Insightful Investor Podcast interviewed Jeffrey Gunlack on Mar. 18, 2025
《洞見投資者》播客於 2025 年 3 月 18 日專訪傑佛瑞·岡拉克
說話者01
Welcome to the Insightful Investor Podcast, a weekly series that seeks to share industry, investment and market insights. Learn more about our show at insightfulinvestor.org. [MUSIC] Today I'm joined by Jeffrey Gunlack, founder, CIO, and CEO of Double Line Capital. I'm in the beautiful studio in lovely downtown Los Angeles. And if you're listening to the audio version of this podcast, make sure to check out the video on Spotify and YouTube as well. Jeffrey, thank you for joining me. Welcome, Flex, for coming. Thank you.
歡迎收聽《洞見投資者》播客，這是一個每週系列節目，旨在分享行業、投資與市場洞見。更多節目資訊請瀏覽 insightfulinvestor.org。[音樂] 今天與我同台的是雙線資本創辦人、投資長兼執行長傑佛瑞·岡拉克。我們位於洛杉磯市中心美麗的錄音室。若您收聽的是音頻版本，別忘了在 Spotify 和 YouTube 上觀看影片版。傑佛瑞，感謝您的參與。歡迎你來，弗萊克斯。謝謝。
Well, let's go back to the very, very beginning. Do you feel that you were born and investor, meaning that it is core to who you are?
讓我們回溯到最初的最初。你覺得自己是天生的投資者嗎？也就是說，投資是否構成了你核心的本質？
說話者02
My father bought me stock in a company, the parent company of a chemical company he worked for, was very small amount. But I would follow, and this was when I was maybe 10 years old. And I would follow it in the daily paper. And one day, we were over at my grandfather's house, and the paper came. And I went to the stock listings, and it was on the American Exchange. And my grandfather had been a stock broker. And he missed the crash of 29. And he had gotten his clients out of it. He's always very proud of that.
我父親買了一家公司的股票給我，那是他任職的化工公司的母公司，金額非常小。那時我大概十歲左右，我會每天在報紙上追蹤這支股票。有一天，我們去祖父家，報紙送來了。我去看股票報價，那支股票在美國交易所上市。我祖父曾經是股票經紀人，他避開了 1929 年的股災，並讓他的客戶都安全撤出，他對此一直非常自豪。
But I went, I was looking up the American Stock Exchange. And he says, what are you doing? You don't care about that. You have to look at the New York Stock Exchange. Now, I can't remember that. So I like following the stock market. And then when I was in eighth grade in a social studies class, we did a thing for about a month on stocks, and it's needed to pick one, and chart it and follow it. And my uncle had been the head of development for Xerox.
但我當時在看美國股票交易所的報價，他問我在做什麼？說我不該關心那個，應該看紐約證券交易所才對。現在我已經記不清細節了。總之我很喜歡追蹤股市動態。後來在八年級的社會課上，我們有一個關於股票的專題，持續了大約一個月，要選一支股票並記錄追蹤它的走勢。我叔叔曾是全錄公司的開發部門主管。
He had developed Xerox copy machine, and we owned Xerox. And I picked Xerox for the stock. And as it turned out, that was right in the teeth of the nifty, 50. And right at the day that we started it in social studies class, it was pretty close to, if not literally, the high. And so I was charting Xerox. And it was going down half a point, two points, three points a day, every day. And we owned Xerox because my father believed in the company. And there was the only time in my time growing up, where he was right at that top, when we thought that we actually had a little bit of money. And my mother was begging my father to sell this Xerox. And she was getting increasingly angry that it was going down down down down down. Because it dropped by about two thirds. So I don't know. I was followed that sort of thing. But I really have came to develop the idea that I'm kind of a natural, looking at financial markets and figuring out kind of what the state of society is by following all the things that go into price movements. But I never really thought there was, I didn't know there was such a thing as an investment business. I really found out about the existence of an investment business primarily from this show on TV. Lifestyles of the rich and famous had a show where they were counting down the top 10 professions, pay-wise on average, I suppose. And I said, this is great. I can figure out career opportunities in terms of what segments.
他開發了施樂影印機，而我們擁有施樂。我選擇了施樂作為股票。結果證明，那正好趕上了漂亮 50 的巔峰時期。就在我們在社會研究課上開始的那一天，它幾乎是（如果不是完全）最高點。所以我一直在繪製施樂的走勢圖。它每天都在下跌半個點、兩個點、三個點。我們擁有施樂是因為我父親相信這家公司。那是我成長過程中唯一一次，當我們以為自己真的有一點錢時，他正好在那個頂點。我母親懇求我父親賣掉這支施樂股票。她越來越生氣，因為它一直在下跌下跌下跌。因為它下跌了大約三分之二。所以我不知道。我跟隨了這種情況。但我確實逐漸形成了一個想法，我天生就適合觀察金融市場，通過追蹤所有影響價格變動的因素來理解社會的狀態。但我從未真正想過，也不知道有投資業務這樣的事情。 我最初是從電視節目上真正了解到投資業務的存在。《富貴名流的生活方式》有一集節目在盤點平均收入最高的十大職業。當時我就想，這太棒了，我可以根據這些領域來規劃職涯機會。
So I've been interested in number one was investment banker. And I didn't know what that was. So I figured I would look into investment bankers in the LA Yellow pages. And I found out that nobody ever ties this investment banking in the LA Yellow pages. But they do put in investment management. And so I figured, I don't know, this sounds like the same thing to me. And so I sent letters to about 23 different investment management companies in Southern California. And I got three letters back. And one of them was ended up being where I've got my first job in the investment business. And they interviewed me and they said, you've got a very interesting unusual background, because there's all mathematics. And I also studied philosophy. And they said, do you think you'd be interested in equities or fixed income?
當時我最感興趣的是排名第一的投資銀行家。但我根本不知道那是什麼，於是決定查閱洛杉磯黃頁裡的投資銀行家資訊。結果發現黃頁裡根本沒有「投資銀行」這個分類，只有「投資管理」。我想這聽起來差不多是同個東西吧，就寄了求職信給南加州約 23 家投資管理公司。後來收到三封回信，其中一家成為我進入投資業的第一份工作。面試時他們說：「你的背景非常特別，全是數學相關經歷，還修過哲學。你對股票還是固定收益比較有興趣？」
And I said, I don't know what those things are. And he got seem pretty exasperated. And he said, equities, stocks, fixed income bonds. And I didn't know what bonds were. But I knew what stocks were. And so I said stocks. And he says, well, I don't know. We probably need more quantitative fire power in the bond group. So long story short, I ended up getting introduced to that.
我說，我不知道那些是什麼東西。他看起來相當惱火。然後他說，權益類就是股票，固定收益就是債券。我那時不知道債券是什麼，但我知道股票。所以我就說股票。他說，嗯，我不確定，債券組那邊可能更需要量化火力。長話短說，最後我被介紹去了那個部門。
And I had been out of the Yale PhD program in mathematics. And I got this book to learn about what bonds were. It was called Inside the Yield Book. And it was kind of seminal in the literature. And it was broken into two sections. The first was prose, explanations of how bond returns are developed and how important reinvestment is. And the back part of the thing was the formulas, bond math formulas. And so I figured I'll derive them all from scratch.
當時我剛從耶魯大學數學博士班休學。我找了這本書來學習債券是什麼，書名叫《收益率之書內幕》。這在文獻中算是開山之作，內容分成兩部分：前半部是散文體，解釋債券回報如何形成以及再投資的重要性；後半部則是債券數學公式。於是我決定從頭推導所有公式。
And I learned a lot about how that worked. And I was so unfamiliar with the investment business. I thought everybody did that. Like, oh, it's like everybody would've done that. And it turned out that nobody did that. No way, really, understood that stuff. And so the quantitative aspect of bonds ended up being a really good match for me. And so I don't know, I often wonder, what if I had started to steal company or something?
我學到了很多關於那如何運作的知識。當時我對投資業務一無所知，還以為每個人都會那樣做。像是，哦，這就像是每個人都會做的事。結果發現根本沒人那樣做。真的嗎？完全沒人懂那些東西。所以債券的量化分析最終成了非常適合我的領域。我常常想，如果我當初去偷公司什麼的會怎樣？
What would have happened? But didn't work out that way. I just fell in half-hazardly into the investment management business. And I got past the chicken and egg problem, which is you can't get a track record unless you have money and you can't get money unless you have a track record. But I was lucky that I was given an account at really an experience level that it was unwarranted. I was in the business like six months.
那會發生什麼事？但事情並沒有那樣發展。我只是誤打誤撞進入了投資管理行業。而且我克服了雞生蛋蛋生雞的問題——沒有資金就無法建立績效記錄，沒有績效記錄就無法獲得資金。但我很幸運，在我經驗水平根本不足的情況下（我才入行六個月），就獲得了一個帳戶。
And I was suddenly I was managing a portfolio for the Chrysler pension system. And they had a horse race of five or six managers. And this was common in those days in the '80s. Their SL occasions decisions were being made by pension plans in very foolish ways. If you had the highest return for a calendar year, they would take money from the other manager and give it to you. So they're selling low and buying high constantly. But as it turned out, I was typically first or second.
突然間，我就開始為克萊斯勒的退休金系統管理一個投資組合。當時他們有五、六位經理在進行競爭，這在 80 年代是很常見的。那些退休金計劃的決策方式非常愚蠢。如果你在某個日曆年獲得最高回報，他們就會從其他經理那裡抽走資金給你。所以他們不斷地在低點賣出、高點買進。但結果證明，我通常都是第一或第二名。
And so my career got going. And I don't know. I still think of investing as not working. I just think of it as just something that I would follow all the time. I mean, even when I was at my first job, and I just got under graduate, I would listen to the radio, and I was following CD rates. And it was really interesting because that was Volker. And so the CD rates were, I remember there were over 20%. I couldn't believe I've been working for four months.
就這樣，我的職業生涯開始了。而且你知道嗎？我到現在還是覺得投資不算工作。對我來說，這只是我一直以來都在關注的事情。即使在第一份工作時，我才剛大學畢業，我就會聽收音機關注定期存款利率。那時正值沃爾克時期，利率高得驚人，我記得定期存款利率超過 20%。我才工作了四個月，簡直不敢相信。
And I got a cost of living increase of 20%. Because the inflation was that high and interest rates and all that stuff were going on. So I've never once thought about doing anything else once I fell into the investment business. So I think to a certain extent, it's serving my blood. And I kind of interpret society through how the markets work. And so I don't think I can really distance myself from that because part of how I view the world.
而我獲得了 20%的生活成本調漲。因為通膨率就是那麼高，利率和所有那些因素都在發生作用。所以自從踏入投資這一行後，我從未想過要做其他事情。某種程度上，我覺得這已融入我的血液。我透過市場運作來解讀社會，因此我認為自己無法真正抽離，因為這已成為我看待世界的方式之一。
說話者01
Well, in your career, you've had the opportunity to meet a lot of great investors, including yourself. What would you say are the key qualities and characteristics of a great investor?
