《洞見投資者》播客於 2025 年 4 月 22 日專訪陳守全：長期股權投資之道
[MUSIC] Welcome to the insightful investor podcast, a weekly series that seeks to share industry, investment and market insights. Learn more about our show at insightfulinvestor.org. [MUSIC] Today's guest is Sue Twenton. Sue Twenton is the founder of Disarrain Group, which is a $2.5 billion investor manager, focused on fundamental, contrary and long-term, global value investing. And we're going to get into all of that today.
[音樂] 歡迎收聽《洞見投資者》播客，這是一個每週系列節目，旨在分享產業、投資與市場洞見。更多節目資訊請見 insightfulinvestor.org。[音樂] 今天的嘉賓是蘇·特溫頓。蘇·特溫頓是迪薩蘭集團的創辦人，該集團是一家管理 25 億美元資產的投資機構，專注於基本面、逆向思維及長期全球價值投資。今天我們將深入探討這些主題。
Sue Twenton launched the firm in 2010, and has developed a unique investment framework in mindset that I look forward to digging into today. Thank you so much for joining us. >> Thank you for having me, Alex. It's a pleasure to be here with you. >> We've had a few conversations in the past. And one thing that's clear to me is that you're a true independent thinker. What influences would you say have shaped this aspect of your approach? >> That's a great question. I'm not a psychologist.
蘇·特溫頓於 2010 年創立公司，並發展出一套獨特的投資框架與思維模式，我期待今天能深入挖掘。非常感謝您加入我們。>> 謝謝邀請，亞歷克斯。很榮幸能與您在此對談。>> 我們過去曾有幾次對話。我清楚意識到您是一位真正獨立的思想家。您認為哪些影響因素塑造了您這方面的投資取向？>> 這是個好問題。我並非心理學家。
What I am about to say simply my own intuition. So take it for what it's worth. But I suspect that independent maintenance is polygina. They can probably learn. In my case, I think that my brain is wired to need to understand things around me from first principles. When I was young, I was at an oinkit that kept asking, why, why, why, about everything around me. But as far back as I can remember, it was not satisfying to get the answer.
我接下來要說的純粹是我個人的直覺。所以僅供參考。但我懷疑獨立維護是 polygina。他們或許能夠學習。以我為例，我認為我的大腦天生就需要從第一原理去理解周遭的事物。小時候，我就像個不斷追問「為什麼、為什麼、為什麼」的好奇寶寶，對身邊的一切都充滿疑問。但就我記憶所及，得到答案從來沒有讓我感到滿足。
Well, it's because it's always been this way or because I said so, because everybody else agrees that it is so. It was intuitive for me to ask. But why could it not be otherwise looking back, I was lucky that this natural independent streak was not shut down by the adults in my life. My parents were both for their extensions. And they encouraged me to go find out the many wise that occupied my interests. Like why is the sky blue? Let's go figure that out. Many of my teachers allowed me to read and pursue special projects beyond the required curricula at school and made time outside the classroom just to engage in discussions where I was treated as an equal despite, of course, massive, ancient experience gaps. So much of how we think is a matter of habit. And, environmentally, I was lucky that figuring things out for myself without an overreliance on a new system was allowed to become a natural neural pathways reinforcing habit over time. Then while it Oxford, I discovered David Hymn for the 19 year old me, what is it to know something? Or what is truth? Seems to be crucially important as a foundational question to try to figure out wrestling with epistemology, the nature of reality, the nature of trust statements, let me to child's bark and immunocons and like wickedness.
