The Most Powerful Investing Tool You Aren’t Using - Four Lessons from Michael Mauboussin 20251208

 

你還沒用過的最強大投資工具 - 來自麥可·莫布森的四大啟示 20251208
 
I think that I would encourage people to learn about and apply base rates as they think about the world of investing. But always it's not just a valuable for investing, but really business or your life actually. The point I make over and over is that multiples are not valuation. Let me just stop there. Multiple are not valuation. They are a shorthand for the valuation process. And one should never confuse those two things. Expectations of investing has three steps. The first step is to go backwards and say the only thing we know for sure in this whole equation is the price. So let's go back and reverse engineer using a discounted cash flow model, which is an appropriate way to think about economic both theoretically and I think practically. Think about what has to happen for this current stock price to make sense. Skill is not only high, but it's uniform, right? And you think about how many smart people go into this industry and how motivated they are and how hardworking they are and how thoughtful they are. It just defies logic that there's no skill. There's huge amounts of skill. It's just that's the problem, right? And that skill gets reflected in prices and if prices to be read which they are largely efficient, then means that means the random wall kind of thing comes into play. So man, apparently we're writing a book.
我認為我會鼓勵人們在思考投資世界時，學習並應用基礎比率。但這不僅對投資有價值，實際上對商業或生活也是如此。我一再強調的是，倍數並非估值。讓我在此停一下——倍數不等於估值，它們只是估值過程的簡化表達，絕不應混淆這兩者。 投資預期分為三個步驟：第一步是回顧過去，並認知到整個方程中唯一確定的只有價格。因此，我們應回過頭來，利用折現現金流模型進行逆向推導——無論從理論或實務角度，這都是思考經濟問題的合適方式。我們需要思考：要讓當前股價合理，必須發生什麼事？ 技能不僅水準高，而且相當一致，對吧？想想有多少聰明人投入這個行業，他們的動機多強、多麼勤奮、多麼深思熟慮。若說其中毫無技能可言，根本不合邏輯。技能其實非常豐富——問題恰恰就在這裡，不是嗎？ 而這項技能會反映在價格上，如果價格能被解讀——它們在很大程度上是有效的——那就意味著隨機漫步這類概念開始發揮作用。 所以老兄，看來我們要寫一本書了。


I don't know the told you yet, but we are. What? Who? Perfectly? And you're the best writer of all of us. So you may need to lead up the upper here because as you know, I'm a very sea writer at best. No, no, you're a very functional writer, but I'm really excited for this because it felt like we're having all these great conversations. And even in many cases making notes or doing stuff to memorialize these, it's not a big extra step for us to go. Let's put this in some type of format so people can have this and put on their shelf. I would have bought the book I feel like we're writing is a book that I would have loved to have on my shelf 15 years ago.
我不知道是否告訴過你，但我們確實要寫。什麼？誰？真的嗎？而且你是我們之中最會寫的。所以你可能得在這方面多擔待點，因為你知道，我充其量只是個很普通的寫手。不、不，你是個非常實用的寫手，但我對這件事真的很興奮，因為感覺我們進行了這麼多精彩的對話。甚至在很多情況下做了筆記或整理內容來記錄這些對話，對我們來說，再往前一步並不算太難。讓我們把這些內容整理成某種格式，讓人們可以擁有它、放在書架上。我會買下這本書——我覺得我們正在寫的這本書，正是我 15 年前會渴望放在書架上的那種書。

And that's a really cool feeling. Yeah, because what we realize is, you know, we have this standard closing question which is based on your experience in markets if you could teach one lesson to the average investor, what would it be? And we've asked like some of the best investors we know, we've asked like 200 people that question right now. And that's sort of logically flows into a book which are what are the best lessons that these best investors would teach you. And the working title we have is the most important investing lesson, what the world's best investors would teach you. And so I think it's a really cool way to bring together all those lessons. Obviously the book does not exist yet, so there's no link to buy it or anything. But what we want to do is the best way to force us to do this is to do this in public. So we started a sub-stack, it's a excess returns pond.substack.com.
這感覺真的很酷。對啊，因為我們意識到，我們有個標準的結尾問題，是基於你在市場中的經驗，如果你能教給普通投資者一堂課，那會是什麼？我們已經問過一些我們認識的最佳投資者，目前大概問了 200 個人這個問題。這邏輯上自然就匯集成一本書，內容就是這些頂尖投資者會教你的最佳教訓。我們暫定的書名是《最重要的投資教訓：世界頂尖投資者會教給你什麼》。所以我覺得這真是個超酷的方式，能把所有這些教訓集結起來。當然，這本書還沒出版，所以沒有購買連結之類的。但我們想做的是，逼我們完成這件事的最佳方式，就是公開進行。所以我們開了一個 Substack，網址是 excessreturns pond.substack.com。

The primary goal was to put the book chapters up as drafts and to work with our audience. You know, to revise it and to get it, make it better as we go. But also the excess returns pond.substack.com will also be the repository for all the old episodes, the old transcripts, some other original content we're creating. So if you do follow us and you like our stuff, that's a good place to go to get all this. Come visit us, say hi and let me put the highlighter on Jack to said, we want feedback on this. So if you look at like what we're going to talk about today. If you look at that chapter, if you look at those ideas and something's really resonating, we'd love to know we did something right. But more so if you're like, ah, this part doesn't really work for me or this is, I'm confused by this. That's why we're putting it on sub-stack first because leaves of grass, baby, do you get that reference?
主要目標是將書籍章節以草稿形式發布，並與我們的讀者互動。您知道的，就是邊進行邊修訂、完善內容。此外，excessreturns pond.substack.com 也將成為所有舊集數、舊文字稿，以及我們創作的其他原創內容的儲存庫。所以如果您關注我們且喜歡我們的內容，那裡是獲取所有資源的好去處。來拜訪我們、打聲招呼，讓我特別強調傑克說的：我們希望獲得對此的回饋。所以如果您看看我們今天要討論的內容，如果您閱讀那個章節、那些想法，有什麼特別引起共鳴的，我們很樂意知道我們做對了什麼。但更重要的是，如果您覺得「呃，這部分對我來說不太適用」或「這裡讓我感到困惑」——這正是我們先將內容放在 Substack 上的原因，因為《草葉集》啊，寶貝，您懂這個典故嗎？

Do you know about uh, the rewriting? The rewriting of the algorithm, which is, you know, that's right. Millions of re-drafts has been normalized in history and I will anchor us on that as long as the day is. And yeah, we're used to, you know, we've had to develop a little bit of the thick skin ear because we're used to operating on YouTube, which is uh, we're used to getting instantaneous comments about a variety of things we do. So it would have been weird to like write a book and then be like, here's the whole book that we've done in the background. It would make sense for us, like it's better to work back and forth our audience like we have on everything else and to try to make it as good as possible. We eventually do it, which we don't even know when that's going to be. But we're going to shoot for every week or two to get a chapter up and hopefully in the next year or so, we'll get it done.
你知道嗎，呃，關於重寫這件事？演算法的重寫，就是，嗯，沒錯。歷史上數百萬次的重寫已經成為常態，我會以此為基準，直到永遠。而且，是的，我們已經習慣了，你知道，我們不得不培養一點厚臉皮，因為我們習慣在 YouTube 上運作，也就是說，我們習慣於對我們做的各種事情立即得到評論。所以，如果寫一本書然後說「這是我們在幕後完成的整本書」，那會很奇怪。對我們來說，更好的方式是像我們在其他所有事情上那樣，與觀眾來回互動，盡可能讓它變得更好。我們最終會完成它，只是我們甚至不知道那會是什麼時候。但我們會爭取每一兩週上傳一個章節，希望在大約一年內完成它。

Here's to giant baby steps, Jack. Let's see if a book comes out on the other end. So now let's move on to the topic of today, which is the first chapter we wrote is about Michael Wolvesson. And I can't think of a better person to write the first chapter of out because there's just so many, like when I went back through his episodes, there's so many great lessons in there. And maybe one of the biggest ones is this idea of base reads. So that's the first section of, that is what the primary goal of that first chapter is. And so let's start before you and I get into base rate, let's hear Michael talk about base rates. So here's Michael talking about what a base rate is. I think that I would encourage people to learn about and apply base rates as they think about the world of investing.
敬祝大步向前，傑克。讓我們看看最終能否誕生一本書。現在讓我們進入今天的主題，我們撰寫的第一章是關於麥可·莫布森。我想不出比他更適合為本書開篇的人選，因為當我重溫他的訪談內容時，發現其中蘊含著太多寶貴的啟示。或許其中最核心的概念就是「基礎比率」。這正是第一章第一節的重點，也是該章的主要目標。在我們深入探討基礎比率之前，先來聽聽麥可如何闡述這個概念。以下是麥可對基礎比率的解說：我認為在投資思考中，應該鼓勵人們學習並應用基礎比率。

By the way, it's not just a valuable for investing, but really business or your life actually is a career for your life. And again, a base rate, you know, the basic set up is that natural way to think about the world or solve your problems is to gather a bunch of information and combine it with your own inputs and experience and project into the future. And that's what we all do left our own devices. Using base rate says I'm going to think about what I'm facing now or my problem as an instance of a larger reference class. I'm going to basically ask what happened when other people or organizations were in this position before. And it's a very unnatural way to think because you have to leave aside, you know, sort of your own information gathering and your own experience. We all tend to place a lot of value on that. And you have to find and appeal to the base rate, which may not be your fingertips and often it's not. So you have to go out and make a little effort to find it.
順帶一提，這不僅對投資極具價值，實際上無論是商業或人生，它都能成為你職涯與生活的指引。再次強調，基礎比率的基本概念在於：我們通常思考世界或解決問題的自然方式，是收集大量資訊，結合自身的見解與經驗，再推演至未來。這正是我們憑藉自身慣性所採用的方法。 運用基礎比率則意味著：我會將當前面臨的狀況或問題，視為一個更廣泛參考類別中的實例。基本上，我會提問：過去當其他人或組織處於類似處境時，發生了什麼事？這是一種非常不自然的思考方式，因為你必須暫時擱置自己的資訊收集與個人經驗——而我們往往對此賦予極高的價值。你必須尋找並依循基礎比率，而這可能並非唾手可得，通常確實如此。因此，你需要付出一些努力去發掘它。