在你的職業生涯中，你有機會遇到許多優秀的投資者，包括你自己。你認為一個優秀投資者的關鍵品質和特質是什麼？
說話者02
Accepting the fact, there's many things I'd probably give a different answer in different days. But you've got to accept the fact that you can't come close to being right all the time. And failures, just like a baseball player, great if they hit 350. That means they're two thirds of the time roughly. They're not getting a hit. So you have to accept the fact that you're going to be wrong. And part of that, when you understand that and accept it, you learn that you have to evaluate what your positions and what your results are going to be, assuming that your core assumptions are wrong. And you have to make sure that it doesn't become a fatal error.
接受這個事實，有很多事情我在不同的日子可能會給出不同的答案。但你必須接受一個事實，就是你不可能總是接近正確。而失敗，就像一個棒球選手，如果能打出三成五的打擊率就很棒了。這意味著他們大概有三分之二的時間是沒有擊中球的。所以你必須接受你會犯錯的事實。而當你理解並接受了這一點，你就會明白你必須評估你的立場和可能的結果，假設你的核心假設是錯誤的。而且你必須確保這不會變成一個致命的錯誤。
That's actually what the double line logo is about. Double line is in your life on the street. You're not supposed to cross it. It's illegal to cross it, but it's also improved. So it's dangerous. And so you know fatal flaws. The other thing is, I think most successful investors come to understand that you might be right in terms of your core assumptions and how you're viewing the course of the future. But it takes way longer than you think. Way longer. I remember, I remember things like the global financial crisis. I saw that coming in 2004.
這實際上就是雙線標誌的意義所在。雙線存在於你街頭生活的每個角落。你不該越過它。跨越它是違法的，但它同時也被改良過。所以這很危險。因此你明白致命缺陷。另一件事是，我認為大多數成功的投資者最終都會理解到，或許你在核心假設和對未來走向的看法上是正確的，但實際發生的時間遠比你預期的要長得多。我記得，我記得像是全球金融危機這樣的事件。我在 2004 年就預見了它的到來。
And it just 2005 came in 2006 came in when it sounds like you're wrong while you're waiting. Oh, you're wrong. Yeah. When people say I'm early, that's just a citizen for wrong. And so it takes a long, long time. In fact, I used to write quarterly white papers to send them out to clients. This is in the days when people sent letters. And I would write on a topic and one of them was that it came to me, it occurred to me that in the holiday season, people buy point set of plants. And a lot of times they end up killing them because the leaves start to fall off. And they think, oh, I need to water it.
然後 2005 年來了，2006 年也來了，當你等待時聽起來就像是你錯了。哦，你錯了。是的。當人們說我太早時，那只是「錯誤」的委婉說法。所以這需要很長很長的時間。事實上，我過去會每季撰寫白皮書寄給客戶。那是在人們還會寄信的年代。我會就某個主題寫作，其中一篇讓我想到，在節日期間，人們會購買聖誕紅植物。很多時候他們最終會把植物養死，因為葉子開始掉落。而他們會想，哦，我該澆水了。
No, no, no, no, no, no. It's the opposite. The leaves, it's going dormant. The leaves just fall off. And if you water it, you're going to kill it. And so they end up killing it. And what you're, what you have to do is just take it if it's in a pot. And just cut it down. So if there's this much above the dirt, put it in a dark closet. And don't even look at it. I mean, maybe once every two weeks, you probably don't have to look out for the first eight weeks. But then every two weeks, oh, I look at it. And then one day, something magical happened, this little green shoot starts to come up. And then you take it out of the closet. And it's now growing again in water.
不，不，不，不，不，不。恰恰相反。葉子，它要進入休眠狀態。葉子只是掉下來。如果你澆水，你會害死它。所以他們最終會害死它。而你必須做的，就是如果它在盆裡，就把它拿起來。然後剪掉。所以如果土面上有這麼多，就把它放進黑暗的衣櫥裡。甚至不要看它。我是說，也許每兩週一次，前八週你可能根本不需要看。但之後每兩週，哦，我看一下。然後有一天，神奇的事情發生了，這個小小的綠色嫩芽開始冒出來。然後你把它從衣櫥裡拿出來。現在它又在水裡生長了。
That's like the investment business. Everybody thinks that, you know, you have a daily cycle, a weekly cycle, monthly, quarterly. The investment business cycle is way outside the context of that. It can take many, many years for something to develop. I mean, we've been talking about the budget deficit problem going back to Reagan. I mean, Ross Perro, I think it was, has a voodoo stick. And there was a book called Bankruptcy 1994 that was popular in the early 90s. And it predicted that this was unsustainable. Well, here we are. I mean, Ross Perro was right. He was just over 40 years early or 30 years early.
這就像投資業務一樣。每個人都認為，你知道的，有日週期、週週期、月週期、季度週期。但投資業務的週期遠超出這些範疇。某些事情的發展可能需要很多很多年。我的意思是，我們從雷根時代就開始談論預算赤字問題。我想是羅斯·佩羅吧，他有一根巫毒棒。90 年代初有一本很受歡迎的書叫《1994 年破產》，預測這種情況是不可持續的。好吧，現在我們就在這裡。我是說，羅斯·佩羅是對的。他只是早了 40 年或 30 年。
And so it takes a very, very long time. But then it all inevitably has to happen, though. And that's the cycles of the market. I remember the dot com situation in 1988, 1998, 1999. It just went on forever. And it just seemed, and then at the very end of it, the fourth quarter of 1999, I think the NASDAQ was up 80% in the quarter. And it seemed invincible, unstoppable. That's kind of where we were entering 2023, 2025, I think. It just seemed like there was a survey they asked, what do you think stock returns in the next 12 months? Well, they'd be, and it was like, it went, it just skyrocketed at the end of 2024. And it was like one of the highest readings of all time. Kind of rivaling 1999. So it, you have to be patient, things take longer. And you have to avoid fatal flaws. And I think that's what you see. I mean, I remember like Bill Aquman was on the cover of Bloomberg Magazine. And that's always, you never want to be on the cover of Bloomberg, most magazines, because you're tempting the fates.
因此這需要非常、非常長的時間。但最終這一切還是不可避免地發生了。這就是市場的週期。我記得 1988、1998、1999 年的網路泡沫情況，它持續了很長時間。到了 1999 年第四季末，那斯達克指數在該季度上漲了 80%，看起來勢不可擋、無法阻擋。我認為 2023、2025 年初的情況有點類似。當時有份調查問人們對未來 12 個月股市回報的預期，結果在 2024 年底時預期值飆升，創下歷史新高之一，幾乎可與 1999 年媲美。所以你必須保持耐心，事情需要更長時間發展。同時要避免致命錯誤，我想這就是我們所見到的。記得比爾·阿克曼曾登上《彭博商業周刊》封面，這通常不是好兆頭——登上雜誌封面往往是在挑戰命運。
And Aquman then had his worst year ever, right after he was on the cover. And I was spoke with some conferences with him over repeatedly. I have a talk to you. It's kind of a taciturn guy, but let's talk into him. And he survived that. So he wasn't a fatal mistake. It was he had a really bad year, but it wasn't fatal. And so I think that's really a common characteristic.
而水行俠緊接著就迎來了有史以來最糟糕的一年，就在他登上封面之後。我不斷地在一些會議上與他交談。我有話要跟你說。他是個有點沉默寡言的人，但我們還是試著跟他聊聊。他挺過來了。所以那並不是致命的錯誤。他只是經歷了非常糟糕的一年，但並未致命。我認為這確實是一個常見的特徵。
說話者01
And I guess part of that is recognizing that you don't know a lot of what will impact the price of your investments. And therefore diversifying, not making overly aggressive bets. And just being in some ways humble to the fact that a lot of is beyond your control. And don't put yourself in a position where if you get one or two things wrong, I can wipe you out.
我想這部分是因為認識到，你並不知道很多會影響你投資價格的因素。因此要分散投資，不要下過於激進的賭注。在某種程度上，要謙卑地承認很多事情是超出你控制的。不要讓自己處於一兩次錯誤就可能讓你全盤皆輸的境地。
說話者02
Right. It also means balancing risks, which I think is easier to do in bonds and it isn't stocks. Customs, I mean, sure there's indices, zig and zag differently. But ultimately, the beta is kind of a constant. Whereas in bonds, you can put together. And I think this is why I like doing the bond stuff is, is I feel less nervous about stuff. If I have offsetting risks, so it's not fatal. So you can put together. And sometimes it's not possible. But oftentimes it is that you can put together things that kind of move an opposite directions or not totally correlated like low quality junk bonds together with long-term traitors. I mean, that's not always a recipe for success, but they will tend to move differently. I mean, like in our current moment, we see that credit is now weakening for the first time in a long time, but interest rates on traitors are falling. So you have offsetting risks. And that's a very comfortable place to be. For quite a few years, that wasn't possible. We had interest rates at zero. When your treasury was one, one and a half percent, there was starvation of yield. So nothing yielded anything.
對。這也意味著要平衡風險，我認為在債券中比在股票中更容易做到。當然，股票有指數，波動方式不同。但最終，貝塔值在某種程度上是恆定的。而在債券中，你可以組合投資。我想這就是為什麼我喜歡做債券投資，因為我對這些事情感覺不那麼緊張。如果我有對沖風險，那就不會致命。所以你可以組合投資。有時候這是不可能的，但很多時候你可以將那些朝相反方向變動或不是完全相關的東西組合在一起，比如低品質垃圾債券和長期國債。我的意思是，這並不總是成功的秘訣，但它們往往會朝不同方向變動。就像在我們目前的時刻，我們看到信用狀況在很長一段時間後首次惡化，但國債利率正在下降。所以你有了對沖風險。這是一個非常舒適的狀態。在過去幾年裡，這是不可能的。我們的利率為零。當你的國債收益率只有 1%或 1.5%時，收益就非常匱乏。所以什麼都沒有收益。
It's hard to believe that a couple years ago that the junk bond index yielded 350. That's to no default. 350.
很難相信幾年前垃圾債券指數的收益率高達 350 基點。這還是在零違約的情況下。350 基點。
說話者01
Instead of changing the name from high yield to low yield.
與其把名稱從高收益改成低收益。
說話者02
Yeah, I just call it junk. When you get below six, I call it junk. If it goes up to 10, I'll call it high yield again.
對，我就直接叫它垃圾債。當收益率低於 6%時，我就稱它為垃圾債。如果升到 10%，我會再叫它高收益債。
說話者01
Let's talk about the macro environment. And like to start out, really zoomed out, looking at the very big picture. So if you go to 2022 and you look backwards 40 years, you basically were living in a world of secularly falling interest rates. And you could argue now that is shifted in a world of secularly rising interest rates.
讓我們來談談宏觀環境。首先從大視角出發，看看整體大格局。如果你回顧 2022 年往前推 40 年，基本上你生活在一個利率長期下降的世界。而現在可以說已經轉變為利率長期上升的世界。
說話者02
That's my belief that we bottomed on interest rates and that we're in a longer term cycle of rising interest rates, which is going to be very interesting because we have, we have had a treasury debt that was like 3% on average. And now it's moving towards 4% and depending upon where rates go, it could go higher. And if you think about that, you get to get some very uncomfortable arithmetic regarding interest expense. And this is something that I talked about two or three years ago when people were saying rates will never go up. But rates will never rise and I use that famous photograph of then cash is clay, Muhammad Ali with Sunni List and I think it was.