嗯，這是因為一直以來都是如此，或者因為我這麼說，因為大家都同意事實就是這樣。對我來說，提出疑問是很直覺的事。但回過頭來看，為什麼不能有其他的可能性呢？我很幸運，這種天生的獨立性格沒有被我生命中的大人們壓抑。我的父母都支持我發揮所長，他們鼓勵我去探索那些佔據我興趣的諸多智慧。比如，為什麼天空是藍色的？我們一起去弄明白吧。我的許多老師允許我在學校必修課程之外閱讀和追求特別的專題，並在課堂之外騰出時間，只為了進行討論，在這些討論中，儘管存在著巨大的、古老的經驗差距，我仍被平等對待。我們的思考方式很大程度上是習慣的問題。而在環境上，我很幸運能夠不依賴新系統，靠自己弄懂事情，這逐漸成為一種強化自然神經通路的習慣。後來在牛津時，我發現了大衛·休謨，對 19 歲的我來說，知道某件事是什麼意思？或者，什麼是真理？ 這似乎是一個至關重要的基礎問題，試圖釐清與認識論的糾葛、現實的本質、信任陳述的本質，讓我聯想到孩童的吠叫、免疫保守主義以及類似邪惡的事物。
Among many others. And then I entered the workplace and in a practical business world, my interest shifted from philosophy to psychology and personal psychology and social psychology. It was interesting for me to learn why people believe what they believe within social constructs. For example, I was a business analyst at McKinsey and company 1999 and you remember the highlighted.com bubble. So many CEOs of large well established corporations were deadly worried that tiny little.com's with limited resources would nevertheless put them out of business. For example, some energy companies were busy shedding assets to try to become more and runesk, become more asset-light in their business model because that was what was perceived to be the flavor of the day.
在眾多因素之中。後來我進入職場，在實際的商業世界中，我的興趣從哲學轉向了心理學，包括個人心理學和社會心理學。對我而言，了解人們在社會結構中為何相信他們所相信的事物非常有趣。例如，1999 年我在麥肯錫公司擔任業務分析師時，正值網際網路泡沫的高峰期。許多大型知名企業的執行長都非常擔心，那些資源有限的小型網路公司會讓他們倒閉。舉例來說，一些能源公司忙著出售資產，試圖讓商業模式變得更「輕資產」，因為這被認為是當時的潮流。
I figured out that truth in an objective and parable sense was often a separate metaphysical thing from the dominant beliefs of people at the time. Yes, sometimes the observers can affect the value of the observed. That reflects these also true in physics as well as in economics. But I still an independent thing which with a separate resistance from the observer. This epistemic stance has given me a lot of courage in making my own decisions in both my personal and professional life. I think I've been more comfortable than most taking the road less travel. As long as I'm focused on generally trying to figure out what is true with the capital T. Instead of what's convenient or what's expedient or conventional wisdom. Sometimes of course, this list of mistakes because I'm a human being. I have my own calibration instruments and my instruments are imperfect and inevitably colored by my own biases. But at least when I make mistakes, it's my own mistakes,
我領悟到，客觀且寓言式的真理往往與當時人們的主流信仰是分屬不同形上學範疇的事物。是的，有時觀察者會影響被觀察對象的價值，這在物理學和經濟學中同樣成立。但真理仍是一種獨立存在，具有與觀察者分離的抵抗力。這種認識論立場讓我在個人與職業生活中，對自行決策充滿勇氣。我認為自己比多數人更樂於選擇人跡罕至的道路——只要我專注於探求大寫 T 開頭的「真實」，而非便利、權宜之計或傳統智慧。當然，身為凡人，我也難免犯錯。我擁有自己的校準工具，但這些工具並不完美，無可避免地受到自身偏見的影響。不過至少當我犯錯時，那是我自己的錯誤。
not somebody else's. More often than not though, it's let me make the choices that I'm glad with hindsight. That I made even if the choices felt lonely or contrary at the time. I guess you could start with what others believe but then don't just assume it to be the truth. You can question it and test it and maybe build what you find to be true around that. If we go back a few years, what would you say originally sparked your interest in investing and when did it begin? I wish I can say that I've always wanted to be an investor and that I write securities analysis when I was 10 and got my first stock given I was 12 or something like that. Some of people at a different team can.