But once you do, I think it reshapes how you think a lot about the world. And I think makes you more grounded in terms of how you think about how things are likely to unfold. So to me, if that would be the one idea is to say, let's think about base rates. You know, you mentioned before jokingly that we're in that sort of season where people do forecasts. You know, that's a great example where base rates would be very helpful. You sort of made the joke 10% with some standard deviation. But that's actually the right way to think about it. That's actually the right answer. And that was that's informed by base rates. So you got to the right place and the right way to think about it using that actual technique.
但一旦你這麼做，我認為它會重塑你對世界的許多看法。而且我認為這會讓你對事物可能如何發展的思考更加踏實。所以對我來說，如果有一個核心概念要說，那就是：讓我們思考基礎比率。你知道，你之前開玩笑提到我們正處於人們做預測的那種季節。這其實是基礎比率能發揮極大作用的絕佳例子。你開了個玩笑說 10%加減某個標準差。但這其實是正確的思考方式。那實際上是正確的答案。而這正是由基礎比率所啟發的。所以你透過運用這個實際技巧，以正確的方式達到了正確的思考路徑。

So to me, that would be the one bit of advice I would give. And if I could go back to my 20 year old self, that's certainly what I would teach. And by the way, I would just say that it's remarkable how underutilized this concept is nowwithstanding it's demonstrable power. I don't know about you, but this idea kind of flipped a lot of things for me. You know, because I'm the person who's sitting there and trying to analyze any situation and say, all right, let me look at all the facts in the ground and let me figure out what's going to happen. And this sort of inverts that completely. And it says, all right, no, let's not do that. Let's just look at when these circumstances exist in the past, what is happening? So so a good example would be like if a company is growing its earnings 50% a year or something,
所以對我來說，這會是我給出的唯一建議。如果我能回到 20 歲的自己，這絕對是我會教導的內容。順帶一提，我想說的是，儘管這個概念具有可證明的強大力量，但其被低估運用的程度實在令人驚訝。我不知道你怎麼想，但這個想法對我來說顛覆了許多事情。因為我原本是那種會坐下來試圖分析任何情況，想著：好吧，讓我看看所有現有事實，然後推斷將會發生什麼的人。而這種方法完全顛覆了那種思維。它告訴我們：不，別那樣做。我們只需看看過去當這些情況存在時，發生了什麼事？舉個好例子來說，就像如果一家公司每年盈利增長 50%或類似情況時……

I could probably look at their business and say, are they going to continue to grow 50% a year? And that's probably part of what I should do. But the other thing I could do is say, let's look at every other company that was growing their earnings 50% a year in the past. Like how many of those were able to sustain that growth rate? And that may give me valuable information as I analyze that company. This whole idea, and this is a repeating if not iterative iterative thing with movies and work is you take an idea like the insight outside. You take an idea like base rates and how you set them. And then you learn like you read the Gary Antanachi stuff on momentum. And you go, okay, am I comparing something against myself or one thing, comparing it against itself? And then comparing it against a broader reference class has this doing relative to all these other things.
我或許可以觀察他們的業務，然後問：他們能否持續每年成長 50%？這可能是我該做的一部分分析。但另一方面，我也可以這樣思考：讓我們看看過去所有曾實現每年收益成長 50%的公司。有多少公司能持續保持這樣的成長速度？這或許能為我分析該公司提供寶貴的資訊。這整個概念——在電影和工作中反覆出現、甚至不斷演進的思維模式——就是將某個洞見（例如外部視角）帶入思考。你採納像基礎比率這樣的觀念，並學習如何設定它們。接著，你讀了蓋瑞·安塔納奇關於動能的文章後，會反思：我是在將某事物與自身或單一對象比較，還是將其置於更廣泛的參考類別中，評估它與其他所有事物的相對表現？

Starts see all the ways these line up. And it falls through on all sorts of levels. It could be on the company where you go, this company is growing at 15% a year. Well, how have those conditions existed for companies growing at this clip in a broader reference class? That ability to zoom out to the wide angle view and then zoom in to the really narrow what's going on in the ground level view. And then reconcile the two. That is a crazy hack that has applications well across finance if not across life. And one thing I think people get wrong is the idea that I should just use base rates or I should just apply the outside view. Like what what was this talking about is you should use this to supplement what you're doing. So for example, if I looked at base rates and I looked at the mag said that I would have been like this things all over.
開始觀察所有這些線索如何相互吻合。然而它在各個層面上都出現了問題。可能是針對你所關注的公司，比如這家公司每年以 15%的速度成長。那麼，在更廣泛的參考類別中，那些以這種速度成長的公司是如何維持這種條件的？這種能夠拉遠視角、宏觀審視，再聚焦到地面層級實際狀況的能力，然後將兩者進行調和——這簡直是個瘋狂的技巧，即使不能應用於整個人生，至少在金融領域有著廣泛的應用。我認為人們常犯的一個錯誤是，以為自己應該只使用基礎比率，或者只應用外部觀點。但這裡要談的是，你應該用這些方法來輔助你正在做的事情。舉例來說，如果我只看基礎比率，並參照雜誌所說的，我可能會覺得這些事情到處都是如此。

It's done. These companies will never grow at these rates and they get they did. And so some smart investors figured out, yes, there are base rates about this, but there's different things about these companies where they're going to maybe defy those base rates. So it's just like a tool in the toolkit. It's not the entire thing you do. Yeah, and that's that interchangeability. Because once you know that this is not historically normal, but I can find one of smaller examples of if these criteria happen, this is how a company sustains those growth. Now you can reconcile them with each other. You can't use these in a vacuum. But you can use these as a reconciliation system to figure out how does this work. And it carries in the light, too. I mean, there's so many examples where no matter what you're doing, you can look at it and say, alright, historically with this situation occurred. What happens, you know, whatever it is, if you're starting a small business, you know, you at least know the odds of success, like of a small business in the category you're starting it. It doesn't mean you don't start the small business. It just means that you know like this restaurant or this bar that I want to open down the street like it's probably not going to work out of basically base rates. I don't know what the base rates are on bars map, but I would assume they're quite early. They're pretty low. It's basically like you're going to start this bar. Well, what what future do you see, Jack? How do you like, um, do you like tax fraud or divorce better? Like, what's the way do you want to? But, but no, seriously, on the, like, on the financial planning side, this is huge because people will talk about.
完成了。這些公司永遠不會以這樣的速度成長，而它們確實做到了。因此，一些聰明的投資者意識到，是的，這方面有基準率，但這些公司有不同之處，它們或許能超越那些基準率。所以這就像工具箱裡的一個工具，不是你做的全部事情。是的，這就是那種可互換性。因為一旦你知道這在歷史上並不正常，但我能找到較小的例子，如果這些條件發生，這就是一家公司如何維持那種成長的方式。現在你可以將它們相互調和。你不能孤立地使用這些。但你可以將它們用作一個調和系統，來弄清楚這是如何運作的。這在現實中也適用。我的意思是，有太多例子，無論你在做什麼，你都可以看看並說，好吧，歷史上這種情況發生時會怎樣。你知道，無論是什麼，如果你正在創辦一家小企業，你至少知道成功的機率，就像在你所創辦的類別中的小企業一樣。這並不意味著你不創辦那家小企業。 這只是意味著，你知道，就像我想在街角開的這家餐廳或酒吧，基本上根據基準率來看，很可能不會成功。我不知道酒吧地圖上的基準率是多少，但我猜它們相當早。它們相當低。基本上就像你要開這家酒吧一樣。那麼，傑克，你看到了什麼樣的未來？你更喜歡，嗯，你更喜歡稅務詐欺還是離婚？就像，你想要哪種方式？但是，不，說真的，在財務規劃方面，這非常重要，因為人們會談論。

It might be paying for your kids for school, it might be paying off your mortgage, it might be paying off all the stuff. And the first view you're going to take is, okay, well, if you're going to save a bunch of money, you're going to pay that mortgage down faster. What's your propensity to save? What's your capacity to save? How good are you doing things like this personally in the past? Now we can zoom out and go, what's the experience of other people similar to your capabilities and what they've done? And, you know, did this make them happy or is this something that they're like, ah, this didn't really make sense. If you're going to reconcile those two views, what makes sense to you, what makes sense in an optimal stance, and you can pick which one you have to override, which one you have to adjust, which one, which one you want to reverse course for. If you want to throw the towel and open up that bar restaurant, you can go in those directions once you have all this stuff on the, on the table. So that's the next lesson we've focused on in the book was the, the investing lesson from Mobison, which is this idea of expectations and testing. And this is another thing that really slipped things for me when I, when I started thinking about things this way, so here's Michael talking about that. So expectations investing has three steps. The first step is to go backwards and say the only thing we know for sure in this whole equation is the price. So let's go back and reverse engineer using a discounted cash flow model, which is an appropriate way to think about economic both theoretically and I think practically. Think about what has to happen for this current stock price to make sense, right? So and that's going to be typically articulated in things like drivers of value, which would be sales, growth rate, margins, capital intensity, those kinds of things, right? And so the key to step one is to try to be sort of agnostic, right? Like you don't have a view of the world necessarily.
這可能是為了支付孩子的學費，可能是為了還清房貸，也可能是為了清償所有債務。首先你會考慮的是：好吧，如果你打算存下一大筆錢，就能更快還清房貸。你的儲蓄傾向如何？你的儲蓄能力又如何？過去你個人處理這類事務的表現如何？現在我們可以拉遠視角，看看與你能力相似的其他人的經驗以及他們的做法。然後，你知道嗎？這是否讓他們感到快樂，還是他們覺得「啊，這其實不太合理」。如果你要調和這兩種觀點——什麼對你來說合理，什麼在最佳立場上合理——你可以選擇必須優先考慮哪一方、需要調整哪一方，或是想要徹底改變哪一方的做法。如果你想放棄一切，開一間酒吧餐廳，只要把所有選項都攤在桌上，你就可以朝那些方向前進。這就是我們在書中聚焦的下一個課題——來自莫布森的投資啟示，即關於預期與驗證的理念。 而這點也讓我豁然開朗，當我開始以這種方式思考時。以下是麥可對此的闡述：預期投資法分為三個步驟。第一步是回溯思考，認清整個等式裡唯一確定的只有股價。因此，我們要回過頭來，利用折現現金流模型進行逆向推導——無論從理論或實務角度，這都是思考經濟問題的恰當方式。我們要推敲：要讓當前股價顯得合理，必須發生哪些事情？這通常會體現在價值驅動因素上，例如銷售額、成長率、利潤率、資本密集度等指標。所以第一步的關鍵在於保持中立態度，也就是不必預設對世界的特定看法。