我相信利率已經觸底，我們正處於一個長期利率上升的周期，這將非常有趣，因為我們曾經的平均國債利率約為 3%，而現在正朝著 4%邁進，根據利率的走向，甚至可能更高。如果你仔細想想，這會讓利息支出變得非常棘手。這是我兩三年前就談論過的事情，當時人們還說利率永遠不會上升。但利率終究會上漲，我當時用了那張著名的照片——穆罕默德·阿里與索尼·利斯顿的對峙畫面來比喻這個情況。
Looks like List has never get enough news looks like he's out coal. And I use that graphic and I just said, you know, we've got to start thinking about where this interest expense problem may go. And of course now that it's higher than the defense budget and not even the official defense budget, the true defense budget is, includes Ukraine and gut and the Israel situation, all that stuff. The interest expense is already higher than that. So over a trillion, I think it's running about a trillion, three right now, up from 300 billion just a few years ago. And I think that is very strongly reason why interest rates are in secular rising position because the deficit is percentage of GDP keeps going up and the interest rates that are rolling off. We still have some 25 basis points stuff that's rolling off and there still will be for some years to come. And depending on the strong possibility that people won't want to lend us money at low interest rates, especially for a long term period of time, especially if the dollar starts falling. So typically in a recession or weaker economy, you get lower interest rates and you get a higher dollar, I think it's going to be the opposite. Because I think we're living in a mirror image of the 40 years that are informed by falling interest rates. And a lot of people have never experienced high interest rates rising rates and no junk button investor has ever really experienced a rising rate default cycle because when defaults would show up, the treasury rates would fall and you would have some capability of refinancing. So instead of going bankrupt, you could refinance. That can't happen in rising interest rates. So I think the corporate CFOs have been very smart and they've definitely managed their debt burdens pretty well. They've pushed the maturitys out. It isn't a problem in the next few years. But ultimately the maturitys will come and will they be able to refinance? Will they have to default?
看起來 List 似乎從未獲得足夠的新聞，看起來他已經退出煤炭行業。我用了那張圖表，然後我說，我們必須開始思考這個利息支出問題可能會發展到什麼地步。當然，現在它已經高於國防預算，甚至不是官方國防預算，真正的國防預算還包括烏克蘭、加沙和以色列局勢等所有這些事情。利息支出已經高於這些了。所以超過一兆，我認為現在大約是一兆三，而幾年前還只是三千億。我認為這是非常強有力的理由，說明為什麼利率處於長期上升的位置，因為赤字佔 GDP 的比例不斷上升，而正在到期的利率。我們仍然有一些 25 個基點的東西正在到期，而且在未來幾年還會繼續。考慮到人們可能不願意以低利率借錢給我們，特別是長期貸款，尤其是如果美元開始下跌。通常在經濟衰退或經濟疲軟時，你會得到較低的利率和較高的美元，但我認為這次會相反。 因為我認為我們正生活在一個由利率下降所主導的 40 年的鏡像中。很多人從未經歷過高利率和利率上升的環境，而且沒有一個垃圾債券投資者真正經歷過利率上升導致的違約週期，因為當違約出現時，國債利率會下降，你還有能力進行再融資。所以與其破產，你可以選擇再融資。但在利率上升的環境中，這種情況不會發生。所以我認為企業的財務長們非常聰明，他們確實很好地管理了債務負擔。他們延長了到期期限。這在未來幾年內不會成為問題。但最終到期日會到來，屆時他們能否進行再融資？還是不得不違約？
I think defaults will be higher in a rising rate environment than they were in a falling rate environment. Yet the junk button market has only existed from the early 80s. So it's been nothing but falling rates until recently. And there hasn't been enough economic stress with these rising rates for the past three years or so to cause significant increase. Defaults are going up, but especially on bank loans. But it hasn't been a day lose that you typically see during a significant recession. So yeah, I think it's a rising. And I think there's going to be some pretty radical changes that have to be made.
我認為在利率上升的環境中，違約率會比利率下降的環境中更高。然而，垃圾債券市場僅從 80 年代初才開始存在。所以直到最近之前，利率一直處於下降趨勢。而過去三年左右的利率上升並未帶來足夠的經濟壓力，導致違約率顯著上升。違約確實在增加，尤其是銀行貸款方面。但這還未達到通常在嚴重經濟衰退時會看到的那種程度。所以，是的，我認為違約率正在上升。而且我認為必須做出一些相當激進的改變。
We have $220 trillion of unfunded liabilities. That's like seven times the economy. We can't pay that off in today's purchasing power. It can't be done. You didn't even see if they're inflated away or restructure it. And I came to the idea that there's a non-zero chance of the Treasury debt being restructured earlier this year back in the spring. And I was thinking about it. And it occurred to me that it's a higher probability than most people think. Most people think it's zero.
我們有 220 兆美元的未撥備負債。這大約是經濟規模的七倍。我們無法以當前的購買力償還這筆債務。這是不可能的。你甚至無法確定這些債務是否會被通貨膨脹吞噬或重組。今年春天早些時候，我開始認為國債重組的可能性並非為零。我一直在思考這個問題。後來我意識到，這種可能性比大多數人想像的要高。大多數人認為這機率是零。
But then I noticed that there was a research paper that got a lot of play about six weeks ago talking about restructuring the Treasury. And then I think somebody said, I think it was Scott Beasant. Maybe I said something about, I don't mean if not, I've been him. Somebody significant who said maybe we should extend the maturitys for our foreign bond holders and significantly chop down the coupon. The interest rate that's paid. And I think Jim Bianco did a webcast on that a few weeks after that. And I was kind of blown away because I said my gosh, that's the idea that I had like seven, seven, seven, eight months ago.
但後來我注意到，大約六週前有一篇研究論文引起了廣泛討論，內容是關於重組財政部債務。然後我記得有人提到——我想是 Scott Beasant 說的，如果不是他，那可能是我記錯了——某位重要人物建議或許我們應該延長外國債券持有人的到期期限，並大幅削減票面利率，也就是支付的利息。幾週後 Jim Bianco 還就此做了一場網路直播，當時我相當震驚，因為這正是我七、八個月前就想到的主意。
And I rolled it out at a couple of conferences where I was speaking. And people sort of gas, they can't wrap their head around that concept. But we have 36 and a half trillion dollars of debt. Some of it's owned by the Fed, but most of it isn't. And it's rolling over at higher and higher interest rates. And we're all, I think it was Stan Drunkhamiller who sort of, sort of, sort of wear and a sign this issue. And he was using the CBO as numbers. And the CBO's numbers are highly optimistic. They assume low interest rates.
我在幾場演講會議上提出這個構想時，與會者都倒抽一口氣，他們難以理解這種概念。但我們現在有 36.5 兆美元的債務，部分由聯準會持有，但大部分不是。這些債務正以越來越高的利率展期。我記得 Stan Drunkhamiller 曾用國會預算辦公室(CBO)的數據來警示這個問題，但 CBO 的預測過於樂觀，他們假設利率會維持在低檔。
They assume never a recession. I can understand how you're going to fit that into a three year forecast. And they assume a deficit that's lower than deficit is now. And we have a 7.2% deficit of the U.S. of GDP deficit. And we haven't had an official recession. So it's going to go to 12% under a weak economy. And I think the interest rates in the next recession on the long end will go up and not down because of fears of this interest expense problem. And I think ultimately we will have some form of restructuring.
他們假設永遠不會有經濟衰退。我能理解你如何將這一點納入三年預測中。而且他們假設赤字會比現在更低。目前美國的赤字佔 GDP 的 7.2%，而我們尚未經歷正式的經濟衰退。在經濟疲軟的情況下，這個數字將會上升到 12%。我認為在下一次衰退中，長期利率會因為對利息支出問題的擔憂而上升而非下降。最終，我認為我們將不得不進行某種形式的債務重組。
Either it's the debt or it's the liabilities. One of those has to give. There's going to be a very rapid growing awareness of this, I think. It's just starting. I think it's really just starting that we're talking about restructuring foreigners. And we're talking about the doge thing is trying to work towards this. And it's really interesting how people are realizing that cutting means cutting. It doesn't mean some guy behind the tree that nobody sees. That's real people. And the reality of that is starting to become a pretty constant headline.
要麼是債務，要麼是負債，總有一方必須讓步。我認為人們對這一點的認識將會迅速增長。這只是開始。我們現在才剛開始討論對外國人的債務重組。而關於「狗狗幣」的討論也正試圖朝這個方向發展。有趣的是，人們開始意識到削減就是真正的削減，不是那種沒人注意的幕後操作。這涉及到真實的人們，而這種現實正逐漸成為頭條新聞的常客。
People say, well, wait a minute. I didn't expect my job was going to go away. So I guess there's there are problems with town halls even in red states now. People saying, you know, why don't we not shut the government down, why don't we fund it for another nine months. And then we'll deal with it. It's always the next time we're going to deal with it. But they're not that many next times left. But per, per, per always it takes longer than everybody thinks.
人們會說，等等，我沒想到我的工作會消失。所以我想即使在紅州，現在市政廳也出現問題了。人們說，為什麼我們不讓政府停擺，為什麼不再資助它九個月。然後我們再處理。總是下一次我們會處理。但已經沒有那麼多「下一次」了。但一如既往，事情總是比大家想的拖得更久。
說話者01
But at some point you hit the tipping point where it becomes too obvious to kick the can down the road further that it's an unsustainable situation.
但在某個時刻，你會達到一個臨界點，那時再拖延問題已經明顯到無法持續的地步。
說話者02
Yeah. And I think the awareness of that is starting to really grow and children want to do about it. Because but people don't know what's about a lot of things. I mean, we get NATO. Look at just geopolitical broadly. How I read a headline today that if France and the UK, back Ukraine, that Italy is not going to join in, which that's interesting. You know, the, the, the, the, the, the, when the trouble comes, you get to serve everyone for themselves type of mentality. And that seems to be a path that we've been on for quite some time.
是的。而且我認為人們對這點的認識正在真正增長，孩子們想做些什麼。但人們對很多事情並不了解。我是說，看看北約。從更廣泛的地緣政治來看。我今天看到一個標題說，如果法國和英國支持烏克蘭，意大利不會加入，這很有趣。你知道，當麻煩來臨時，就會出現人自為戰的心態。而這似乎是我們長期以來一直走的路。
And it's just going to keep accelerating. So I, I think I, I, I, I quite fond of Neil Howes work. He said to, toographer, he wrote the book called The Fourth Turning in 1996 or 1995 when he used demography to predict the global financial crisis. And he said it would come somewhere around 2006. So it's pretty accurate. But his work is based upon this concept of turning. So we used to talk about the continuity of cycle years ago. No one were talks about that anymore. It was basically a 75 year thing.