不是別人的。不過更多時候，它讓我做出那些事後看來令我慶幸的選擇。即便當時這些選擇讓我感到孤單或與眾不同，我依然堅持己見。我想你可以從他人所信開始，但別就此認定那就是真理。你可以質疑它、驗證它，或許還能在此基礎上構建出你認為真實的東西。如果我們回溯幾年前，你會說最初是什麼點燃了你對投資的興趣，又是從何時開始的？我真希望我能說我一直都想成為一名投資者，說我十歲時就寫證券分析，十二歲左右得到第一支股票之類的。有些不同團隊的人或許可以。
I wasn't that kid and I didn't. My interest growing up were omnivorous and far-ranging by a didn't include the start. I discovered Warren Buffett rather late when I was a business school. He came to speak on campus and a few of my classmates recommended I read his letters. I did and I was immediately captivated. Buffett just meant so much sense. For the first time investing felt like a craft. He couldn't wrap your head around it with rules of reason instead of voodoo. I know this is getting it backwards but reading Buffett's letters let me to say Chris analysis and that let me to intelligent investor and I was sold on a career in investing. I decided not to return to McKinsey after business school and that was an expensive decision at the time because it meant I had to repay McKinsey for sponsoring my MBA but I thought that it was the worst-world decision and I've not the back sense.
我不是那樣的孩子，也沒有那樣做。我成長過程中的興趣廣泛且多樣，但一開始並不包括投資。我是在商學院時才比較晚發現華倫·巴菲特。他來校園演講，幾位同學推薦我讀他的股東信。我讀了，立刻就被吸引住了。巴菲特的話就是那麼有道理。投資第一次讓我感覺像是一門技藝。你可以用理性的規則來理解它，而不是靠巫毒般的迷信。我知道這有點本末倒置，但讀了巴菲特的信後，我開始接觸克里斯分析，接著又讀了《智慧型股票投資人》，就此決定投身投資事業。商學院畢業後，我決定不回麥肯錫工作，這在當時是個代價高昂的決定，因為這意味著我得償還麥肯錫贊助我的 MBA 學費。但我認為這是最不後悔的決定，至今從未後悔。
You mentioned Warren Buffett. How would you say Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger inspired you? What were the biggest lessons you learned from them and are there any areas where you disagree? Warren and Charlie have said many memorable things but my favorite quote this is rather modest one from Charlie which is the best thing a human being can do is to help another human being no more. Warren and Charlie have walked the walk of this victim by generously sharing their worldie wisdom with so many people including me. They didn't need to do so. Many wealthy people choose to spend a time very differently and of course, pressure halfway is the ultimate pedagogical platform. I'll tell you a funny story. When I met Charlie in 2018 this was a few years before I passed away I told Charlie that we were struggling to find good investments that met our investing bar and I asked him if he had any advice on what we should be doing differently.
你提到了華倫·巴菲特。你會如何形容華倫·巴菲特和查理·蒙格對你的啟發？你從他們身上學到最重要的教訓是什麼？是否有任何你不同意他們的觀點之處？華倫和查理說過許多令人難忘的話，但我最喜歡的是查理一句相當謙遜的話：「一個人能為他人做的最好的事，就是幫助另一個人，僅此而已。」華倫和查理以身作則實踐了這句話，慷慨地與包括我在內的許多人分享他們的智慧。他們本不必這麼做。許多富人選擇以截然不同的方式度過時光，當然，波克夏股東會堪稱終極的教學平台。我告訴你一個有趣的故事。2018 年我見到查理時——那是在他去世前幾年——我告訴查理我們當時很難找到符合我們投資標準的好標的，並請教他我們是否該調整做法。
He looked at me unblinkingly through his moonshave glasses and said, "Who said this would be easy?" Which is of course, it's exactly right and serve as a timely kick-up by behind. Charlie deservedly his famous social-economic singers but I also found him in person to be more measured more equivocal, almost whistful than this projected image of his pithy, panchy, public statements. Over time I've become more convinced that Warren and Charlie's leave to help people know more is the best thing that each of us can do to people around us. There are fewer pure expressions of caring and fewer gifts that are more available. I can't think of major areas where I disagree with Warren and Charlie.