You just want to say what has to happen or what does one need to believe for today's stock price to make sense, right? So if you want to metaphor for that, it would be where's the bar been set for the bar, a high jumper. We don't know how high the high jumper good jump yet, but we know the bar set of two feet, five feet, ten feet, whatever it is. Step two is an introducing historical analysis, but more importantly strategic and financial analysis to judge whether that company is going to meet exceed or come short of those expectations, right? So that's really where the rubber meets the road analytically. And again, history can be a really good guide for that, but but it's also, and by the way, the other thing that comes out that is really important is , you know, typically lower multiples are associated with lower expectations of the higher multiple high expectations. But you might notice that that whole discussion goes out the window, right? It's not really the difference just low multiples. It's really how will the company perform vis-a-vis what's priced in, right? So that's step two.
你只是想說，為了讓今天的股價顯得合理，必須發生什麼事，或者人們需要相信什麼，對吧？所以如果要用比喻來說，就像是跳高選手面前的橫桿設定在哪裡。我們還不知道這位跳高選手能跳多高，但我們知道橫桿設定在兩英尺、五英尺、十英尺，無論是多少。第二步是引入歷史分析，但更重要的是策略和財務分析，來判斷這家公司是否會達到、超越或低於那些預期，對吧？這才是分析真正見真章的地方。同樣地，歷史在這方面可以是很好的指引，但同時——順帶一提，另一個非常重要的點是——通常較低的估值倍數伴隨著較低的預期，而較高的倍數則伴隨著高預期。但你可能會注意到，整個討論其實可以拋開這點，對吧？關鍵不僅僅在於估值倍數的高低，真正重要的是公司表現相對於市場已反映的預期會如何，對吧？這就是第二步。

And I should say, too, that that is a very probable list of exercise. We argue that coming out of step two, we should have as a number of scenarios for potential outcomes. And you should attach probabilities to those. So we're really going to think about the world in an expected value terms rather than, you know, here's the answer. And then step three is, of course, by seller hold as appropriate based on steps one and two. This is so rare, I think, because when I'm analyzing a company, what I want to do is I want to say, like, here's what I think the company is worth. And then I want to compare that to the stock price. And this is taking that in the exact opposite direction. This is saying, there is a stock price. What are the expectations that exist in that stock price? And then I could start looking at the world and how I think the world might play out relative to those expectations that are in the stock price.
我必須說，這確實是一份相當可能的練習清單。我們主張，在完成第二步後，我們應該針對潛在結果設想出多種情境，並為這些情境附上相應的發生機率。因此，我們將真正以期望值的角度來思考這個世界，而非僅僅給出一個確定的答案。當然，第三步則是根據第一步和第二步的結果，適時地進行買入、賣出或持有的決策。 我認為這種做法非常罕見，因為當我分析一家公司時，我通常想做的是：提出我認為這家公司值多少錢，然後將其與股價進行比較。而這種方法恰恰相反：它從現有的股價出發，探討這個股價中蘊含了哪些市場預期。接著，我才能開始觀察現實世界，並思考世界未來的發展可能如何與股價中反映的這些預期相比較。

So it's sort of like flipping around the way people typically analyze the situation like this. When did you come across expectations investing that that book in this whole idea? Do you remember when this found you in the world? It was definitely before, I mean, I think this interview we're playing Cliffs from Michael was in like 2022 or something like that. It was well before that, but I don't know exactly. Somewhere for me, probably in like the 2000 somewhere between 2000 like 10 and 2015, maybe 2017, somewhere in that window. And it would have been because probably like I heard them on Consuelo Mac or something like, like, however he, like, somebody introduces you to him and you started reading like the like Mason stuff and all the behavioral papers and whatever. I was like, I should get this book. That book in this whole idea of instead of doing what you just described having like, this is what I think the stock is worth.
這有點像是把人們通常分析這類情況的方式給翻轉過來。你是什麼時候接觸到《期望投資法》這本書和整個概念的？還記得這個想法是在何時進入你的世界嗎？那肯定是在之前——我是說，我們現在引用的麥可訪談大概是 2022 年左右的事，但這概念出現得更早，只是我不確定確切時間。對我來說，大概是在 2000 年代初期，介於 2010 到 2015 年之間，或許到 2017 年，就在那段時間範圍內。會接觸到可能是因為我在 Consuelo Mac 之類的節目上聽到他，或者有人介紹他的作品，然後我就開始讀他那些關於行為金融的論文等等。當時我就想：我該找這本書來讀。這本書和整個概念的核心，就是不要像你剛才描述的那樣——先認定「我覺得這支股票值多少錢」。

Here's five scenarios of what I think the stock is worth if this is happening, if this is happening, if this is happening, this is happening, this is happening, this is happening. Bear cases, bull cases, base cases and variations in between as many as you need to have. Because then once you figure out what's the stock worth and all these different considerations, then you can start going, how do I probably wait each of these things? And that guides you to, um, what's the L-roy dimson, the risk means more things can happen than we'll have and it's something like that. Do you know what I'm talking about? Yeah, I guess right. Okay, so risk that means more things can happen than we'll have it. So the whole spot of spaghetti noodles, like only one of those noodles becomes the historical record.
我認為這支股票在以下幾種情境中的價值可能是：如果發生這種情況、如果發生那種情況、如果這種情況發生、那種情況發生、另一種情況發生。你需要考慮熊市情境、牛市情境、基本情境以及其間各種可能的變化。因為一旦你釐清在這些不同考量下股票的價值，你就能開始思考：我該如何權衡每種可能性？這會引導你理解所謂的「風險」——風險意味著可能發生的事情遠多於我們所能預測的，大概就是這樣的概念。你明白我在說什麼嗎？對，我想你懂了。好的，所以風險代表可能發生的事情比我們能掌握的更多。就像一整把義大利麵條中，最終只有一根麵條會成為歷史紀錄。

But it's like all these variations that have to be there and you want to be aware of in order to inform that call. That's such a different way to look at tool for old and look at people going like, I think this is worth that. Like maybe 60% what do we put on this? Also, what you just said about probabilities is so important because even when people use this expectations investing, they want to say like, Here's the way I think the way is going to, the way the world is going to play out and they have like this one scenario. And it's, what Mobus is talking about is taking a bunch of scenarios and probably listically waiting those scenarios and then looking at it from that perspective. And that's very different than those of us who think we have the confidence because, you know, as we know from like behavioral research, all of us are very, very overconfident. And we think we know what this scenario is going to be, but it's more important to think about all these scenarios both good and bad and it's a sort of look at it from a probabilistic standpoint. And then it can tell you on average, this is something we use in the financial planning sphere all the time too. Where it's like, on average, are you at or above the, not even the expectation where you want to or hope to be? And so it's like, we're going to take in the, in the consideration, all these like dreadful scenarios. And if we still bake those in and on average, it's like, yeah, this is an acceptable outcome. That's a aiming for like we can't aim for 100%. I can't tell you if you're going to get, have some like horrible affliction in your future. But I can't say when we weigh out all these options, we still think this is better off on this path. That mode of decision making where you let go of an absolute knowledge or control of the future is actually quite empowering if you can train your brain or retrain your brain to embrace it.
但所有這些變數都必須存在，而你必須意識到它們，才能為那個判斷提供依據。這與看待傳統工具的方式截然不同，也與那些只會說「我覺得這個值那個價」的人大相逕庭。比如說，也許 60%？我們該如何評估這個？此外，你剛才提到的機率觀念非常重要，因為即使人們使用這種預期投資法，他們往往只想著：「我認為世界會這樣發展」，然後只構思單一情境。而莫布辛所談論的，是構思一系列情境，並以機率方式權衡這些情境，再從那個角度來審視。這與我們這些自認有把握的人非常不同——正如行為研究所示，我們所有人都過度自信。我們以為自己知道情境會如何發展，但更重要的是去思考所有可能的情境，無論好壞，並從機率的角度來看待。這樣一來，它就能告訴你平均而言的結果；這也正是我們在財務規劃領域中時常運用的方法。 這就像是，平均而言，你是否達到或超越了——甚至不是你所期望或希望達到的標準？因此，我們會將所有這些糟糕的情境納入考量。如果我們在計算中仍將這些因素考慮進去，而平均結果顯示：是的，這是一個可接受的結果。這就是我們所追求的目標——我們無法追求百分之百的完美。我無法告訴你未來是否會遭遇某些可怕的困境。但我可以說，當我們權衡所有選項後，我們仍然認為這條路徑是更好的選擇。這種決策模式——你放棄對未來的絕對知識或控制——實際上非常具有賦能效果，如果你能訓練或重新訓練你的大腦去擁抱它。

And that mag said that example I gave before I think is a really good example here because like if I looked back, you know, whatever it is, you know, eight years ago or something looked at Google, I would have said, wow, there's a lot of expectations. Built into that stock, but somebody who was analyzing using this framework, who had a different view can, with that can say, the actual reality ended up being way, way, way beyond those expectations. So it was a good way to look at it and say, yes, there are these expectations in the stock, but the people that were right about Google realized, there's a much bigger future in line here, or there's a higher probability of this bigger future that far exceeds those expectations. There was a couple of people back when it was back when Amazon started to break off the Amazon web services reporting because remember for a long time, they didn't report those. They had launched the business, but they weren't telling you like what was going on, they might tell you how much that segment grew, but they didn't break it out.
而那本雜誌提到我之前舉的例子，我認為在這裡是個非常好的例證。因為回顧過去，無論是八年前還是什麼時候，當我觀察 Google 時，我可能會說：「哇，這支股票承載了太多期望。」但若有人運用這套分析框架，持有不同觀點，就能指出：實際結果最終遠遠、遠遠超出了那些預期。因此，這是個很好的方式來審視——是的，股票中確實存在這些期望，但那些對 Google 判斷正確的人意識到，這裡蘊藏著更龐大的未來，或者實現這個更宏大未來的可能性遠超過那些預期。回想亞馬遜開始拆分報告亞馬遜網路服務（AWS）時，有幾位人士就注意到了這點——記得嗎？很長一段時間他們並未單獨報告這塊業務。他們已經啟動了這項業務，但並未透露具體情況，或許會告訴你該部門的成長幅度，卻未將其獨立列出。

And somebody had done like a sum of the parts analysis to try to back it up and I remember Ben Thompson at Street Checkery writing one of these posts to being like, it's somewhere in these ranges of what this is probably worth. And remember reading that and very unfortunately it did not cause me to put like a million dollars in Amazon or something otherwise we might not be having this conversation. But it did make me realize like even under the hood of this company that already feels so big and so richly valued and so I remember being like, but it's twice the valuation of like Walmart or whatever. Is that really what not having stores or worth? And it's well, there's this other growth engine inside that nobody knows how to evaluate. So how can we start thinking through what this could mean either an upside for the company or in development or in other forms of leverage that were not yet understanding. And it's constantly making sure you're aware of putting that stuff back onto your radar.
有人曾進行過分部加總分析試圖佐證，我記得班·湯普森在《街頭核查》寫過一篇這樣的文章，內容大致是說它的價值可能落在這些範圍之間。記得讀到那篇文章時，非常遺憾地，這並沒有促使我投入百萬美元到亞馬遜之類的投資，否則我們現在可能就不會有這段對話了。但這確實讓我意識到，即便在這家感覺已經如此龐大、估值如此高昂的公司內部——我當時還想著，它的估值可是沃爾瑪的兩倍左右呢，難道不設實體店鋪真值得這麼多嗎？然而，公司內部其實存在另一個成長引擎，當時無人知曉該如何評估。所以我們該如何開始思考這可能意味著什麼，無論是對公司的上行潛力、發展方向，或是其他我們尚未理解的槓桿形式。關鍵在於持續確保自己將這些因素重新納入觀察範圍。

