你完成初步研究後，這些研究引導你投資某個標的，但後續的新研究顯示情況已變 - 比如出現新的競爭者，這家公司可能不再擁有過去的單位成長率，利潤空間可能縮減，甚至需要投入更多資本支出才能維持在同行中的競爭地位。

So it always has been taken into account. And when it's sex up against us, you know, we, we, we, we exit. So when we build our models, we look at a low-basin high case, in our low cases, you know, as when we think we can, but might could loop attention to this money, hopefully not that much. And when, when the company isn't performing, doesn't quite execute on their plan, as much as we would hope they, they would. The base case, the company shoots in the plan, the economies relatively good, and the market in Athens, up in reflect in the stock price, in the market, and we had to make a decent money. Then there's the upside case where there's things you're doing better than we, and we, you know, might otherwise, well, there's good as we hope for, but not as good as we were willing to underwrite, too. And so that's just, you know, optionality, you know, sometimes the high cases, sometimes the low-caseits, but more often than not, we are, have been more successful than not over the last, you know, three decades focusing with these very, very simple rubrics.
因此我們始終將其納入考量。當情勢對我們不利時，我們就會選擇退出。在建立模型時，我們會設定三種情境：低基線情境、高基線情境，以及最差情境。在最差情境中，我們會評估可能損失的資金規模——當然希望不會太嚴重。而當公司表現未達預期，執行力不如我們期盼時，我們會啟動基線情境：若公司能按計劃發展，經濟環境相對良好，市場反應能體現在股價上，我們就能獲得合理收益。至於上行情境，則是當公司表現超乎預期，成果比我們原本評估的更好——雖未必達到我們願意承保的極限，但已足夠令人滿意。這就是所謂的選擇權特性：有時會實現高標情境，有時會落入低標情境。但過去三十年來，我們運用這些極簡準則所獲得的成功案例，遠多於失敗案例。

And these are not other models that offer the peer to offer great precision, but it has earnings down to the penny. It's just, it's just the result as a, you know, byproduct of the model. That's it. I guess a simple way to think about it is you have a company out there that you think is worth a hundred dollars, and it's creating at 80, and so you've got a decent margin of safety relative to what you feel it's worth, and then you buy it at 80, and you think it's worth a hundred, if new information comes out and now realize, you know, it's not worth a hundred, it's actually worth 90.
而這些並非其他能提供極高精準度的同類模型，但它的收益計算可以精確到分毫。這只是，你知道的，模型運算過程中自然產生的副產品。就這樣。我想最簡單的理解方式是：假設有間你認為價值一百美元的公司，現在股價八十元，相對於你認定的價值存在不錯的安全邊際；於是你用八十元買進，認為它值一百元。若出現新資訊讓你意識到——它其實不值一百元，實際價值只有九十元。

