1 [00:00:07] Welcome to the Insightful Investor podcast, a weekly series that seeks to share industry investment and market insights. Learn more about our show at insightful investor dot org. Today, I’m joined by Chris Davis, chairman and portfolio manager at Davis Advisors, an independent employee owned firm founded in nineteen sixty nine.
1 [00:00:07] 歡迎收聽《洞見投資人》播客，這是一個每週更新的系列節目，旨在分享產業投資與市場洞見。如欲了解更多節目資訊，請造訪 insightful investor dot org。今天，與我對談的是克里斯．戴維斯，他是戴維斯顧問公司的董事長暨投資組合經理人，該公司是一家成立於一九六九年的獨立員工持股企業。
1 [00:00:30] The firm manages about $30 billion as of the end of March. Chris says nearly four decades of experience investing through multiple market cycles. And he also serves on the board of Berkshire Hathaway. We’ll talk about alpha, stewardship, patients, market cycles, and the enduring lessons and potentially the limits of the Buffett and Munger framework. Chris.
1 [00:00:30] 截至三月底，該公司管理約三百億美元的資產。克里斯表示，他擁有近四十年、歷經多次市場循環的投資經驗。他同時也在波克夏．海瑟威的董事會任職。我們將探討超額報酬、盡職治理、耐心、市場循環，以及巴菲特與蒙格投資框架的歷久彌新之道，乃至其潛在侷限。克里斯。
2 [00:00:51] thank you for joining us. Oh, Alex, I’m so glad to be here.
2 [00:00:51] 感謝你加入我們。喔，艾力克斯，我很高興能來到這裡。
1 [00:00:54] Let’s start with a little bit of background. You grew up in a family deeply involved in investing. When did you. You realized that this was a path you actively wanted to pursue rather than something you were simply inheriting.
1 [00:00:54] 我們先從一些背景談起。你在一個深度參與投資的家庭中長大。你是什麼時候意識到，這是一條你主動想追求的道路，而不僅僅是你繼承的東西？
2 [00:01:06] Well, you know, my father, I give enormous credit. I mean, he and his father were passionate about investing. They loved their jobs. They didn’t get along particularly well. That’s a different story, but my father had six kids and his view was. EVERYbody should be financially literATE, and that there’s so much misleading INFATION about investing.
2 [00:01:06] 嗯，你知道，我父親，我給他很大的肯定。我的意思是，他和他父親都對投資充滿熱情。他們熱愛自己的工作。他們相處得不是特別融洽，那是另一回事了，但我父親有六個孩子，他的觀點是，每個人都應該具備財務知識，而且關於投資有太多誤導性的資訊。
2 [00:01:29] THERE’s so much, there’s so many P peoplePLE PRE prepared to EX exploit ignorance, that he just felt, you know, his Fly duty was not necessarily to teach me how to changeGE a TI, or to repair a car, to DO any homeOME repairs or anything like that, or to barbecue, but boy, he wanted all of his kidsIDS to UN understandSTAND investingING. SO. You know, I have a sister that’s a small town physician.
2 [00:01:29] 有太多、有太多人準備好要利用他人的無知來牟利，所以他覺得，你知道，他身為父親的責任，不一定是教我怎麼換輪胎、修車、做任何居家修繕或類似的事情，或是烤肉，但是天啊，他想要他所有的孩子都了解投資。所以，你知道，我有個妹妹是小鎮醫生。
2 [00:01:53] She understands the fundamentals of this. So I think we grew up with this fund. mental understanding that investing in stocks was really about businesses, it wasn’t pieces of paper and stock, you know prices gyrating around or charts or statistics, they were businesses and that businesses were essentially people and ideas and assets, you know it was this and so that fundamental understanding from a very young age because we would wherever we were driving on a family vacation we’d visit companies along the way and.
2 [00:01:53] 她深諳箇中道理。所以我認為，我們從小就建立了這樣的基本認知：投資股票其實就是投資企業，而不是那些價格上下波動的紙張憑證、圖表或統計數據。它們是實實在在的企業，而企業的核心本質就是人、想法和資產。就是這樣，因為我們無論是開車去哪裡家庭旅行，都會沿途拜訪公司，這份基本認知從很小的時候就深植於心。
2 [00:02:31] It was just his passion. So I think I grew up comfortable in this world, but it was not going to be for me. And in fact, you know, I went, I was going to be a veterinarian.
2 [00:02:31] 這正是他的熱情所在。所以我想，我在這個領域中長大，感到自在，但這條路並不適合我。事實上，你知道嗎，我曾經立志成為一名獸醫。
2 [00:02:45] I worked at the Bronx Zoo. I worked at the Animal Medical Center. I was, you know, a dog walker. I lived on a sheep farm. And then I became very interested in teaching when I was in college, teaching and working with young.
2 [00:02:45] 我在布朗克斯動物園工作過，也在動物醫療中心待過。我當過遛狗員，也住過牧羊場。後來在大學時期，我對教學產生了濃厚的興趣，特別是教導和陪伴年輕人成長。
2 [00:03:00] Young people and ultimately went to seminary, and I moved to Boston, and I had worked maybe three or four summers for my dad or grandfather or internships in investing just as part of that being numerate, and I realized in particular after I was turned down for a job at the CIA. What I was really passionate about was research. I loved research, I loved teaching, and the CIA.
2 [00:03:00] 年輕人，最後進了神學院，後來搬到波士頓。我大概有三、四個暑假，曾為我父親或祖父工作，或是在投資領域實習，這部分是因為我對數字還算在行。特別是在我申請中情局的工作被拒絕後，我才真正意識到，我真正熱衷的是研究。我熱愛研究，熱愛教學，還有中情局。
2 [00:03:34] I didn’t want to be a spy, I wanted to be an analyst. And I came to realize that, of course, so much of investing was about that idea of trying to assemble, look at all of the things other people have looked at, but see what they don’t see. But the trouble was, even though I understood these investing principles, I didn’t have the grounding of an MBA or an accounting degree.
2 [00:03:34] 我並不想當間諜，我想當的是分析師。然後我逐漸領悟到，當然，投資的很大一部分，就在於那種試圖拼湊、審視所有其他人已經看過的東西，卻能看出他們沒看到的東西的想法。但問題是，即使我理解這些投資原則，我卻沒有 MBA 或會計學位的基礎。
2 [00:03:58] I majored in philosophy and theology. Done my masters in philosophy and theology, and so I managed to get work in a training program at State Street Bank and became a fund accountant. And it was just fabulous grounding.
2 [00:03:58] 我主修哲學與神學，也拿到了哲學與神學的碩士學位。所以我設法在道富銀行的一個培訓計畫中找到了工作，成為了一名基金會計師。而這真是絕佳的基礎訓練。
2 [00:04:14] It was not a job I wanted long term, but I learned the language of investing, the language of business. So my father taught me the principles, State Street taught me the technical skills. And the language, and then the hook was set. I’ve been in love with it ever since, and my grandfather used to say it’s the best game in town, and boy was he right.
2 [00:04:14] 這並不是我長期想做的工作，但我學會了投資的語言、商業的語言。所以我父親教會我原則，道富銀行教會我技術技能。還有那套語言，然後就著迷了。從那時起我就愛上了這行，而我祖父常說這是城裡最棒的遊戲，天啊，他說得真對。
1 [00:04:35] Would you just share the history of your grandfather and your father founding Davis Advisors?
1 [00:04:35] 能否請你分享一下你祖父和父親創立戴維斯顧問公司的歷史？
2 [00:04:42] Well, my grandfather very much like me didn’t start out thinking investing was for him. He was. He had done a PhD in international relations, by the way, as had his wife.
2 [00:04:42] 嗯，我祖父跟我非常像，一開始並不認為投資適合他。他當時……順帶一提，他取得了國際關係博士學位，他太太也是。
2 [00:04:55] They met in graduate school, both doing PhDs in nineteen twenty eight. I mean, it’s sort of an incredible thing. They fell in love, both passionate about international relations.
2 [00:04:55] 他們在研究所認識，1928 年時兩人都在攻讀博士。我的意思是，這有點不可思議。他們墜入愛河，兩人都對國際關係充滿熱情。
2 [00:05:06] In the same way I was interested in intelligence, you know, they were interested in global affairs. And he went to work thinking that maybe he could end up at the State Department. He was probably in his mid twenties.
2 [00:05:06] 就像我對情報工作感興趣一樣，他們對國際事務感興趣。他開始工作時，以為自己最終可能會進入國務院。他那時大概二十五、六歲。
2 [00:05:24] Early 30s，and he the war came and he became involved in the War Department，and when Dewey ran for president against Harry Truman，my grandfather saw a great opening，he became an economic advisor and an international advisor to the Dewey campaign，he was a bright young man，passionate，had this global view。And he thought Dewey was a certain shoe in to be the next president, as did everybody. And the famous headline Dewey defeats Truman, the newspapers had already printed it.
2 [00:05:24] 三十出頭時，戰爭爆發，他進入了戰爭部。當杜威競選總統對抗杜魯門時，我祖父看到了一個大好機會，他成為杜威競選團隊的經濟顧問和國際事務顧問。他是個聰明的年輕人，充滿熱情，擁有全球視野。他和所有人一樣，都認為杜威篤定會是下一任總統。當時甚至出現了「杜威擊敗杜魯門」的著名頭條，報紙都已經印好了。
2 [00:06:00] And of course Dewey lost. And but he was still governor of New York. And so he felt, well, this bright young man backed to, you know, my campaign and was so an advisor and I’d love to find him a job in state government.
2 [00:06:00] 當然，杜威最後輸了。但他仍然是紐約州長。所以他覺得，嗯，這個聰明的年輕人曾支持我的競選活動，還擔任顧問，我很樂意在州政府幫他找份工作。
2 [00:06:17] And he made my grandfather the deputy superintendent of insurance for the state of New York. Now you can imagine a bigger come down thinking you’re going to the State Department and ending up. In the insurance department in Albany, um, but my grandfather you know immediately took to the responsibility, and you’ve got to realize this was nineteen forty-eight.
2 [00:06:17] 他任命我祖父為紐約州保險局的副局長。你可以想像，原本以為要去國務院，結果卻落腳在奧爾巴尼的保險部門，這落差有多大。嗯，但我祖父，你知道的，立刻扛起了這份責任，而且你得知道，那是在一九四八年。
2 [00:06:41] So what was happening was all of the soldiers were coming home, the baby boom was underway. And life insurance was like biotech, it was this hyper growth industry because the first thing you did when you got married, you had no assets, you know, you were starting your family. Having kids, you bought life insurance.
2 [00:06:41] 當時的情況是，所有士兵都返鄉了，嬰兒潮正開始興起。而人壽保險就像生技產業一樣，是個高度成長的行業，因為當你結婚後，第一件事就是，你沒有任何資產，你知道的，你正要建立家庭。有了孩子，你就會買人壽保險。
2 [00:07:02] But the accounting for life insurance meant that when an insurance company sold a policy, they would pay the salesman a commission. And that commission was often as much as the first year premium. But remember that customer was agreeing to pay that premium for thirty, forty, fifty years.
2 [00:07:02] 但人壽保險的會計處理方式，意味著當保險公司賣出一份保單時，他們必須支付業務員佣金。而這筆佣金往往相當於第一年的保費。但別忘了，那位客戶可是同意要繳交這筆保費長達三十、四十甚至五十年之久。
2 [00:07:22] So there was an enormous present value being created. But there was a cash outflow, so Wall Street hated these companies. It viewed them, you know, they were losing money year after year.
2 [00:07:22] 所以當時有巨大的現值被創造出來。但因為有現金流出，華爾街很討厭這些公司。他們認為，你知道的，這些公司年復一年都在虧錢。
2 [00:07:34] The faster they were growing, the more money they were losing. And my grandfather, who is a regulator, was looking at this and saying that’s crazy—they are creating huge value—and so he created this concept of owner earnings. where he said you know if you owned the business you wouldn’t say it’s losing money you would say you’re investing but you’re creating enormous value.
2 [00:07:34] 它們成長得越快，虧損就越多。而我祖父，他是一位監管者，看到這種情況就說這太瘋狂了——它們正在創造巨大的價值——於是他創造了「業主盈餘」這個概念。他說，你知道嗎，如果你擁有這家企業，你不會說它在虧錢，你會說你正在投資，但你正在創造巨大的價值。
2 [00:08:00] Every dollar you invest because you have a longer term perspective. Exactly. And you’re looking at the true economics of the business, not just at the accounting metrics. Now, in those days, there wasn’t GAAP accounting for insurance. So that has now been normalized. But so he looked at Wall Street at these stocks and he looked at the value that he saw in the businesses and he said, I’m going to go to work.
2 [00:08:00] 你投入的每一塊錢，都是因為你擁有更長遠的眼光。正是如此。而且你關注的是企業的真實經濟狀況，而不僅僅是會計指標。要知道，在那個年代，保險業還沒有公認會計原則（GAAP）的規範，現在這部分已經標準化了。但他當時就是這樣審視華爾街上的這些股票，觀察他在這些企業中看到的價值，然後他說，我要開始行動了。
2 [00:08:25] Investing in these companies，and he was able to borrow $100,000，which was a lot of money back then，from his wife’s family。And he started investing，he started a firm called Shelby Colin Davis and Company，and he turned that $100,000 into $800 million at his death，investing almost exclusively in financial stocks，and he gave 100 percent of that to charity。He didn’t believe in inheritance，and.
2 [00:08:25] 投資這些公司，他從妻子娘家借了 10 萬美元，這在當時可是一大筆錢。他開始投資，創立了一家名為 Shelby Colin Davis and Company 的公司，並在他去世時，把那 10 萬美元變成了 8 億美元，幾乎全部投資在金融股上，而且他把這筆錢百分之百捐給了慈善機構。他不認同繼承的概念，而且...
2 [00:08:56] He was an incredible philanthropist. And but. He also created an investment philosophy, and that shapes my father who understood this idea of owner earnings, the idea that perception of a business can be different than the reality.
2 [00:08:56] 他是一位了不起的慈善家。不僅如此，他還創立了一套投資哲學，這套哲學深深影響了我父親，讓他理解了「業主盈餘」這個概念，也就是對一門生意的認知，可能與實際情況大相逕庭。
2 [00:09:12] And if you do the work, if you understand the business, there was enormous opportunity. And my grand, my father branched way beyond financial stocks, and he started at the Bank of New York, which was at a great investment department. I don’t know if you remember the name Barton Biggs, but Barton Biggs’s father was the head of the investment department of Bank of New York, Bill Biggs, and he was my dad’s boss.
2 [00:09:12] 如果你願意下功夫，如果你了解這門生意，就會發現巨大的機會。我的祖父，我父親的投資範圍遠遠超出了金融股，他最初是在紐約銀行起步，那裡有個很棒的投資部門。不知道你是否記得 Barton Biggs 這個名字，但 Barton Biggs 的父親 Bill Biggs 正是紐約銀行投資部門的主管，也是我父親的老闆。
2 [00:09:36] And my dad fell in love with investing, but he hated doing it at a bank because the banks were so concerned about not about looking like they wanted to look like everybody else. And so he really valued independent thought and independent action, but that was not possible in the confines of a trust bank. So he decided to go out on his own.