而且這種加速只會持續下去。所以，我、我、我相當欣賞尼爾·豪的著作。他在 1996 年或 1995 年以人口學預測全球金融危機時，曾對攝影師說過，他寫了一本名為《第四次轉折》的書。他預測危機將在 2006 年左右發生，結果相當準確。但他的研究是基於「轉折」這個概念。我們過去常談論週期的連續性，現在已經沒人提了。這基本上是一個 75 年的循環。
And it turns out that it's, there's a logic behind why it's every, you know, 75 years or so. And it has to with the fact that societies get a framework. And it starts out in a context of crisis typically. But the framework is agreed upon. And it's designed to be in harmony with the production, called, put it in the marksy of philosophical terms, the means of production. And the means of production get addressed through how you split up the rewards of the, of the, the economy. So there's the production economy and then there's the property relations, which is how you divvy it up.
結果發現，這背後有其邏輯，大約每 75 年就會發生一次。這與社會建立框架有關，通常始於危機的背景下。但這個框架是大家共同認可的，旨在與生產方式保持和諧——用馬克思哲學的術語來說，就是生產工具。生產工具的問題是通過如何分配經濟成果來解決的。因此，有生產經濟，也有財產關係，後者涉及如何分配這些成果。
And it starts out where they're in sync. But there's a natural tension, which is unavoidable, where the property relations don't want to change. They get set in place. And the people that benefit from them, work hard to not let them change. The powerful, the wealthy. They don't want that to change. But the means of production change in revolutionary form. Many times over 75 year period, think of television, think of the internet, think of AI, think of the steam engine, the telegraph, you name it.
一開始，他們是同步的。但存在一種不可避免的自然張力，即財產關係不願改變。它們被固定下來，而從中受益的人們則努力阻止其改變——那些有權有勢、富有的階層。他們不希望現狀被打破。但生產方式卻以革命性的形式不斷變革。想想過去 75 年間的電視、互聯網、人工智能、蒸汽機、電報等等，這樣的變革發生了許多次。
And so they radically change the, the, the means of production and the populations get further and further out of sync with the means of production and this tremendous tension. And ultimately, it's kind of like having one foot on the dock and one foot on the canoe. And it's keep drifting. And eventually, you're going to get wet. You're going to fall in. And so everything has to get ripped up. You have to start over again. And that's where we are. And I think people use different frameworks to talk about this, but they're all sort of cousins of each other. And it has to do. And usually, not always, but usually, it leads to some sort of significant conflict like the Civil War, World War II. One happens about every 80 years or so. And you know, the war was 1865 and a World War II was 1945 and at 80 to that, it's 2025. So it's kind of you are here on the map. And it's just going to keep going, coming faster. So this is, this is really interesting. I thought the financial crisis was a really interesting investment period.
因此，生產方式發生了根本性的改變，而人口與生產方式之間的脫節越來越嚴重，這種巨大的張力不斷累積。最終，這就像一隻腳踩在碼頭上，另一隻腳踏在獨木舟上，而船還在不斷漂離。遲早，你會濕透——你會掉進水裡。所以一切都必須被徹底推翻，必須重新開始。這就是我們現在的處境。我認為人們用不同的框架來討論這個問題，但它們本質上都是相通的。彼此之間。而這必須發生。通常來說，雖然不總是如此，但通常會導致某種重大衝突，像是內戰或第二次世界大戰。這種情況大約每 80 年左右就會發生一次。你知道，內戰是在 1865 年，二戰是在 1945 年，再加上 80 年就是 2025 年。所以你現在正處於這個時間點上。而且情況會加速發展。這真的很有趣。我認為金融危機是一個非常有趣的投資時期。
It was challenging. It took longer to come than most people thought, including me. But when it came, it was brutally difficult, but exhilarating to navigate. I think this is going to be harder. So I'm looking forward to it. I, you know, I want to get people through it and I want to see how the movie ends.
這很有挑戰性。它的到來比大多數人預期的要晚，包括我在內。但當它來臨時，雖然極其艱難，卻也令人振奮地去應對。我認為這次會更難。所以我對此充滿期待。你知道，我想要幫助人們度過難關，也想看看這場電影會如何結局。
說話者01
And you think it's harder because we threw the kitchen sink at the problem before. And now we don't have that anymore any longer to back us out, to back, you know, what will save us?
你認為這次更難是因為我們之前已經用盡了所有手段來解決問題。而現在我們再也沒有那些方法來拯救我們了，那麼，什麼能拯救我們呢？
說話者02
We've done it over and over again. I mean, what we did during the global financial crisis looks pretty tame compared to what we did in the, in response to the pandemic. And it just keeps notching higher and higher. Just like the participation rate and employment participation rate keeps dropping. I mean, irregularly, but it's lower, lower highs and it keeps dropping. So we, we, we, we, we threw way too much at the global financial crisis. We broke laws. We subordinated senior investors to technically less secured investors.
我們已經一次又一次地這樣做了。我的意思是，與我們在疫情期間採取的措施相比，我們在全球金融危機期間所做的看起來相當溫和。而且情況只會越來越糟。就像參與率和就業參與率不斷下降一樣。我是說，雖然不規律，但高點越來越低，而且持續下降。所以我們在全球金融危機時投入了太多。我們違反了法律。我們將優先投資者置於技術上保障較少的投資者之下。
We modified mortgages illegally, you know, in, in the pandemic. We bought corporate bonds from the Fed, which is illegal prescribed by the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. So that the, the, the responses just keep getting bigger. But it gets to the point where the response is so big that it, it kind of can't work. So we've, we've had a corporate bond crisis in 2003. We had this lending, the scam lending crisis, the global financial crisis. Then we threw $7 trillion of cash at the pandemic. And it's just going to keep being more. And we've, we've already crossed that tipping point.
我們在疫情期間非法修改了抵押貸款條款，你知道的。我們從聯準會購買公司債券，這根據 1913 年的《聯邦儲備法案》是違法的。因此，這些應對措施規模越來越大，但最終會大到無法運作的地步。我們在 2003 年經歷了公司債券危機，後來又爆發了這場詐騙貸款危機——全球金融危機。接著我們向疫情砸了 7 兆美元的現金。而情況只會愈演愈烈。我們已經越過了那個臨界點。
I've been talking about this for decades, where you gave enough money to people that you caused the inflation. And that was like, oh, because can we really do it again? Can we, and, and, and we keep, we keep having to bail out somebody else. And the, the last, the last one that needs to be bailed out is going to be the government. And the Federal Reserve system. Because the Federal Reserve is bankrupt. But thanks to the bear market of of 2023, 2020, 2023, they, they have negative net worth. There's nothing there. So I think we're going to end up in a different sort of, a, property relation situation. And the interesting thing is it will be very, very good. People actually agree to it. So actually get along. The fourth turning is about people not getting along. First, the first turning is about everybody getting along. That's kind of like how great the US economy was in the 50s. And so it'll be great when we get there. And the baby boomers are going to have to give up their entitlements on some percentage. And they will. They're pretty docile group, actually.
我已經談論這個問題幾十年了，當你給人們足夠的錢時，就會引發通貨膨脹。這就像是，哦，因為我們真的能再來一次嗎？我們能嗎？而且，我們不斷地需要救助別人。最後一個需要被救助的將會是政府。還有聯邦儲備系統。因為聯邦儲備已經破產了。但由於 2023 年、2020 年至 2023 年的熊市，他們的淨值為負。那裡什麼都沒有。所以我認為我們最終會進入一種不同的財產關係情況。有趣的是，這將會非常好。人們實際上會同意這一點。所以實際上會相處融洽。第四次轉折是關於人們無法和睦相處。第一次轉折是關於每個人都和睦相處。這有點像 50 年代美國經濟有多麼繁榮。所以當我們到達那裡時會很棒。嬰兒潮一代將不得不放棄他們的部分福利。他們會的。實際上他們是一個相當溫順的群體。
And, you know, means tested, age tested. I mean, we can solve these problems very easily. But just like cutting means cutting. Restructuring means restructuring. You can't. And there's a lot of vestiditchers that don't want to do it. So it'd be the easiest thing. All you do is you say if you're above X, I don't know, 50. Whatever it is. You know, you're, you're good.
而且，你知道的，經過經濟狀況調查、年齡測試。我是說，我們可以很輕易解決這些問題。但就像削減就是削減，重組就是重組。你不能...而且有很多既得利益者不願意這麼做。這本該是最簡單的事。你只需要說，如果你超過某個年齡，比如 50 歲或什麼的。你知道的，你就沒問題。
But you can get it at 865 or whatever it is. But every year, less than that, we're going to start extending. And you're pretty quickly, pretty quickly, get to a place where it wouldn't be such a problem. But people are going to have to give things up. And they always say that the entitlements are a third rail of politics. But just a little bit. The volume's coming up a little bit on talking about those things. And it's going to be obviously necessary. In the next recession, we're going to have to do it. So if we can't, we can't just do a 30% of GDP deficit, we can't do that.
但你可以在 865 歲或什麼年齡領取。但每年低於這個年齡的，我們就要開始延後。很快地，很快地，就能達到一個問題不那麼嚴重的狀態。但人們將不得不放棄一些東西。他們總是說福利是政治的高壓線。但只要一點點。現在討論這些事情的聲音開始變大了。這顯然是必要的。在下一次經濟衰退時，我們就必須這麼做。因為我們不能，我們不能讓赤字佔 GDP 的 30%，我們做不到。
說話者01
Well we started with the qualities of a greater master and don't get wiped out is priority number one. And if you just think about where we are, the stretching rubber band and kicking the can down the road and just responding, we're great and greatest stimulus. At some point that ends.
我們最初是從偉大大師的特質開始談起，而首要之務就是不要被淘汰出局。只要想想我們現在的處境——就像拉長的橡皮筋、拖延問題的處理方式，以及不斷應對的狀態——我們正處於最強勁的刺激政策中。但這一切終有結束之時。
說話者02
And also I think we're the last one.
而且我認為我們是最後一個了。
說話者01
And then the interest rate cycle, we talked about that. So one thing that I've learned by talking to investors is they build a playbook and the longer they've been in the business, they feel like they've got to figure it out. And somebody's been in the business for 40 years. I feel like I've got this thing figured out. But a lot of those assumptions may be flipped on their head because the world has really changed. Would you talk about that?
接著我們談到了利率週期。透過與投資者交流，我學到的一點是：他們會建立一套投資策略，而隨著在這個行業的時間越久，他們就越覺得自己已經掌握訣竅。比如有人從業 40 年，會覺得自己已經完全摸透這個市場。但許多這樣的假設可能會被徹底顛覆，因為世界已經真正改變了。你能談談這點嗎？
說話者02
I talked about, we're secretly rising interest rates. That's a very big difference. And it will lead to different relationships, I think. So I think we'll see much higher default rates. We're already seeing elevated default rates on bank loans because they reprise every 90 days, typically. So they've already absorbed all those Fed hikes and they're actually benefiting from the Fed cuts a little bit. But I think that the endless outperformance of the United States equity market will reverse when this with this regime shift. If you just look at the foreign investment position in the United States, it's gotten so big. It's $23.5 trillion.