That could be viewed as a permanent impairment capital, regardless of what the market prices that 80 could move up or down, because that's just the reflection of what the consensus view is of that company. Is that a simple way to think about it? The one pushback, I have is the permanent permanent capital, it only happens when you sell something, but it isn't a pro, it's so it's a permanent permanent value in that case. Or maybe never, not even, maybe it's went from a hundred to ninety today, and maybe it ends up being a hundred and ten in the future, because they, they write the ship, new information, you know, suggest the ship is listing, and then the new management comes in, is the current management team was enabled to execute, and they end up, you know, writing the ship and creating greater opportunity in the future, and things end up going suddenly. I mean, a great example that would be, take Microsoft, right? I mean, Microsoft grew its earnings, some place ran 18% in the, at the, you know, from a 2000 to 2009 for the first decade of the century, and the stock went down, because it was priced so when appropriately, going into it, and they didn't have bubble. And at the time, there was a lot of fear that people were going to be using different form factors, you know, and 2019 people were going to be not using IOS and not dust, people were not going to be using word, they'll be using Google Docs. And I mean, all of that, you know, didn't end up being true as we now know, and they moved into the cloud as our doing other things. And that's a good example of a different management team coming along the way, and, and helping, you know, push that stuff over the, get this over the finish line. You founded a quote, unquote, go anywhere fund 32 years ago when the concept was relatively unique. Why was this path so intuitive? I guess I wanted more places to potentially lose money than others. You know, I always thought it was silly to pigeonhole oneself. Why only by large gaps stocks when you can buy small, sometimes one market gap presents more of an opportunity than other. Why only by US when we can buy overseas? You've got Nike here. It did is in Europe. You had Oracle here.
這可以被視為永久性資本減損，無論市場價格如何波動（那 80 元可能上漲或下跌），因為這只是市場對該公司共識觀點的反映。這樣理解是否簡單？我唯一的不同意見是關於「永久性資本」的概念——唯有當你出售某物時才會真正實現資本減損，但這並非優勢。在這種情況下，它反而成為永久性的價值錨定。或者可能永遠不會實現？甚至可能今天從 100 元跌到 90 元，未來卻漲到 110 元，因為公司扭轉局勢——新資訊顯示船身傾斜後，新管理團隊接手（若現有團隊無法有效執行），最終成功導正航向並創造更大未來機會，情勢突然好轉。舉個絕佳例子：微軟。從 2000 年到 2009 年，微軟盈利增長約 18%，但股價卻下跌，因為在世紀初其股價已被合理定價，且未存在泡沫。 當時有很多人擔心人們會開始使用不同的設備規格，你知道嗎？2019 年時有人預測人們將不再使用 iOS 系統，也不再使用 Word 文書軟體，轉而使用 Google Docs。但現在我們都知道，這些預測最終都沒有成真，他們反而轉向雲端服務並發展其他業務。這正是不同管理團隊適時出現，協助推動這些計畫跨越終點線的良好範例。 您在 32 年前創立了所謂的「無限制基金」，當時這個概念還相對新穎。為何會直覺地選擇這條道路？我想是因為我希望擁有比其他人更多可能虧錢的管道吧。我一直認為將自己局限在某個領域是愚蠢的——既然可以購買小型股，為何只投資大型股？有時某個市場領域的機會就是比其他領域更多。既然能投資海外市場，為何只局限在美國？這裡有耐吉，歐洲也有業務；這裡有甲骨文，同樣遍布各地。

You had SAP in Europe. You've got, you know, similar businesses in different parts of the world, and maybe there be managed better in other parts of the world than the US or maybe not. But, but not to look at the whole landscape didn't make sense to them. Why only by equity when I can buy corporate debt that might offer an equity rate of return. So, it just seemed really silly to, to not consider opportunities for an front of you. A good example would be a cystic real estate. You know, if you were to look at an office building that's a, a four story office building, the real to the small footprint compared to a a 20 star office building, could be that to a 50 star office building, call them, you know, small meeting on large cap stocks. The analysis is going to be the same. What is, you know, what is the occupancy, how good, what are the credit quality of those occupants, how good is the location that building in the city that's in, how good is that city in that state? Is there a lot of deferred capbacks, you know, to bring that building along, there's a lot of TI that 10 improvements, you know, expense is going to be required to bring new tension to the building as these laces, expires, et cetera, et cetera. The analysis is the same. So, when I look at small versus large, or what if you're looking at that larger, you know, bigger building, when you could buy the data that building and get, you know, a 12% you love in 12% rate of return. Yeah, good example, that would be Rockefeller Center, Rockefeller properties, you know, when the keys were turned back in back in the late night or mid, I guess, 90, losing track of my time, but call it 96, 97, time frame. I guess that comes down to this balance between specialization and the benefits of that, and what you describe, it's essentially the same type of analysis. So, the specialization isn't as significant when the analysis is comparable. Yeah, exactly. And when we do, we look at where some industries, we just don't, short product lifecycle companies, we kind of stay away from those industries.
你在歐洲有 SAP 系統。世界各地都有類似的企業，有些地區的管理可能比美國更好，也可能不如。但對他們來說，忽略整體市場狀況是不合理的。既然可以購買可能提供股權級回報的公司債，為什麼只投資股票？眼前明明有機會卻不去考慮，這實在很荒謬。 房地產就是個好例子。比如比較一棟四層辦公樓和一棟二十層甚至五十層的摩天大樓，就像區分小型股與大型股一樣。分析方法是相同的：出租率如何？租戶的信用品質怎樣？建築所處的城市區位好不好？那個城市在該州的發展狀況又如何？ 這棟大樓是否累積了大量延遲的資本回撥？要知道，為了推動建築物營運，需要投入大量租戶改善工程與設備升級，隨著租約到期等情況，必須支出可觀費用來為大樓注入新活力。分析邏輯其實是相通的。因此當我比較小型與大型物業時，若選擇收購整棟大型建築能獲得 12%投資回報率——沒錯，洛克斐勒中心就是個好例子，記得在 90 年代中期（具體時間記不清了，大概是 96、97 年左右）產權移交的那段時期。這其實歸結於專業化與其效益之間的平衡，而您描述的分析方法本質上是相同的。當分析基礎相近時，專業化差異就沒那麼重要了。確實如此。我們在評估產業時，會避開產品生命周期過短的企業，這類產業我們通常不會涉足。