2 [00:09:36] 我父親從此愛上了投資，但他非常不喜歡在銀行體系內做這件事，因為銀行極度在意形象，總是想方設法要和同業看起來一模一樣。因此，他非常重視獨立思考與獨立行動，但這在信託銀行的框架下是不可能實現的。於是，他決定自立門戶。
2 [00:10:00] And started Davis advised then called Davis Palmer and Biggs, and then what became Davis Advisors, and then my grandfather’s firm. They came together and sort of the rest is history, but they really built these fundamental tenants on each other. My grandfather on the value of owner earnings looking through my father on the idea of applying independent thought, independent analysis, but across a range of industries.
2 [00:10:00] 然後創立了 Davis Advisors，當時叫做 Davis Palmer and Biggs，後來才演變成 Davis Advisors，也就是我祖父的公司。他們的事業匯聚在一起，可以說後續的發展大家都知道了，但他們確實是在彼此的基礎上，建立起這些根本的投資原則。我祖父專注於透視股東盈餘的價值，而我父親則在此之上，加入了獨立思考、獨立分析的理念，並將其應用於更廣泛的產業領域。
2 [00:10:29] And taking in client money versus my grandfather initially just managed his own capital or the capital of the firm, and so that was… That’s a long answer. I’ll try to keep my future answer shorter, but I was… I was so lucky to have them both as role models, and my grandfather lived well into his nineties and wanted to die at his desk. I mean he loved.
2 [00:10:29] 並且開始管理客戶的資金，相較之下，我祖父最初只管理自己的資本或公司的資金，所以這…… 這是個很長的回答。我以後會盡量讓回答簡短一點，但我…… 我真的非常幸運能有他們兩位作為我的榜樣，而我祖父活到了九十多歲，並且希望在他的辦公桌前鞠躬盡瘁。我的意思是，他熱愛這份工作。
2 [00:10:54] He loved the business. And so, you know, I got to learn from two people that they it wasn’t. That they were talented, is that they were passionate and that it was so infectious. And the relationships that they built through business were just became just bedrock parts of their life and something that I aspired to.
2 [00:10:54] 他熱愛這門事業。所以，我從這兩個人身上學到的，不是他們多有天賦，而是他們充滿熱忱，而且那種熱忱極具感染力。他們透過事業建立起的關係，成了他們人生中如基石般穩固的一部分，也是我心嚮往之的。
1 [00:11:14] Yeah, and when you take passion and add tremendous success together, it can be a real draw.
1 [00:11:14] 是啊，當你把熱忱和巨大的成功結合在一起時，確實會很有吸引力。
2 [00:11:20] Oh yeah, yeah, although. I have to say, both my father and my grandfather were extremely frugal. So I would say that they’re value investors, right? They’re value investors.
2 [00:11:20] 喔，是啊，是啊，不過呢。我得說，我父親和祖父都極其節儉。所以我會說他們是價值投資人，對吧？他們是價值投資人。
2 [00:11:37] And you know, net worth might have been a way to keep score, but there was no planes and yachts and mansions. You know, it just wasn’t their mindset. They lived.
2 [00:11:37] 你知道，淨資產或許是他們用來記分的方式，但他們沒有私人飛機、遊艇或豪宅。你知道，那根本不是他們的心態。他們的生活不是那樣。
2 [00:11:49] With great integrity, with frugality, thoughtfulness, and sometimes it was extreme. I mean, you know, my we love skiing as a family, but the, you know, the. The rule was that you had to walk uphill for the first run in order to understand the value of the ticket, the lift ticket.
2 [00:11:49] 他為人非常正直、節儉、體貼，有時甚至到了極端的程度。我的意思是，你知道，我們全家都熱愛滑雪，但，你知道，規矩是第一次滑雪必須自己走上坡，這樣才能體會纜車票的價值。
2 [00:12:11] I worked for my grandfather one summer just in his house, you know, when I was a kid, like, you know, cleaning and working in the kitchen and, you know, driving. I was probably sixteen. The oven was rusted out on the inside and my grandfather told me to paint it.
2 [00:12:11] 我小時候有一個暑假在我祖父家打工，你知道，就是打掃、在廚房幫忙，還有開車。那時我大概十六歲。烤箱的內部生鏽了，我祖父叫我把裡面漆一漆。
2 [00:12:32] I didn’t know much, but I knew that was a bad idea. I was like, you know, he just his expression that he would always use was use it up, wear it out, make do or do without. And so it wasn’t really the money.
2 [00:12:32] 我當時懂得不多，但我知道那是個餿主意。我心想，你知道嗎，他總是掛在嘴邊的一句話就是：用到壞、穿到爛、湊合著用，不然就別用。所以這其實跟錢沒太大關係。
2 [00:12:47] It was the idea that they, you know, as my dad said, I get to live in the future. And what a privilege that is to live in the future. I’m always trying to think about what the world could look like.
2 [00:12:47] 重點在於那種想法，就像我爸說的，我有幸活在未來。活在未來是多麼大的榮幸。我總是在思考這個世界未來可能的樣貌。
2 [00:13:00] How could this business evolve? How could and that’s an exciting way to live. It is and you know, it would be very I would be very lousy at manufacturing chairs or something like that. You know, where I do it every day and just try to make the chair a little better or a little more cheaply and you know, to me and that was that was something they really had. That was the infectious part.
2 [00:13:00] 這門生意會如何演變？這一切會怎麼發展？這是一種令人興奮的生活方式。確實如此，而且你知道嗎，如果要我去做製造椅子之類的工作，我肯定會做得很糟。那種每天重複，只想著把椅子做得稍微好一點或成本壓低一點的工作，對我來說……而這正是他們真正擁有的特質，那是最具感染力的部分。
1 [00:13:25] Yeah, it sounds like the focus is on value creation and doing it in a meaningful way because. It’s hard work, and when you’re done, you want to make sure that it was all worthwhile, just like climbing the mountain to the top.
1 [00:13:25] 聽起來重點在於創造價值，而且要以有意義的方式去實踐。因為這是份苦差事，當你完成時，你會希望確保一切努力都是值得的，就像攀登到山頂一樣。
2 [00:13:37] Yes, and and value creation is a lovely way to put it Alex, because it was this idea of of what makes a valuable life. And by the way, my father is very actively giving away one 100 percent of his fortune. it is a uh and.
2 [00:13:37] 是的，亞歷克斯，價值創造這個說法很貼切，因為這關乎如何活出有價值的人生。順帶一提，我父親正非常積極地捐出他百分之百的財富。這是一種……嗯。
2 [00:13:55] You know, I don’t want to over it. I mean, babe, he set aside money for six. K, and but you know, it was set aside in the mode of Warren that said, you know, I want my kids to have enough that they can do anything, but not so much that they can do nothing.
2 [00:13:55] 你知道，我不想過度解讀。我的意思是，寶貝，他為六個孩子都留了錢，但是，你知道，那是用華倫的那種模式預留的，他說過，我希望我的孩子有足夠的錢，讓他們能做任何事，但不要多到讓他們可以無所事事。
2 [00:14:11] And you know, that that remains sort of an ethos, but this idea of what it is to live a valuable life to create value for your clients, to work hard to do that, to work with colleaguesGU that you admire, that you respect. You know, spending yourself in a cause that you think is valuable, but also then to you know, to make a difference in your community, to make a difference in your family. So yeah, I mean, I really truly started on bird base.
2 [00:14:11] 你知道，這始終是一種精神，但這個概念是關於活出有價值的人生，為你的客戶創造價值，為此努力工作，與你敬佩、你尊重的同事們一起奮鬥。你知道，將自己投入在你認為有價值的事業中，同時也要，你知道，在你的社區做出改變，在你的家庭做出改變。所以，是的，我的意思是，我真的、打從根本上就是這麼開始的。
2 [00:14:41] I mean, there it was an amazing value system, it was an amazing model to be given, it was amazing content to be given, and it was a name I was proud to be given. So. That I mean, you know, it would be you could spin the wheel of life seven billion times. It’s a hell of a place to start, and so I was very.
[00:14:41] 我的意思是，那是一個很棒的價值體系，一個很棒的傳承典範，很棒的傳承內涵，也是一個讓我引以為傲的姓氏。所以，你知道的，就算把生命輪盤轉個七十億次，這都是個非常了不起的起點，因此我非常……
1 [00:15:03] very lucky. So you described the core investment tenant that goes back almost 100 years. Did you feel like the firm has stayed true to its original principles, even though the markets and potentially competition have evolved through time?
1 [00:15:03] 非常幸運。所以你描述了這項可追溯近百年歷史的核心投資原則。你覺得即使市場和競爭環境隨著時間演變，這家公司是否仍堅守其最初的原則？
2 [00:15:18] Absolutely. I mean, you know, the phrase that we use a lot is that we have to hold to unchanging principles. And adapt to changing times, and you know the principles that the idea of owner earnings, that stocks are ownership interests in businesses, that the leadership of those businesses matters enormously, that there is a difference between value and price, right?
2 [00:15:18] 絕對是。我的意思是，我們經常掛在嘴邊的一句話是，我們必須堅守不變的原則，同時適應時代的變遷。而這些原則，像是股東盈餘的概念、股票代表的是企業的經營權、企業領導層至關重要，以及價值與價格之間存在差異，對吧？
2 [00:15:44] These these tenants that the nature of stewardship of being entrusted. With somebody’s savings, the sense of responsibility and accountability for that… Um, these are sort of bedrock unchanging principles, but. But as an investor, where you found value in the sixties or the fifties, you know, life insurance, we started talking about life insurance and my grandfather, that, you know, that industry has changed dramatically.
[00:15:44] 這些核心原則，也就是受託管理他人積蓄的盡職本質，那種責任感與問責精神……嗯，這些可說是堅如磐石、恆久不變的原則。但，作為投資人，你在五、六零年代找到價值的地方，像是人壽保險，我們開始談到人壽保險和我祖父，你知道，那個產業已經發生了巨大變化。
2 [00:16:14] And so if we viewed ourselves as insurance investors, you know, the opportunity set dried up. But, you know, the evolution of the economy, we have to sort of follow that evolution. And that’s delicate because there can be fads and false starts and the new new thing and the new era, especially in bull markets and bubbles, you know, people that holds on changing principles often look like dinosaurs.
[00:16:14] 所以如果我們把自己定位成保險業投資人，那麼機會就枯竭了。但隨著經濟的演變，我們必須跟上這種變化。這需要拿捏分寸，因為市場上總會出現一時的狂熱、錯誤的開端，以及所謂的新玩意、新時代，特別是在多頭市場和泡沫時期，那些堅持不變原則的人，往往看起來就像恐龍一樣。
2 [00:16:41] And I like to say we’re not dinosaurs, we’re turtles, right? The dinosaurs went extinct, but turtles have persisted for millennia and have done so. By being resilient and being relentless and those sorts of qualities, you know we look for them in the.
2 [00:16:41] 我常說我們不是恐龍，我們是烏龜，對吧？恐龍已經滅絕，但烏龜卻存活了數千年，靠的就是韌性與堅持不懈這類特質，你知道，我們尋找的正是具備這些特質的…
2 [00:17:00] In the businesses that we invest in, but we also want to embody them in our firm. Like we have a fortress balance sheet, you know? My colleagues, our families, our partners… We’ve been together on average 20 years.
2 [00:17:00] …在我們投資的企業中，但我們也希望在我們的公司體現這些特質。就像我們擁有堡壘般的資產負債表，你知道嗎？我的同事、我們的家人、我們的合作夥伴…我們平均共事了二十年。
2 [00:17:13] Some of us for 30 years. We’re the largest investors in our funds. Everything we offer to a client, we’ve put our own money in, and we’ve done it because we see it as an investment opportunity. And we can be resilient, we can be out of fashion, and we can be in this lasting game. But we are going to be on the other side, and I think over time we will build value over the indexes.
2 [00:17:13] 我們有些人已經投資了三十年。我們是自家基金的最大投資人。我們提供給客戶的任何產品，都投入了自己的資金，我們這麼做是因為我們將其視為投資機會。我們可以保持韌性，可以暫時不受市場青睞，也可以在這場持久的賽局中堅持下去。但我們終將迎來轉機，而且我認為隨著時間推移，我們將創造超越指數的價值。
2 [00:17:39] But we can accept periods of time where we will lag, and usually we will lag when there is a momentum trade that is building and feeding back on itself, because we will pull back, and we will not pull back by going to cash. We’ll pull back by going into what people aren’t interested in, and sometimes that can be a stop. That like think of meta only four years ago, right? Down sixty percent, seventy percent.
2 [00:17:39] 但我們可以接受在某些時期表現落後，通常是在動能交易不斷自我堆疊、自我強化的時候，因為我們會退一步，而我們退一步的方式並非轉為持有現金。我們會轉向那些人們不感興趣的領域，而這有時可能會成為一種阻礙。想想看，不過是四年前的 Meta，對吧？股價下跌了六成、七成。
2 [00:18:06] You know that became our largest position. Um, but it was at a time when there was this sort of mindset that we were out of sync, and you know we had clients that sort of how can you own it? Don’t just read the papers, see what it’s doing. This in the last twelve months, look at what happened United Health right? That’s a company we’ve you know we probably owned twenty-five years ago.
2 [00:18:06] 你知道，那後來成了我們最大的持股部位。嗯，但那時候有一種氛圍，覺得我們跟市場脫節了，你知道，有些客戶會質疑說，你怎麼能持有這種股票？別只看報紙，看看它實際上在做什麼。看看過去十二個月，聯合健康集團發生了什麼事，對吧？那是一家我們大概在二十五年前就持有過的公司。
2 [00:18:30] We’ve owned it this is the third time we’ve owned it and I don’t want to give the impression we’re traders we dip in and out but you know it’s this idea you can get massive mispricings in a sector in ah in a specific company and ah and so we need to be willing. To be out of sync，the CEO of Sam Walton at Walmart once said，you can’t do what everybody else does and expect a different results。So we have a portfolio that.
2 [00:18:30] 我們持有過它，這已經是我們第三次持有這家公司了，我不想給人一種我們是交易員、頻繁進出的印象，但你知道，重點在於，你可以在某個產業、某家特定公司上，看到巨大的錯誤定價，所以我們必須願意承擔。必須願意跟市場不同調，沃爾瑪的山姆·沃爾頓執行長曾說過，你不能做跟其他人一樣的事，卻期望得到不同的結果。所以我們打造的投資組合，就是這樣。
2 [00:19:00] Nothing like the averages. And yet, you know, I mean, certainly if you were to look at things like the Russell one thousand value, I mean, we’ve outperformed it in all periods. But you know, even in this crazy market, we’ve been ahead of the S and P for the last three or almost four years with, you know, well less than, you know, half the Mag seven and all of that stuff with a big underweighting in technology. You know, we’re going to do it like the tortoise. We’re going to grind it out and it’s going to be about resilience and relentless progress, but it’s not going to be about, you know, being the hair.
[00:19:00] 這跟平均值完全不能比。不過呢，你知道的，我的意思是，如果你去看像羅素一千價值指數這類的東西，我們在所有期間的表現都優於它。但你知道嗎，即使在這個瘋狂的市場中，過去三年、將近四年的時間裡，我們的表現都領先標普五百，而且你知道的，我們持有的七大巨頭部位遠不到一半，還有那些科技股配置大幅減碼的情況。你知道的，我們會像烏龜那樣去做。我們會一步一步穩紮穩打，重點在於韌性與持續不斷的進步，而不是在於，你知道的，去當那隻跑得快的兔子。
1 [00:19:41] It’s interesting. You mentioned, you know, the question about aren’t you reading the papers and seeing what everybody else sees? You are reading the papers, but you’re reading the one that’s written two years from now, not the one that everybody else is reading today.