And sometimes it comes from unexpected places, like it comes from like a Ben Thompson at Street Checkery in 2015 or whatever the hell year it was. Yeah, and then obviously to value guys like me, there's the flip side of this, which is a decade ago, we were like this retailer in the mall just you know those expectations are so low it couldn't possibly dip anywhere. You're going away. You're going to be another bankrupt mall here V is too high, but this does relate to value investing in that value investors are betting on to some degrees that across a wide number of cheap companies. The expectations are too low for those companies and the reality on average across them is a little bit better now that didn't play out in the past decade or so, but that has played out over a hundred year period so it does relate a little bit to what I'm doing value investing. And this goes back to your probabilistic argument because there's different strategies. Much of value investing boils down to can genuinely awful become less bad.
而有時靈感來自意想不到的地方，比如 2015 年（或管他哪一年）街頭檢查員的本·湯普森。當然，對像我這樣的價值投資者來說，這也有另一面——十年前，我們就像商場裡的零售商，你知道那些期望值低到不可能再跌了。你即將消失，你會成為另一家破產的商場，估值太高了。但這確實與價值投資相關，因為價值投資者某種程度上是在賭：大量廉價公司的期望值過低，而它們的平均實際狀況其實稍好一些。這在過去十年左右並未實現，但在百年週期中確實成立，所以這與我從事的價值投資確實有些關聯。這又回到你關於概率的論點，因為存在不同的策略。許多價值投資歸根結底在於：真正糟糕的情況能否變得沒那麼糟。

Not can good become great growth and momentum investing is can good become great or can be can good become amazing but most good value investing turns into can genuinely awful turn into maybe not totally terrible. Why did you make a lot of investing strategy like where genuinely awful when what I want to happen is genuinely awful to turn into bad. That doesn't sound like a very when you put it that way and that it's like maybe a different approach in order. You know not necessarily it takes it does take a village and somebody has to have the really dark and sadistic humor. So I like to think we all have a place. So as we as we move on to lesson three here, this is a great one because this applies to life to investing to everything all of us want to use shortcuts and often when we use the shortcuts we have no idea what they actually mean. So here's Michael talking about that. The point I make over and over is that multiples are not valuation.
並非優秀就能成就卓越的成長與動能投資，是優秀能否變得卓越，或是優秀能否變得驚人；但大多數優秀的價值投資，卻可能轉變為真正糟糕的狀況，或許不至於完全慘不忍睹。為何你會制定許多投資策略，讓真正糟糕的情況發生，而我期望的卻是讓真正糟糕轉變為只是不佳？這樣說起來似乎不太對勁，或許需要不同的方法才行。要知道，這並非必然，確實需要眾人合力，且必須有人具備那種陰暗又殘酷的幽默感。所以我喜歡認為，我們各自都有其位置。 那麼，當我們進入第三課時，這點非常重要，因為它適用於生活、投資，以及一切事物——我們都想要走捷徑，但往往在使用捷徑時，我們根本不清楚它們真正的意義。以下是麥可對此的見解：我一再強調的重點是，倍數並非估值。

Let me just stop there. Multiple are not valuation they are a short hand for the valuation process and once you never confuse those two things right so the valuation process is the present value future cash flows multiples are a short hand. Now what's good about multiples what's good about short hands in general right they save you time right and by the way I should just be clear I use multiples if you and I were having a conversat casual conversation we might I would maybe drop multiples about a particular business whatever that's fine. But the key is that you understand the economic implications of the multiples that you're using. So you're saying I think this should be a 15 times EBITDA or the 30 times earnings. So what what is that what what do I have to believe for those multiples to make sense and so as you know we spent a lot of time writing about we wrote a piece called what does a P multiple mean we wrote a piece called what does need VD but down multiple mean essentially creating a bridge between those multiples is people tend to use them and. And the economic the underlying economic assumptions that you need to make in order for those to justify those multiples and just to be really explicit about those things and you know as what the motor in it. New York University sort of the dean evaluation he's talked a lot about this he surveyed investor reports and he's found or analysts reports pardon me he's found that nine out of ten rely predominantly on multiples so this is how people tend to talk to one another. And as I tell my students the end of the you know sort of end of our evaluation module you have to sort of earn the rights to you multiple you can use them but earn the right and and the way you earn the right is to demonstrate that you understand the underlying economic assumptions that are embedded right. So last thing I'll say and it's goes back to expectations investing broadly speaking which is the assumptions about future value creation investment needs all the.
讓我先停在這邊。倍數並非估值本身，它們只是估值過程的簡化表達方式。一旦你不再混淆這兩者，就能明白估值過程其實是未來現金流的折現值，而倍數僅是一種速記法。 那麼倍數有什麼好處呢？速記法一般而言的優點是什麼？它們能節省時間。順帶一提，我應該說清楚，我確實會使用倍數——如果你我進行一場隨意的交談，我可能會提到某個企業的倍數，這沒問題。但關鍵在於，你必須理解所使用的倍數背後的經濟意涵。 當你說「我認為這家公司的 EBITDA 倍數應該是 15 倍」或「本益比應該是 30 倍」時，你必須問自己：我得相信什麼，這些倍數才能成立？正如你所知，我們花了很多時間撰文探討——我們寫過一篇〈P 倍數意味著什麼？〉，也寫過一篇〈EV/EBITDA 倍數意味著什麼？〉，基本上就是在人們慣用的這些倍數之間搭建橋樑。 而為了使這些倍數合理化，你必須做出的基本經濟假設，並且要非常明確地闡述這些假設，你知道這就像是其中的驅動引擎。紐約大學那位可說是評估學權威的教授對此談論很多，他調查了投資者報告——或者該說分析師報告，抱歉——他發現十份報告中有九份主要依賴倍數分析，這就是人們通常相互溝通的方式。正如我告訴我的學生，在我們評估模塊的尾聲，你必須可以說是「贏得使用倍數的權利」；你可以使用它們，但要先贏得權利，而贏得權利的方式，就是證明你理解其中所蘊含的基本經濟假設。最後我要說的是，這廣泛地回歸到「預期投資」的概念，也就是關於未來價值創造、投資需求等所有方面的假設。

And that's implicit in a multiple it's implicit it's not that it's not there it's implicit and a DCF model it is explicit right so people go oh well you just change the assumption a little bit the value absolutely but that's explicit so the question is would you rather have something implicit and. And so we don't really know what's actually what we're doing or explicit and overt and then we could debate right and then that that to me of course the latter is a vastly more attractive proposition than the former so. So economic Colisec might be a little bit strong but but that's that's the basic idea and then a related idea I'll just mention quickly is there's a presumption often that growth in and of itself is a good thing. And it's simple appendix and chapter one I think it is actually the growth in and of itself is not value to need and be value creating so the key concept is growth adds value when a company's earning above the cost of capital right so qualifying growth. The fact the way you should think about it is return on capital cost the capital spread is first and foremost and then growth amplifies right makes a good thing better and if you're spread is negative it makes a bad thing even this thing you said in that clip of.
而這在倍數中是隱含的，它是隱含的——並非不存在，只是隱含其中；而在現金流折現模型中，它是明確的，對吧？所以人們會說：「哦，你只要稍微調整假設，價值就會完全改變。」但那是明確的，所以問題在於：你寧願要一個隱含的、我們其實不太清楚自己在做什麼的東西，還是要一個明確且公開的，然後我們可以進行辯論？對我來說，後者當然比前者更具吸引力得多。所以，說「經濟上的柯里西克」可能有點誇張，但基本概念就是如此。接著我想快速提一個相關概念：人們常有一種假設，認為成長本身必然是好事。我在附錄和第一章中簡單提到，實際上成長本身並不創造價值，必須是能創造價值的成長。關鍵概念在於：只有當公司的獲利高於資金成本時，成長才會增加價值——也就是所謂的「有條件的成長」。 事實上，你應該這樣思考：資本回報率減去資本成本——也就是資本利差——是最首要的，然後成長會放大這個效果，對吧？它讓好事情變得更好。而如果你的利差是負的，它會讓壞事變得更糟，就像你在那段影片片段裡說的那樣。