他透過他那副半月形眼鏡一瞬不瞬地看著我，說道：「誰說這會很簡單？」這話當然完全正確，也及時給了我當頭棒喝。查理確實配得上他那著名的社會經濟評論家名聲，但我親身接觸後發現，比起他那些精闢犀利、公開言論所塑造的形象，他本人其實更為審慎、更模稜兩可，甚至帶著幾分惆悵。隨著時間推移，我越發確信，華倫和查理留給世人最珍貴的禮物，就是幫助人們增長見識——這正是我們每個人能為周遭之人所做最有意義的事。世上少有比這更純粹的關懷，也少有比這更易獲得的禮物。我想不出在哪些重要議題上，我與華倫和查理存在分歧。
And, periodically, this rings investment program has been more in trap it than pressure pathways or the Buffet clinicians. But I also started my investing career at a different time and I have a different biography and therefore different circles of competence than Warren and Charlie. They live through PEX and Rick Connor. A lot of wealth was created in the US over their lifetimes. So owning sees candy or gai go or go kola or Rick and express a warman over a generational time horizon during the fair particular lifetimes have been wonderful. This ring lodging 2010, not 1950. The world is a much more global place today. Various to information, trade technology, capital, talent, labor have all come down. I'm not American and Ki-Evd in significant and incredible businesses are being built around the world.
而且，週期性地，這個投資計劃更多地陷入了陷阱而非壓力途徑或巴菲特式的臨床方法。但我也是在一個不同的時代開始我的投資生涯，我有著不同的背景，因此與華倫和查理相比，我有不同的能力圈。他們經歷了 PEX 和瑞克·康納的時代。在他們的一生中，美國創造了大量財富。因此，在他們特定的生命週期內，長期持有 See's Candy 或 Geico 或可口可樂或瑞克快遞等企業，跨越世代時間視野，一直是非常美好的。這個投資環境是 2010 年，而非 1950 年。今天的世界是一個更加全球化的地方。信息、貿易技術、資本、人才、勞動力的各種壁壘都已降低。我不是美國人，而世界各地正在建立重要且令人難以置信的企業。
Yet, they're still significant language and culture and pimes and home bias based barriers that make capital markets globally far less efficient than in the US. For example, the capital markets in Malaysia even today in 2025 looks like that of the US 60 maybe 70 years ago. I believe that over my own investing lifetime being willing to look for businesses to own generationally across the globe, not just the US, it's the right thing to do for principles. Would you walk us through your vision when launching disarraying about 15 years ago? Sure. I started disuring when I was 33 years old. Sometimes it's good to be young and idealistic. I didn't know how hard it was going to be and which is great because I may not have started it.
然而，語言、文化、制度及本土偏好所形成的障礙依然顯著，使得全球資本市場的效率遠不如美國。例如，即便到了 2025 年的今天，馬來西亞的資本市場仍像是美國 60 甚至 70 年前的模樣。我相信，在我個人的投資生涯中，願意放眼全球尋找能世代持有的企業，而不僅限於美國，這對原則而言是正確的做法。能否請您談談約 15 年前創立 disarraying 時的願景？當然。我 33 歲時創立了 disuring。年輕且理想主義有時是件好事。當時我並不知道這會有多困難，這或許是件好事，否則我可能就不會開始了。
Because I was such a big buffet fan, I wanted to do the buffet thing that is to run an investment program over 50 years of time horizons. I was 33. I thought maybe if I stayed healthy and I worked out and I was lucky I could have a 50 year investing career so that was a time horizon. I wrote a white paper on what a 50 year investment program would look like from first principles. In it I said that we would invest a swimming of fundamental, long-term, country and global, very investing philosophy. Of course we weren't reinventing the wheel. These elements are all classic value investing philosophy elements. The terms are almost all of the time. A few start bigger say they're not fundamental or they're not long-term.
因為我是如此熱衷於巴菲特，我想效仿巴菲特的做法，即運行一個跨越 50 年時間視野的投資計劃。當時我 33 歲，我想如果保持健康、堅持鍛鍊並且運氣好的話，或許我能擁有 50 年的投資生涯，這就是我的時間框架。我寫了一份白皮書，從基本原理出發，探討一個 50 年投資計劃應該是什麼樣子。在文中，我提到我們將採用一套基本面、長期、國家及全球視角的投資哲學。當然，我們並非重新發明輪子，這些元素都是經典價值投資哲學的組成部分。幾乎所有時候這些原則都適用，只有少數人會聲稱他們不注重基本面或不採取長期視角。
But I was very specific by what each term meant. First fundamental. That term sometimes mean as opposed to technical. But that was not what we meant. Fundamental for us meant that we would own businesses and not stocks. And if you talk to any business owner, even if there's a small business like hard dealership or gas station or a laundromat, you know that that business is going to go through good and bad times. It's a given. No business owner would say, "Oh my dealership is going so badly.