Businesses that offer more of a binary opportunity, you know, biotech would be example, doesn't mean one shouldn't invest in them. We just don't have a, they don't bring great skill to the, to the table in that regard. But if we can go it, bring skill across different asset classes and, you know, geographies and then why, why not? Is there a reason you typically hold more cash than many managers and, and how does that fit within your bottom up process? Yeah, yeah, cash cash is merely a byproduct of our investment process. As we see opportunity, we pull cash down.
那些提供較多二元機會的企業，你知道的，像是生技公司就是個例子，這不代表人們不該投資它們。只是我們在這方面沒有、它們無法帶來太大的專業優勢。但如果我們能夠運用專業能力跨足不同資產類別，還有不同地區，那為何不這麼做呢？請問您通常為何持有比許多經理人更多的現金？這又與您由下而上的投資流程如何契合？是的，現金純粹是我們投資流程的副產品。當我們看到機會時，就會動用這些現金。

When there's not opportunity, we end up selling some of the more expensive companies in our portfolio and cash bills. So, cash is truly a byproduct of our, our investment process. And there's been points of time. It's been drawn down into the mid-single. There's just been quite some time, since that's been the case. But we open to it for, to be the case at some point in the future. What does it say when you have more cash? What, what, what should investors take away from that? Well, it means that we aren't seeing the risk reward in the markets broadly. We have more cash. We might see it narrowly. We might be in certain, in certain asset classes, certain industries, companies, regions. But, but to put together a whole diversified portfolio is, uh, it's harder for us and to certain points in time when, when markets are generally more expensive. So, I think that the only takeaway one can amazement, we aren't seeing the opportunity.
當市場缺乏機會時，我們會選擇賣出投資組合中估值較高的公司並持有現金。因此，現金實際上是我們投資流程中的副產品。過去確實曾有過現金部位降至中等個位數百分比的時期，但這種情況已許久未見。不過我們對未來可能再次出現這種狀況持開放態度。 當持有更多現金說明了什麼？投資者應該從中領悟到什麼？這意味著我們在整體市場中未能看到理想的風險回報比。雖然可能在特定資產類別、產業、企業或區域發現機會，但要建構完整的多元化投資組合確實更具挑戰性——特別是在市場普遍估值偏高的時期。所以我認為唯一能得出的結論就是：我們尚未看到足夠的投資機會。

It doesn't mean there isn't opportunity. It doesn't mean that we are right. That's fair. Today, and maybe, for some time, we live in a world of great uncertainty in the macroeconomic landscape. I guess you could say, it's always uncertain. It just seems like it's more than normal. How do you reconcile your macroeviews with your bottom-up investment analysis? So, as I mentioned, we look at our, we do our analysis. Look at our, we build these models that that have, as I said, this false precision is low-case, base-case, and high-case. And so, our macroeconomic reviews end up being a backdrop that we, that we use in those models, like in the bad economy. If we end up with a lot more inflation, we end up with higher interest rates, you know, how does that affect, you know, a business you're looking at, and that can get that we'll get built-in off-instalokus. Look, we try and handicap outcomes as to what is more likely, but, you know, we, at the end of the day, we're really trying to ensure, is that company x, y, z that we're buying today will still be company x, y, z with its, with its position in the marketplace, and at with more earnings than it has today, five and ten years from now. Back in our economic, again, you have to, you know, with long-term versus short-term, too, right? I mean, market that the economy is going to go up and it's going to go down. And why I think the economy is going to be better in ten years than it is today, more GDP globally. I think the economy better in 20 years than it is today, than it is in ten years.
這不代表沒有機會，也不代表我們是正確的。這樣說很公平。當前——或許未來一段時間——我們都活在宏觀經濟格局極度不確定的世界裡。我想你可以說，世事本就充滿不確定性，只是現在似乎比往常更甚。您如何將宏觀觀點與自下而上的投資分析相調和？ 正如我提到的，我們會進行分析，建立那些帶有虛假精確度的模型——就像我說過的，分為低標、基準和高標情境。因此我們的宏觀經濟評估最終會成為這些模型的背景參數，比如在經濟不景氣時：若通膨加劇、利率攀升，這會如何影響您正在評估的企業？這些變數都會被納入我們的模型計算中。 你看，我們試著評估各種結果的可能性，但說到底，我們真正努力確保的是——今天買進的 X、Y、Z 公司，在五到十年後依然能保持其市場地位，且盈利能力比現在更強。回歸經濟層面討論，必須區分長期與短期對吧？畢竟市場經濟本來就會有起有落。而我認為十年後的經濟會比現在更好，全球 GDP 會成長；二十年後的經濟狀況不僅會勝過現在，也會比十年後更上一層樓。