我談到，我們正在暗中提高利率。這是一個非常大的差異。我認為這將導致不同的關係。因此，我認為我們會看到更高的違約率。我們已經看到銀行貸款的違約率上升，因為它們通常每 90 天重新定價一次。所以它們已經吸收了所有那些聯準會的加息，而且實際上它們從聯準會的降息中稍微受益。但我認為，隨著這種體制轉變，美國股市無休止的優異表現將會逆轉。如果你只看美國的外國投資部位，它已經變得如此龐大，達到了 23.5 兆美元。
15 years ago or so, it was like three. It was the net investment position. So the outperformance of US has attracted money into the US and that's led to a virtuous circle of US outperformance because the money keeps piling in because it's a one way trade, particularly versus EM. I mean, it's been going on for like decades and versus Europe, it went on pretty hard for over a decade. But that's suddenly reversing now, which I think is a tell on this one way outperformance. It's driven in large extent by flows and flows reverse or can reverse. And when they do, particularly if we're getting bellocose with other economies and other governments, well, China, a few of these talk about China, not reinvesting their treasuries.
大約 15 年前，情況類似於三倍。那是淨投資部位。美國的優異表現吸引了資金流入美國，進而形成了一個良性循環，因為資金持續湧入，這是一個單向交易，尤其是相對於新興市場而言。我的意思是，這種情況已經持續了幾十年，而相對於歐洲，這種情況也持續了十多年。但現在突然開始逆轉，我認為這顯示了這種單向優異表現的跡象。這在很大程度上是由資金流動驅動的，而資金流動可以逆轉或確實逆轉。當這種情況發生時，特別是如果我們開始與其他經濟體和其他政府對抗，比如中國，有些人談到中國不再重新投資其美國國債。
But quietly, they've been doing that for a long time. I mean, they're already done by 600 billion from their peak. And so that's already happened, but what if that accelerates? And what if the non-cooperation, which obviously the terror, terror rhetoric, and just the past month has gotten people not getting along. I mean, we've got the Canadians booing the NHL, the national, the star-spangled banner when they play in Toronto or Montreal. So I mean, that's all part of things, you know, disassociating. And so I do think that I think my strongest belief on how this regime will play out is the mirror image concept.
但悄無聲息地，他們已經這樣做了很長時間。我是說，他們已經從高峰時期減少了 6000 億。這已經發生了，但如果這種情況加速呢？還有，如果這種不合作——顯然是恐怖言論，以及過去一個月讓人們無法和睦相處的情況——加劇呢？我是說，我們看到加拿大人對 NHL 比賽中演奏的美國國歌《星條旗》發出噓聲，無論是在多倫多還是蒙特利爾。所以，這都是疏離的一部分。因此，我確實認為，我對這個政權如何演變的最堅定信念就是鏡像概念。
I think the dollar will go down as the economy weakens. And I believe that's happening. And the dollar is already down by 10 percent from its highs and it's falling quite a bit on just in recent months. And most people say, I know this, I've been doing this 40 years, I know exactly how this works when the economy goes down, the dollar goes up. I think it's going to be the opposite. And I think during recessions, you know, the US outperforms, emerging markets don't do well, it's going to be the opposite. And so I really strongly suggest that investors that are US dollar based and I'm sure this is true, the prominence of US citizens, they have almost all their investments in the dollar, almost all. And I think that it's been such a comfortable thing to do because it worked in a nonstop way. But that's starting to change too. So I think the investment consequences of this is you want to be much more diversified, peel talk about 6040. I think 6040 went out the window with zero interest rates. And then we had the beer markets and stocks and bonds when the interest rates were rising. And I think I've been advocating more diversification, not just 6040 stocks, bonds. But just just take a look at what's happening with gold.
我認為隨著經濟走弱，美元將會下跌。而且我相信這種情況正在發生。美元已經從高點下跌了 10%，僅在最近幾個月就下跌了不少。大多數人會說，我知道這一點，我已經做了 40 年，我完全明白當經濟下滑時美元會上漲的運作方式。但我認為情況將會相反。我認為在經濟衰退期間，美國表現優異，新興市場表現不佳的情況將會反轉。因此，我強烈建議以美元為基礎的投資者——我相信這對美國公民尤為重要，因為他們幾乎所有的投資都是以美元計價的，幾乎全部都是——我認為這樣做一直很舒適，因為它一直有效。但這種情況也開始改變了。所以我認為這對投資的影響是，你需要更加多元化，不要只談論 60/40 的比例。我認為 60/40 的比例在零利率時代已經不適用了。然後在利率上升時，我們經歷了啤酒市場、股票和債券的波動。我一直主張更多的多元化，不僅僅是 60/40 的股票和債券配置。 但請看看黃金市場的現況。
Gold actually, if you take a very highly convenient start date, which is the year, January first 2000, so it's been 25 years, stocks have done quite well, gold's done better. And if you just look at the S&P divided by gold, it doesn't really relate at all. So we're starting to see interest away from traditional dollar only, 64 types of investments. And that's why I believe gold has been so strong when other commodities have been weak. It's not so much for economic purposes. It's people are bi-degrees, monotonically gaining mistrust in a way all of this is being run. From all of this embedded elites and amazing how many politicians we have that were born in the 1940s and they're still in office. They just don't want to leave.
事實上，若以一個極具代表性的起始點來看——也就是 2000 年 1 月 1 日，至今已 25 年——股市表現相當不錯，但黃金的表現更勝一籌。若觀察標普 500 指數與黃金的比值，兩者幾乎毫無關聯。我們正逐漸見證資金從傳統純美元投資（64 種投資類型）中抽離的趨勢。這正是為何在其他大宗商品疲軟之際，黃金仍能保持強勢。這與經濟用途關係不大，而是人們對現行體制運作方式逐漸、單調地失去信任。看看這些根深蒂固的精英階層吧！令人驚訝的是，有多少出生於 1940 年代的政治人物至今仍在位。他們就是不願離開。
But I think the dropout due to age or just death, I mean, you're going to see all those people that are clinging to this belief that it's still 1960. I'm talking about all of the 80 year old politicians. It seems to think the same thing. And they will, there are ability to hang onto that. We'll decrease by circumstances, but just by simple demographics will go away. And the United States has been a very strange position for a long, long time. And that is spending way more money on retired people than on young people. I read a magazine article back when there were magazines on airplanes and you've had to read them because you were in a family else to do.
但我認為，由於年齡或只是死亡而退出，我的意思是，你會看到所有那些堅持這種信念的人，認為現在仍然是 1960 年代。我指的是所有 80 歲的政治人物。他們似乎都這麼想。而他們會，有能力堅持這一點。我們的情況會減少，但僅僅因為簡單的人口統計學就會消失。美國長期以來一直處於一個非常奇怪的位置。那就是花在退休人員身上的錢遠遠多於年輕人。我曾經在飛機上讀過一篇雜誌文章，那時飛機上還有雜誌，你不得不讀它們，因為你無事可做。
I read an article, this is quite a few years ago. And it said that if you take a look at 65 plus and compare them to, I think it was 25 and younger, we spend seven times as much on 65 plus as we do on 25 and under. And spending money a lot of money on 65 plus, you're just giving them, you're just giving them sustenance, you're not investing in the future. There's no such thing as investing in an 80 year old. But the future is the younger generation. And if you're not developing, I mean, not educating them, you're really missing out. So you see this everywhere, you know, the leaders, the leaders of all this or a Californian seems to lead everything in a vast, everything in California.
我讀過一篇文章，那是好幾年前的事了。文章中提到，如果你比較 65 歲以上和 25 歲以下的人群，我們在 65 歲以上的人身上花的錢是 25 歲以下人群的七倍。而在 65 歲以上的人身上花大錢，你只是在給他們維持生計，而不是在投資未來。投資一個 80 歲的人是沒有意義的。未來屬於年輕一代。如果你不培養——我是說，不教育他們，你真的錯失了機會。這種情況隨處可見，你知道的，那些領導者，所有這些的領導者，或者說加州人似乎領導著一切，加州的一切。
It's been so much money per student on education and yet they have very mediocre results. So it's like we're in this place where we're not logically managing and I think it's a lot to do with the political cycle. It's always yield to next election for politicians. And it's one of the fall downfalls of democracy is if you have regular elections and the U.S. is really extreme in this regard. I mean, it's set in stone two years, four years, six years. Well, you know, that it's hard to do long-term planning. So one of the ways that China managed to keep together for a long time is if you're in a autocracy.
我們在教育上為每個學生投入了這麼多錢，但成果卻非常平庸。所以我們現在處於一個沒有邏輯管理的狀態，我認為這很大程度上與政治週期有關。對政客來說，一切總是讓位於下一次選舉。而民主制度的弊端之一就是如果你有定期的選舉，美國在這方面真的非常極端。我的意思是，兩年、四年、六年都是固定的。你知道，這使得長期規劃變得困難。所以中國能夠長期保持團結的方式之一就是處於專制體制下。
But we have we have benefits of democracy or the republic or democratic voting. But there's also the idea that the regime can change awfully quickly as if we saw in the first four weeks of Trump's second term. I mean, things are changing very, very quickly and they can be changed back. Maybe one executive order says what next guy comes in and changes back and they come back and changes again. So it's not a system that has a spirit or a belief system. It's just it's devolved into very short termism. I think what with the U.S. A.D. thing, I mean, I know that some of that stuff is prior legitimate, but I mean, the list that they wrote were reading off the first few days of looking at that was pretty horrifying. I mean, it's not a lot of money, but the fact that it's anything like that is reveals. And you can only imagine how much rot there must be in the defense department which feels every audit. I mean, they never, they don't know where the money went. You know, you can only imagine what they're going to find in Medicaid Medicare and the department of defense. I mean, there's a lot there. And I think it'll accelerate the dissatisfaction with the way we keep kicking the can down the road and allowing for blatant corruption.
但我們擁有民主或共和政體的好處，或是民主投票的權利。但同時也存在政權可以極快更迭的觀念，就像我們在川普第二任期的前四周所見。我是說，事情變化得非常、非常快，而且它們也可能被逆轉。也許一項行政命令剛頒布，下一位上任者就將其撤銷，然後又有人回來再次更改。所以這不是一個擁有精神或信仰體系的制度。它只是退化成了非常短視的狀態。我想，關於美國國防部那件事，我是說，我知道其中一些事情之前是合法的，但他們在前幾天查看時列出的清單相當駭人。我是說，金額並不大，但事實上有這樣的事情發生就已經揭露了問題。你只能想像國防部裡有多少腐敗，他們每次審計都感覺得到。我是說，他們從來不知道錢去了哪裡。你知道，你只能想像他們在醫療補助、醫療保險和國防部會發現什麼。我是說，那裡問題很多。 我認為這將加速人們對我們不斷拖延問題、縱容明目張膽腐敗行為的不滿。
I mean, just blatant corruption. And I guess everybody can always knew the politicians were corrupt, but I don't suppose they suspected the extent to which they could go. Well, decades ago, people were getting angry because the government was paying $100 for a hammer in the defense department. I mean, that sounded bad at the time, but what we got going on now is really was unimaginable and unthinkable just 20 years ago.