The multiples are not valuation like that is stuck with me forever like I've used that in a bunch of podcasts we've done like ever since he said that like like like that I don't know that just like got stuck in my head. But he's talking about this idea that everybody wants to be like well it's seven times earnings I love this business and they have absolutely no idea what it means. But the business trades is seven times earnings and if you take mobile since class which you know, thank you. I don't have to because I would have to go through this whole process. He takes you all the way through the process of understanding what that multiple actually means and when you can prove to him that you understand that then you can use the multiple. This I remember to remember reading this in that paper that earned the right to use the multiple paper and I remember the the pin coming into my ego balloon and being like oh boy. This is this is tough because different valuation multiples they're good shortcuts they mean different things with they're not the same and then there's there's layers to them. I specifically remember this layer too because I remember. I remember thinking about. I was. Did you ever have this experience some people have it with sports I definitely had it with sports and music at least where you realize you're like you're better than average you're good at something. And then all of a sudden you find out like just how high the ceiling is for certain other people who are in the more special class than you are. You know that feeling. Yeah, I know I do know that feeling I was like a I was like an above average which is which is terrible because it's very cliche with my name but I was I wasn't above average tennis player. Growing up in the like I can't see but and then I got to get a high school and like my my school that I went through favorite high school and Connecticut was like one of the top teams the country James Blake was on the team. And and I quickly realized that I was not good at all and I like basically capped out it like the upper JV team and that was the end of it for me. So it's crazy is like you learned the the fundamentals of this sport you understand the things like you understood the shortcuts you could take to like win at games on average against the average and below average competition. But then there's like a whole next level and I remember part of reading this thing from him and explaining like how you have to earn the right to use these multiples and see how they fit in different industries and different sectors and different like well. These are the growth assumptions you're baking into these scenarios that you're you're mapping out. And it's like even earning the right to just baseline pass I can tell you why this multiple exists for. You know whatever tech companies should trade about against this much free cash flow but these other companies these industrial should trade against this version of operating income.
倍數並不是那種永遠困住我的估值方式，就像我在我們做過的許多播客節目中使用過的那樣，自從他說了那句話之後，我就一直記在心裡。但他談到這個概念，每個人都想說「哦，這家公司的本益比是七倍，我喜歡這家公司」，但他們完全不知道這意味著什麼。這家公司的交易價格是本益比七倍，如果你上過莫布森的課——你知道的，謝謝你。我不需要上課，因為我得經歷整個過程。他帶你走完整個過程，理解那個倍數的真正含義，當你能向他證明你理解了，你才能使用那個倍數。我記得在那篇論文中讀到這個，那篇論文名為《獲得使用倍數的權利》，我記得我的自負氣球被針戳破的感覺，心想：天啊。這真的很難，因為不同的估值倍數是很好的捷徑，它們意味著不同的事情，它們並不相同，而且還有層次之分。我特別記得這個層次，因為我記得。我記得當時在想。我是。 你是否曾有過這樣的經驗？有些人是在運動方面，我絕對是在運動和音樂上至少如此，當你意識到自己比一般人優秀，在某件事上表現出色。然後突然間，你發現某些屬於更特殊階層的人，他們的天花板有多高。你懂那種感覺。是的，我懂，我確實知道那種感覺——我就像是個「高於平均」的人，這說法很老套，但以我的名字來說真是糟透了，不過我確實曾是位高於平均的網球選手。成長過程中，我自認還不錯，但上了高中後——我就讀的康乃狄克州頂尖高中是全國頂尖隊伍之一，詹姆斯·布雷克就在隊上——我很快意識到自己一點也不厲害，基本上就卡在二軍頂端，我的網球生涯也就此結束。這很瘋狂，就像你學了這項運動的基本功，理解那些能讓你在對抗平均或以下對手時贏得比賽的捷徑。 但接著還有更深一層的境界，我記得讀到他文章的一部分，解釋你必須先「贏得使用這些倍數的資格」，並理解它們如何適用於不同產業、不同領域，以及不同的情境。這些都是你在規劃各種情境時，所融入的成長假設。這就像是，你甚至得先贏得最基本的入場券——我能告訴你為什麼這個倍數會存在。比如說，科技公司應該根據多少自由現金流來交易，而其他公司，像是工業類股，則應該根據這種版本的營業收入來交易。

And here's why and here's where I use enterprise value here's where I don't care like all that stuff there's also the next level there's the Michael movies and so like the millers of the world right in around. And I don't want to get on the court with them it's very intimidating. Yeah there was lights. What was it to someone I would not want to be up against anything on any level that requires any sort of intellectual skill. But the other point you need was I think is is important to is it doesn't mean you can't use the multiples and it doesn't mean you can't use shortcuts in life. It just means that like when I'm talking about the multiples I have to understand what's going on behind the scenes. So what was mentioned in that clip that he when he's talking to some other very smart investor they'll say like oh yeah that business is at eight times free cash flow or something.
這就是為什麼我會使用企業價值，也是我不在乎那些細節的地方。還有更高層次的，像是麥可·莫布森的電影，以及像米勒那樣的世界級人物。我可不想和他們在場上較量，那實在太令人畏懼了。沒錯，那裡有聚光燈。對我來說，我絕不想在任何需要智力的層面上與任何人對抗。但另一個我認為重要的點是，這並不代表你不能使用倍數法，也不代表生活中不能走捷徑。這只是意味著，當我談論倍數時，我必須了解背後發生了什麼。就像他在那段影片中提到，當他與其他非常聰明的投資者交談時，他們會說：「哦，那家公司的自由現金流是八倍左右。」

Like they'll have that in the conversation but implicit between the two of them will be both of us understand what that actually means and we're not taking that is like that's the only thing we're looking at here. Exactly and that's you just said the point I was trying to make a little bit clearer it's when you're using those shortcuts those shortcuts are still they're still essential you still have to use them they help us communicate. They help us tell the story they also help us go I just did all this work and compressed it into this one area. You still put all those man hours in on the tennis court to go now I don't have to think when I do this. Forhand the swing whatever it is so it's you get these things you bake them into your head you bake them into your logic and you're thinking and then you can use them because you can apply them the shortcuts are still essential. You just have to earn your way up to getting there so that they don't turn around to bite you because otherwise they become bad habits. Yeah and I don't know if the student relates it completely to this point but like I've been thinking about this a lot with the LLNs because shortcuts are becoming more and more available. To getting towards places and I'm thinking a lot about like the efficiency I gained by using shortcuts versus what I lose and like in each thing I'm doing with them. I'm having this trade off between like am I using the shortcut or am I thinking about it more deeply it's just something it maybe a side point is not completely related to this but it's just something I've been thinking about a lot recently. They make it so easy to outsource your thinking if you're not really on top of not letting it do that. I would say that applies here too. It's any place where there's a shortcut a hack away to just quickly get from one point to another where you almost feel like there's a little bit of like a cheat code going on. And just it's stopping to say wait wait wait that's a shortcut we are bridging to very large sets of data very like there's a lot of depth in nuance here that we are now skating over the surface of and if we start to unpack it there's a lot of color that we're going to start to extract and we want to make sure that we're not doing that for the wrong reasons. I see that with all limbs. I see that with you know pulse post cultural analysis of the little mermaid and Disney films like there's lots of places you can present a very compelling argument but you want to make sure you can drill down and be comfortable with those results and they justify the shortcut you're using. Yeah, because when you use them in properly they prevent learning basically and that's good how I was getting out with the LLM thing and that's what I worry about like my kids too is as they grow up in a world where these things are to be dominant is this idea that if you can do the shortcut and you never do the work. You don't have that knowledge and that you know that compounds over time if you continue to do that over and over. Yeah, if you just let.
就像他們會在對話中提到，但兩人之間心照不宣的是——我們都明白那實際意味著什麼，而且我們並非將其視為這裡唯一關注的重點。沒錯，你剛才正好點明了我試圖更清晰表達的觀點：當你使用那些捷徑時，這些捷徑依然至關重要，你仍然必須運用它們，它們能幫助我們溝通。 它們協助我們講述故事，也讓我們得以將所有努力濃縮進這個特定領域。你依然在網球場上投入了所有訓練時數，才能達到現在這樣無需思考就能自然揮拍擊球的境界。無論是正手拍還是任何技術，你將這些內化為本能，融入邏輯與思維中，才能自如運用——因為你能實際應用它們，所以這些捷徑依然不可或缺。 你只是必須透過努力累積才能達到這種境界，這樣它們才不會反過來咬你一口，否則它們就會變成壞習慣。 是的，我不確定學生是否完全將這點與此關聯起來，但就像我一直在思考關於 LLNs 的這個問題，因為捷徑變得越來越容易取得。為了達到某些目標，我經常思考使用捷徑所獲得的效率，與我在使用它們時所失去的東西之間的比較。在我所做的每件事中，我都在權衡：我是該使用捷徑，還是該更深入地思考？這或許只是個次要觀點，不完全與此相關，但這確實是我最近一直在思考的事情。如果你沒有真正注意不讓它這麼做，它們會讓你非常容易將思考外包出去。我想這在這裡也適用。任何有捷徑、有快速從一點到達另一點的方法的地方，幾乎都會讓你感覺有點像是在使用作弊碼。 而這正是要停下來說，等等、等等，那是一種捷徑——我們正在連接到非常龐大的數據集，這裡面其實有許多細微的深度，我們現在只是滑過表面而已。如果我們開始拆解它，將會提取出許多豐富的細節，而我們必須確保我們不是出於錯誤的理由這麼做。我在所有 LLM 身上都看到這種情況。比如，你看那些對《小美人魚》和迪士尼電影進行的脈搏式文化分析，有很多地方你可以提出非常具說服力的論點，但你得確保自己能深入探究，並對那些結果感到放心，且它們能證明你所使用的捷徑是合理的。沒錯，因為當你不當使用這些捷徑時，它們基本上會阻礙學習，這正是我對 LLM 這件事的看法，也是我所擔心的——就像我對孩子們的擔憂一樣，他們在一個這些工具將佔主導地位的世界中成長，那種「只要能走捷徑，就絕不踏實做事」的想法。你將無法擁有那些知識，而你知道，如果你一再這樣做，這種情況會隨著時間加劇。是的，如果你只是放任不管的話。

Chachi PT and Claude right the entire book for us Jack will we really be authors. I don't know I mean I guess I think a lot of people are going to test that theory based on how good these things are getting. There will be if there aren't already tons it's all the m-dash net right he's got to look for that m-dash. I don't you want to get you going and it's don't get me going on the m-dash. I'll defend Emily Dickinson to the death that Matt and Chachi PT or the last two people using the the m-dash basically. And that's going to actually be writing with it and everybody. I don't even use m-dashes. I've always been scared of them I grew up with two English teachers there's a mom and a grandmother like I'm terrified of m-dashes and semi-colance is just seeing those all show them I'm like you don't have the confidence for that. That's yeah you're through around valuation multiples with no idea what you know in your people this is a danger zone. I've never good enough write it a properly using so if you see it in my writing the likelihood is that I have to do a Chachi PT would be the right guess in that case I'm so as we move on to lesson four here which is the fourth lesson we had in the chapter which is the life lesson but this is also and I feel like I say is every time we're talking about when mobs and things that it changed the way I think but like he's one of the few people where you can say that about a ton of stuff. He's talked about so here's Michael talking about the paradox of skill. It's one of these things it's not at first blush intuitive but it's I think it's right so when you think about skill you can think about it on two levels the first is absolute skill and I think we'd all agree and all the listeners would agree that if you look around the world not just investing but business and sports or whatever it is that those apps level skills never been higher. Right and part of that is because we have better training better techniques better in investing we have you know computing power and access information and so on so we're great.
Chachi PT 和 Claude 為我們寫完整本書 Jack 我們真的會成為作者嗎 我不知道 我是說 我想很多人會根據這些東西進步的程度來驗證這個理論 如果現在還沒有 將來肯定會出現大量——等等 他得找那個破折號 我不想讓你開始 也別讓我開始講破折號 我會誓死捍衛艾蜜莉·狄金森 Matt 和 Chachi PT 大概是最後兩個真正使用破折號寫作的人了 而且還是和所有人一起寫 我甚至不用破折號 我一直很怕它們 我從小在兩位英文老師身邊長大 媽媽和奶奶都是 我超怕破折號和分號 光是看到這些符號我就覺得 你根本沒自信用對嘛 沒錯 你隨意使用估值倍數卻完全不懂 夥計 這可是危險區域啊 我從來沒能好好寫出恰當的用法，所以如果你在我的文章裡看到，很可能我得靠 ChatGPT 幫忙——這樣猜大概沒錯。那麼我們接著來看第四課，也就是本章的第四個教訓，這既是人生課題，同時...每次談到莫布辛的觀點時，我總覺得必須說：他徹底改變了我的思考方式。他是極少數能讓我對諸多事物產生這種感受的人。以下是麥可談論「技能悖論」的片段——這概念乍聽並不直覺，但我認為他是對的。當我們思考「技能」時，可以從兩個層面來看：首先是絕對技能。我想大家都會同意，無論放眼投資界、商業領域、體育競技或任何專業，當今頂尖水準的技能從未如此高超。部分原因在於我們擁有更完善的訓練體系、更精進的技巧，投資領域則有運算能力與資訊獲取優勢等等，我們確實處在絕佳時代。