I think over time, we will continue to grow. And along the way, there's going to be episodes of weaker economic environment. You're going to have recessions. And, you know, that will hopefully, you know, create opportunities to recapital work. So, when you're buying companies, you're, obviously, you're, hopefully, of the things that can go right, but you're also thinking about what can go wrong. How do you weigh macro risks like an economic downturn versus more specific factors like competition, business model weakness, and the companies level of innovation in your analysis? That's a really a great question, but not one that's possible to answer globally, because different companies require different ways. Some are more subject to what the competition is doing. Some operate more, you know, in a, in a, in a, in a, to popular, I'll go up the labor. It's less of an issue. Today, some are more impacted by the economy than others.
我認為隨著時間推移，我們將持續成長。在這個過程中，必然會經歷經濟環境較為疲弱的階段。經濟衰退是不可避免的。而這些時期，或許反而能創造資本重組的機會。因此當收購企業時，除了期待順利發展的可能性，也必須思考可能出錯的環節。在分析過程中，您如何權衡像經濟衰退這樣的宏觀風險，與競爭、商業模式弱點、企業創新能力等具體因素？這確實是個很好的問題，但無法用單一標準回答，因為不同企業需要不同的評估方式。有些企業更容易受到競爭對手的影響，有些則更依賴勞動力市場的波動——這反而較不成問題。當今有些企業受經濟影響程度確實比其他企業更顯著。

So, I really think it's, it's, it's company centric. We try and anticipate what can go wrong. And as we realize that more things can go on the will go wrong, but we're always trying to figure, okay, let's, let's, let's stream the dream on the one hand, and then it's live and fear on the other hand. So, we kind of operate on a, on a cotidian basis of that kind of duality. Your fund has a over 30 year track record and few funds share that characteristic. But what do you feel has allowed you to survive and adapt through so many cycles over the last three decades? Think it begins with intellectual honesty, requires continuous learning and you all love of love learning. Just, you know, every day is different. New companies, new industries crop up, they can, can disrupt old, old industries, and having that portfolio that obviously affects the ability to move around to take advantage, you know, of that in different environments is also key. And lastly, I would say that it none of that could be done, you know, for me without my great partners brand self-mail and marklander. Well, in the last 30 plus years, you've lived through many major market cycles.
所以我認為這一切都是以公司為核心。我們試著預測可能出錯的地方，而當我們意識到會有更多狀況發生時——雖然問題確實會不斷出現——但我們始終在思考：一方面要追逐夢想，另一方面則要懷抱憂患意識。因此我們日常的運作方式始終保持著這種雙重性。 您的基金擁有超過 30 年的績效紀錄，極少基金具備這樣的特質。請問您認為是什麼關鍵讓您在過去三十多年間能夠持續適應各種市場週期？我認為首要的是保持知識上的誠實，這需要持續學習，而我們團隊都熱愛求知。每天都是全新的挑戰，新公司、新產業不斷湧現，它們可能顛覆傳統產業。擁有能夠靈活調整的投資組合，在不同環境中把握這些機會，這點至關重要。最後我想說，若沒有我優秀的合作夥伴布蘭德、賽爾夫梅爾和馬克蘭德，這一切都不可能實現。 在過去三十多年間，您經歷了許多重大市場週期。

What do you see as the potential drivers for the next big cycle? There's been points and time where it's been more obvious to me was me the driver. I mean, it was pretty obvious to me how much leverage there was in the system back, you know, preceding the great financial crisis and how that was that really was going to be a great unwindest result and and speaking to that specifically, you know, as I said before, we do returns or driven not just but what you own but what you don't know and we it's sold out of all of our financials and you're talking to a guy who started out some, you know, well, for the focus on banking thrifts working for the first investment partnership when I when I left college in in 1985.
你認為下一個大週期的潛在驅動因素是什麼？有些時期對我來說驅動因素相當明顯。我的意思是，在金融危機爆發前，我當時就清楚看到系統中存在多少槓桿操作，也明白這最終必然會引發大規模的去槓桿效應。具體來說，正如我之前提到的，我們的投資回報不僅取決於持有什麼，更取決於避開什麼——我們當時出清了所有金融類持股。要知道，我從 1985 年大學畢業後，最初就是在投資合夥公司專注於銀行儲貸業務起步的。