我是說，簡直就是明目張膽的腐敗。我想大家一直都知道政客們很腐敗，但我猜他們沒料到這些人能墮落到什麼程度。幾十年前，人們就因為國防部花 100 美元買一把錘子而憤怒。那在當時聽起來已經很糟糕了，但現在發生的事，在 20 年前根本是無法想像、難以置信的。
說話者01
You brought up the topic that I think is worth digging into a little bit, which is obviously the macro environment is highly uncertain as a lot of risk and regime shifts and everything we talked about. And then you also talked about in consequence and as a function of this, you want to be more diversified. Yet, when you look at most investors, they're much less diversified today than they were 10 years ago. I think that's right, particularly with the fads when the mania's come and we had a mania in 2024. I mean, the whole mind is, since seven things, obvious mania. I mean, it's exactly a carbon copy of what happened in the letter part of the 20th century. And so you get to these manias and people buy the S&P 500 index fund because they're like DTF's or cheap and the whole thing, but they don't realize that seven stocks are this massive piece and they're all highly correlated. So the NSMP index fund has such a massive AI or yeah, I'd it's less now, but massive AI sort of awaiting.
你提到了一個我認為值得深入探討的話題，那就是宏觀環境顯然充滿高度不確定性，伴隨著許多風險和體制轉變，以及我們談論的一切。接著你也談到，作為這種情況的結果和功能，你會希望更加多元化。然而，當你觀察大多數投資者時，他們現在的多元化程度比十年前低得多。我認為這是正確的，特別是在狂熱潮流來臨時，我們在 2024 年就經歷了一次狂熱。我的意思是，整個市場就是，七件事，明顯的狂熱。我的意思是，這完全是 20 世紀後半葉發生的事情的翻版。所以當這些狂熱來臨時，人們會購買標普 500 指數基金，因為他們覺得 DTF 很便宜或什麼的，但他們沒有意識到那七支股票佔了很大一部分，而且它們之間高度相關。所以 NSMP 指數基金有如此巨大的 AI，或者說，現在可能少一些了，但巨大的 AI 某種程度上還在等待。
But I think people need to diversify out of financial assets as the only thing that they so-called invest in. I mean, people have a house, but they can't really sell your house. You gotta live somewhere. But I think the reason it gold has gotten new life is because people buying it as an asset class, not as a speculation, not as some commodity pool advisor or something, they're buying it because they, it's outside of what they see is a deteriorating financial management at the governmental level in much of the world. And so they're going to that and I think real estate just land farmland. I mean, I thought I was never a real estate guy, but over the past 10 years, about three significant properties. And I have a mix now. I'm different. You know, asset allocation is very personalized. I had to do with where you are in life and what your resources are. But when I just talk about everything that's non-double-line, because I don't know how to what bucket to put double-line in such a unique thing. But when it comes to real assets versus financial assets, I'm basically 50-50. So I believe in tangibles, I believe in land, I believe in gold or other high concentration stores of value.
但我認為人們需要將投資多元化，而不僅僅局限於金融資產。我的意思是，人們可能擁有一棟房子，但你不能真的賣掉你的房子，因為你總得有個地方住。然而，我認為黃金之所以重獲新生，是因為人們將其視為一種資產類別來購買，而非投機或某種商品池顧問之類的東西。他們購買黃金是因為它超出了他們所見的、在全球許多政府層面日益惡化的財務管理範疇。因此，他們轉向黃金，而我認為房地產——僅僅是土地、農田——也是同樣的道理。我過去從不認為自己是房地產投資者，但在過去的十年裡，我已經擁有了大約三處重要的房產。現在我的投資組合已經多元化。你知道，資產配置是非常個人化的，它與你的人生階段和資源有關。但當我談到所有非雙線（double-line）的資產時——因為我不知道該如何歸類雙線這種獨特的東西——在實物資產與金融資產之間，我基本上是五五開。因此，我相信有形資產，我相信土地，我相信黃金或其他高濃度的價值儲存方式。
And I think, I'll, it'll be a long time before I go back into financial assets at greater than a 50% sort of sort of allocation. So I've gone, that's pretty significant. When I talk about other people who aren't in a more common situation, I've been advocating 25% cash for the last six, eight months. And only about 20, 25% in stocks. And the stocks be equal weighted, not marketed. So you actually have diversification in the US. And then I like long-term plays. And my favorite long-term play.
我認為，在未來很長一段時間內，我都不會將超過 50%的資產配置到金融資產上。這是一個相當重大的轉變。當我談到那些處於更常見情況的人時，過去六到八個月我一直在建議持有 25%的現金，股票配置僅約 20%到 25%，而且這些股票應該是等權重配置而非市值加權，這樣才能在美國市場實現真正的分散投資。此外，我偏好長期投資策略，而我最看好的長期投資標的...
And this has been, I've been saying this for over a decade is India because of the demographics and the education and the global supply chains escape from China. And they have the same demographic profile today that China did 35 years ago, which means hundreds of millions of people entering the labor force. China actually has a decreasing labor force now that we're suffering the back end of the consequences of the so-called one-child policy, which was never one-child policy. But they did have a low birth rate. And that's challenging too for the fourth turning. If you will, you've got all these developed economies and they have horrible fertility rates. Under two.
這個觀點我已經提倡了超過十年——由於人口結構、教育水平以及全球供應鏈從中國轉移的趨勢，印度是最具潛力的市場。當前印度的人口結構與 35 年前的中國相似，意味著將有數億勞動力進入市場。反觀中國，由於所謂「一胎化政策」（實際上從未嚴格執行單孩政策）的後遺症，勞動力人口正持續減少。這對所謂的「第四次轉折」也構成挑戰——所有已開發經濟體都面臨生育率低於 2.0 的嚴峻問題。
And so the population's dwindling or they need immigration. The most common male name in 2024 in the UK was Muhammad, which is kind of tells you how the demographic shift has been evolving. And so we don't have quite the same problem here, although we certainly decided that our fall-off in the labor force could partially be replaced ultimately with immigrants.
因此人口正在減少，或者他們需要移民。2024 年英國最常見的男性名字是穆罕默德，這在某種程度上告訴你人口結構的變化是如何演變的。所以我們在這裡沒有完全相同的問題，儘管我們確實認為勞動力的下降最終可以部分由移民來替代。
說話者01
If you had to rank the performance of these four asset classes within the next 10 years, or would you rank them? US stocks, non-US stocks, bonds and gold.
如果你必須在未來 10 年內對這四種資產類別的表現進行排名，或者你會如何排名？美國股票、非美國股票、債券和黃金。
說話者02
I think number one would probably be non-US stocks. Number two would be gold. Number three. I guess it would be US stocks. That's a close call between that and bonds. Yeah. When if you'd asked me that 18 months ago, I would have been much higher up on bonds. I mean, the yields from much higher, you could easily, easily put together a low-risk bond portfolio with 8 or 9% yield. Now, you know, six is the new, is the new nine.
我認為第一名可能是非美國股票。第二名會是黃金。第三名，我想會是美國股票。這和債券之間的差距很小。是的，如果你在 18 個月前問我這個問題，我會把債券排得更高。我的意思是，當時的收益率要高得多，你可以很容易、很容易地組建一個低風險的債券投資組合，收益率達到 8%或 9%。現在，你知道，6%是新常態，是新的 9%。
And yes, stocks might be able to do 6%. But from the starting point of where we were at the end of 2024, I would think stocks and bonds. I would think getting 9 or 8 out of stocks from where we started. It just seems impossible. The cap ratio, Schiller's, Sucleus, Joseph Ration was at 37. It just can't get higher. I mean, it's only higher once in history. And I think that was 1999. So it's all earnings. You can't expect expansion from a 37 cap ratio of any significance.
是的，股票或許能有 6%的報酬。但從 2024 年底的起點來看，我認為股票和債券的表現。我原本預期股票能從當時的起點獲得 9%或 8%的報酬，現在看來根本不可能。當時的市值比率——席勒本益比（Shiller CAPE）高達 37 倍，幾乎沒有再上升的空間。歷史上只有一次比這更高，我想那是在 1999 年。所以一切都取決於企業獲利。你不可能指望從 37 倍的本益比中獲得顯著的擴張空間。
So what are the earnings going to be? Well, people are hoping for 12% this year. They were hoping for 14%. The ways are shaping up. I think it's going to be single digit. So yeah, I think bonds and stocks are sort of close. But where we are now on yields with some rates now below 4 again on the Treasury bond market. And I see very significant problems for long-term Treasury bonds as well. So I put long-term Treasury bonds as the least attract even the rates have come up some.
那麼企業獲利會如何呢？目前市場希望今年能有 12%的成長，之前甚至期待 14%。但從現狀來看，我認為最終會是單數字的成長率。因此，現在債券和股票的吸引力確實接近。但考慮到當前公債市場部分利率又回落至 4%以下，我認為長期公債也存在非常嚴重的問題。所以即便利率略有回升，我仍將長期公債列為最不具吸引力的選項。
We have been de-emphasizing long-term Treasury bonds. And one of the things that I'm still grappling with is we entered this year with a very little extra compensation versus historical norms from buying non- Treasury bonds by buying junk bonds or corporate bonds. And it's stuck for a long time. But on a valuation basis, you should be saying, I don't want to have heavy allocations to these things. But I think the reason that we've had such a prolonged period of that de-emonomous compensation for taking that risk is I think people are waking up to the fact that that risk might not even be a risk.
我們一直在降低長期國債的配置比重。其中一個我仍在思考的問題是，今年初我們發現購買非國債債券（如垃圾債券或公司債）所能獲得的額外補償，與歷史標準相比微乎其微。這種情況已持續很長時間。但從估值角度來看，你應該會說：我不想重倉這類資產。然而我認為，之所以會長期存在這種承擔風險卻未獲相應補償的異常現象，是因為人們逐漸意識到——這種風險可能根本算不上真正的風險。
If you're willing to accept the notion as possible that they restructure the Treasury debt, you might be better off in corporate bonds. When I started in this business, there were corporate bonds that yielded less than Treasury bonds. IBM, for example. IBM still around. So it wasn't a lot of risk there. But it was perceived that IBM was a safer bond investment than the Treasury. Did you get trust the company more than you can trust the government? Well, yes, and people thought that the government was running a bad fiscal policy.
如果你願意接受「美國財政部可能重組債務」這個假設，那麼投資公司債或許是更好的選擇。我剛入行時，有些公司債的收益率甚至低於國債，例如 IBM（國際商業機器公司）。IBM 至今仍在運營，所以當時投資其債券風險並不大。但當時市場認為 IBM 債券比國債更安全——你寧可信任企業也不信任政府？沒錯，因為人們認為當時政府正在實施糟糕的財政政策。
We still are. Tours, let's worse. I think that investment grade corporate bonds are really like single-day corporate bonds. I think they're safer than long-term treasuries. Even though the government can print money to pay it. They can print it, but it won't be worth anything. That hurts your corporate bonds too because they're dollar-denominated. But the government has been printing a lot of money. And it's getting to the point where it's not your grandchildren's problem anymore. Remember years ago, people used to say social careers got run out of money by 2050.