[00:19:41] 這很有意思。你提到那個問題，不就是你在看報紙，看到大家都看到的東西嗎？你確實是在看報紙，但你看的是兩年後的報紙，而不是其他人今天在看的那一份。
2 [00:19:53] What a wonderful way to say it. It is so true. We really do. We try to visualize, you know, when I talk. About living in the future, and by the way, we do it both on the bull case and the bear case. You know, we have a discipline that’s called the pre-mortem instead of the post-mortem. Yeah, you know, we spend a lot of time studying our mistakes, looking back at them: what did we learn?
2 [00:19:53] 這說法真是太棒了。確實如此。我們真的這麼做。我們試著去想像，你知道，當我談到「活在未來」時，順帶一提，我們在做多和做空的情境下都會這麼做。你知道，我們有一套紀律，叫做「事前驗屍」，而不是「事後驗屍」。沒錯，你知道，我們花很多時間研究自己的錯誤，回顧它們：我們學到了什麼？
2 [00:20:18] What are the transferable lessons? We actually frame them, and you know, they… We have them all on a wall in the center of the research department—the stock certificates of our biggest mistakes. By the way, some of those mistakes we made money on.
2 [00:20:18] 哪些是可以舉一反三的教訓？我們其實會把它們裱框起來，你知道，它們……我們把它們全掛在研究部門中心的一面牆上——那些我們犯下最大錯誤的股票憑證。順帶一提，其中有些錯誤我們還是有賺到錢。
2 [00:20:31] Some were mistakes of omission. They’re things we didn’t own that we should have owned. So it’s not about buying a stock that goes down. That’s not a mistake. It’s that we’ve misanalyzed the business. But we have advanced that thought to also try to project ourselves into the future to that paper.
2 [00:20:31] 有些則是疏失的錯誤。是那些我們本該持有卻沒持有的東西。所以重點不在於買了一支下跌的股票。那不算錯誤。真正的錯誤是我們錯誤地分析了那門生意。但我們已將這個想法進一步發展，也試著將自己投射到未來，去面對那份研究報告。
2 [00:20:52] Five years from now, and the headline says you know this company dramatically underperformed. Over the last five years, what happened? Here’s this story. And we write it that way. We write it as if it is already done badly.
2 [00:20:52] 想像五年後，報紙頭條寫著這家公司表現大幅落後。過去這五年發生了什麼事？這就是背後的故事。而我們就是用這種方式來撰寫，把它當作事情已經搞砸了來寫。
2 [00:21:10] And because it helps us be more open to as if bad news unfolds and not be so wedded to a single investment thesis. So that’s part of our process too. Not just looking at how far a wonderful company under a wonderful leader can go.
2 [00:21:10] 因為這麼做能幫助我們，在壞消息真正發生時，能以更開放的態度去面對，而不會過度執著於單一的投資論點。所以這也是我們流程的一部分，不只是去看一家卓越的公司，在優秀的領導者帶領下能走多遠。
2 [00:21:28] I mean, think of. Jamie diamond going to bank one and everything that has unfolded since. I mean, JP Morgan was certainly second tier when it merged with Bank One.
2 [00:21:28] 我的意思是，想想看，傑米·戴蒙加入第一銀行，以及自此之後所開展的一切。我的意思是，當摩根大通與第一銀行合併時，它肯定還只是個二線角色。
2 [00:21:40] It had really struggled in the wilderness for sort of a decade, little like maybe what city has gone through. I mean, it was a once. Great business that had lost its way, unintegrated mergers, unambiguous culture.
[00:21:40] 它確實在荒野中掙扎了大約十年，有點像花旗銀行所經歷的那樣。我的意思是，它曾經是一家很棒的企業，但後來迷失了方向，合併整合不順，企業文化模糊不清。
2 [00:21:56] Think of a one person, the difference that that’s made. Right, that was not a winning hand. It was a hand that was made turned into a winning hand. He wasn’t dealt that. And so, you know, you can be, oh, you can put yourself in the future and think how far could one person or one business go, but you can also put yourself in the future and think about where could we be wildly wrong. And both of those are useful and exciting exercises.
2 [00:21:56] 想想一個人所能帶來的改變。對吧，那原本不是一手好牌。那是一手被扭轉成贏面的牌。他並非一開始就拿到那手好牌。所以，你知道，你可以把自己放到未來，去思考一個人或一家企業能走多遠，但你也可以把自己放到未來，去思考我們可能在哪些地方犯下大錯。而這兩種思考都是有用且令人興奮的練習。
1 [00:22:24] So after nearly four decades in markets, does it feel harder to generate excess returns today than it did earlier in your career?
1 [00:22:24] 那麼，在市場上打滾近四十年後，現在要創造超額報酬，是否感覺比您職業生涯早期更困難？
2 [00:22:33] I’m going to say no with a caveat. I think there’s a wonderful saying of my grandfather’s that you make most of your money in a bear market. You just don’t realize it at the time. And similarly, in a bull market, you can be making enormous mistakes but not realize it at the time because they’re looking so good. So I believe that we are in a.
2 [00:22:33] 我會說不，但附帶一個條件。我認為我祖父有句名言說得好：你大部分的錢都是在熊市賺到的，只是你當下沒有意識到。同樣地，在牛市，你可能正在犯下巨大的錯誤，但當下卻渾然不覺，因為它們看起來表現得太好了。所以我認為我們正處於一個…
2 [00:23:00] Period of meaningful outperformance，and I’ll give you just one number to think about，you know，在 the last five years，forget stocks，I’m not going to talk about the prices，but our businesses have grown their earnings 百 分 之 1 7 a year for the last five years。And yet today they trade at fourteen and a half times earnings. Now, if I look at like I’ll use the Russell one thousand value just to start, you know the Russell one thousand value over the last five years, the companies that make it up is generate generated growth of twelve and a half percent.
[00:23:00] 這是一段表現明顯優於大盤的時期，我給你一個數字思考就好，你知道，在過去五年裡，先不談股價，我不打算討論價格，但我們旗下企業的獲利在過去五年間，每年成長了百分之十七。然而，它們目前的交易價格卻只有十四倍半的本益比。現在，如果我先拿羅素一千價值型指數來比較，你知道，羅素一千價值型指數在過去五年間，其成分股的獲利成長率是百分之十二點五。
2 [00:23:38] So versus our almost seventeen. So huge our companies have dramatically up for the Russell one thousand value currently trades at twenty times earnings and we trade at fourteen and a half. And then if I look at the S and P, the S and P trades at twenty six times earnings versus R fourteen and a half and has only grown earnings eighteen percent.
2 [00:23:38] 相較於我們接近十七倍的本益比，差距相當大。我們的持股公司表現大幅提升，而羅素一千價值指數目前的本益比為二十倍，我們則是十四點五倍。再來看標普指數，標普的本益比為二十六倍，相較於我們的十四點五倍，其盈利成長率僅有百分之十八。
2 [00:24:00] So ours are 17, S&P’s 18. So our companies have grown about the same, and yet we are sitting at 14 and a half times earnings. So I would argue that we are in a period of real outperformance, but that it’s not necessarily obvious yet. I mean our results have been good in the last… I mean certainly relative to the value index of the last three years, five years, so on.
2 [00:24:00] 我們的（本益比）是 17 倍，標普 500 是 18 倍。所以我們投資的公司成長幅度大致相同，但我們的本益比卻只有 14.5 倍。因此，我認為我們正處於一個表現真正優異的時期，但這點目前還不一定顯而易見。我的意思是，我們的績效在過去… 當然，相對於過去三年、五年的價值型指數來說，表現一直不錯。
2 [00:24:25] They’ve been good relative to the S&P in the last three years, but still I would say that I think we’re in a stage where I believe that our relative results have been much better over the last 10 years than the reported results would indicate. Now that’s an easy thing to convince yourself of, right? So I say it with a lot of recognition that there could be hubris in that, but.
2 [00:24:25] 過去三年相對於標普 500 的表現也不錯，但我還是要說，我認為我們正處於這樣一個階段：我相信過去十年我們的相對績效，遠比帳面結果所顯示的要好得多。當然，這很容易說服自己，對吧？所以我這麼說的時候，也充分意識到這其中可能存在傲慢的成分，不過…
2 [00:24:53] You know, the simple fact is over the last fifteen years or so, the companies that we own have grown. Grown their earnings as a percentage of the S&P, and yet their valuation as a percentage of the S&P has come down. And so we’ve been right on the businesses, wrong on the prices.
[00:24:53] 你知道，簡單的事實是，在過去十五年左右的時間裡，我們持有的公司一直在成長。它們的獲利佔標普 500 指數的比重有所提升，但它們的估值佔標普 500 指數的比重卻下降了。所以我們對企業的判斷是正確的，但對價格的判斷錯了。
2 [00:25:13] That gap will come together now. It can come together because the businesses end up having bleak futures. Right? The old story of a ten-year-old racehorse has a great record, but.
[00:25:13] 這個差距現在會逐漸縮小。之所以會縮小，可能是因為這些企業的前景最終變得黯淡。對吧？就像那匹戰績輝煌的十歲賽馬，但。
2 [00:25:25] It’s not going to win anymore or it can come together because our businesses get revalued relative to the market that that twenty six times earnings of the market comes down and ours stays the same, we will dramatically outperform or our fourteen times earnings comes up and the market stays the same, we’ll dramatically outperform. But that’s something that to me, I like the position that we’re in. Certainly on a relative basis, an absolute basis.
[00:25:25] 它不會再贏了，或者情況可能匯聚在一起，因為我們的企業相對於市場被重新估值，市場的二十六倍本益比下降，而我們的保持不變，我們將大幅跑贏；或者我們的十四倍本益比上升，而市場保持不變，我們也將大幅跑贏。但對我來說，我喜歡我們所處的位置。當然，無論是相對基礎還是絕對基礎上。
2 [00:25:54] I think starting at fourteen or fifteen times earnings is fine. I always say invert that. you have a reasonable starting point for thinking about future returns, so you know at fourteen times earnings we got we’re at a seven and a half percent earnings yield at twenty six times earnings the market is at like a three eight percent earnings yield that’s not a bad starting point as you think about what returns could look like in the next decade.
2 [00:25:54] 我認為從十四、十五倍的本益比開始是沒問題的。我常說要反過來思考。這樣你就有一個合理的出發點來思考未來的報酬率，所以你知道，在十四倍本益比時，我們的盈餘收益率是七．五％，而在二十六倍本益比時，市場的盈餘收益率大約是三．八％，這在你思考未來十年報酬率可能的面貌時，是個不錯的出發點。
2 [00:26:21] And that would bode very well for relative results, and okay for absolute results. But I promise you, it will be lumpy. It won’t be well. It’s not going to look like a smooth line, however it plays out.
[00:26:21] 這對相對績效來說會是非常有利的，對絕對績效也還算不錯。但我向你保證，過程會起伏不定，不會一帆風順。無論最終如何發展，都不會是一條平滑的曲線。
1 [00:26:34] But yeah, what you did there is you separated the fundamentals of the business versus the price that the market attributes to that. Yes, because the price is backward-looking, but it’s also forward-looking into. Expectations of the future，and also，uh，we talked about this earlier，psychology plays a big role in what that price is，and that part is harder to predict，whereas an underwrite，whereas the fundamental. Of the business, they’re all difficult, but that’s probably easier to underwrite and predict. And so you focus on that.
1 [00:26:34] 沒錯，你剛才做的就是將企業的基本面與市場賦予的價格區分開來。是的，因為價格既反映過去，也前瞻未來。對未來的預期，還有，嗯，我們之前談過，心理因素對價格的影響很大，而這部分比較難預測；相較之下，承銷，或者說企業的基本面，雖然都很困難，但可能比較容易評估和預測。所以你專注在那一塊。
2 [00:27:06] Well, yeah Alex, I mean imagine if you owned an apartment building in LA and you know you paid $10 million for the apartment building and the apartment building you know reliably generated $750,000 a year of profits. Right, you would say that’s pretty good. I’m getting seven and a half percent on my money now.
[00:27:06] 嗯，沒錯，Alex，想像一下，如果你在洛杉磯擁有一棟公寓大樓，你知道你花了 1000 萬美元買下這棟公寓大樓，而這棟公寓大樓每年穩定地為你帶來 75 萬美元的利潤。對吧，你會說這還不錯，我現在資金的報酬率有 7.5%。
2 [00:27:28] If somebody comes along and says, ‘Hey Alex, I’ll buy your building for eight million dollars,’ you wouldn’t think you had lost money. But if that was a stock, it would be down 20 percent. But you would be rattled if somebody offered you 800 thousand.
[00:27:28] 如果有人跑來跟你說：「嘿 Alex，我出八百萬美元買你那棟大樓，」你不會覺得自己虧了錢。但如果這是一檔股票，股價就等於跌了兩成。可要是有人只出八十萬，你肯定會嚇得心慌意亂。
2 [00:27:45] If they said Alex, you got to sell that building today, and you said, well I can’t find anybody that’ll pay me more than seven million for it, you’d say but I’m not going to sell it. Because I’m making seven and a half percent. By the way, I.
2 [00:27:45] 如果他們說，Alex，你今天就得把那棟大樓賣掉，而你回答，嗯，我找不到任何人願意出價超過七百萬來買，你會說，但我不打算賣啊。因為我現在有七點五趴的收益。順帶一提，我。
2 [00:28:00] That seven hundred fifty thousand, I’m going to raise rents next year. I put a new roof on you know. I think that’s it’s going to end up being at a million dollars of earnings ah in two years.
2 [00:28:00] 那七十五萬，我明年要調漲租金。我換了新屋頂，你知道的。我認為兩年內，這筆收益最終會達到一百萬美元。
2 [00:28:11] So why the hell would I sell it for seven hundred thousand? I mean, for seven million, I’d be like, ‘I’m not, I’m not going to sell it for seven million.’ Screw you!
2 [00:28:11] 那我他媽的為什麼要賣七十萬？我是說，就算出到七百萬，我也會說：『我才不要，七百萬我也不賣。』去你的！
2 [00:28:19] And you wouldn’t feel so rattled. But with stocks, people feel very rattled. You know, if we buy, you know, MGM at forty and it goes to thirty-three, I’m not uncomfortable with that.
2 [00:28:19] 你也不會覺得那麼慌。但換成股票，人們就很容易驚慌失措。你知道，如果我們在四十塊買進美高梅，它跌到三十三塊，我並不會因此感到不安。
2 [00:28:34] I know the business, I know the people, I know the assets. I don’t particularly understand. I’ll look with humility at is the market seeing something we’re missing.
2 [00:28:34] 我了解這門生意，我了解經營團隊，我了解它的資產。我並不特別理解市場的波動。我會抱持謙遜的態度去審視，市場是不是看到了我們忽略的東西。
2 [00:28:43] We will always revisit our assumptions, but very often, you know what the market is doing is they’re miscategorizing a business. Right? My grandfather coined the phrase about his favorite insurance companies that they were growth stocks.