But I think that, you know, low rates have perverted capital allocation. So a lot of capital has been put into manufacturing facilities and and into RNG and other other capax needs with an expectation of some, you know, future return. Well, an expectation of a future return can be lower if rates are lower and the high rates are going to cause us to change and magnify that with any cover that's got higher debt levels. And that in turn can get magnified by by the sovereign risk that exists, you know, with high debt levels. And so, you know, higher interest rates, you know, when the recovery, you know, could be a risk serious problem along with the weaker economy, we could end up with side inflation that want to be clear.
但我認為，低利率扭曲了資本配置。大量資金被投入製造設施、再生天然氣及其他資本支出需求，預期著未來的回報。然而，當利率較低時，對未來回報的預期可能隨之降低，而高利率將迫使我們調整，並使任何負債水平較高的企業面臨更大壓力。這種情況又可能因主權風險（特別是在高負債水平下）而進一步加劇。因此，當經濟復甦伴隨疲軟的經濟環境時，較高的利率可能成為嚴重問題，最終甚至可能導致我們不願見到的滯脹現象。

That's not me calling for that. I'm spitballing, you know, with you at the moment. I mean, I, you know, successfully have called, you know, seven of the last two recessions. Fortunately, I don't know, you know, commit to portfolio into that, you know, to the great conviction I have and my economic goals. To me, it seems like there's, there's a variable that is at play today that hasn't been for some time. And that's the risk of inflation. You know, we had low and stable inflation for decades.
這並不是我在預測什麼。我只是在跟你隨口聊聊想法。我的意思是，我過去號稱成功預測了兩次經濟衰退中的七次——說實話這種預測紀錄根本不可靠。幸好我從不會因為自認對經濟情勢有十足把握，就貿然調整投資組合。對我來說，當前似乎存在著一個許久未見的變數正在發酵，那就是通膨風險。要知道，我們已經享受了幾十年的低而穩定的通膨環境。

And it just seems that that, at least the risk of inflation being higher and more and more elevated for longer is, is greater today than it has been for some time. Yeah, I don't know that's fully fully in the market. But whether there's areas of opportunity, I have my word, you know, the certain parts of the portfolio have been sold in, we've been selling off as, as they've, the good news is in the stock prices. We don't have that varying view anymore in this parts of the market where that isn't true today. As you're looking at companies, how important is innovation in long term investing? For example, you and I talked about in the past, the difference between Netflix and Blockbuster, and maybe some of the lessons they came out of that. I mean, you don't have to be a technological endeavour to be a good company. We have own, you know, wholesomeness, a men, aggregate company, you know, for years. And, you know, they aren't delivering a cutting edge product. But nor are they likely to be replacing in their future by some other cutting edge product.
至少目前看來，通膨風險持續處於更高水平且維持更長時間的可能性，確實比過去一段時期更為顯著。這點我認為市場尚未完全消化。至於是否存在投資機會，我的看法是——投資組合中某些部位已陸續出清，我們趁股價反映利好消息時逐步減碼。在當前市場中，我們對這些領域已不再持有分歧觀點。 當您審視企業時，創新對長期投資有多重要？例如我們過去討論過的 Netflix 與百視達案例，以及從中汲取的經驗。我的觀點是：優秀企業未必都要投身科技領域。就像我們長期持有的 Wholesomeness 這家骨材公司，他們提供的並非尖端產品，但未來也不太可能被其他創新產品取代。

But when you look at at Blockbuster Netflix is the example and, you know, to address in your question, I mean, Blockbuster isn't a ropes for years. You know, I thought that company was going to be a problem because of for different reasons. I thought it was a problem. They were going to be challenged because the pipe to the home is getting bigger. And you had, you know, direct TV, you know, that you could, you could get paper view with. And so the more you want, as you could have on paper view, the less of a need you had to go to Blockbuster.
但當你觀察百視達與 Netflix 的例子時，針對你的問題我想說明，百視達其實多年來早已危機四伏。我當時就認為這家公司會出問題，原因有很多面向。我預見他們將面臨挑戰，因為家庭網路頻寬正在不斷擴增。當時已有 DirectTV 這類服務，讓人能直接透過隨選視訊收看節目。當隨選視訊內容愈來愈豐富，人們前往百視達的需求自然就隨之降低。