So I think that's there's not a lot of doubt about that the second issue though is the one that's more important for our discussion which is relative skill. Right which is the difference between the very best and the average participants in each field. You learned about this idea it was not my idea at all I learned about it from Stephen J. Gould who wrote a book called Full House back in the mid 1990s and he was ruminating on why no one has hit over 400 immediately baseball since Ted Williams did that in 1941 and you know the argument he said was because essentially the standard deviation of batting average has come down a lot which is there's more uniform skills even though the batting average hasn't changed all that much and in fact the powers it be it majorly baseball will change the rules to keep it sort of in a reason. But sort of in a reasonable band the standard deviations come down a lot so Ted Williams was a three standard deviation event when if you're a three standard deviation event now you'd hit like 380 or 385 which is awesome you'd win the batting title but you're not anywhere near breaching that 400 level.
所以我認為這點沒有太多疑問。然而，第二個問題對我們的討論更為重要，那就是相對技能。沒錯，這指的是每個領域中最頂尖者與平均參與者之間的差距。這個概念並非我的原創，我是從史蒂芬·傑·古爾德那裡學到的。他在 1990 年代中期寫了一本名為《滿堂紅》的書，書中他沉思著為何自泰德·威廉斯在 1941 年達成後，就再也沒有人能擊出超過四成的打擊率。他提出的論點基本上是：打擊率的標準差已大幅下降，這意味著球員的技能更加均質化，儘管打擊率本身變化不大。事實上，棒球當局會修改規則以將數據維持在合理範圍內。但標準差確實大幅下降了，所以泰德·威廉斯當時是一個三標準差的事件。如果現在有人達到三標準差，打擊率大概會是.380 或.385，這已經非常出色，足以贏得打擊王頭銜，但離突破四成大關還差得遠。

So I think the same thing's true in investing and we can measure that right we we measured by looking at essentially the equivalent of batting average which is a standard deviation of alpha. And historically that's come down a lot now I'll just say one thing Justin which is a little bit weird is it it's actually flattened and bumped up a little bit in the last couple of years so for reasons I'm not sure I can fully fully put my arms around so. Apart that might just be it's correlated with the actual dispersion of markets to some degree so so it they're there's some other external factors that come into play but. But yeah so so that's the way to measure it so when you look around and in by the way sports leagues is a really good sort of framework to think about this. Sportly sports leagues are actually grinding toward parity right and some have like salary caps in order to try to encourage parity but they're all grinding toward parity because these guys are all so good.
所以我認為投資也是如此，我們可以透過觀察相當於打擊率的指標來衡量，也就是阿爾法的標準差。從歷史上看，這個數值已經大幅下降，不過有件有點奇怪的事要說，賈斯汀，那就是在過去幾年裡，這個數值實際上趨於平穩，甚至略有上升，原因我不太能完全確定。除了可能與市場的實際分散程度有一定相關性之外，還有其他一些外部因素在起作用。但沒錯，這就是衡量它的方式，當你觀察四周時，順帶一提，體育聯盟是思考這個問題的一個很好的框架。體育聯盟實際上正在逐漸趨向平衡，有些聯盟甚至設有薪資上限以試圖促進平衡，但它們都在朝著平衡發展，因為這些選手都太優秀了。

So even the bad teams are really good right and and certain sports like baseball or hockey or are very very. The level skills very high in very uniform and as a consequence the luck has it appears to make make a bigger have a bigger role in the outcome so that this is the thing I and I push back you know in in Danny economists book thinking fast and slow he's got a little section where he talks about investment managers and. G either so clueless about there's no skill in this industry and I and I went to him and I said you know it's actually the opposite you know the way to think about it is the skill is not not only high but it's uniform right and you think about how many smart people go into this industry. And and how motivated they are and how hard working they are and how thoughtful they are it justifies logic that that there's no skills there's huge amounts of skill is just that's the problem right and that skill gets reflected in prices. And if prices to be reduced their largely efficient then means that means the random wall kind of thing comes into play this one is the most like mind bending for me of all so it's this idea is as the absolute level of skill rises.
所以即使是表現不佳的團隊其實也很厲害，在某些運動項目如棒球或冰球中，技能水準非常高且相當一致。因此，運氣因素在比賽結果中似乎扮演了更重要的角色。這正是我反駁的觀點——在丹尼爾·卡尼曼的《快思慢想》一書中，他有一小節談到投資經理人，認為這個行業根本沒有技巧可言。但我去找他並說：實際上恰恰相反，應該這樣理解——這個行業不僅技能水準極高，而且相當均質。想想有多少聰明人投入這個行業，他們的動機多強、工作多努力、思考多縝密，若說這裡沒有技巧根本不合邏輯。問題在於，這些技能都已反映在價格中。如果價格大致有效，就意味著隨機性開始發揮作用——這對我而言是最顛覆認知的觀點：隨著絕對技能水準的提升……

So it's relative skill or becomes less important and luck becomes more important so you might be able to explain it better than me but this is like it's something to take some thinking to kind of wrap your arms around it. Yeah, I mean it's the losers game thing right like this goes back to Charlie Ellis and the losers game in tennis where he basically points out. But if a pro is playing an amateur the pro is going to smoke the amateur nine times at a ten one times at a ten or whatever the stats are I'm. Charlie knows that we're on a first name basis. In the case though like that amateur might have a really lucky day and beat the pro and we have to acknowledge that if the amateur beats the pro it's probably out of luck and statistically it's going to happen once in a great blue moon. When we get two two pros or two amateurs will as focus on the pros for a second to highly skilled individuals with absolutely the same stuff and we 've set them off against each other that game the outcome will be determined on luck. Because one of them's going to flub a shot one of them's going to do something is probably going to make an error and that's going to be the unlucky reason that they lose the game.
所以相對技能變得不那麼重要，而運氣變得更為關鍵，你可能比我更能解釋這一點，但這確實需要花些心思去理解。是的，我的意思是這就像「輸家的遊戲」概念，這可以追溯到查理·艾利斯提出的網球輸家遊戲理論。他基本上指出，如果職業選手對上業餘玩家，職業選手十次中大概會贏九次，或者統計數據大致如此——我和查理很熟，可以直接稱呼他的名字。然而，如果那個業餘玩家某天運氣爆棚，擊敗了職業選手，我們必須承認這很可能是靠運氣，而且統計上這種事千載難逢。當我們讓兩位職業選手，或者兩位業餘玩家對決——先專注於職業選手的情況——兩位技術高超的個體擁有完全相同的條件，讓他們相互競爭，那場比賽的結果將由運氣決定。 因為其中一人可能會失誤，其中一人可能會犯錯，而這很可能就是他們輸掉比賽的不幸原因。

And I think with the skill luck continuum as mobus and frames it it's understanding that like with luck you have to think of unlucky and unlucky especially in competing situations too. Because you can have all the skill in the world and somebody else just gets lucky or the new or you get unlucky or whatever else happens to. And in this framework just plays out in so many different domains and that to me that's the lesson of that book. So there's a couple good examples one is in baseball and what is investing so in baseball. This is this is hard to understand but like baseball players are I think anybody would argue baseball players are way better than they were back in the day. I mean did you have you seen Babe Ruth did you see what you look like. Like relative to these guys that are playing. He looked like he looked like Kyle Schwerber. Let's be honest.
我認為，按照莫布森所構建的技能與運氣連續體概念，關鍵在於理解運氣時必須考慮到幸運與不幸，尤其是在競爭情境中。因為即使你擁有全世界最頂尖的技能，別人可能只是運氣好，或者你運氣不佳，又或者發生了其他狀況。這個框架在許多不同領域都適用，對我來說，這就是那本書的核心教訓。有幾個很好的例子，一個是棒球，另一個是投資。這可能有點難理解，但棒球選手——我想任何人都會同意——現在的棒球選手比過去強太多了。我的意思是，你看過貝比·魯斯嗎？你看過他長什麼樣子嗎？跟現在這些球員比起來，他看起來簡直就像凱爾·施瓦伯。老實說。

So maybe you would be maybe better than I think he'd be but the point is like on an absolute basis the baseball players are way better today. But yeah nobody's ever come nobody comes close to you 400 and so why is that and this whole this whole paradox of skill. Explains this idea baseball players are way more crunch together now. They're all better but they've crunched together in terms of standard deviation and that that explains it's actually harder now to hit 400 despite the fact that everybody's better. And there's there's all sorts of examples across domains and that becomes one of the most important insights of the book. You should look at each domain. You should think about the people who are on that field and competing against each other and then try to determine where on that skill. Look continuum things exist because that can also tell you where to place your focus. It can tell you if if I'm going to play Jack forehand in tennis.
所以也許你會比我想像中更好，但重點在於從絕對標準來看，現在的棒球選手確實強得多。不過確實，再也沒有人能接近打擊率四成的境界，這正是「技術悖論」的核心所在。這個概念解釋了為何當今棒球選手的實力分佈更為集中——大家都變得更強，但從標準差來看實力卻更緊密地擠在一起。這說明了儘管整體水準提升，現在要達成四成打擊率反而比過去更困難。這個現象在各領域都有例證，也成為書中最關鍵的洞察之一：你應該審視每個領域，觀察該領域的競爭者們，試著判斷他們的技術水平在分佈曲線上的位置，因為這能指引你該將注意力聚焦何處。就像如果我決定專攻網球正手拍，這個分析就能告訴我是否值得投入。