但我對每個術語的定義非常明確。首先是「基本面」。這個詞有時被用來與「技術面」相對，但這並非我們所指。對我們而言，「基本面」意味著我們擁有的是企業本身，而非股票。如果你與任何企業主交談，即便是像汽車經銷商、加油站或自助洗衣店這樣的小生意，你也知道那家企業必然會經歷起起落落。這是理所當然的。沒有企業主會說：「哦，我的經銷店生意太糟了。
Let me dump it and when earnings recover or buy it back." That's crazy talk. A business owner will own that business through good and bad times. Of course you can choose not to be in a business at all. It's a business that you're going to put too much capital in and you're not going to get enough written out of it. Then don't be in that business at all. But if the returns through cycle are good, it's a business that's worth putting money in, then expect to own it through economic cycles. Good and bad times.
讓我拋售它，等盈利恢復再買回來。」這種說法簡直荒謬。企業主會在好光景與壞時機中都持有那門生意。當然，你可以選擇完全不涉足某個行業——如果那是個你需要投入過多資本卻無法獲得足夠回報的生意，那麼從一開始就不該進入。但如果整個週期中的回報是可觀的，這門生意值得投資，那麼就該預期自己會伴隨經濟週期持有它，無論順境逆境。
That leads directly to the second element which is being locked term. Sometimes when the market investors say I'm long term, they mean holding a stock for more than one year. Or maybe there are two years, maybe three years. But we're talking about owning business through economic cycles. Well, each cycle is seven to ten years. So if you want to own a business through more than one economic cycle, you're literally talking about a generational time horizon. So we put a stick in the ground in 2010 to say we're going to try to own public companies generationally. As you can imagine, that was countercultural at the time.
這直接引出了第二個要素，那就是鎖定期限。有時候當市場投資者說自己是長期投資者時，他們的意思是持有一支股票超過一年。或者可能是兩年，甚至是三年。但我們談論的是透過經濟週期持有企業。每個週期大約是七到十年。所以，如果你想持有一家企業超過一個經濟週期，你實際上是在談論一個世代性的時間跨度。因此，我們在 2010 年立下了一個標誌，表示我們將嘗試以世代為單位持有上市公司。可以想像，這在當時是反文化的。
This is in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Or worried about whether stocks are even in S.A. class that people can safely own anymore. It was a different time. But it's also still countercultural today in 2025 to say that you want their own businesses. Generationality. The third element was being contraired. This is a crucial element of value investing. But it's also an element that has fallen out of favor lately because it has paid off the by businesses that are writing high and they keep writing higher. The big companies keep getting bigger. So the idea of buying something when it is out of favor is itself out of favor.
這是在全球金融危機之後。或者擔心股票是否還屬於 S.A.級別，人們是否還能安全持有。那是一個不同的時代。但即使在 2025 年的今天，說你想擁有自己的企業仍然是反文化的。世代性。第三個要素是逆向操作。這是價值投資的關鍵要素。但這個要素最近已經不受歡迎，因為那些表現優異的企業持續表現優異，它們的股價不斷攀升。大公司變得越來越大。因此，在不受歡迎時買入某樣東西的想法本身就不受歡迎。
But I'll believe what's and still is, if you want to generate super normal returns by owning companies generationally, then you need to buy businesses at prices offering large margins of safety because markets generally are efficient and not efficient all the time. But generally they are efficient. So if you just pay a fair price, or business, then you're going to get a fair return. So you need to pay an unfair price for business. But unfair prices don't come around that often. Usually when you're getting a business at an unfair price, it's because something went wrong with it.
但我相信現在和過去一樣，如果你想通過世代持有公司來創造超額回報，那麼你需要以提供巨大安全邊際的價格買入企業，因為市場通常是有效的，但並非總是有效。總的來說，市場是有效的。所以如果你只是支付一個公平的價格，或者企業，那麼你將獲得一個公平的回報。因此，你需要為企業支付一個不公平的價格。但不公平的價格並不經常出現。通常當你以不公平的價格獲得一家企業時，是因為它出了問題。
Sometimes it's very company-specific. Like they messed up. They lost a bit customer or they had an operational mishab. But sometimes it's a whole industry. They go through a convulsion. In 2010, when we launched, it was the US Health Care industry. They went through a convulsion because the affordable care act had just been passed and you recall they created a lot of uncertainty among peers and providers and they created a sell-off in US Health Care stocks. Sometimes it's a whole country going through a recession or inflation or unemployment, whatever it tastes might be. And sometimes it's a whole world like a global pandemic.