2 [00:28:43] 我們總是會重新審視自己的假設，但很多時候，市場在做的事情就是錯誤地歸類了一家公司。對吧？我祖父曾用一句話來形容他最愛的保險公司，說它們其實是成長股。
2 [00:29:00] In disguise，and you know we don’t，we don’t need them to be the business will reveal the growth。We don’t need multiple expansion，we don’t think about that as part of our investment approach。We may get it，but it’s nowhere in our models。We think of our return just the way you would on that apartment building。
2 [00:29:00] 只是偽裝起來了，而你知道嗎，我們不需要它們——企業本身就會展現出成長。我們不需要本益比擴張，我們不把那當作投資方法的一部分。我們可能會得到它，但我們的模型裡完全沒有這一項。我們看待報酬的方式，就像你評估那棟公寓大樓一樣。
2 [00:29:20] We’re getting 750,000 a year of after-tax rents and. And after expense rent, and we think that’s going to a million, and we think ultimately it’s going to a million two and to a million five. We’re very happy that we were very comfortable that we paid $10 million for that asset, and if we could sell it at five, we’re not interested now. If somebody comes along and says I’ll pay you twenty-five. Well, that’s trickier question.
2 [00:29:20] 我們每年稅後租金收入有 75 萬美元，扣除費用後，我們認為這數字會成長到 100 萬，最終更會達到 120 萬甚至 150 萬。我們很滿意當初以 1,000 萬美元購入這項資產，就算現在有人出價 500 萬，我們也沒興趣。但如果有人跑來說，我出 2,500 萬跟你買，嗯，這問題就比較棘手了。
1 [00:29:47] You know what’s interesting about that example is it makes it clear the difference when you focus on what numbers are in front of you. So when you own the apartment, the value of it doesn’t show up on your phone, doesn’t show up in a. Monthly statement that you see fluctuate, where the value that you see is the amount of income that’s going into your account.
[00:29:47] 你知道這個例子有趣的地方在於，它清楚說明了當你專注於眼前數字時的差異。當你擁有那間公寓時，它的價值不會顯示在你的手機上，也不會出現在你會看到波動的月結單裡，你看到的價值是存入你帳戶的收入金額。
1 [00:30:07] Whereas with a stock, the price goes up and down and you see, you know, you lost a million dollars today, you gained, you know, two million dollars last year. That’s what’s in front of you. As opposed to the earnings of that company, you have to dig in a little bit to get that. So it is interesting how that plays into the psychology.
1 [00:30:07] 但股票就不一樣了，價格會上下波動，你看到的是今天虧了一百萬美元，去年賺了兩百萬美元。這些數字就擺在你眼前。相較之下，那家公司的實際獲利狀況，你還得稍微深入挖掘才能掌握。所以，這如何影響投資心理，確實很有意思。
2 [00:30:22] Hugely. I mean, that. You know, the description that Ben Graham did of mister Market is so useful, right? It’s this idea if you owned that apartment building with a partner, so you each had put in five million dollars, and now you have this ten million dollars building, you own fifty, your partner owns fifty.
2 [00:30:22] 影響非常大。我的意思是，你知道，班傑明·葛拉漢對市場先生的描述實在太有用了，對吧？這個概念是這樣的：如果你和一個合夥人共同擁有一棟公寓大樓，你們各自投入了五百萬美元，現在這棟大樓價值一千萬美元，你持有五成，你的合夥人也持有五成。
2 [00:30:41] And every day your partner comes to you and names a price. And at that price, they will buy your interest. Or sell you their interest in, and you don’t have to do anything.
2 [00:30:41] 而你的合夥人每天都會來找你，報出一個價格。在那個價格下，他們會買下你的股份，或是把他們的股份賣給你，而你什麼都不用做。
2 [00:30:53] you know，if your partner comes and says six，you’re like，i’m not interested。now if your partner. And says twenty, you might say okay you can buy me out at that valuation.
2 [00:30:53] 你知道嗎，如果你的合夥人跑來說六倍，你大概會說，我沒興趣。但如果你的合夥人說二十倍，你可能就會說，好吧，用這個估值把我手上的股份買走吧。
2 [00:31:04] And so Warren and Ben created this model of mister market, your partner is mister market, and mister market names this price. And of course they went on and said what sort of personality would you like mister market to have? And you know Warren’s night answer was a heavy drinking manic depressive, right?
2 [00:31:04] 於是華倫和班恩創造了市場先生這個模型，你的合夥人是市場先生，而市場先生會開出這個價格。當然，他們接著說，你希望市場先生擁有什麼樣的性格？你知道華倫可能會給出的答案是，一個酗酒又躁鬱的傢伙，對吧？
2 [00:31:25] That the more crazy Mister Market is, the more money you’re going to bake because you focus on the value and Mister Market focuses on the price. But you’re right, people look at that price and they confuse it with value, even you did when you were saying you know they see the value has gone down. The value hasn’t gone down.
2 [00:31:25] 市場先生越瘋狂，你就越有機會賺到錢，因為你專注於價值，而市場先生專注於價格。但你說的對，人們看到那個價格，就把它跟價值搞混了，就連你之前說「他們看到價值下跌了」的時候也是這樣。價值並沒有下跌。
2 [00:31:44] They see the price has gone down. And so that fundamental, that bedrock distinction, you know, that was one of those four legs on the stool or on the chair, you know, from my dad and grandfather was always separating price and value. You know, Rudyard Kipling in his famous poem, if, you know, he says, you know, if you can keep your head when all about you are losing theirs and blaming it on you, it goes on.
[00:31:44] 他們看到價格下跌了。而那個根本的、基礎的區別，你知道，那是我父親和祖父所說的凳子或椅子上的四條腿之一，就是永遠要把價格和價值分開。你知道，吉卜林在他那首著名的詩〈如果〉中寫道，你知道，如果你能在周遭所有人都失去理智並歸咎於你時，仍能保持冷靜，詩句是這樣繼續的。
2 [00:32:11] But it has a wonderful thing where it says, if you can keep your head when all about you are doubting you, but make allowance for their doubts as well. And that’s our job. We have to make allowance for their doubts.
[00:32:11] 但其中有段很棒的詩句是這麼說的：如果你能在周遭所有人都懷疑你時保持冷靜，但同時也體諒他們的懷疑。而這就是我們的工作。我們必須體諒他們的懷疑。
2 [00:32:24] Are they seeing something that we’re not? What is the short thesis? What is our premortem? Where could we be wrong? And are we open and sensitive to looking for that data? Because we’re in a world of probabilities.
2 [00:32:24] 他們是不是看到了我們沒發現的東西？做空的論點是什麼？我們的事前檢討是什麼？我們可能在哪裡出錯？我們是否保持開放和敏銳的態度去尋找那些數據？因為我們身處的是一個充滿機率的世界。
2 [00:32:39] You know, the story I like to tell about probabilities is, you know, if it came from Warren, I was asking him about a loss they had on an investment. And Warren said, well, I don’t think that’s a mistake. And I’ll tell you why.
2 [00:32:39] 你知道，我喜歡講一個關於機率的故事，這故事源自華倫。我當時問他關於一筆投資虧損的事。華倫說，嗯，我不認為那是個錯誤。我來告訴你為什麼。
2 [00:32:54] Take out a coin from your pocket and I’ll bet you a billion dollars on a coin toss. If you give me two to one odds. And what that means is he was willing to take a fifty percent chance of losing one hundred percent of that investment.
2 [00:32:54] 從你口袋裡拿出一個硬幣，我跟你賭十億美元，就擲硬幣。條件是你給我二比一的賠率。這意味著，他願意承擔百分之五十的機率，去輸掉那筆投資百分之百的本金。
2 [00:33:14] And so he said, I wouldn’t bet you 10 billion, I wouldn’t bet you 50 billion, but at two to one odds, a billion is about the right amount relative to the net worth that I have. And so on, so you know recognizing that we can be right in our analysis of a company. AND STILL HAVE SOMETHING GO TERRIBLY WRONG IN THE BUSINESS, AND IT DOESN’T MEAN WE ARE WRONG TO BUY IT.
2 [00:33:14] 所以他說，我不會跟你賭一百億，也不會賭五百億，但在二比一的賠率下，十億美元相對於我擁有的淨資產來說，大概是個合適的金額。以此類推，所以你要認知到，我們對一家公司的分析可能是正確的，但生意上仍然可能發生極其糟糕的事，而這並不代表我們當初買進的決定是錯的。
2 [00:33:40] THE ODDS WERE IN OUR FAVOR, BUT WE HAVE TO BE OPEN TO SEEING WELL. BUT THE THESIS EVOLVED THIS WAY, AND NOW WE HAVE ANOTHER DECISION TO MAKE. AND SO IT’S A WONDERFULLY DYNAMIC PROCESS.
2 [00:33:40] 當時的勝算對我們有利，但我們必須保持開放心態，才能看清局勢。然而，投資論點後來演變成這樣，現在我們又得做出另一個決定。所以這是一個非常精彩的動態過程。
1 [00:33:52] SO WHEN YOU LOOK BACK, ARE THERE ANY PARTS OF THE TRADITIONAL VALUE INVESTING PROCESS THAT YOU FEEL? have become less effective. As they become more widely known and followed.
1 [00:33:52] 所以回顧過去，你覺得傳統價值投資流程中，有哪些部分因為變得廣為人知且被廣泛遵循，而變得比較沒那麼有效了？
2 [00:34:03] well certainly the process of you know the meaningfulness of book value has been wildly distorted by changes in accounting and irrationalities in accounting, but also by the nature of how companies earn their money, the type of capital intellectual capital brands and so on that don’t show up.
2 [00:34:03] 嗯，當然，像是帳面價值的重要性，已經因為會計準則的改變和會計上的不合理之處而被嚴重扭曲，同時也受到企業賺錢方式的本質、那些不會顯示在帳面上的資本類型，像是智慧資本、品牌等等的影響。
2 [00:34:24] I think some of the parts analysis can be a little bit misleading or dangerous because people often don’t think about what are the value of the underlying parts. They know what the price is, right? They say, oh, you know, you own this much of this public company.
[00:34:24] 我認為部分加總分析有時可能有點誤導或危險，因為人們往往不去思考這些組成部分的實際價值。他們只知道價格，對吧？他們會說，哦，你知道的，你持有這家上市公司這麼多的股份。
2 [00:34:43] And I’ll give you a famous example was, I think it was Sears. That owned Allstate, and it also owned Compuserve. And there was a point at which Comp you people would say, well, if you buy Sears, you’re.
2 [00:34:43] 我舉個著名的例子，我記得是西爾斯百貨。它旗下擁有好事達保險，還有 Compuserve。當時有個說法，人們會說，如果你買西爾斯，你等於。
2 [00:35:00] Getting the retailer for free because the value of the Allstate and the Compuserve are worth more than the market cap of the company. So that sounds like a great idea as a value investor to get something for free. But of course, it was only free because the Compuserve was so grossly overvalued and it collapsed. And so you actually ended up losing even on a sum of the parts basis like forty or fifty percent. Because the comp you serve was, you know, eighty percent of the NAV and it went down, you know, more than in half.
2 [00:35:00] 免費得到零售業務，因為好事達和 Compuserve 的價值加起來，已經超過了整家公司的市值。所以對價值投資人來說，這聽起來像是個很棒的主意，可以免費得到東西。但當然，之所以免費，是因為 Compuserve 被嚴重高估，後來崩盤了。結果，即使從資產分拆價值的角度來看，你最終還是虧了四、五成。因為 Compuserve 你知道，占了資產淨值的八成，而它的價值你知道，跌掉了一半以上。
1 [00:35:35] Well, because the focus is on the price as opposed to the sum of the fair value.
[00:35:35] 嗯，因為重點在於價格，而非公允價值的總和。
2 [00:35:39] Exactly, exactly. So, you know, the nature and I think there are companies that can be very cheap on a book value. But the nature of the underlying business is that they are forced to invest at low returns, so if you have a you know a crash.
2 [00:35:39] 沒錯，正是如此。所以，你知道，本質上，我認為有些公司帳面價值可能非常便宜。但其基礎業務的本質，迫使它們只能以低回報進行投資，所以如果你遇到崩盤的情況。
2 [00:36:00] Business that is trading at 百 分 之 80，but the business is going to continue to invest capital at a 百 分 之 5 return on equity or a 百 分 之 4 return on equity，then buying it at 百 分 之 80 a book is not a great recipe。In other words，the biggest mistake I think value investors. Confuse is that value investors often say, well, I’m a value investor, so I’m a long term investor.
2 [00:36:00] 一家以帳面價值 80%交易的企業，但該企業未來仍將以 5%或 4%的股東權益報酬率繼續投入資本，那麼以帳面價值 80%的價格買入，並非什麼好策略。換句話說，我認為價值投資人最大的錯誤，就是混淆了這點，他們常說：「嗯，我是價值投資人，所以我是長期投資人。」
2 [00:36:29] If you’re a long term investor, you need to be far more sensitive about the quality of the underlying business than if you’re a short term investor. The longer you own that business at eighty percent a book with a lousy return on equity, your return over time is going to approach the return on equity of the business. No matter what your starting prices, right? Isn’t that amazing? Or you could buy it at half a book, but if they are continuing to reinvest at four percent over time.
[00:36:29] 如果你是長期投資人，對於標的企業的品質，你得比短線投資人更加敏感。你持有這家公司的時間越長，如果它的股價淨值比是八成，但股東權益報酬率卻很差，那麼長期下來，你的報酬率就會趨近於這家公司的股東權益報酬率。不管你一開始買進的價格是多少，對吧？這不是很驚人嗎？或者你可以在股價淨值比五成時買進，但如果他們長期持續以百分之四的報酬率再投資。
2 [00:37:00] Your return is going to approach four percent. And similarly, if you buy a business that is reinvesting 100% of its earnings at a 20% return on equity, and you pay three times book for it, well that sounds like that can’t be a value right? And you know, three times book would be in that case, you know, you would add a 20% return on equity.
2 [00:37:00] 你的報酬率會趨近於百分之四。同樣地，如果你買進一家將百分之百盈餘再投資、且股東權益報酬率達百分之二十的企業，而你付出了三倍的帳面價值，聽起來這不可能是價值投資對吧？你知道，在這種情況下，三倍的帳面價值，嗯，你會得到百分之二十的股東權益報酬率。
2 [00:37:27] You’d be starting well, let’s say you paid four times book. Let’s make the math easy. You’d be start that would be mean you’re paying twenty times earnings and you’re getting a five percent yield on your cost, right?
2 [00:37:27] 你一開始的狀況，嗯，假設你付出了四倍的帳面價值。為了讓計算簡單點。這意味著你付出了二十倍的本益比，而你的成本收益率是百分之五，對吧？
2 [00:37:40] If you bought it a book, you’d be making twenty percent, but you paid four times book, so you’re making five. But if that company is reinvesting at twenty percent. THEN THE NEXT YEAR, YOU’RE GONNA MAKE FIVE PLUS TWENTY PERCENT OF FIVE, RIGHT? SO YOU’RE GONNA MAKE SIX, AND THE NEXT YEAR YOU’RE.