Even if you're even if your tennis game is not good, I assure you. Like I play tennis a couple times in gym class in high school I think like that's the extent of my experience. You should smoke me, but I should walk into it with the confidence that hey, here's the chance I could get wildly lucky be the same thing if I actually ever golfed in my life. Dunn enough mini golf on the boardwalks and other fine places and strip walls. But I don't play real golf but could I go out there and have like an insanely lucky day? Yes, most likely I'll have an insanely unlucky day and it'll be a disaster. But there's just I'm going to approach those domains where I don't have skill of luck will determine this outcome. If it is a domain where I have skill I want to understand my relative skill next to the other players to try to go how can I tilt luck in my advantage.
即使你的網球打得不好，我敢保證。就像我在高中體育課打過幾次網球，我想那就是我全部的經驗了。你應該能輕鬆打敗我，但我應該帶著信心上場，心想：嘿，這是我可能走大運的機會。如果我這輩子真的打過高爾夫，情況也會一樣。我在木板路上和其他好地方以及迷你高爾夫球場打過足夠多的迷你高爾夫。但我不打真正的高爾夫——然而，我能不能上場然後遇到一個瘋狂幸運的日子？是的，很可能我會遇到一個極度倒楣的日子，那將會是一場災難。但重點是，在那些我沒有技能的領域，我會抱持著「運氣將決定結果」的心態去面對。如果是在我擁有技能的領域，我會想了解自己相對於其他選手的技能水平，試圖找出如何讓運氣朝對我有利的方向傾斜。

And this helps to refute this idea like a lot of people will say oh there's less and less active managers so it's way way easier to outperform. But it's not because the active managers that are left are all really really good and they're tightly bunched together. And so you actually have a situation where it's harder to outperform now. So Michael kind of takes that a simple thing that I used to say for years which is this idea that let's get rid of all the active managers. And I'm going to be outperforming like that's wrong and when you look at it from this context you understand why. Yeah and I would also throw that into spaces where this is also where you get into like degenerate tendencies. This is where you also get into moral hazard. This is where all this stuff comes from too because if all of a sudden you've neutralized skill then you start to incentivize bad actors or stuff. So you look at a place where it's like oh a lot of money is flowing into I don't know crypto or private credit or pick pick your punching bag vehicle .
這有助於反駁一種常見觀點：許多人會說「主動型基金經理人越來越少，所以要超越市場變得容易多了」。但事實並非如此，因為留下來的主動型經理人都是真正頂尖的，而且彼此實力非常接近。因此實際上，現在要超越市場反而更困難了。所以麥可（Michael）釐清了我多年來常說的一個簡單想法——那種「把主動型經理人都淘汰掉，我就能輕鬆勝出」的觀念是錯誤的，從這個角度來看，你就能明白原因。 是的，我也想把這點延伸到某些領域，這些領域往往會出現惡性傾向，也是道德風險滋生的溫床。所有這些問題都源於此——因為一旦技能因素被中和，你就等於在變相鼓勵不良行為或投機操作。所以當你看到某個領域湧入大量資金時，不管是加密貨幣、私募信貸，或是任何當下的炒作標的……

And then you go this is what encourages bad actors which also encourages them to get horribly horribly unlucky when the tide turns. And you have to be aware of these of these things what's neutralizing the skill. What's that doing to luck what's that doing to the way people are acting because sometimes that last return you can squeak out is not for the best reasons and that's what ends up smoking you. Yeah, this is just a good thing to think about across life and we had this is the life lesson in the chapter. But the idea of if I'm competing in something like how tightly are people bunched how high is the absolute skill. If I look at those variables then I can kind of understand what's more important here. Not that skill is not important and you know mobs is not arguing obviously investing you know skill is still important. But you just have to understand how luck comes in and how that relates to this you know this crunching variance in the level of skill. So when you're flexing on an excess returns channel growth and you're looking at all those channels that you've passed here you're just like I am so much more skillful. Yeah, that's why you always say this to me. I think I'm like the best YouTube thumbnail designer of all time I probably should be looking at what is the level of skill of all YouTube thumb designers and how what is the variance of that I don't know how you would ever calculate any of that. But I would say I thankfully am operating in the world of investing channels and I'm not operating against Mr. Beast because that would though those would obviously be two different levels of skill. The two different bonds I'd be playing in there. It's okay you can be miss your beast something like that will get you a good nice variation. So so this was actually your idea so one of the things I like about what we did at the end of this chapter is you did something and this was your idea to do it.
然後你會發現，這正是助長不良行為的因素，同時也讓他們在情勢逆轉時遭遇極度不幸。你必須意識到這些正在抵消技能的因素——它們如何影響運氣，又如何影響人們的行為模式，因為有時你勉強擠出的最後一點回報並非出於最佳理由，而那正是最終擊垮你的關鍵。是的，這正是人生中值得深思的道理，我們在本章節中探討的正是這項人生課題。核心概念在於：當我參與競爭時，必須思考人群的密集程度有多高？絕對技能水平又有多強？若能審視這些變數，便能大致理解什麼在此更為重要。這並非指技能不重要——莫布辛顯然並非主張投資不需技能，技能當然仍具關鍵地位。但你必須理解運氣如何介入，以及它與技能水平波動之間的關聯。因此，當你在超額回報渠道上展現成長實力，回顧所有已突破的關卡時，很容易陷入「我的技能遠超他人」的錯覺。沒錯，這正是你常對我說的道理。 我想我大概是有史以來最棒的 YouTube 縮圖設計師了。我或許應該看看所有 YouTube 縮圖設計師的技能水平如何，以及這個水平的變異程度——雖然我不知道該怎麼計算這些。但我想說，幸好我是在投資頻道的領域裡運作，而不是跟 Mr. Beast 競爭，因為那顯然是兩個不同層級的技能，就像在兩個不同的聯盟裡打球一樣。沒關係，你可以錯過你的「野獸」，這樣反而能帶來不錯的變化。所以，這其實是你的主意——我很喜歡我們在這章結尾做的一件事，就是你做了某個舉動，而且這是你想出來的主意。

We did something here that I think maybe a lot of books or a lot of things you learn from don't do which is it's it's great to read. It's it's great to read all this stuff and try to learn from it but then you sort of have the challenge yourself and say like what am I actually taking away from this what do I do in my life or maybe I'm not learning from this rule. And so we've got some sort of a lightning round here some quick questions maybe you could ask yourself to see am I gaining any value from like we're reading from what these people are writing and these questions I have asked myself all the time too. This is the live capture of and I learned this from doing my culture creative us is the live capture of like I started to make a little. Dump file of the existential dread and question that come on what I'm like starting to think about these are like I don't really know how to answer this or I'm going to try to answer parts of this and I just started to save them because I was like oh well maybe these will help other people and I 've gotten really great feedback on them so I started prepping this chapter I was like. I should just write down my existential dread that's been going through this data and then at the end we can kind of like target so people can experience and share that existential dread so this is sadistic but. But this is the thing that happens when everybody whenever you talk to anybody about like these behavioral flaws we have as investors is like you'll talk to them about them and including myself and they'll be like oh yeah that's great that they have those problems and then you'll go back into your investing life and you'll just do all those things. Because they're sort of naturally ingrained in you so I think it's important to at least ask the questions afterwards and say like what am I taking from this so like a good example is like the humility question we had here is. Are we willing to start with base rate the light contradict their optimism and that's an important question because all of us have this inside you and we have to be able to look outside and say alright what am I doing in my life right now where I'm taking this inside you and maybe I'm not looking at the base. We see that.
我們在這裡做了一件我認為很多書或你學到的東西可能沒有做的事，那就是——閱讀很棒。閱讀所有這些內容並試著從中學習固然很好，但接著你必須挑戰自己，問問自己：我到底從中得到了什麼？我在生活中該怎麼做？或者，我可能根本沒有從這條規則中學到東西。 因此，我們準備了一個類似「快問快答」的環節，一些你可以問自己的快速問題，來看看自己是否從這些人的文字中獲得了任何價值——這些問題我也時常問自己。這是一種即時捕捉，我從我的「文化創意」實踐中學到了這一點，就像我開始建立一個小小的「傾倒檔案」，用來存放那些存在的恐懼和問題。當我開始思考這些時，我會想：我真的不知道該如何回答這個，或者我會試著回答其中的一部分。我開始把它們保存下來，因為我覺得，嗯，也許這些能幫助其他人。而我確實得到了非常棒的回饋，所以我在準備這一章時就想到了這個點子。 我應該把我一直透過這些數據感受到的存在性恐懼寫下來，然後最後我們可以設定目標，讓人們能夠體驗並分享那種存在性恐懼，這雖然有點虐待狂，但……這就是每當你和任何人談論我們作為投資者所擁有的這些行為缺陷時會發生的情況——你會和他們談論這些問題，包括我自己在內，他們會說：「哦，對啊，他們有那些問題真是太好了。」然後你就會回到你的投資生活中，繼續做所有那些事情。因為這些缺陷某種程度上是天生根植於你體內的，所以我認為事後至少提出問題是很重要的，比如問自己：「我從中學到了什麼？」一個很好的例子就是我們這裡提到的謙遜問題：我們是否願意從基礎概率開始，讓它與我們的樂觀主義相矛盾？這是一個重要的問題，因為我們所有人內心都有這種傾向，我們必須能夠向外審視，然後說：「好吧，我現在生活中正在做什麼事，是出於這種內在傾向，而我可能沒有考慮到基礎概率？」我們都看到了這一點。

There I say constantly and financial planning because we have to talk about negative scenarios we have to talk about we have this. I know an unknowns risk segment that we do with the at the end of the financial planning process as sort of like a. A recheck of all the work we just did to map out the other scenarios and it's what happens if I live longer than expected what happens if I die sooner than expected what happens if I get sick what happens if I get sued and these are all. Debbie down our moments. There's no fun really in any of these things because you're running out of money or something disastrous is happening at the end of all of them. We know that once we've taken somebody through that process of all the ways we're imagining life could go. We can't just look at the positive ones and we have to interject those in and go are we comfortable with these paths too and the plans not really complete until we've rumble through those hard conversations so yeah yeah you got to have that humility. This next one is a great one this idea of the reference class question which is how do we decide what similar situations actually are.
我經常提到財務規劃，因為我們必須討論負面情境，必須談論我們所面臨的這些。我知道在財務規劃過程的最後，我們會進行一個未知風險環節，這有點像是對我們剛剛完成的所有工作進行重新檢視，以描繪其他可能情境——如果我活得比預期更長會怎樣？如果我比預期更早離世會怎樣？如果我生病了會怎樣？如果我被起訴了會怎樣？這些都是令人沮喪的時刻。這些事情其實一點都不有趣，因為你要麼面臨資金耗盡，要麼最終遭遇災難性後果。我們明白，一旦帶領某人經歷了我們所能想像的人生各種可能路徑的過程，我們不能只看積極的一面，還必須將這些負面情境納入考量，並自問：我們是否也能接受這些路徑？唯有經歷這些艱難對話的碰撞，計畫才算真正完整。所以，是的，你必須保持這種謙遜態度。接下來這個概念很棒——參考類別問題，即我們如何判斷哪些情境才算真正相似。