有時問題非常公司特定。像是他們搞砸了，失去了一些客戶或發生了營運失誤。但有時是整個行業經歷震盪。2010 年我們成立時，美國醫療保健行業就經歷了這樣的震盪，因為平價醫療法案剛剛通過，記得嗎？這在同行和供應商中製造了大量不確定性，導致美國醫療保健類股票遭到拋售。有時是整個國家陷入衰退、通脹或失業等困境。還有時是全球性的，比如一場大流行病。
But a dislocation could be very micro-ic, be very macro, or somewhere in between. When that's that dislocation, things tend to sell off because a human being is just not wired to like uncertainty. And not so the embrace fear, fear, grids force selling and doing that time to use a buffer phrase, you can be greedy when others are fearful. And to use a different buffer phrase, at that time, you can almost step in to be the underwriter of the business. At this price, I'm willing to own that business sell it to me.
但市場失序可能非常微觀，也可能非常宏觀，或介於兩者之間。當這種失序發生時，資產往往會被拋售，因為人類天生不喜歡不確定性。人們不會擁抱恐懼，恐懼會迫使他們賣出。這時候用一句緩衝語來說，你可以在別人恐懼時貪婪。換句話說，在那個時刻，你幾乎可以介入成為企業的承銷商——以這個價格，我願意接手這門生意，賣給我吧。
You're fearful. You want to dump it. I'm going to take the other side. I'm going to buy it. Not because I believe I can then flip it to somebody else, but because at that price, I'm willing to be the final order of that business. So that's being contrary. The last part is being global, which we've already discussed. Our belief was, and still is, that these are principles are so easy to describe. I just described it in five minutes, but they are hard to execute against everyone wants to invest like buffered by very few people can, because of the structural asset like the mismatch in the money-matchment industry. As a limit, matches were back in the headlines a few years ago, because it's become a big bang. In first Republic, et cetera, we don't think about it that much. In a case of non-banks, but there's an even bigger asset like this, which matches in the asset management industry. Most public markets funds have daily liquidity.
你感到恐懼。你想拋售它。我將採取相反的立場。我要買進它。不是因為我相信可以轉手賣給別人，而是因為在那個價格下，我願意成為這筆交易的最終買家。這就是逆向操作。最後一部分是全球化，這我們已經討論過了。我們的信念過去是，現在依然是，這些原則描述起來非常簡單。我剛剛在五分鐘內就描述完了，但執行起來卻很困難，因為每個人都想像巴菲特那樣投資，但極少人能做到，這是由於資產結構的問題，比如資金管理行業中的不匹配。幾年前，限價匹配再次成為頭條新聞，因為它引發了一場大震盪。在第一共和銀行等案例中，我們並沒有過多考慮這一點。在非銀行機構的情況下，資產管理行業中存在著更大的資產不匹配問題。大多數公開市場基金都提供每日流動性。
If it's a mutual fund or quarterly, sometimes annual, sometimes two years liquidity, if you're hedge-wine, but you cannot invest in companies, generationally, in public markets. If you have liquidity terms of a day or quarter or year or two years, you cannot tell investors that with a straight face. This is especially true for imaging managers like we were back in 2010. Imaging managers have to put up numbers in the first three years. If you don't do that, 80% of imaging managers shut down. So you don't have the luxury of thinking long-term, no matter how well-intentioned you are.