So, you know, we should have shorted it, but we didn't end up shorting actually, uh, to other public companies, Hollywood video and movie gallery. And Netflix, you know, succeeded so dramatically because the bandwidth in the home that pipe into the home, you know, got, got bigger. Love them to replace. So, you ubiquitous, red and white envelopes to carry their DVDs through US, US, BS. It was streaming, which was not part of her video rental short thesis.
所以我們當時其實應該放空這支股票，但最終我們放空的是另外兩家上市公司——好萊塢影視與電影畫廊。而 Netflix 之所以能取得如此巨大的成功，正是因為家庭網路頻寬持續擴大。他們成功取代了那些隨處可見的紅白信封——那些透過美國郵政系統寄送 DVD 的服務。後來發展出的串流技術，更是完全超出我們當初對影視租賃產業的看空論點範疇。

But the most innovative companies often attract the greatest attention. And therefore, the highest valuation in that valuation isn't always defensible. I mean, so we didn't know Netflix for a long time. We weren't sure how successful it would be in generating free cash flow. Then COVID hits and, you know, and the production went, you know, stopped globally. And Netflix went down and we were able to buy Netflix at that point in time. We don't own it in, in, in crescent, you know, but uh, with something we, we all been, you know, because of that.
但最具創新力的公司往往最受矚目，也因此常獲得最高估值——而這種估值未必經得起考驗。以 Netflix 為例，我們很長一段時間都未投資它，當時無法確定其創造自由現金流的能力。後來疫情爆發，全球影視製作停擺，Netflix 股價隨之下跌，我們才在那個時間點進場。雖然我們在 Crescent 基金中並未持有部位，但正因如此...（語意未盡）

Often, there's fear that some businesses once stand at that time because of the innovation, you know, that's happening around them. And I gave that example of of Microsoft and other times it was a fear that shows up, not just because of innovation, but because of, you know, economic concerns or something, some other exogenous factor like when Facebook getting caught up in its Cambridge Analytica scandal and was at 2018, which allowed us to buy what is now Meta or the economic fears that that impacted Google in 2011 allowed us to buy that company. And I guess it's related to your earlier comment about constant learning and growing. And if you're too dogmatic in your business model and the market passes you up, then you effectively go extinct slowly. But if you're innovative and you're aware of the fact that maybe your business model will become outdated and you constantly evolve as the market evolves, then you obviously have less risk of permanent capital. If it may not be sick, you can make money in a company whose business has been disrupted and is is going away. If that company is a good enough business with a, with a, with a management team that's got their skin in the game is mindful of what's happening, where they're just going to deliver that cash to the, to their investors and let it, you know, think it was a net present value situation, deliver the cash to the investors over time and what's your IRR to the last, you know, to the last dollar you get back. Make it still be okay, you know, from an investment perspective, probably not worth spending a lot of time on those kinds of things, but you know, but it's still an interesting, you know, thought experiment. Of course, it, all of this comes down to the price, right? Yeah. Well, price and management, right? Because you go, the institutional imperative is more often than not, let's keep the company alive.
人們經常擔心某些企業會因為周遭的創新浪潮而受到衝擊。我舉過微軟的例子，有時這種擔憂不僅來自技術革新，還可能源於經濟隱憂或其他外部因素——比如臉書在 2018 年捲入劍橋分析醜聞時，讓我們有機會買進現在的美達公司；或是 2011 年因經濟恐慌受挫的谷歌，也成為我們的投資標的。這讓我聯想到您先前提到持續學習與成長的觀點：若企業過度固守既有商業模式，終將被市場淘汰而逐漸衰亡；反之，若能保持創新意識，認知到現行模式可能過時，並隨市場脈動不斷進化，資本永久損失的風險自然降低。即使企業遭遇產業顛覆危機，仍可能從中發掘獲利契機。 如果那家公司是一家足夠優秀的企業，擁有與公司利益緊密相連的管理團隊，能夠敏銳察覺市場動態，他們就會將現金返還給投資者。這就像是淨現值概念，隨著時間推移將現金分配給投資者，直到收回最後一美元時，你的內部報酬率仍然保持在合理水準。從投資角度來看，或許不值得花太多時間鑽研這類情況，但這仍然是個有趣的思考實驗。當然，所有這些最終都歸結於價格，對吧？沒錯，價格和管理能力。因為機構的慣性思維往往傾向於讓公司持續營運下去。