Because going back to like that earnings growth rate example I gave maybe not looking at every company in history and saying what happened to every company that had a 20% earlier three that might not be the proper reference class because this type of company there might be a completely different reference class that's more important. So it's it's very important at least look at that and say do I have the right reference class because if you have the right right if you have the wrong reference class you also are going to end up with the wrong basings. One place that my brain immediately goes to with this one is you'll be talking to somebody and they have a rental property or that they have an investment property or a bunch of investment properties and they're like well if I sell these properties then. What do I do with the proceeds do I 1031 into a new one or do I turn around and buy a read and you and immediately you get into these conversations of like the valuation differentials between these things is like well if you sold the. You know part of the expression if you sold the crappy house that even running for 10 years and you go buy some publicly traded eat read ETF like of course those are going to be very different. The valuation multiples because you're trading extreme concentration and whatever location that rental property was for some giant index version of extreme diversification and everything else you'd expect a differential but there's different tradeoffs and benefits when the toilet breaks in my whatever product read ETF. What do you call me like that's got to be worth something and you have to normalize around this and if you don't have a framework for normalizing around it you might be stuck. Comparing not just apples to oranges but apples to eight balls that that can be a real problem if you don't have a framework to handle it. I won't withdraw the questions because you can go to the you can go to the blog and you can see the all the questions but this last one is very interesting which is. The base rates of our judgment is this is probably one of the hardest questions to potentially ask because I probably think the base rates in my own judgment are way way way way higher than they actually. Yeah, go read bread don't only there's a reason the man is a living advocate for keep that trade journal and keep all the steps and if you've never seen I know we've had Brent on multiple times if you've never seen a person especially like on an FX trader basically mark down. The full range of experiences data points and emotions that go through like just a morning they come warning when there's a central bank announcement . And just cataloging all that stuff what you can get right wrong and be confused about along the way you have to have a journal you have to be able to go back reflect or study these things. If you want to do that that's trading professionally but I would say any investment decision or whatever else knowing the framework you were in when you made that decision becomes useful later on and that's that's a meta question for all of us hard to do. There's something we talked about when we went on value after errors with Tobias Carla but this idea that I think LLM's help us with this idea because now we can as we're putting all this stuff we're doing into LLM's I can sort of get an evaluation of my judgment over time. I can maybe get a better you know unbiased evaluation of what I've done and I can catalog what I've been thinking because Toby's less answer to this question which I'm sure will become a chapter as well was to write it down. So the one lesson you would teach the average investors to write things down so you actually understand where you were at that point how what you actually thought at that point because we misremember everything about what we actually thought and we made a decision. So I think maybe LLM's will be helpful for this in terms of like judging ourselves against the base rates of our own judgment. Can not agree with that more I love I think I've told you this before I will regularly in my conversations with Claude I will ask for ranking so stuff I'll say rank this thing I just did against these other things whether it's looking these prior chats or I'm going to pay some of them in. Give me that reference example of what's there give me pros and cons I want to know if I'm like growing if I'm trading water if like something wildly different.
回到我之前提到的盈利增長率例子，或許不該檢視歷史上每家公司、追問所有早期曾達 20%增長率的公司後續如何，因為這類公司可能存在一個完全不同且更重要的參考類別。因此，關鍵在於審視並確認：我是否選對了參考類別？若參考類別錯誤，最終得出的基準也必然謬誤。 談到這點，我腦中立刻浮現一個場景：當你與人交談時，對方擁有出租物業或投資房產（甚至多筆投資性房產），他們可能會說：「如果我賣掉這些房產，該怎麼處理資金？該用 1031 交換條款購入新物業，還是轉而投資 REITs？」這類對話往往迅速聚焦於各選項間的估值差異——例如賣掉房產後的資金配置考量。 你知道那句俗語的一部分，如果你賣掉那棟破房子，即使它已經運轉了十年，然後你去買一些公開交易的 ETF，比如說，當然這些會非常不同。估值倍數之所以不同，是因為你交易的是極度集中的資產，無論那棟出租物業位於何處，相對於某個極度分散化的大型指數版本，以及所有其他因素，你預期會有差異，但當我的馬桶壞了，無論是什麼產品類型的 ETF，這其中存在不同的權衡和好處。你得稱呼我什麼，這肯定有它的價值，你必須圍繞這一點進行標準化，如果你沒有一個標準化的框架，你可能會陷入困境。不僅僅是拿蘋果和橘子比較，而是拿蘋果和八號球比較，如果你沒有一個處理框架，這可能會成為一個真正的問題。我不會撤回這些問題，因為你可以去部落格，看到所有的問題，但最後這個問題非常有趣，那就是。 我們判斷的基礎率可能是最難回答的問題之一，因為我認為自己判斷中的基礎率遠比實際情況高出太多太多。沒錯，去讀讀布蘭特的東西吧——他之所以成為堅持撰寫交易日誌、記錄所有步驟的活生生倡導者，是有原因的。如果你從未見過（我知道我們已多次邀請布蘭特上節目），尤其是像外匯交易員那樣，在央行宣布消息時，他們會詳細記錄整個早晨經歷的完整數據點與情緒波動。將所有這些內容——你在過程中可能做對、做錯或感到困惑的部分——系統性地記錄下來，你必須有本日誌，必須能夠回頭反思或研究這些事情。若你想專業地交易，就該這麼做；但我會說，任何投資決策或其他決定，了解你做出該決策時所處的框架，將來都會非常有用——而這對我們所有人來說，都是個難以實踐的後設問題。 我們之前和托比亞斯·卡爾拉討論價值與錯誤時曾談到這個概念，我認為 LLM 能幫助我們實現這個想法。因為現在我們可以把所有正在做的事情輸入 LLM，這樣我就能隨著時間推移對自己的判斷力進行評估。或許我能對自己做過的事獲得更加客觀的評價，同時也能系統化記錄自己的思考歷程——畢竟托比對這個問題的解答（我相信這也會成為書中的一章）就是「寫下來」。所以我想給普通投資者的一個建議就是：把想法寫下來，這樣你才能真正理解當時所處的情境、當時的真實想法，因為我們總會錯誤記憶自己做決策時的真實思考過程。我認為 LLM 或許能幫助我們實現這點，像是透過對照自身判斷的基準比率來評估自己。我完全同意這個觀點，其實我應該跟你提過，我在與 Claude 對話時經常會要求它進行排序評估，比如說「幫我剛做的這件事和其他事項排序比較」，無論是參考過往對話紀錄，或是準備導入某些資料時都會這樣做。 給我那個參考範例，看看裡面有什麼，告訴我優點和缺點，我想知道我是在成長、原地踏步，還是發生了天差地別的變化。

And these are tools that can look in a second at 10 different things and tell you what's going on and the idea that we wouldn't take that type of feedback when we're looking for that feedback for growth like what a gift to have some of these tools. Be have to pick those tools this goes back to the examples to of like if you want to up your skills. Look at the tools that everybody else is using up their skills. You you're probably going to have to use the say it's not like every hitter in major league baseball. There was that that the whole like the torpedo bat thing this year you know it's like things become trends and you have to understand of those trends are helping you are not and if they can help you and if they are that's the only way sometimes you're going to keep up in your skills. It's amazing like how little people talk about the torpedo bat now like at the time that was going to like change the game of baseball it was an unfair advantage to the people that were using it and now I'm sure there's still people that are using it, but like you don't hear about it all anymore. This is one of those things or I was wondering at about it seeing a couple of games this year and being like oh here's a bunch of funky bats and then slowly but surely over the course of the year like I don't see too many of those bats anymore. I don't know I'm looking for the post hoc analysis on that that'll be an interesting one there's always a weird one we've got a world cup but you know coming up soon and it's like the they changed the ball every four years basically and there's always some crazy hub above about that just these little things that mess with the games we love. That's probably a good note to wrap up on so that the blog is excess returns pod that substact calm boba's in chapter is pinned at the top and we are like we're honest and we say we'd love to hear feedback on this. I've been called about every horrible thing you possibly call them YouTube here by our loyal or viewers so like we want to make this thing better we want to make the book really good and also if you have suggestions for other guests like I believe we're going to do Liz and Sandra's next. For our next chapter which will become another one of these podcasts but if you have suggestions for great answers you think we've gotten to our closing question or people we think we should include in the book definitely let us know. But if you do like our work if you can check us out there access returns pod at substact calm we would certainly appreciate it.
這些工具能夠在一瞬間檢視十個不同面向，並告訴你當下的狀況——當我們尋求成長所需的回饋時，若拒絕接受這類回饋，豈不是辜負了擁有這些工具的珍貴機會？選擇工具時，必須回歸到實際案例：若想提升技能，就該觀察其他人正在使用哪些工具來精進自身。你很可能也得採用相同工具——這就像美國職棒大聯盟的打者們，並非人人都使用所謂的「魚雷球棒」。今年這類話題曾掀起熱潮，但你要明白：必須辨別哪些趨勢真正對你有益。唯有當趨勢確實能幫助你時，有時這才是維持技能競爭力的唯一途徑。有趣的是，現在幾乎沒人再談論魚雷球棒了——當時它被視為能顛覆棒球賽局的利器，對使用者而言簡直是不公平的優勢。雖然我相信至今仍有人使用，但相關討論早已銷聲匿跡。 這正是那種讓我思考的事情，今年看了幾場比賽後，我注意到一些奇怪的球棒，但隨著賽季慢慢推進，這些球棒卻越來越少見了。我不知道，我還在等待事後的分析，那一定會很有趣——總會有些古怪的情況。我們即將迎來世界盃，基本上他們每四年就更換一次比賽用球，而這總會引發一些瘋狂的討論，就是這些小細節在影響我們熱愛的比賽。這或許是個不錯的結尾點。 那麼，這個部落格是「超額回報」播客，在 Substack 上的章節已置頂，我們誠實地說，我們很樂意聽取大家的反饋。我們忠實的觀眾（或該說 YouTube 上的觀眾？）已經用盡各種難聽的話來稱呼我們了，所以我們希望讓這個節目變得更好，也希望讓這本書更加出色。另外，如果你有其他來賓的建議，我相信我們接下來會邀請 Liz 和 Sandra。 在我們下一章節中，這將成為另一個播客節目，但如果你對我們收尾問題的精彩回答有任何建議，或是認為我們應該在書中收錄哪些人物，請務必告訴我們。如果你喜歡我們的作品，歡迎到 substact calm 平台搜尋「access returns pod」關注我們，我們將不勝感激。