如果是共同基金或是按季度、有時年度、甚至兩年才有流動性的避險基金，你無法在公開市場上進行跨世代的企業投資。當你的流動性條款設定為一天、一季、一年或兩年時，你根本無法面不改色地向投資者宣稱這是長期投資。這對像我們 2010 年那時的影像管理公司尤其如此。影像管理公司必須在前三年交出成績單，如果做不到，80%的同業都會倒閉。所以無論初衷多麼良善，你都沒有奢侈的本錢去思考長期佈局。
Our thesis was, if you want to invest generationally, then we have to structure a firm very different from the typical public markets fund. So we did, when we launched in 2010, we created three year by the 10 year investor number gates, which were highly a typical in 2010. This was after the Lehman and a lot of big funds throughout gates and Alps hated that. And here we were a new fund. And so, okay, we're going to have investor level gates to let it go. But today, 2025, there's still unusual. But we also wanted the line incentives.
我們的核心論點是：若要進行跨世代投資，就必須建立與典型公開市場基金截然不同的架構。因此在 2010 年創立時，我們設計了「三年鎖定期+十年投資人贖回門檻」機制，這在當時是極度非典型的設計——雷曼兄弟倒閉後，許多大型基金紛紛設立贖回限制，投資人對此深惡痛絕。而我們這家新創基金竟敢逆勢操作，堅持設置投資人層級的資金鎖定期。時至 2025 年的今日，這種模式依然罕見。但我們同時也想要對齊激勵機制。
So we created three year clawbacks on our incentive allocations. So as to avoid the heads, I win, tails, you'll lose structure of many investment partnerships where general partners collect a lot of incentive applications a little way out. And then they have a big drawdown and then they shut down the partnership because they under the high watermarks, no GP, ever returns incentive allocations to their LP. So we wanted to make the incentive more online and have more skills in the game. This was some of the structures that we created from the GATGO in 2010. However, in 2018, which is about eight years after we launched, we did something even more. We decided to return capital to our investors because cash balances in our fund were creeping up and we couldn't find anything we wanted to buy.
因此，我們在激勵分配上設置了三年的追回機制。這樣做是為了避免許多投資合夥中「正面我贏，反面你輸」的結構，即普通合夥人在短期內收取大量激勵分配，隨後遭遇大幅虧損，便因低於高水位線而關閉合夥關係——畢竟沒有普通合夥人會將激勵分配返還給有限合夥人。我們希望讓激勵機制更即時，並在遊戲中融入更多技巧。這些是我們自 2010 年 GATGO 以來創建的部分結構。然而，到了 2018 年，也就是我們啟動約八年後，我們更進一步：決定向投資者返還資本，因為基金中的現金餘額逐漸攀升，而我們找不到任何想買的標的。
So we thought that the intellectual honest thing to do was to just give the capital back. But we wanted to be able to call the money back to us in the future when we next found something completely by. In order to do that, we needed a capital drawdown structure, a capital commitment structure, which is of course a very typical and prep equity furnishes but not at all typical public markets funds. The idea was we would sweep the cash back to our LP's. But contractually, they were committed to funding these capital calls in the future. And when we had exits, we can suit the cash back to our piece. And this was of course an unusual structure.
所以我們認為，從知識分子的誠實角度出發，最恰當的做法就是將資金返還。但我們希望未來當我們再次完全偶然發現投資機會時，能夠將這些資金召回。為了實現這一點，我們需要一個資本提取結構，也就是資本承諾結構，這在私募股權基金中非常典型，但在公開市場基金中卻完全不常見。我們的設想是將現金返還給有限合夥人（LP），但根據合約，他們承諾未來會為這些資本召喚提供資金。而當我們有退出時，可以將現金返還給我們的份額。當然，這是一種非典型的結構。
We still have the structures today. The structure allows us to maintain strict investment discipline and demand and absolute not the route to tolerate every time we make an investment. Because of our structure and because our mandate were willing to do anything and the ability to do nothing, those two things are rampourable. I've only been discussing legal structures so far. But back in 2010, I believe that setting the right culture for the partnership is even more important than setting the right legal structures. We sometimes forget, but investment partnerships are actually partnerships. If you roll back the clock on the early partnerships, whether it's the Alfred Winslow-Jones partnership or the Buffet partnership, or Graham Newman, people will actually going to business together. Someone could be the capital, someone could be the the sweat. But it was really a JV. It's just like any other JV. It happens to be an investment JV. Roll the clock forward. Investment partnerships, legally, are still partnerships today. But they look more like products rather than JVs. LPs can buy this hedge fund product or that private equity product and gain that stream of returns and that exposure.