2 [00:37:40] 如果你用一倍帳面價值買進，報酬率會是二十％，但你付了四倍帳面價值，所以報酬率變成五％。但如果那家公司能以二十％的報酬率再投資，那麼到了第二年，你的報酬就會變成五％加上五％的二十％，對吧？所以你會賺到六％，再下一年則是——
2 [00:38:00] Make seven point two, then you’re going to make eight point five right? Then you’re going to make almost ten. So that business is going to be a compounding machine, even though it didn’t look like a value in the beginning.
2 [00:38:00] 賺到七．二％，然後是八．五％，對吧？接著會賺到將近十％。所以這門生意會是一部複利機器，即使它一開始看起來不像是價值投資。
2 [00:38:12] And the longer you own it, the more you’re going to make, the more your return will converge on that twenty percent so. Value investors can get trapped in cigar butts, in value traps by buying it at a cheap price and then holding this lousy business year after year after year, and that becomes a value trip. And value investors can actually end up buying an amazing value, but they had to wait three or four years before it became obvious what a great value it was.
2 [00:38:12] 而且你持有的時間越長，賺得就越多，你的報酬率會越來越趨近於那個二十％。所以，價值投資者可能會陷入煙屁股型的價值陷阱，用便宜的價格買進，然後年復一年地持有這家糟糕的企業，這就變成了價值陷阱。而價值投資者最終也可能買到極具價值的標的，但他們得等上三、四年，這筆投資的絕佳價值才會變得顯而易見。
1 [00:38:43] Yeah, because you want to focus on the business first, right? Buy a great business at a good price.
1 [00:38:43] 是啊，因為你得先專注在企業本身，對吧？用合理的價格買進一門好生意。
2 [00:38:48] Exactly. 2 [00:38:48] 沒錯。
1 [00:38:49] As opposed to a bad business at a cheap price.
1 [00:38:49] 相對於用便宜價格買到爛事業。
2 [00:38:52] Exactly. And the bad business at a cheap price is great if there’s a catalyst, right? If the company’s going to liquidate or. Private equity or new management’s going to come in and sort it out. And there are lots of things that can make that bad business at a great price, a good investment. But they take something happening, right? It’s like a vulture has to become, it has to go out and kill something. So yeah. Otherwise time where time is not your friend.
2 [00:38:52] 沒錯。而用便宜價格買到爛事業，如果有觸發轉變的催化劑，那就很棒，對吧？如果公司要清算，或是私募基金、新管理團隊要進來整頓。有很多因素可以讓那個用超棒價格買到的爛事業，變成一筆好投資。但這些都需要有事情發生，對吧？這就像禿鷹必須出動去獵殺一樣。所以，是的。否則，時間就不是你的朋友。
1 [00:39:21] So yeah, because it is a, it may be a bad business today, but you have visions of it becoming a good business. So you’re effectively buying a future good business today.
1 [00:39:21] 所以沒錯，因為它現在可能是個爛事業，但你預見它會變成一個好事業。所以你實際上是在今天買進一個未來的好事業。
2 [00:39:28] Yeah. Yes, but you need to then there needs to be a reason why that’s going to happen. Right. And that is, you know, it can’t happen. And we’ve played a part in it happening sometimes.
2 [00:39:28] 對，沒錯，但你得先有理由說明為什麼會發生這種情況。對吧。而且你知道，這不可能憑空發生。我們有時也在促成這件事上出了一份力。
2 [00:39:39] I mean, we we’re not known as activist investors, but we certainly actively engage with the companies that we’re invested in. And sometimes that means, you know, being involved in proxy voting in a way that’s hostile to management or talking to other, you know, owners. And getting their opinion and their perspective and sharing.
2 [00:39:39] 我的意思是，我們雖然不被視為積極介入的股東，但我們確實會主動與我們投資的公司互動。有時候這意味著，你知道的，以對管理層不友善的方式參與委託書投票，或是與其他股東溝通，了解他們的意見和觀點並分享交流。
1 [00:40:00] You touched on this a little bit earlier, but how do you think about stewardship when people are trusting you with their life savings rather than just capital on a spreadsheet?
1 [00:40:00] 你稍早稍微提到過這一點，但當人們託付給你的是他們畢生的積蓄，而不僅僅是試算表上的資金時，你如何看待受託人的責任？
2 [00:40:09] I think in my first year or two, I didn’t quite understand how important that was. And for me personally, but even to the business that we are, it was really taught to me more than anything by Tom Gaynor, who is. A man I admire greatly, and I don’t know if you’ve ever spoken with him.
2 [00:40:09] 我想在我入行頭一兩年，我並不太理解那有多重要。對我個人而言是如此，甚至對我們所從事的這個行業來說也是。這一點，主要是由湯姆·蓋納教會我的，他是一位我非常敬佩的人，不知道你是否曾和他交談過。
2 [00:40:28] I can’t. He’s the CEO of Markel. When I met him, he was just a crank in the investment department at Markel. We met in Omaha in the early nineties, maybe more than thirty years ago.
2 [00:40:28] 我沒辦法。他是 Markel 的執行長。我剛認識他時，他只是 Markel 投資部門裡的一個怪咖。我們是九〇年代初在奧馬哈認識的，大概三十多年前了。
2 [00:40:41] We just happened to be sitting by each other and struck up a conversation, and that conversation changed the arc of my life. I mean, Because I saw investing as a puzzle that we were always trying to solve. And all of the excitement that we talked about in the beginning about the businesses and living in the future.
2 [00:40:41] 我們當時剛好坐在彼此旁邊，就聊了起來，而那場對話改變了我人生的軌跡。我的意思是，因為我過去把投資看作一道我們總在試圖解開的謎題，以及我們一開始談到的所有關於企業和活在未來的那種興奮感。
2 [00:41:01] And I love that. But I didn’t see Wall Street as a high calling, right? Remember, I’d been in seminary, and so a lot of my friends who became priests would sort of, you know, tease me about that.
2 [00:41:01] 我很喜歡那樣。但我當時並不認為華爾街是個崇高的志業，對吧？別忘了，我讀過神學院，所以我很多成為神父的朋友總會拿這點來調侃我。
2 [00:41:12] Like, oh, how are things in Wall Street, you know? And I felt a little sheepish about that. And in that very first conversation with Tom, Tom said, you know, how do you like the work? And I said, well, the work’s great, but it’s not a high calling.
2 [00:41:12] 就像，喔，華爾街那邊怎麼樣啊，你知道嗎？我當時對這點感到有點不好意思。而在跟湯姆的第一次對話中，湯姆說，你知道嗎，你喜歡這份工作嗎？我說，嗯，工作本身很棒，但這並不是什麼崇高的志業。
2 [00:41:29] And Tom stopped me, and he said, ‘You are wrong. Stewardship is a biblical calling.’ I mean, it is a noble profession and a big responsibility. You’re not in the investing business; you’re in the stewardship profession, and that is a huge… that shift. Was really fun because, as I said, my grandfather mostly managed his own money. My father was so dispositionally sort of an analyst.
2 [00:41:29] 湯姆打斷了我，他說：「你錯了。受託管理是聖經中的一種召喚。」我的意思是，這是一份高尚的職業，也是一份重大的責任。你不是在投資業；你是在受託管理的行業，而那是個巨大的……這種轉變。真的很有趣，因為，就像我說的，我祖父主要是管理他自己的錢。而我父親的性情則比較像是一位分析師。
2 [00:42:00] And a portfolio manager that he didn’t really think about that side of the business. It was, you know, he had started as an institutional investor. And so he just the clients were sort of something over here. And Tom saying that was it was one of the three or four most important conversations in my professional life. And so the stewardship really changed where we thought, you know, remember in the early nineties.
2 [00:42:00] 他當時是一位基金經理，並未真正考慮到業務的那個面向。你知道，他最初是從機構投資人起家的，所以對他來說，客戶就像是另一個世界的事物。而湯姆說，那是我職業生涯中最重要的三四次對話之一。因此，這份受託責任感確實改變了我們的想法，你知道，回想在九〇年代初期。
2 [00:42:27] We had a lot of insider money, we were a small firm, and people would say, ‘Well, why don’t you just convert to a hedge fund?’ And you would make a lot more money, which is true. But I think our mindset was… And this is a little catty, but I felt like making rich people richer.
2 [00:42:27] 我們那時有很多內部資金，是一家小公司，人們會說：「你們為什麼不乾脆轉型成避險基金呢？這樣可以賺更多錢。」這確實沒錯。但我認為我們的心態是……這樣說可能有點刻薄，但我總覺得那只是在讓有錢人變得更富有。
2 [00:42:46] Didn’t feel to me as motivating as the idea that we have a school teacher’s life savings, and you know being able to send that kid to college really matters, and… And I felt like it. the way our firm has unfolded and of course we’re built in partnership with financial advisors and within that community the financial advisors that we have. Sort of had the opportunity to work with for thirty years are really the advisors that have their clients, they have their clients’ kids, they have their clients’ grandkids.
[00:42:46] 對我來說，這不像我們手握一位學校老師畢生積蓄那樣具有激勵作用，你知道，能夠送那個孩子上大學真的很重要，而且……我確實有這種感覺。我們公司的發展方式，當然是與理財顧問合作建立起來的，而在這個社群中，我們有幸合作了三十年的那些理財顧問，他們真的是那種服務客戶、客戶的孩子、甚至客戶的孫子的顧問。
2 [00:43:23] They haven’t taken a shortcut, and of course that’s also a community where there are people trying to pump and dump and all of that. And so I think our culture has reinforced the type of advisors that choose to work with us. Because the advisors that choose to work with us trust matters greatly.
[00:43:23] 他們沒有走捷徑，當然，那也是一個有人試圖炒作拉高出貨的圈子。所以我認為我們的文化強化了選擇與我們合作的顧問類型。因為選擇與我們合作的顧問，非常重視信任。
2 [00:43:43] It matters more than the hot dot and your alpha in this period and chasing whatever is great. So we have selected in to a group of advisors that’s especially, in my view, especially high quality and that focus on stewardship. It has helped create an ecosystem that I’m proud to be associated with.
2 [00:43:43] 這比追逐當下的熱門標的、這段期間的超額報酬，或是任何當紅的投資都更重要。因此，我們精選了一批在我看來品質特別優異、且專注於受託人責任的顧問。這幫助建立了一個讓我引以為傲、樂於與之為伍的生態系統。
2 [00:44:05] We’re not, you know, we don’t have salesmen out pumping, you know, whatever the hot product is. And one of the things we talk with advisors a lot about is the difference between a business and a profession. And you know, in a business, you sell a product to a customer and the number one, and you gauge your success by profits.
2 [00:44:05] 我們沒有業務員在外頭四處推銷當紅的產品。我們經常和顧問討論的一個重點，就是「生意」與「專業」之間的差別。你知道的，在做生意時，你是把產品賣給顧客，而衡量成功的首要標準就是利潤。
2 [00:44:27] And the number one rule of business is push the customer the way they want to go, right? In a profession, you provide a service to a client. And that sounds like semantics, except when you realize that the only way you can judge the quality of a professional versus a businessman is by referencing client outcomes.
2 [00:44:27] 做生意的首要法則，就是順著顧客想走的方向去引導他們，對吧？而在專業領域中，你是為客戶提供服務。這聽起來像是文字遊戲，但當你意識到，評斷一位專業人士與一個生意人優劣的唯一方式，就是參考客戶最終的成果時，你就會明白其中的差異。
2 [00:44:51] So if you want to know Alex, who’s the best doctor? You could say, well, show me their tax return. That’s. Not going to do it right, you have to say let me see the patient outcomes right? You want to know who’s the best teacher? You’d say well is it the teacher that’s paid the most right or is it I have to look at student outcomes? You know what about the best lawyer? I need to look at a client outcome and so.
[00:44:51] 所以，如果你想認識亞歷克斯，誰是最好的醫生？你可能會說，嗯，給我看他們的報稅單。那是不會有用，對吧，你得說，讓我看看病患的治療結果，對吧？你想知道誰是最好的老師？你會說，是薪水最高的老師嗎，還是說我得看學生的學習成果？你知道嗎，那最好的律師呢？我需要看客戶的案件結果，所以。
2 [00:45:19] The financial advisors, you know, portfolio managers, we’re in a profession and we need to be judged on how the end client does. And that doesn’t just mean our performance. It also means when they get in, when they get out. Do you have a good stretch and then market like crazy and get everybody in, you know, in a bad and so in a bad stretch, you know, do they hire high and fire low? So you end up with terrible dollar weighted returns.
[00:45:19] 財務顧問、基金經理人，我們身處的這個行業，最終必須以客戶的成果來評判。這不單指我們的績效表現，還包括他們何時進場、何時出場。你是否在市場表現亮眼時，吸引所有人一窩蜂地在高點投入，然後在市場低迷時，他們又認賠殺出？最終導致糟糕的資金加權報酬率。
2 [00:45:47] And so you know, a big part of our work with advisors is that idea of how well I’ll put it positively, how do we improve client behavior? How do we improve investor behavior? How do we save, you know, when I go to the doctor, you know, the doctor doesn’t say to me, you know what you should do, drink as much as you want, you know, he doesn’t tell me what I want to hear, right? He tells me things I don’t really want to hear, but they’re good for me.
2 [00:45:47] 所以你知道，我們與理財顧問合作的一大重點，就是這個概念——我正面一點來說——我們如何改善客戶行為？我們如何改善投資人行為？我們如何幫助他們，你知道，當我去看醫生時，醫生不會跟我說，你知道你該做什麼，想喝多少就喝多少，你知道，他不會說我想聽的話，對吧？他會告訴我一些我其實不太想聽，但對我好的事。
2 [00:46:15] And advisors, you know, in a sense are like doctors, but they also. Have play a big role in getting the person to exercise, getting the person to drink glass. In other words, behavior modification is an enormous part of the value they can have.
2 [00:46:15] 而理財顧問，你知道，某種程度上就像醫生，但他們也扮演著重要角色，促使那個人去運動、促使那個人喝一杯水。換句話說，行為修正正是他們所能提供的巨大價值中，非常重要的一部分。
2 [00:46:34] And so the partnership that we have with advisors is really built with that mindset. And so I don’t know how many financial their advisors are in the country, but we deal with a tiny sliver of them. And to me, it’s a sliver of them for whom stewardship, trust, and client outcomes is the reason they go to work every day versus, you know, the type. Car they drive or how much money they can extract from their clients, and so it makes it a lot more fun to come to work. So going all the way back to what you said about stewardship, it’s ended up being a wonderful feedback loop rather than just a you know a slogan.
2 [00:46:34] 所以我們與理財顧問之間的合作關係，其實就是建立在這種心態上。我不清楚國內到底有多少理財顧問，但我們只與其中極少數合作。對我來說，這少數人是把受託責任、信任和客戶成果當作每天工作的動力，而不是為了開什麼樣的車，或是能從客戶身上榨取多少錢，這讓上班變得有趣多了。所以，回歸到你剛才提到的受託責任，它最終形成了一個很棒的回饋循環，而不僅僅是一句口號。
1 [00:47:20] and it is ah it is an important mindset because it is a tremendous responsibility to. Manage other people’s assets, and I think what that inserts into your disposition and your view of the world is focused on the downside and thinking about resilience through time as opposed to momentum and chasing the hot dots and trying to maximize profits. It’s looking for asymmetric opportunities, which is a very different area focus.