Let's keep going. Well, we're not going to be using the mail as much and we're putting both, so we're going to start making lots of acquisitions. If you have to be very careful, let's see, you know, what's the intention of management? Are they willing? Does it, do they have their money along set of years? And are they investing wisely, you know, for the future? Or are they just throwing a bunch of, uh, Hail Mary's? Let me ask you about AI, the hot topic today.
我們繼續往下談。既然郵件使用量會減少，而我們兩者都採用，接下來將開始進行大量收購。如果必須格外謹慎，我們得思考：管理層的意圖是什麼？他們是否願意投入？他們的資金是否已長期備妥？更重要的是，他們是否正為未來進行明智的投資？抑或只是漫無目的地亂槍打鳥？ 讓我請教您關於當前熱門話題——人工智慧的看法。

AI is seen as both an opportunity and a risk. How are you approaching AI at a high level? And how do you assess which firms will benefit versus those that may ultimately be disrupted? I mean, there's clearly going to be a lot of companies that use AI to improve their businesses and in some of which will just be by necessity. And then as they didn't use AI, you know, their costs would be higher than their peers. Um, biotech is a, you know, I think is a clear winner, you know, because and again, this is an area where we don't have an expertise in, but with, with having mapped, you know, the human genome, you know, a little over 20 years ago, combined with AI machine learning, you can, you can, you can really drive, you know, a drug development, uh, the bench strength and labs is going to be exponentially, you know, as a result. And there's going to be losers, there's going to be, you know, the call centers and other traditional appetizers that are that are going to, you know, be replaced. But one of it is on the applied AI side of the equation, it, you know, for the users of the AI, guys that we're going to take AI and apply it in their businesses, it really depends on how much that gets competed away. It reminds me for some of this is a reminds me a little bit of, of those companies that move their, take a parallel retailer that move their manufacturing offshore. And, you know, vertically integrated a pair of retail, moves their manufacturing offshore. They bring it back to the US at a much more sure price in their competition. And they, and it is big price in umbrella is a competition, uh, hadn't, you know, hadn't changed the way they were operating. So they just had margin expansion.
人工智慧被視為既是機會也是風險。您從宏觀層面如何應對 AI？又該如何評估哪些企業將受益，哪些可能最終被顛覆？我的意思是，顯然會有許多公司運用 AI 來改善業務，其中部分企業只是出於必要。如果他們不使用 AI，成本就會比同業更高。嗯，我認為生物科技顯然是贏家，雖然這並非我們專業領域，但隨著二十多年前人類基因組定序完成，結合 AI 機器學習，確實能大幅推動藥物開發，實驗室的研發實力也將呈指數級成長。當然也會有輸家，像是客服中心和其他傳統服務業都將面臨被取代的命運。 但其中一個面向在於應用人工智慧這端，對於那些打算將 AI 應用於自身企業的使用者來說，最終成效其實取決於競爭優勢能被保留多少。這讓我不禁聯想到某些將製造業務移往海外的零售商案例——當垂直整合的零售商把生產線轉移到海外後，能以更低的成本將產品回銷美國市場，在競爭對手尚未調整營運模式時，形成巨大的價格保護傘。於是他們就單純享受了利潤擴張。

Then those companies realized, well, we got to go overseas too. So soon, everybody's manufacturing overseas and that competitive advantage gets, you know, it was competed away. So for some businesses in the applied AI, that's going to be the, you know, the case for the future. And other companies, there's the picks and shovel companies that are going to be, you know, winners. I mean, artificial intelligence is clearly disruptor today.
等到其他企業察覺後也跟著外移生產，很快地所有人都把製造端轉向海外，原本的競爭優勢就這樣在競逐中消逝。這正是部分應用 AI 企業未來可能面臨的狀況。不過另有些提供基礎工具的公司將成為贏家——畢竟人工智慧在當今確實是顛覆性的存在。