我們現在依然如此。說實話，我認為投資級公司債券其實就像單日公司債券。我覺得它們比長期國債更安全。儘管政府可以印鈔來償還債務，但印出來的鈔票可能一文不值。這也會傷害到你的公司債券，因為它們是以美元計價的。但政府一直在大量印鈔，現在已經到了這不再是你的孫輩才需要面對的問題的地步。記得幾年前，人們常說社會保險基金會在 2050 年前耗盡資金。
And then 10 years later, it was 2040. And then 10 years later, it's 2032. I think they're out of money in five years. And so this is a real-time problem. And this is why non-financial assets, non-dollar investments, I think, are more attractive now than any time in the past 10 to 20 years.
然後十年後，這個期限變成了 2040 年。再過十年，現在又變成了 2032 年。我認為他們在五年內就會耗盡資金。所以這是一個即時的問題。這就是為什麼非金融資產、非美元投資現在比過去 10 到 20 年中的任何時候都更具吸引力。
說話者01
And that's part of being diversified. We talked about diversification. So being diversified across non-financial assets and financial assets, different asset classes. And when you just look at where people are, it is extremely concentrated. It's heavy in stocks, heavy in US stocks, heavy in a handful of companies. It's almost the opposite extreme.
而這正是分散投資的一部分。我們談到了分散投資。因此，要在非金融資產和金融資產、不同的資產類別之間進行分散投資。當你觀察人們的投資現狀時，會發現投資極度集中。重倉股票、重倉美國股票、重倉少數幾家公司。這幾乎是另一個極端。
說話者02
Well, like I said, it's highly reminiscent of the last few years of the 1990s. You know, yes, something that investors are successful have in common. I think one of the things is, I don't know if you're born with this or you're somewhere developing it, but it's sort of an emotional memory. Where you're ever facts, most people can remember facts pretty well. But don't remember kind of how it felt. That's why I mean by emotional memory. And I'm part of getting from reading a book. I've been really sort of lucky with that. The thing that really, really defined my almost unique success during the global financial crisis for someone that wasn't shorting things. I remembered 1994 in the Fed cycle. And the bottom art was poor in 1994. It was, you know, 2022 was way worse. But 1994 was not great. And there was a lot of malinvestment that was banking on interest rates, not going up and the Fed had to raise rates during 1994. And there was no bid. Nobody had any money because everybody was a seller. So prices were just gapping lower.
就像我說的，這讓人強烈聯想到 1990 年代末期的情景。你知道的，成功的投資者確實有一些共同點。我認為其中一點是——不確定這是與生俱來還是後天培養的——某種情感記憶力。多數人都能清楚記得事實，但往往忘記當時的感受，這正是我所謂的情感記憶。這部分能力我從閱讀中獲得，在這方面我算是相當幸運。真正讓我在全球金融危機期間（作為沒有做空操作的人）取得近乎獨特成功的關鍵，在於我記得 1994 年聯準會的升息週期。1994 年的債券市場表現很差——當然 2022 年更糟——但 1994 年確實不好。當時有大量錯誤投資押注利率不會上升，而聯準會卻在 1994 年被迫升息。市場完全沒有買盤，因為所有人都在拋售導致資金枯竭，價格只能斷崖式下跌。
And certain securities that were in the news as being money losers for some public pension plans and stuff. Nobody wanted to buy them. They either didn't have the money or it was viewed to be impruent. And the securities got so cheap. It was unbelievable. It was truly unbelievable. There was absolutely no way to lose. People were just giving them away. I mean, there were securities that if you put on the worst possible assumptions, you would still have significant excess return versus treasures. The worst possible case assumptions. And I was just amazed at how low they went. And I learned the lesson. I said, you know, it's not always about value. Somebody has to actually take out all it and buy. And the global financial crisis was just getting started. Countrywide wasn't gone yet. But there started to be problems with the defaults going up. And one Friday afternoon, which is a really terrible time to do a margin call, but a mortgage rate, a very high quality mortgage rate, maybe the best one in terms of their underwriting, ran out of money and they got margin call. And these floating rate mortgages had never traded below 100. The prices started to give and they were drowned about 98. So not much of a discount. And this list comes in from this rate. And there were big blocks. It was a big rate. And there were several trades that were in the hundreds of millions. And they said, we're talking at 97.
而某些證券在當時的新聞中被報導為一些公共退休金計劃等的賠錢貨。沒有人想買它們。他們要不是沒錢，就是認為這不明智。而那些證券變得非常便宜，簡直令人難以置信。真的難以置信。根本不可能虧損。人們簡直是在白送。我是說，有些證券即便你以最糟糕的假設來評估，你還是會相對於國債仍有顯著的超額回報。這是最壞情況的假設。我當時對價格跌到如此之低感到震驚，並從中學到了教訓。我說，你知道嗎，這不僅僅是價值的問題。總得有人實際接手並買下所有這些資產。當時全球金融危機才剛開始，Countrywide 還未倒閉，但違約率上升的問題已開始浮現。某個週五下午——這真是進行保證金追繳的最糟時機——一個抵押貸款利率，一個非常高品質的抵押貸款利率，可能是他們承銷中最好的一個，資金耗盡並收到了保證金追繳通知。這些浮動利率抵押貸款從未以低於 100 的價格交易過，價格開始鬆動，跌到了約 98，折扣並不大。這份清單來自這個利率，而且是大宗交易，涉及的利率規模龐大，有幾筆交易金額達數億美元。他們說，我們正在以 97 的價格談判。
And I said, I don't know. I'll pay, I've been 93, 4 point back, and I got hit on 300 million. And one of the younger guys, he's tuned how works at double line. It's been worked for me, his whole career. He was, this is, he's had a Russian accent. It's like, this is too cheap. This is the cheapest bond I have ever seen. And it was like a lightning bolt went off. It was like, you're right in that on the ticket. cheapest bond I've ever seen.
我說，我不知道。我會付錢，我已經 93 歲了，落後 4 點，然後我被擊中了 3 億。其中一個年輕人，他在雙線工作。這對我來說一直有效，他的整個職業生涯都是如此。他是，這個，他有俄羅斯口音。就像是，這太便宜了。這是我見過的最便宜的債券。就像一道閃電劃過。就像是，你說得對，就在那張票上。這是我見過的最便宜的債券。
You're tacking it onto the blotter on the board. Because mark my words. They yielded at that price 93, they yielded 8. And I said, mark my words, this isn't going to end until these things yield 15. Well, I was wrong. They actually went to a yield of 40. But the point was, I said, we are not buying any more of these period. None. We're not putting on a throw. We've been nothing.
你把它釘在板上的交易記錄上。因為記住我的話。它們在那個價格 93 時收益率是 8。我說，記住我的話，這些東西的收益率不會停止，直到它們達到 15。好吧，我錯了。它們實際上達到了 40 的收益率。但重點是，我說，我們不會再買這些了，就這樣。一個也不買。我們不會再投入任何東西。我們什麼都沒做。
And we're going to, there was a small rally early on in the credit crisis. We were able to get out of profit. But those bonds went down to like 45 cents on the dollar. And today, there were like 103 again. But there was nobody to buy him. That's what people don't understand. The popularity of index funds is dangerous because you have, index does well, attracts money, index does better. The index outperforms 95% of active managers and stocks. A bull market has something to do with that because the index has no cash.
我們當時在信貸危機初期遇到了一波小反彈，成功獲利了結。但那些債券後來跌到了約 45 美分兌一美元。而今天，它們又回升到了 103 美分左右。但問題是當時根本找不到買家——這點多數人都不明白。指數基金的盛行其實很危險，因為當指數表現好時會吸引資金流入，進而推升指數表現更好。指數能擊敗 95%的主動型基金經理和股票表現，這與牛市有關，畢竟指數基金不持有現金部位。
But it's that thing that people are just reinforced to buy more. And then all of a sudden, starts going down and they start selling. And there's nobody to buy it. And index funds are very susceptible to this because you know, you're running an index fund. They give you money. You buy the stocks. You're buying, put some, put some higher. People give you more money. And again, it's a virtuous circle. And the other side of that is the vicious cycle of selling.
但問題在於這種機制會強化人們持續買進的行為。等到市場突然轉跌時，大家又開始拋售，這時反而找不到承接買盤。指數基金特別容易受此影響——試想你在管理指數基金，資金湧入時你就得按比例買進成分股。你越買股價就被推得越高，吸引更多資金流入，形成良性循環。但反過來說，這也造就了惡性拋售循環。
And I don't think investors quite understand the danger of having so much money in index funds that have such lack of diversification. So it's this theme runs through everything. It's this question of degree. And I think the worst is US index funds because of the foreign investment position, we could have 20 trillion dollars come out of this market in the next whoever, however, many years. Could even happen in a more compressed timeframe, that would lead to tremendous underperformance. Because that maybe that money goes home. Because Europe is now outperforming in recent weeks. It's now outperforming.
我認為投資者並未充分理解將如此龐大的資金投入缺乏多元化的指數基金所帶來的風險。這個主題貫穿於所有討論中，關鍵在於程度問題。我認為最糟糕的是美國指數基金，由於其海外投資部位，未來無論多少年內，我們可能會看到 20 兆美元資金撤出這個市場。甚至可能在更短的時間內發生，這將導致極其嚴重的表現不佳。因為這些資金可能會回流本土。因為歐洲近幾週表現已開始超越美國，目前確實如此。
Emerging markets have started to perform. Maybe that becomes a trend. And everybody wants to switch to the new ball game. And I think the odds of that, again, it might take longer, probably will take longer than people think. But it's going to be very severe. And the underperformance is going to be very acute and painful. And that's what will accelerate that turnover from sector to sector, from country to country. And I believe it has started.
新興市場已開始有所表現，這可能形成一種趨勢。每個人都想轉向新的投資領域。我認為這種轉變的機率，雖然可能需要比人們預期更長的時間，但一旦發生將會非常劇烈。表現不佳的情況將極其尖銳且痛苦，這將加速資金在不同產業與國家間的輪動。而我認為這個過程已經開始了。
說話者01
And if I were to tease out the insight in what you just described, the way I would summarize it is, as an investor, you have to be very careful about the assumptions that you make. And in some ways, the ones who have been in the market for a long time have deeper assumptions that they feel are investment truths. And when you go through a big regime change and the backdrop changes radically, you've got to be really careful because that's what can wipe you out.
如果我從你剛才的描述中提煉出關鍵見解，我會這樣總結：作為投資者，你必須對自己所做的假設非常謹慎。某種程度上，那些在市場中打滾多年的人，他們懷抱更深層的假設，並視之為投資真理。而當你經歷重大體制變革，且背景環境劇烈變化時，你必須格外小心，因為這正是可能讓你一敗塗地的關鍵。
說話者02
Yeah, I put it in very simple practical way of operating every single time that, and I learned this probably 30 years ago through painful experience or two, every time you make a change or reconsidering allocation, first question I asked myself is, if and when this goes wrong, how am I going to explain it to the client? What is the spectrum of my assumptions and somewhere within that spectrum, there has to be analysis done that assumes that this is going to be wrong. Yes, it was wrong, but I had a legitimate thesis, very well-flot through, but I'm wrong about 30% of the time, which is quite a low number. I mean, most people are more than 50% of the time, and people are reasonably successful in investment business, they're like 55% of the time.