1 [00:47:20] 這確實是一種很重要的心態，因為管理他人的資產是一項巨大的責任。我認為，這會融入你的性格和世界觀中，讓你專注於下行風險，思考如何長期保有韌性，而不是追逐動能、追捧熱門標的，並試圖將利潤最大化。這是在尋找不對稱的機會，是一個截然不同的關注焦點。
2 [00:47:49] Absolutely! And you know, it helps. And you know, if I had one. Piece of advice for investors, it’s you know we don’t invest in a single company where our. The incentives of management aren’t aligned with our incentives as owners or our goals as owners. And it is amazing to me how many strategies and portfolios are managed by people that don’t have their own money invested alongside their clients.
2 [00:47:49] 沒錯！而且你知道，這很有幫助。如果我有什麼要給投資人的建議，那就是我們投資的每一家公司，管理層的激勵措施都必須與我們作為股東的激勵措施或目標保持一致。讓我感到驚訝的是，有許多策略和投資組合的管理者，他們自己的資金並沒有和客戶的資金一起投入其中。
2 [00:48:17] And you know, that is a huge part of our ethos and our culture is that alignment because we know it matters when we look at the end companies we invested. We want to invest in owner operators. Right, because if we don’t, then what happens is if their incentives aren’t aligned, then what they’re interested in is getting the most compensation possible.
2 [00:48:17] 你知道，這種利益一致性是我們精神和文化的核心，因為我們知道，當我們審視所投資的最終公司時，這點至關重要。我們想投資的是經營者本身也是股東的企業。沒錯，因為如果我們不這麼做，那麼當他們的激勵措施不一致時，他們感興趣的就會是盡可能拿到最高的薪酬。
2 [00:48:39] That’s an expense for us, right? We don’t like that. But if their incentive is to create as much value as possible, then we’re aligned. So we want to look through it.
2 [00:48:39] 對我們來說，那可是一筆開銷，對吧？我們不喜歡那樣。但如果他們的激勵措施是盡可能創造最大的價值，那麼我們就利益一致了。所以我們希望看穿這一點。
2 [00:48:48] Are they owners of the business? Are they fellow owners? Are they standing alongside us? And it’s amazing in the investment profession how few people ask about that or talk about. about that or model that. We view that as a hugely important part of our commitment.
2 [00:48:48] 他們是企業的擁有者嗎？他們是與我們並肩的股東嗎？他們是否與我們站在同一陣線？在投資這個行業裡，令人驚訝的是，很少有人會去問這個問題、討論這件事，或是將其視為典範。我們認為，這是我們承諾中極為重要的一部分。
1 [00:49:05] When you look at today’s concentration in the large tech companies, what parallels do you see with the late 1990s? And is there anything that feels fundamentally different this time?
1 [00:49:05] 當你審視今日大型科技股的高度集中現象，你認為與 1990 年代末期有何相似之處？而這次是否有任何本質上的不同？
2 [00:49:16] I would say the similarities are bigger than the differences. You have a really exciting world-changing new technology in the form of AI, as you did then in the Internet. Amara’s Law is a wonderful way to conceptualize this part of a cycle.
2 [00:49:16] 我會說相似之處遠大於差異。如同當年網路帶來的變革，現在我們有 AI 這項令人振奮、足以改變世界的新科技。阿瑪拉定律（Amara's Law）是理解這類週期現象的絕佳概念。
2 [00:49:34] Amara said that new technologies are often overestimated in the short term and underestimated in the long term, and we are in the overestimating phase. And that’s very powerfully similar to the late nineties. And the reason it’s dangerous is everybody’s spending all of their time trying to pick the winners, who are the emerging winners.
2 [00:49:34] 阿瑪拉曾說，新科技在短期內往往被高估，長期卻被低估，而我們正處於高估的階段。這與九零年代末期的情況極為相似。之所以危險，是因為所有人都在傾盡全力，試圖押注誰會是脫穎而出的贏家。
2 [00:49:57] And in a fast. Emerging technology, that is a really dangerous game. And if I was just to look back at that period and say there were three sure winners in the internet that everybody knew them—they were called the Three Horsemen right? And it was Yahoo, AOL, and Cisco—and they were the dominant blue chip absolute—the Three Horsemen of the Internet—and so.
2 [00:49:57] 而在快速崛起的新興科技領域，這是非常危險的遊戲。若回顧那段時期，會發現當時公認的網路三大贏家，眾所周知——被稱為網路三騎士（Three Horsemen），對吧？就是雅虎（Yahoo）、美國線上（AOL）和思科（Cisco）——它們是當時絕對主導的藍籌股，所謂的網路三騎士——結果呢。
2 [00:50:24] You know, if you bought Amazon in 99, you were down 百 分 之 7 0 8 0 by 2 0 0 2. You still did fine if you bought it in 99, but if you also had Yahoo, AOL, Cisco, you were killed. And so our view is.
2 [00:50:24] 你知道嗎，如果你在 99 年買了亞馬遜，到 2002 年你會下跌百分之 70 到 80。但如果你在 99 年買入，最終表現還是不錯的，但如果你同時持有雅虎、美國線上、思科，那就慘賠了。所以我們的看法是。
2 [00:50:45] That’s the first point. All of the hype and attention is being spent trying to identify the emerging managers and driving them up to valuations where even good businesses have so much valuation risk built in, right? And the second.
2 [00:50:45] 這是第一點。所有的炒作和關注都花在試圖找出那些新興的基金經理人，並把他們的估值推高到一個地步，即使是好公司也內建了巨大的估值風險，對吧？然後第二點。
2 [00:51:00] Part of it is in that period of hype, people lose track of everything else. So you get a narrower and narrower market. And of course in ninety-nine if you predicted the bear market that was coming and went to cash, that was a mistake actually.
2 [00:51:00] 部分原因在於，在那段炒作期間，人們忽略了其他所有東西。所以你會看到市場越來越集中。當然，在九九年，如果你預測到熊市即將來臨並轉為現金，那其實是個錯誤。
2 [00:51:17] You know, I think in the year two thousand the market was down I don’t know nine percent or something like that. YOU KNOW, A LOT OF VALUE MANAGERS INCLUDING US WERE UP LIKE DOUBLE DIGITS. YOU KNOW, I MEAN MAYBE YOU WERE UP, YOU KNOW, NINE.
2 [00:51:17] 你知道嗎，我記得在兩千年，市場下跌了大概百分之九左右吧。你知道嗎，很多價值型基金經理人，包括我們在內，報酬率都有兩位數的成長。你知道嗎，我的意思是，也許你的漲幅是百分之九左右。
2 [00:51:31] WE HAD MANAGERS WE ADMIRE OAKMARK, YOU KNOW, THEY WERE UP FIFTEEN, EIGHTEEN, TWENTY PERCENT. AND BY THE WAY, THEY HAD A GREAT FIVE YEAR STRETCH, SO WE HAD DECENT RETURNS FOR THAT FIVE YEARS FROM MARCH OF TWO THOUSAND. FOR.
2 [00:51:31] 我們有一些我們很欣賞的基金經理人，像是橡樹基金（Oakmark），你知道，他們的漲幅達到十五%、十八%、二十%。而且順帶一提，他們有過一段很棒的五年表現，所以從兩千年三月開始的那五年，我們的報酬率還算不錯。
2 [00:51:47] And so it is, that’s the second element of a market like this is that it gets so narrow that there’s a lot of good durable businesses that are considered boring and are sort of overlooked, so. Avoiding the hype, then trying to look and see what’s been overlooked. And the third thing is recognizing if the trend is real, which we believe absolutely it is.
2 [00:51:47] 所以就是這樣，這是像這樣市場的第二個要素，它會變得非常狹隘，以至於有許多優質、穩健的企業被認為很無趣，並且有點被忽略了，所以。避開那些炒作，然後試著去觀察、找出那些被忽略的標的。而第三件事，就是要認知到這個趨勢是否為真，而我們絕對相信它是真的。
2 [00:52:12] I mean, AI is a real powerful technology. Are there other ways to invest in it that will be beneficiaries of the technology without the risk? So instead of just focusing on the emerging winners, can you focus on the enablers?
2 [00:52:12] 我的意思是，AI 確實是一項非常強大的技術。有沒有其他投資方式，能夠受惠於這項技術，又不用承擔那麼高的風險？也就是說，與其只關注那些新崛起的贏家，能不能把重點放在那些賦能者身上？
2 [00:52:28] What are the companies that will enable this technology today? You can think of things like Applied Materials or Taiwan Semiconductor or Samsung or Texas Instruments and you know… But you can also think of companies like natural gas companies or copper companies, you know. These are the companies that will make a lot of money whether or not the returns on the capital being spent are good or not.
[00:52:28] 哪些公司現在就能實現這項技術？你可以想到像應用材料、台積電、三星或德州儀器這類公司，還有你知道的……但你也可以想到像天然氣公司或銅礦公司這類企業。無論投入資本的回報率好壞與否，這些公司都會賺進大把鈔票。
2 [00:52:54] So they’re enablers, then they’re users, right? The users of the technology. So you know, in the internet, who were the users that were able to benefit from this? You know, enormously powerful new technology.
2 [00:52:54] 所以他們是先成為賦能者，然後才成為使用者，對吧？技術的使用者。那麼你知道，在網際網路時代，哪些使用者能夠從中受益呢？這項極其強大的新技術。
2 [00:53:08] Right? Think of Netflix as a dramatic example. Pivot their whole model to being able to deliver through the internet instead of sending DVDs everywhere.
2 [00:53:08] 對吧？想想 Netflix 這個戲劇性的例子。他們將整個商業模式轉向透過網路傳輸，而不是到處寄送 DVD。
2 [00:53:19] Well, think about the users of AI. You know, who are the obvious winners? Well, it’s going to be companies that have enormous data sets. That have labor costs that easily lend themselves to providing better service at a lower price using AI that have the appropriate tech stack that have managements that are willing to cross that chasm.
2 [00:53:19] 想想人工智慧的使用者。你知道，誰是顯而易見的贏家？嗯，將會是那些擁有龐大數據集的公司。那些勞動成本結構，很容易就能利用人工智慧，以更低的價格提供更優質服務的公司，它們具備合適的技術堆疊，而且管理層願意跨越那道鴻溝。
2 [00:53:41] So an example that jumps to the top of our list is Capital One Financial, right? Capital One is in the top ten companies of all companies in the world for AI patents. And machine learning patents, by some measures they’re in the top five, which is amazing.
2 [00:53:41] 所以，我們名單上最突出的一個例子就是第一資本金融公司（Capital One Financial），對吧？第一資本在全球所有公司中，擁有的人工智慧專利數量排名前十。而機器學習專利，根據某些衡量標準，他們甚至排在前五名，這相當驚人。
2 [00:53:59] It’s hard to get a. Clear data on that, but they are certainly in the top 10. And you know, it’s… it is that is a data company and AI is going to be fabulous for them.
2 [00:53:59] 這方面的明確數據很難取得，但他們肯定排在前十名。而且你知道，這是一家數據公司，人工智慧對他們來說將會非常有利。
2 [00:54:11] So they’re the users of the Tao. Then there’s a category that mattered again with the internet, which was you know who are the indifferent or the insulated. Right, who are the protected? And that’s the famous Jeff Bezos question.
2 [00:54:11] 所以他們是道的使用者。接著又出現了一個在網路時代同樣重要的類別，也就是那些無關緊要或受到隔離保護的對象。對吧，誰是受到保護的？這就是傑夫·貝佐斯那個著名的問題。
2 [00:54:27] People always ask me what’s going to change. They ought ask me what’s not going to change. That’s also a very important question. And you know Tyson chicken not going to change that much, right? AI neither here nor there for their business raising chickens, you know, raising protein. I guess makes it sound a little more neutral. And then the last category in a time of change like this that we can go back to the late nineties and think about are who are the walking dead, who’s the Kodak of this era, you know, who are the newspaper companies where the new technology is just.
[00:54:27] 大家總是問我什麼會改變。他們應該問我什麼不會改變。這也是一個非常重要的問題。你知道泰森食品的雞肉業務不會有太大變化，對吧？人工智慧對他們養雞、生產蛋白質的業務來說，既不重要也無關緊要。我想這樣說聽起來稍微中立一點。然後最後一類，在像這樣的變革時代，我們可以回想九零年代末期，想想誰是行屍走肉，誰是這個時代的柯達，你知道，哪些報紙公司會因為新科技而直接被淘汰。
2 [00:55:00] So much better, and this is where I think index investors are in for a tough surprise because I think that indexes adapt more slowly even than they did, but now that the indexes might be 50 to 70%, you’re going to go down with the ship. And I’ll give you a good example from back then: I mean Kodak. I think ten million, ten million digital cameras had been sold when digital camera sales crossed film camera sales.
[00:55:00] 好太多了，而這正是我認為指數投資人將會面臨嚴峻考驗的地方，因為我認為指數的調整速度甚至比以往更慢，但現在指數權重可能高達五到七成，你就會跟著一起沉船。我舉個當時的好例子：我說的是柯達。我記得當數位相機的銷售量超越底片相機時，數位相機已經賣出了一千萬台。
2 [00:55:33] So ten million people knew that film was dead. Right, I’m a photographer. The first time you used a digital camera, you knew you were never going back. In fact, it wasn’t even close. It was so crazy to go and buy this canister of film and you know take 36 pictures and then put it back in the canister and drive to the store and drop it off and drive home, and then three days later drive to the store.
[00:55:33] 所以有一千萬人知道底片已經玩完了。對吧，我是個攝影師。你第一次用數位相機的時候，就知道自己再也回不去了。事實上，根本連比都不用比。跑去買一捲底片，拍三十六張照片，然後把它放回罐子裡，開車去店裡送洗，再開車回家，三天後再開車去店裡拿，這整件事真的太瘋狂了。
2 [00:56:00] Pick it up，and then you see your kids’ eyes are closed，I got dang it，you know。And so if you were looking for a house or a car or a job，you know，I got my job at State Street Bank from the classified section of the Boston Globe，like going through circling jobs that I could apply for，and State Street was hiring into their accounting program。If you use that online search, you realized it was crazy the old system of like reading you know dishwasher wanted no you know trying to find the the end or the zip code you’re interested in or the type of car so but with ten million.
[00:56:00] 拿起書本，然後你看到孩子們眼睛都閉上了，我心想，唉，真是的，你知道的。所以，如果你正在找房子、車子或工作，你知道嗎，我當年在道富銀行的工作，就是從《波士頓環球報》的分類廣告欄裡找到的，就像是一頁頁翻，圈出我能應徵的職缺，當時道富銀行正在招募會計培訓計畫的人員。如果你用那種線上搜尋，就會發現舊系統有多瘋狂，像是讀著「徵洗碗工」之類的廣告，不對，你知道的，試著找到你感興趣的區域郵遞區號，或是想要的車款類型，但現在有一千萬筆資料可以搜尋。
2 [00:56:43] Digital camera sold Kodak was still in the top third of the S&P 500. And you just, you know, eight year, you knew it was sinking. Uh, you didn’t know the rate. Uh, you knew they had a film business for movies.