There's, there's the, some companies are going to benefit by providing picks and shovels to the industry like in, in India. And others, as I said, are going to apply at your improve their businesses like users in true place there, outsource help us. Obviously, there's, there's a big focus, you know, on the AI spotlight of the, the big companies that you just described. Um, but, but obviously, it's going to apply across the board. Obviously, there'll be other businesses that will benefit and others that are risk. So I'm, I'm, here's how you think about all of that. It comes back to this, the rubric reuse, the low base in I in, you know, and as we look through to see what can happen, this company's earnings and cash flow over time. And we do the low base high cases, we're not looking out what the company's going to our next week, next quarter, even next year. It's like, where are they going to be in a few years? And then then then think beyond that as well.
有些公司將會透過提供產業所需的基礎工具獲益，就像在印度的情況。而其他公司，如我所說，將會著重於改善自身業務，例如透過外包服務來提升效率。顯然，正如您剛才描述的那樣，目前市場焦點主要集中在大型企業的人工智慧發展。但毋庸置疑的是，這股趨勢將會全面滲透各行各業。當然，有些企業會從中受益，也有些會面臨風險。關於這一切，我是這樣思考的：最終還是要回歸到我們的核心評估框架——關注企業的收益與現金流長期發展。我們會進行基礎情境與樂觀情境分析，重點不在於預測公司下週、下季甚至明年的表現，而是著眼於他們未來數年的發展軌跡，甚至要看得更長遠。

Um, so in our low case, the company, um, well, if we think that companies likely to be disrupted by AI, there we're not going to invest. But if we think that there's fears in the marketplace that an industry is going to be disrupted by AI. And we don't see it happening. We don't think that it's likely, but it's not improbable. So we have to do as we look at these key performance indicators, these KPIs, is we have to evaluate as an information flow comes across our desk. As we continue to read and work on the daily basis, as we stay in tune and touch with these companies, is what is happening? Is AI actually a disruptor? There's one industry, which is going to remain nameless today, as we are in in engagement and buying it, where there is that fear of AI disrupted? And we think that it's possible, but we also think they can use it to their advantage or we think that we think too much of it has shown up in the stock price. And we think that risk has been largely discounted by by the lower stock price. It's obviously a tremendous enthusiasm about AI. I'm curious what parallels in differences you draw between that current boom relative to the late 90s and the internet enthusiasm?
呃，在我們的悲觀情境中，這家公司...嗯，如果我們認為企業很可能被人工智慧顛覆，那我們就不會投資。但如果是市場上存在對某個產業將被 AI 顛覆的恐懼，而我們認為這種情況不會發生——我們不認為它很可能發生，但也不是完全不可能——這時就必須透過關鍵績效指標來評估。當資訊流不斷湧入我們案頭，當我們持續在日常工作中閱讀研究，當我們與這些企業保持密切聯繫時，我們必須判斷：AI 究竟是否真的構成顛覆性威脅？有個產業（今天暫不指名道姓，因為我們正在洽談投資）正面臨著被 AI 顛覆的恐懼，但我們認為他們反而能化為優勢，或者覺得市場已過度反映在股價上。我們相信較低的股價已大致折價了這項風險。 目前市場對 AI 確實存在巨大狂熱，我很好奇您如何看待當前這波熱潮與 1990 年代末期網路狂熱之間的異同？

Well, I think broadly speaking, I think there's there's more better companies today than there were than there were then. I mean simplistically, but they're also going to be a lot of companies are going to go away. You said that don't would justify the price of which they trade or any price for that matter. So I think there's going to be some of those companies as well. AI is the artificial intelligence of these is kind of like the two words of the day. And we're going to be talking about, we did this podcast in two years, we might be talking about quantum, which is a thing. I mean, it's not commercial, Leah thing today, but it will be, you know, a commercial viability in the future. And now, what's that going to disrupt? Who are the winners and losers going to be of that? And so we're just going to, there's always a word to substitute or, you know, there's something that's sexy out there that people buy into and and there were wanting to hang their outs on and and some kind of panacea and they'll value it as such. I will Steven, I appreciate you taking the time and sharing your insights with us. I enjoyed our conversation, and I hope our listeners did as well. Thank you.
總的來說，我認為現在比過去有更多優質企業。雖然說法簡單，但同時也會有許多公司被淘汰——那些根本不符合當前股價、甚至任何價格水平的企業。人工智慧無疑是當今最熱門的關鍵字，不過若我們兩年後再錄這期節目，可能就會改談量子科技了。這項技術目前雖未商業化，但未來必定會具備商業可行性。屆時又將顛覆哪些產業？誰會成為贏家與輸家？市場總是會出現新的流行詞，某些令人趨之若鶩的潮流概念，被人們當作萬靈丹般追捧並賦予超高估值。Steven，非常感謝您撥冗分享真知灼見，這次對談令我獲益良多，相信聽眾們也是如此。衷心致謝。

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