是的，我用非常簡單實際的方式來操作每一次，這大概是我 30 年前透過一兩次痛苦的經驗學到的。每當你做出改變或重新考慮配置時，我問自己的第一個問題是：如果這件事出錯了，我該如何向客戶解釋？我的假設範圍是什麼，而在這個範圍內的某處，必須進行分析，假設這件事會出錯。是的，我錯了，但我有一個合理的論點，經過充分思考，但我大約有 30%的時間是錯的，這是一個相當低的數字。我的意思是，大多數人超過 50%的時間都是錯的，而在投資業務中相當成功的人，他們大約有 55%的時間是對的。
I'm pretty very high, but I've been doing this for over 40 years and I've got tons of data, so I'm statistically pretty significant. You know you're going to be wrong, so you just say, okay, this is one of the 30% that I got wrong, but this is how it was risk mitigated, this is how the loss was contained and how it didn't come a fatal risk. That's really important because there's nothing worse than I've seen some real horror shows. I've been in meetings with pension committees years ago now where they would have all their managers come in and the managers would present with the other managers present, going around the table, and I'll never forget one. It was during the emerging market, the long-term capital management meltdown, the world of the markets, and this poor firm had had really a visible performance, and this is in bonds, too, and it's many percentage points below an index one, and they said, "So can you explain this to us?" And the guy from that company, wow, he said, "You know, we have no idea what happened. We're just as confused as you are." He was fired on the spot, and he deserved to be fired on the spot. It was just like, "We've always thought it's like, "Hey, we're throwing some darts one day, and this is where they landed." There was nothing there. So I really think it's important to say, "When and if this goes wrong, how am I going to explain?" I mean, when we had that tremendous interest rate suppression that yield zero interest rates for so many years, we had owned some securities, and they had because of the yield starvation, the lack of volatility, they had gone down to very low yields. In fact, it got to a point where the yield on under the most likely outcome was negative, actually negative, because it was a premium dollar price, the might could be returned quickly enough that you would have a bigger dollar loss on the price than the interest you received. And one of the guys that was helping to run that product, he was like, "I don't know what to do, because this looks so unattractive, but there's nothing to buy." And I said, "We cannot own something whose base case is a negative return in a way that's not even conjectural." I mean, it's just very simple mathematics. And I said, "We just can't do it. I'd rather own cash. I can explain to the investors why we have 30 percent cash. A lot better than how I own this." So sometimes you just have to really think, "No, I can't just sit here and do nothing." And the problem is lack of action. There's a syndrome in a lot of people that says, "Ready, aim, aim, aim, aim." And they just can't pull the trigger. And that's your first question. But investing and makes people good investors, you got to act. And there's an old bond phrase that's probably true in all investment classes. Your first loss is your best loss. What that means is don't hold onto something praying for a recovery. Small losses, more often turning back into profits, turn into bigger losses.
我現在狀態相當亢奮，但我在這行已經幹了超過 40 年，手上有海量數據，所以從統計學角度來看我的判斷相當具有參考價值。你明白自己總會犯錯，所以就直接承認：好吧，這是那 30%的失誤案例之一，但我們是這樣進行風險緩衝的，這樣控制虧損幅度的，這樣避免演變成致命風險的。這點非常重要——我見過些真正的災難場景，沒有比這更糟的了。多年前我參加養老金委員會會議時，他們會讓所有基金經理輪流匯報，其他經理就在會議室裡聽著。有個場景我永生難忘：當時新興市場正經歷長期資本管理公司崩潰引發的市場動盪，這家倒楣的公司業績慘不忍睹（而且還是債券投資），落後基準指數好幾個百分點。委員會問：「能解釋一下嗎？」那家公司的代表居然說：「說實話我們也一頭霧水，跟你們一樣困惑。」當場就被開除了，他活該被當場炒魷魚。 這就像是，「我們一直以為這就像，『嘿，某天我們隨手扔了些飛鏢，這就是它們落下的地方。』那裡什麼都沒有。」所以我真的認為重要的是要說，「當這件事出錯時，我該如何解釋？」我的意思是，當我們經歷了那長達多年的極低利率壓制，導致零利率時，我們持有了一些證券，由於收益匱乏、缺乏波動性，它們的收益率降到了非常低的水平。事實上，在最可能的情況下，收益率甚至是負的，確實是負的，因為它是以溢價美元價格買入的，可能很快就會回調，導致你在價格上的美元損失超過了你獲得的利息。當時協助管理那個產品的一位同事說，「我不知道該怎麼辦，因為這看起來太不吸引人了，但沒有其他東西可買。」而我說，「我們不能持有一個基本情況是負回報的東西，而且這甚至不是推測性的。」我的意思是，這只是非常簡單的數學。我說，「我們就是不能這麼做。我寧願持有現金。」 我可以向投資者解釋為什麼我們持有 30%現金，這比我擁有這些資產更能說明問題。」所以有時候你必須認真思考：「不，我不能只是坐在這裡什麼都不做。」問題在於缺乏行動。許多人有一種症狀叫做「準備、瞄準、瞄準、瞄準」，但就是無法扣下扳機。這是你的第一個問題。但要成為優秀的投資者，你必須採取行動。債券市場有句老話，可能適用於所有投資類別：第一次虧損是最好的虧損。意思是不要抱著某項資產祈禱它會回升。小虧損若經常轉為盈利，最終往往會變成大虧損。
So you have to be able to accept that and move on. That's important.
所以你必須能夠接受這一點並繼續前進。這很重要。
說話者01
The last question I wanted to ask you. Thank you for your time is on inflation. One of the assumptions and it may not be overt is that inflation volatility has been relatively low for a long period of time.
最後一個問題我想請教你。感謝你抽空回答，是關於通貨膨脹的。其中一個可能不明顯的假設是，通脹波動性長期以來一直相對較低。
說話者02
It was, yeah. 確實如此，是的。
說話者01
Until recently. But you basically had low and stable inflation for a long period of time. And then all the sudden inflation spike that came down. But it seems that inflation volatility is a thing now. And that has a significant impact on the way you invest. Because that is something that you could see people under value because it was not an issue for a long period of time.
直到最近。但基本上長期以來通膨都處於低且穩定的狀態。然後突然間通膨飆升又回落。但現在通膨波動似乎已成常態。這對投資方式產生重大影響，因為人們可能低估了這點，畢竟長期以來這都不是問題。
說話者02
Right. I've been predicting for over two decades that the response to recessions or economic weakness would increasingly be money giveaways. And we did it under George W. Bush. It was a few hundred dollars in the global financial crisis. And that's not enough. And then there's different rounds of this stuff. But you get to a certain point where it's too much. And the monetary authorities and certainly the leadership and government, they have no idea what that is. But we obviously passed that by the inflation rate going from 1.4 to 9.1 on the year over your CPI. And the next round I'm afraid is going to be bigger. And so inflation went up to 9.1 pretty quickly.
沒錯。我過去二十多年來一直預測，對經濟衰退或疲軟的反應會越來越多地以發錢方式呈現。我們在小布希任內就這麼做過，全球金融危機時發了幾百美元。但那根本不夠。後來這類措施又進行了好幾輪。但總會到達一個臨界點，發太多錢反而適得其反。貨幣當局和政府領導層顯然不知道界線在哪。從消費者物價指數年增率 1.4%飆到 9.1%來看，我們顯然已越過那條線。我擔心下一輪刺激規模會更大。通膨確實很快就衝到了 9.1%。
So few people in the Fed saw this coming. And it just seems to me that anybody, you don't need economics lessons. If you give, when I was like five years old, we didn't have any money. And I remember saying, you know, bomb, why doesn't the government just give everybody a million dollars? No, everything would be great. She says, Jeffrey, if the government gave everybody a million dollars, an apple would cost a thousand dollars. And I was like five years old. And I said, hey, she's right. Because I used to, in speeches, I used to say, I hear commonly the most ridiculous idea that you cannot bring inflation back because of demographics and all the stuff.
聯準會裡幾乎沒人預見到這點。對我來說，這根本不需要經濟學課程就能理解。記得我五歲時家裡很窮，我曾天真地問：「為什麼政府不直接給每人一百萬美元？這樣大家不就都過得好了嗎？」我母親回答：「傑佛瑞，如果政府真這麼做，一顆蘋果就會漲到一千美元。」當時才五歲的我就恍然大悟——她說得對。我常在演講中提到，最荒謬的論調莫過於「人口結構等因素會讓通膨回不來」。
I said, I can bring inflation back by five o'clock this afternoon. And I have the Treasury Department to clear, I'm going to be hyperbolic for dramatic effect, that they're going to give every single American one billion dollars. And I said, if there isn't inflation by five o'clock tonight, the lines at the Ferrari dealers are going to be something to behold. Of course, you can get that happening. It's always in forever a monetary phenomenon. And that amount of money. So I think you're right. We had inflation was so stable.
我曾公開說過：「我能在今天下午五點前讓通膨捲土重來。」為了戲劇效果我要誇張地說——只要財政部核准，我就要給每個美國人十億美元。我還補了句：「如果今晚五點前沒爆發通膨，法拉利經銷商門口的排隊盛況絕對會成為奇觀。」當然這會立刻引發通膨，貨幣現象永遠是關鍵因素。正如你所言，過去通膨確實穩定得令人安心。
I mean, it was two plus or minus for so long. It didn't matter what terrible policies we ran. It didn't matter that we started giving money away. But we've crossed the rubicon. We did it. And I don't know if that will. They won't suddenly get a new dose of caution and fiscal rectitude. Because when the trouble comes, it's always the same thing. We've got to do something, desperate times call for desperate measures. And these crises keep getting worse.
我的意思是，長期以來通膨率都在 2%上下浮動。無論我們實施多糟糕的政策都沒關係。即便開始撒錢也無所謂。但我們已經越過了盧比孔河。我們真的這麼做了。我不確定這是否會...他們不會突然變得謹慎或恢復財政紀律。因為當危機來臨時，總是一樣的劇本——我們必須採取行動，非常時期需要非常手段。而這些危機正變得越來越嚴重。
And so I think it's base case is the next one will be worse than the last one. And that means a bigger response. And that's going to be the catalyst.
所以我認為基本情境是：下一次危機會比上次更嚴重。這意味著需要更大規模的應對措施。而這將成為催化劑。
說話者01
I appreciate you sharing your insights. I always enjoy our conversations. And I hope our listeners did as well. Thank you. Thanks everybody for listening.
感謝您分享這些深刻見解。每次與您對談都讓我獲益良多。希望聽眾們也有同感。謝謝。也感謝各位的收聽。
We hope you enjoyed this episode.
希望您喜歡本集內容。
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