2 [00:56:43] 數位相機問世時，柯達仍在標普 500 指數中名列前三分之一。而你很清楚，八年內，你就知道它正在走下坡。呃，你不知道下滑的速度。呃，你知道他們還有電影底片業務。
2 [00:57:00] That was pretty profitable, but you could just… So the Walking Dead and I think the indexes and momentum investors and illiquid strategies, those three are going to be the three horsemen of the apocalypse. I think in the next five years, I think people have underestimated how valuable liquidity is. They’ve locked themselves up in private equity, private credit, all of these pension plans, sovereign wealth funds.
[00:57:00] 那確實相當有利可圖，但你只能……所以《陰屍路》，還有我認為指數型投資、動能投資者，以及流動性差的策略，這三者將成為末日啟示錄的三騎士。我認為在未來五年內，人們低估了流動性的價值有多高。他們把自己鎖在私募股權、私募信貸，以及所有這些退休金計畫、主權財富基金裡。
2 [00:57:27] And they can’t change their mind at a time when the world is changing fast. They’re locked up. So I think that’s very dangerous. I think momentum strategies that are based on this is what worked in the past. So it should keep working dividend strategies. This company’s paid a dividend for forty years, fifty years.
2 [00:57:27] 而且在世界快速變遷的時候，他們無法改變心意。他們被鎖死了。所以我認為這非常危險。我認為那些基於過去有效方法的動能策略，就認為它應該繼續有效，還有股息策略也是。這家公司已經發放股息四十年、五十年了。
2 [00:57:46] I feel safe. Don’t feel safe in times of change, right? Kodak had paid a dividend for forty or fifty years. It can change fast, so those are all back in the index. These are backward-looking. Strategies and they’re slow to adapt when the world changes.
2 [00:57:46] 我覺得很安全。在變革的時代，千萬別覺得安全，對吧？柯達也曾發放了四、五十年的股息。情況可能瞬息萬變，所以這些全都回歸到指數裡。這些都是回顧型的策略，當世界改變時，它們適應得很慢。
2 [00:58:04] It’s an area where fundamental analysis going all the way back Alex to where we started with my grandfather. We’re looking through at the business and can be a huge advantage. It’s not an advantage when everything is driven by the momentum of the past, but when you get transition. THEN BEING ANCHORED TO THE PAST CAN BE VERY DANGEROUS, SO I THINK THE DIVIDEND STRATEGIES, THE LIQUID STRATEGIES, THE MOMENTUM STRATEGIES, THE PASSIVE STRATEGIES… AH! ALL COULD BE VERY DISADVANTAGED IN THE WAY WE SEE THE WORLD UNFOLDING IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS.
2 [00:58:04] 這正是基本面分析能發揮巨大優勢的領域，一路追溯到亞歷克斯，回到我祖父起家的那個起點。我們透徹審視這門生意，這可以是一個巨大的優勢。當一切都被過去的動能驅動時，這算不上優勢，但當你遇到轉型期時，錨定在過去可能會非常危險，所以我認為股息策略、流動性策略、動能策略、被動策略……啊！在我們預見未來五年世界發展的方式中，這些策略都可能處於非常不利的地位。
1 [00:58:38] SERVING ON THE BOARD OF BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY, WHAT HAVE YOU LEARNED FIRSTHAND ABOUT WARREN BUFFETT’S AND CHARLIE MUNGER’S APPROACH THAT YOU FEEL MIGHT BE COMMONLY MIS.
1 [00:58:38] 在波克夏海瑟威董事會任職期間，關於華倫．巴菲特和查理．蒙格的處事方法，您有哪些第一手觀察到的見解，是您認為外界普遍存在誤解的？
2 [00:58:49] Well, what I’d say is what’s so dramatic about Berkshire has been the culture of transparency. And you know, I’ve been going to Berkshire annual meetings since like 1980. Nine or ninety，I’ve read every annual report and the partnership letters before that。The answer is not much is different on the inside than the outside.
2 [00:58:49] 嗯，我想說的是，波克夏最引人注目的地方，就是它的透明文化。你知道，我大概從 1980 或 1990 年就開始參加波克夏的股東會，我讀過每一份年報，還有在那之前的合夥事業信件。答案是，內部實際情況和外界看到的，其實沒有太大差別。
1 [00:59:11] because they’re so transparent。
1 [00:59:11] 因為他們太透明了。
2 [00:59:12] Yeah，you know the word integrity，it comes from the Latin integrity，it is wholeness。Right, it’s wholeness. There’s not it, it’s not one thing over here and one thing over here.
2 [00:59:12] 是啊，你知道「誠信」這個詞，源自拉丁文的 integrity，意思是完整。對吧，就是完整性。不是這邊一套、那邊一套。
2 [00:59:27] There is enormous integrity in that organization. And so in that sense, I would have been shocked if it, if I’d seen anything different on the inside. I would say a nuanced difference.
2 [00:59:27] 那個組織內部有著極高的誠信。所以從這個角度來說，如果我在內部看到任何不同的情況，我才會感到震驚。我會說，有個微妙的差異。
2 [00:59:42] Is the way in which that firm and it influences how we think. There’s two pillars that are very central, and one is the idea that people have their life savings invested there. That’s been a part of Warren and Charlie’s ethos.
2 [00:59:42] 就是那家公司運作的方式，以及它如何影響我們的思考。有兩個非常核心的支柱，其中一個是，人們把畢生積蓄都投資在那裡。這一直是華倫和查理精神的一部分。
2 [01:00:00] From the beginning, that their friends and neighbors trusted them, that Berkshire represents the lion’s share of their net worth and their assets, and they have a duty to be protective of that far more so than the duty to outperform an index or whatever. That’s job one, and goes back to stewardship. Yeah, and you feel that very much on the inside as well.
2 [01:00:00] 打從一開始，他們的朋友和鄰居就信任他們，波克夏代表了他們絕大部分的淨資產和財富，他們有責任保護這些資產，這份責任遠比超越某個指數或其他什麼的更重要。這是首要之務，回歸到受託人責任的本質。沒錯，你在內部也能深刻感受到這一點。
2 [01:00:22] This and it relates to the second part. which is you can read every annual report, go to every annual meeting, and you will have an enormous sense of how word thinks about risk. I would say the only nuanced difference I would say from the inside is he really thinks about risk, and he thinks about risk in ways he imagines things happening that are from a common perception point of view would be unthinkable.
2 [01:00:22] 這也連結到第二部分，你可以閱讀每一份年報、參加每一次股東會，你會深刻感受到巴菲特如何看待風險。我會說，從內部來看，唯一細微的差別在於，他確實非常認真思考風險，而且他思考風險的方式，是去想像那些從一般認知角度來看，根本難以想像會發生的事情。
2 [01:00:54] But of course, if you even just look back at our life, lots of unthinkable things have happened. Right, I mean, it’s the norm. It’s the norm COVID, the financial crisis, the tech collapse, the oil embargo, the you know the Cuban missile crisis Vietnam impeachments and you know… And I think everybody’s so interested.
[01:00:54] 但當然，如果你回顧我們的人生，許多難以想像的事情都發生過。對吧，我的意思是，這其實是常態。新冠肺炎、金融危機、科技泡沫破裂、石油禁運、古巴飛彈危機、越戰、彈劾案等等……這些都是常態。而我認為大家都對此非常感興趣。
2 [01:01:20] I probably have so no, I don’t see it right in breach, but you know, I think everybody’s been interested reading the book about 1929. But somehow when you’re out of that moment of chaos, people forget it. It’s what you said.
[01:01:20] 我大概有，所以沒有，我沒看到它直接違反，但你知道，我想每個人都對閱讀關於 1929 年的書感興趣。但不知怎的，當你脫離那個混亂的時刻，人們就忘了。就像你說的。
2 [01:01:34] People just somehow it doesn’t stick in their minds. And it really does with Warren. He really thinks about what if capital markets were closed for six months.
2 [01:01:34] 人們不知怎地，就是記不住這個道理。但華倫確實銘記在心。他會認真思考，如果資本市場關閉六個月會怎樣。
2 [01:01:43] What if, you know, we need to be able to make payroll. We need to make sure that we’re on the other side. We need to be an asset to the country. In a time like that, we can’t be somebody that needs a bailout. And he thinks about that. In a profoundly pervasive way, and I think I would have expected it, but I would say that’s just a difference of nuance that I really just struck by.
2 [01:01:43] 如果，你知道，我們必須有能力支付薪資。我們必須確保自己能安然度過。我們必須成為國家的資產。在那樣的時刻，我們不能是那種需要紓困的對象。他會思考這一點，以一種極為深刻且無所不包的方式。我想我原本就預期他會這麼想，但我得說，這真的只是個細微的差別，卻讓我印象極為深刻。
1 [01:02:13] So I know Charlie Munger was an important mentor to you. What lesson from him most deeply shaped how you think about investing?
1 [01:02:13] 我知道查理·蒙格是你重要的導師。他教給你的哪一課，最深遠地塑造了你對投資的思考方式？
2 [01:02:21] Well, actually, I’ll do this. Let me see if I can turn this. There, so just so you can see Charlie behind me, and he’s there for a psychological reason. It’s not just an homage. He had been a bust of Ben Franklin in his office, and he said it’s useful to have the people you wouldn’t want to disappoint looking over your shoulder.
2 [01:02:21] 嗯，其實我來調整一下。讓我看看能不能把這個轉過來。好了，這樣你們就能看到我身後的查理，他擺在那裡是有心理層面的用意，不單單只是致敬。他辦公室裡原本放的是班·富蘭克林的半身像，他說，讓那些你不想辜負的人在你身後看著你，是很有用的。
2 [01:02:43] And uh uh the picture out there is is is my grandfather in the Navy, and and you know there’s sense and that’s a useful thing, but well it I really can’t to distill down Charlie is is hard. I think all of the things we’ve talked about stewardship and rationality certainly are huge part to the idea of constant learning, the willingness to really take an unpopular stand. I think the ability to bring so many models to bear in your thinking about people and.
2 [01:02:43] 還有，呃，那邊那張照片是我祖父在海軍服役時拍的，你知道，那有種傳承的意義，這確實很有用，但，嗯，我實在很難濃縮出查理的智慧，這太難了。我想我們談過的所有關於受託人責任和理性的特質，無疑是其中很大的一部分，還有持續學習的理念、願意真正採取不受歡迎立場的勇氣。我認為，能夠運用如此多元的思維模型來思考人和事，這種能力……
2 [01:03:24] To just maintain this enormous equanimity, and I think one of the things maybe that is most interesting to me about Charlie is he really didn’t care at all what anybody else thought, but he cared deeply about doing the right thing, and that meant that sometimes people thought he was rude, or sometimes people thought he was mean, or sometimes they thought he was stubborn. But he was his own most fierce critic, he was his own grader, and most people if they take a self-graded exam score pretty well, yeah not. Charlie，and there’s something so admirable about the center that he holds。
[01:03:24] 就只是為了維持這份巨大的平靜，而我認為關於查理最令我感興趣的一點，或許是他真的完全不在乎別人怎麼想，但他極度在乎做正確的事，這意味著有時人們覺得他粗魯，有時覺得他刻薄，有時又覺得他固執。但他對自己是最嚴厲的批評者，他是自己的評分者，而大多數人如果給自己打分，通常都打得不錯，對吧，但查理不是。他堅守的那個核心，有種令人非常敬佩的特質。
2 [01:04:07] I mentioned the arc of my life that changed with Tom Gaynor，and Charlie was the other，those two where a single conversation my life would have gone very differently if I hadn’t just had this chance opportunity to meet Charlie when I was young and. I was trying to sell him a business which he had no interest in, but it… you know, at the end of that meeting, he said, ‘you know, if you find yourself in Los Angeles, I’ll make time to see you.’ And I just started these routine pilgrimages, you know, every month or two, you know, just to spend time with him.
[01:04:07] 我提過我人生的轉捩點，一次是遇到湯姆．蓋納，另一次就是查理。這兩個人，只要其中一次對話沒有發生，我的人生就會截然不同。要不是我年輕時有那個偶然的機會遇見查理，當時我試著賣一門他根本沒興趣的生意給他，但那次會面結束時，他說：「如果你有機會來洛杉磯，我會抽空見你。」於是我就開始了這種例行的朝聖之旅，大概每一、兩個月就去一次，就只是為了跟他相處。
1 [01:04:45] You often emphasize patience, and we have today… did you see it as a competitive advantage in a world? That seems to be built around immediate gratification.
[01:04:45] 你經常強調耐心，而我們今天所處的世界……你是否將其視為一種競爭優勢？這個世界似乎都圍繞著即時滿足在運轉。
2 [01:04:55] Oh, absolutely, absolutely. The quick feedback people. But it’s dangerous too because, you know, it’s given rise to a type of activist investor that is hugely destructive, value destructive to long term investing.
2 [01:04:55] 喔，絕對是，絕對是。那種快速獲得回饋的人們。但這也很危險，因為，你知道，它催生了一種對長期投資極具破壞性、會摧毀價值的激進投資人類型。
2 [01:05:11] And I really resent it, right? The activist investor who gets involved who says this company, you know, we talked about the low return on equity company that continues to pour money in. You know，an activist investor that’s involved in that situation and says we need to improve this business，we need to be more disciplined。
2 [01:05:11] 而且我真的很反感這種情況，對吧？那種介入的激進投資人會說，這家公司，你知道，我們談到的那種股東權益報酬率很低、卻還持續投入資金的公司。你知道，在那種情況下介入的激進投資人會說，我們需要改善這項業務，我們需要更有紀律。
2 [01:05:30] Fabulous, that’s great! But the ones that are there to sort of get a quick sugar high at the expense of long-term investing—I’ve seen it over and over. If activists had been able to get into Amazon in 2002, they would have fired Jeff; they would have you know kept the company focused only on books.
[01:05:30] 太棒了，這真是太好了！但那些為了追求短期快感而犧牲長期投資的人——我已經看過太多次了。如果激進投資者在 2002 年就能介入亞馬遜，他們早就把傑夫給炒了；他們會你知道的，讓公司只專注在賣書上。
2 [01:05:53] If activist investors had gotten into Meta four years ago. They would have shut down all the work on wearables. Would have shut down the work on you know the metaverse.
2 [01:05:53] 如果激進投資人在四年前介入 Meta，他們早就會關閉所有穿戴式裝置的研發工作，也會終止你所謂的元宇宙相關計畫。
2 [01:06:03] They probably would have voted down the acquisition of Instagram, and yet that is a company where they are making investments for a decade or longer ahead because that’s how the owners think. I spent last week I was down in Texas and I visited with the now retired CEO of Texas Instruments Rich Templeton. Texas Instruments became one of our largest positions in the early 2000s.
2 [01:06:03]他們當時很可能會投票反對收購 Instagram，然而這卻是一家他們願意投資十年甚至更久的公司，因為這就是經營者的思維方式。上週我去了德州，拜訪了現已退休的德州儀器前執行長 Rich Templeton。德州儀器在 2000 年代初期成為我們持股比重最高的標的之一。
2 [01:06:28] When Rich became the CEO, and we had known the company before, the company got really hyper overvalued in the year 2000 as part of that Internet wave. It went down seven years later; it was still below what it had traded for then. And seven years after Rich became head Wall Street hated it. You’d gone nowhere for seven years. We had been buying year after year after year because they were.
[01:06:28] 當 Rich 接任執行長時，我們之前就認識這家公司。這間公司在 2000 年網路浪潮中，股價被極度地過度高估。七年後股價下跌，甚至還低於當時的交易價格。而在 Rich 掌舵七年後，華爾街對它嗤之以鼻。這七年來股價毫無起色。我們之所以年復一年持續買進，正是因為他們……
2 [01:07:00] MAK ENORMO CH in their B businessESS that W going to CRE huge value, AND it WAS’t’ clear in the earningsNING, BECSE ES essentiallyALLY what THEY W doingING was gettingT OUT OF the CAP capital intensive partsTS OF MAN manufacturingACTING S semiconduuUR and FO focusing on this businessESS called analogOG, BUT you KNOW, thinkINK OF themM as AS low- priced chips THAT are I important to customersOM, but YOU needED to makeAKE A lot OF themM. And they have a long life in the product. They go into toasters and phones and everything anyway.
[01:07:00] 他們在 B 業務上進行了巨大變革，這將創造極大價值，但從財報中並不明顯，因為他們本質上是在退出半導體製造中資本密集的部分，轉而專注於名為類比晶片的業務。你可以把這些晶片想成是對客戶很重要、但價格低廉的晶片，而且需要大量生產。這些產品的生命週期很長，會用在烤麵包機、手機等各種東西上。
2 [01:07:32] But the company was still running a huge amount of depreciation from when they had all these expensive factories through their income statement. So it didn’t look like they were earning a lot of money. They were walking away from revenue as they got out of those businesses. And yet the cash was pouring in because their capital spending had gone way down, and the core of the business was so good. So anyway, nothing for seven years.
2 [01:07:32] 但這家公司當時的損益表上，仍因過去那些昂貴工廠而持續認列巨額折舊費用。所以帳面上看起來，他們好像沒賺什麼錢。隨著他們退出那些業務，營收也跟著縮水。然而，由於資本支出大幅下降，加上核心業務體質極佳，現金反而源源不絕地流入。總之，就這樣沉寂了七年。
2 [01:07:57] If an activist had gotten in there, And screwed that up and said we’re going to start building these big factories now, you know we’re going to go back to chasing unprofitable revenue, we’re going to go back to being in iPhones even though we don’t make any money and blah blah blah. And instead we got a triple in the stock in about fourteen months because it took along now I was with Rich recently. And in a way, they’re investing for the next 10 years in the opposite way.
2 [01:07:57] 如果當時有維權投資者介入，把事情搞砸，說我們現在要開始蓋這些大工廠，你知道的，我們要回頭去追逐那些不賺錢的營收，我們要重新回去做 iPhone 的生意，即使根本沒賺到錢等等之類的。結果相反，我們反而在大概十四個月內，看到股價翻了三倍，因為這花了很長一段時間……我最近才和 Rich 碰面。而就某方面來說，他們現在正用完全相反的方式，為未來十年進行投資佈局。
2 [01:08:26] He said everybody got so enamored of outsourcing manufacturing to Taiwan and everywhere else. He said I think we need to build our own factories. This was five years ago.
2 [01:08:26] 他說，大家都太著迷於把製造外包到台灣和其他地方了。他說，我認為我們需要建立自己的工廠。這可是五年前的事了。
2 [01:08:37] We need to build chip factories, and we’re going to build them in the US, and we are also at the same time going to change our distribution from going through the channel to going direct to customers. That meant that a lot of the channel was going to punish them and kick them out, and they were going to take enormous short-term pain. They were going to spend an enormous amount of capital.
2 [01:08:37] 我們需要蓋晶片廠，而且要在美國本土興建，同時我們也要改變經銷模式，從透過通路商轉為直接供貨給客戶。這意味著許多通路商會因此懲罰他們、把他們踢出局，而他們將承受巨大的短期陣痛，還得投入極為龐大的資金。
2 [01:09:00] Bu pack and everybody said, what are you doing? you idiots? You’re SU supposed to be capital LI, and you’re you’re givingIV up all this revenue, and we knew RICH and he’s retired now. but you know, I can… I will BET a large, well I am betting a large sum of money. That over the next ten years, I don’t know when it’ll happen that all of these investments they made will pay off.
2 [01:09:00] 但帕克和所有人都說，你們在搞什麼？你們這群白癡？你們理應是輕資產的公司，卻要放棄這麼多營收。我們認識瑞奇，他現在已經退休了。但你知道嗎，我可以……我敢押注一大筆錢，對，我正押下一大筆錢，賭在未來十年內，我不知道何時會發生，但他們所做的這些投資終將獲得回報。
2 [01:09:25] Whereas if an activist came in and said, ‘In fact, an activist did come in there and said, Oh you’ve got to stop this capital spending, you’ve got to you know go back to using the channel,’ and that is hugely destructive to long term value. So I have a really… I hate what activist investing has become. It’s become short term.
[01:09:25] 然而，如果有激進投資者介入並說：『事實上，確實有激進投資者介入那裡，說，哦，你必須停止這些資本支出，你必須回到使用原有通路，』這對長期價值極具破壞性。所以我真的……我對激進投資主義的現狀感到厭惡。它已經變得短視近利。
2 [01:09:45] It’s become, you know, let’s there were some activists got involved in Markel. We were talking about Tom Gaynor. It’s insane what they were recommending to get a short term fix that they split up this incredible three engines they have that.
[01:09:45] 這已經演變成，你知道的，有一些激進投資者涉入了 Markel。我們之前聊到 Tom Gaynor。他們所建議的那些短期解方簡直荒謬，竟要拆散他們所擁有的那三個絕佳引擎。
2 [01:10:00] Enormous stability, they built up this wonderful portfolio of private companies, and they’re like you should sell those companies to private equity because you could get a good price for them. And it’s like well if we could get a good price for them, it’s because they’re probably undervalued in here. We are judging those business because of the earnings they contribute, the stability they create with our insurance operations.
2 [01:10:00] 極其穩固，他們建立了這個出色的私人公司投資組合，然後他們說你應該把這些公司賣給私募股權，因為你可以賣個好價錢。但這就像，如果我們能賣個好價錢，那是因為它們在這裡可能被低估了。我們評估這些事業，是看它們貢獻的盈餘，以及它們為我們保險業務帶來的穩定性。
2 [01:10:22] And this activist is trying to get them to split up. It’s insane. And it would be hugely destructive, but there’s no question if they announce they were going to split up, the stock would go up 20 for a short period of time, and long-term investors would be screwed over the long term. And that sugar high is a really poisonous part of capitalism that goes under the guise of activism, but is actually undermining to long-term shareholder returns.
2 [01:10:22] 而這位維權投資者正試圖迫使他們分拆公司，這簡直荒謬至極。此舉將造成極大的破壞，但毫無疑問，如果他們宣布分拆，股價短期內會上漲 20%，而長期投資者最終將蒙受巨大損失。這種短暫的亢奮感，是資本主義中極具毒害的一部分，它打著維權行動的幌子，實際上卻在損害長期股東回報。
1 [01:10:49] Well, Chris, this has been a really fun conversation. I appreciate you sharing all your insights, your experience, and describing the way you view investing. And being a steward for the assets. So I really appreciate that. And you know, I really appreciate you joining us.
1 [01:10:49] 克里斯，這次對談真的非常愉快。感謝你分享所有的洞見、經驗，以及闡述你如何看待投資，還有作為資產管理者的角色。我由衷地感謝這一切。也很感謝你願意加入我們的節目。
2 [01:11:05] Oh, Alex, thank you so much. It’s an enormous pleasure to be with you.
2 [01:11:05] 噢，Alex，非常感謝你。能和你對談真是莫大的榮幸。
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得道大腦摘要重點
录音总结
本次是Insightful Investor播客对Davis Advisors主席、投资组合经理Chris Davis的访谈，Chris分享了家族投资传承、价值投资理念、对当前AI投资热潮的观点，以及从巴菲特、芒格身上学到的投资智慧，强调长期主义、 stewardship（受托责任）和风险控制的重要性。
Chris Davis的投资职业发展路径
职业选择背景：出生在投资世家，祖父与父亲都热爱投资，从小被要求掌握金融知识，家庭旅行途中会安排参观企业，很早就建立了“买股票就是买企业”的认知。
早期职业规划：原本计划成为兽医，之后对教学产生兴趣，还进入神学院学习，申请CIA分析师岗位被拒后，才确定热爱研究与投资。
专业能力积累：大学专业为哲学与神学，没有MBA或会计学位，通过道富银行的培训项目成为基金会计，学习了投资与商业的专业语言，正式进入投资行业。
Davis Advisors的家族创立历史
祖父的起步经历：祖父拥有国际关系博士学位，原本计划进入国务院，杜威竞选总统失败后，被任命为纽约州保险副监管官。
创始人的核心理论：1948年在监管人寿保险行业时，发现当时会计准则无法体现企业真实价值，最早提出了所有者收益的概念，判断快速增长的人寿保险公司实际创造了大量价值。
公司发展与理念传承：祖父1948年从妻子家族借了10万美元创立公司，去世时将资产增值到8亿美元并全部捐给慈善；父亲之后拓展到金融以外的行业，创立独立的Davis Advisors，逐步合并了祖父的公司，传承了价值投资的核心原则。
Davis家族的投资与生活价值观
节俭的生活方式：祖父与父亲都是极度节俭的价值投资者，不购买私人飞机、游艇或豪宅，遵循“用光、穿坏、凑合或者不用”的原则。
长期主义的视角：家族投资理念强调聚焦长期价值创造，而非短期价格波动，同时认为投资就是提前活在未来，思考企业长期的发展方向。
财富分配的理念：父亲计划将自己几乎全部财产捐出，只给六个孩子留下足够做任何事但不足以一事无成的财富，强调创造有价值的人生而非积累财富。
Davis Advisors的投资原则坚守与进化
核心不变原则：始终坚持所有者收益、股票是企业所有权、管理层至关重要、价格与价值分离、客户储蓄受托责任这些不变的核心原则。
适配市场变化：称自己不是会灭绝的恐龙，而是能长期存续的乌龟，会跟随经济发展变化寻找价值机会，不固守单一行业。
机构自身定位：公司团队平均任职时间达到20年，员工是旗下基金最大的投资者，所有产品都有内部人员跟投，可以接受阶段性业绩落后，只投资被市场错杀的企业。
内部决策流程：除了复盘过往投资错误，还会做“事前尸检”，提前假设企业5年后大幅跑输市场，撰写对应的失败故事，帮助团队保持开放，避免固执己见。
当前市场超额收益获取难度判断
Davis持仓的基本面数据：过去5年，Davis持仓企业的年均盈利增长率达到17%，当前市盈率为14.5倍。
对比市场基准数据：罗素1000价值指数成分股过去5年年均盈利增长12.5%，当前市盈率为20倍；标普500过去5年年均盈利增长18%，当前市盈率为26倍。
当前收益判断结论：戴维斯持仓基本面和标普500增长接近，但估值低近一半，当前是非常好的布局阶段，未来无论市场估值回落还是持仓估值修复，都会带来显著超额收益。
价格与价值的关系认知
市场先生模型的应用：引用格雷厄姆的市场先生模型，市场先生每天给出报价，但投资者不需要必须交易，可以利用市场先生的情绪波动获取收益。
股票与实物资产的对比：对比洛杉矶1000万美元、年利润75万美元的公寓楼，如果有人报价800万美元收购，投资者不会觉得自己亏损，也不会轻易出售，投资股票也应当遵循同样的逻辑。
对市场下跌的应对：遇到持仓股价下跌，会重新复盘投资假设，但大多数时候只是市场错判了企业，不需要恐慌卖出，不需要将估值扩张纳入收益模型，只关注企业盈利的长期增长。
传统价值投资方法的失效点
账面价值的失效：账面价值指标已经被会计准则变化和企业资本结构变化严重扭曲，现在企业大量价值来自无形资产、品牌和智力资本，不会体现在账面价值上。
分部估值法的陷阱：投资者经常只看公开市场价格分部加总，忽略各部分的真实价值，比如当年西尔斯百货的分部估值看起来让零售业务免费，但实际上被高估的业务后续崩盘，最终投资者仍然亏损。
低账面价值陷阱：很多价值投资者会买入账面价值折价、但roe只有4%-5%的烂生意，长期持有下来，投资收益会向企业的roe收敛，哪怕买入价格折价一半，长期收益也只有4%左右；反过来，高roe的优质企业哪怕买入估值高，长期收益也会向roe收敛，会成为复利机器。
对 stewardship（受托责任）的认知
观念转变的来源：早年认为投资不是崇高的职业，和Markel CEO Tom Gaynor的对话改变了这个认知，Tom说受托责任本身就是圣经意义上的崇高职业。
公司发展的选择：90年代很多人建议公司转型为对冲基金赚更多钱，但团队认为帮普通人打理养老储蓄比帮富人变得更有钱更有意义，因此坚持和重视受托责任的财务顾问合作。
职业的判断标准：商业以利润为核心，会顺着客户的喜好推产品；而专业服务以客户结果为核心，就像医生会告诉你不想听但对你有用的建议，投资也应当帮助客户改善投资行为，避免追涨杀跌。
当前AI科技股投资热潮的分析
和90年代互联网热潮的相似性：AI当前处于阿玛拉定律的短期高估阶段，所有人都在疯狂追捧新兴赢家，和90年代追捧雅虎、美国在线、思科的情况完全一致。
不同投资方向选择：除了直接赌AI赢家，还可以投资三类受益标的：第一类是AI的赋能者，比如台积电、应用材料、天然气和铜矿企业；第二类是AI的使用者，比如拥有大量数据、已经布局AI技术的Capital One，它的AI专利数位居全球前10；第三类是不受AI影响的传统企业。
当前市场的风险点：当前指数、动量投资、私募资本都是向后看的策略，变化来临时调整很慢，很多已经走入末路的企业比如当年的柯达，仍然占指数很大权重，未来投资者会因此承受大幅损失，锁定在私募市场的资本也无法快速调整，风险极高。
伯克希尔哈撒韦董事会的亲历收获
透明度与完整性：巴菲特和芒格对外展示的内容和内部实际情况完全一致，公司文化拥有极高的完整性，对内对外保持一致的诚信标准。
对风险的极致重视：内部能更明显感受到巴菲特对风险的极端重视，他会普通人认为不可能发生的风险做提前准备，会提前思考如果资本市场关闭6个月公司能否正常运转，绝对不做需要救助的企业。
查理芒格的投资思想影响
核心特质影响：查理芒格完全不在乎其他人的看法，只关心自己是否做了正确的事，同时对自己极为苛刻，是自己最严厉的批评者。
个人成长影响：年轻时和查理的偶然相遇改变了人生轨迹，养成了每月定期登门请教的习惯，查理始终是放在身后督促自己不犯错误的榜样。
耐心作为投资竞争优势的观点
短期激进投资的危害：当前很多激进投资者追求短期收益，会破坏企业长期价值，如果当年激进投资者进入亚马逊或Meta，会毁掉企业的长期布局。
德州仪器的长期案例：2000年后德州仪器CEO Rich Templeton带领企业转型模拟芯片业务，7年股价没有上涨，华尔街极度不满，戴维斯持续加仓，后续股价在14个月翻了三倍；5年前Rich Templeton又开始在美国自建芯片工厂、改革分销渠道，承受了大量短期批评，戴维斯认为这些长期投资未来一定会获得回报。
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