我們至今仍保有這些結構。這種結構讓我們能夠維持嚴格的投資紀律，並且要求絕對不能容忍每次投資時的偏離。正因為我們的結構，也因為我們的授權範圍允許我們無所不為，同時也有能力選擇無所作為，這兩點是至關重要的。到目前為止，我只討論了法律結構。但早在 2010 年，我就相信為合夥關係建立正確的文化，比建立正確的法律結構更為重要。我們有時會忘記，投資合夥實際上就是合夥關係。如果回溯早期的合夥案例，無論是阿爾弗雷德·溫斯洛-瓊斯合夥、巴菲特合夥，還是格雷厄姆-紐曼，人們實際上是在共同經營事業。有人可能出資，有人可能出力。但那確實是一種合資企業，就像任何其他合資企業一樣，只不過它恰好是一家投資合資企業。時至今日，從法律角度來看，投資合夥仍然是合夥關係，但它們看起來更像是產品而非合資企業。有限合夥人可以購買這個對沖基金產品或那個私募股權產品，從而獲得相應的回報流和風險敞口。
They get the statements that get their power by presentations. They get it in vestities and get a chicken dinner once a year. But really, the LPs are customer of the fund. Not a partner in that partnership. We wanted to dial the clock all the way back and build this arena as a genuine partnership with a DNA of a defacto JV, not just a DURA partnership. We wanted our limited partners to be partners as the close to customers, basically saying let's go into business together. Well, there was more than a little bit of self-interest in this because of 33 years or at a time.
他們通過簡報獲得聲明，從而獲得權力。他們在投資中獲利，每年還能享用一次雞肉大餐。但實際上，有限合夥人（LPs）是基金的客戶，而非合夥關係中的合夥人。我們希望將時鐘完全撥回，將這個領域建立為一個真正的合夥關係，具有實質合資企業的 DNA，而不僅僅是一個 DURA 合夥關係。我們希望我們的有限合夥人能成為接近客戶的合夥人，基本上就是說，讓我們一起做生意。當然，這其中也不乏一些自利因素，因為這關係到 33 年或更長時間的利益。
I fancy myself to be smart and hardworking and long-tension. But we had limited resources and we had this global mandate. We wanted to go anywhere. We wanted to do anything. There was a very broad investment program. We were lucky that we were back by a handful of rather thoughtful, low-term institutions and downman's families, etc. They had far more resources and experience and networks than we did. There was self-interest in saying let's all be partners together and that gave us access to all those resources and networks. As I tried to allow this to punch above our way when we launched. Of course, we couldn't just simply demand that our partners, whether it's an animal or a family, work with us as part of our team. My theory was and still is that you actually had to underwrite to do that. You do that by behaving like a partner with a certain amount of transparency that is not typically an investment firm. Sometimes people say transparency, they just means it's the general partner willing to share what they own before they always tried. To me, it's more than that. Transparency means sharing what is it that we're working on? What is it that we're struggling with? One is that we're keeping us up and night and there's a certain vulnerability in that process. The idea is to share what the investment program is working on such that our LPs can actually help us to our research and try to figure out those questions.
我自認為聰明、勤奮且具有長遠眼光。但我們的資源有限，卻肩負著全球性的使命。我們想去任何地方，想做任何事情。當時有一個非常廣泛的投資計劃。幸運的是，我們背後有少數幾家深思熟慮的長期機構和唐曼家族等支持。他們擁有的資源、經驗和人脈遠超過我們。基於共同利益，我們提議成為合作夥伴，這讓我們得以接觸所有這些資源和人脈。當我們起步時，我試圖讓這一切發揮超出我們自身能力的作用。當然，我們不能單純要求合作夥伴——無論是機構還是家族——像團隊成員一樣與我們合作。我的理論過去是、現在依然是：你必須實際投入才能做到這一點。你要以合作夥伴的方式行事，保持一定程度的透明度，這在投資機構中並不常見。有時人們談到透明度，僅僅是指普通合夥人願意分享他們在嘗試前所擁有的東西。但對我來說，這遠遠不夠。透明度意味著分享我們正在努力的事項是什麼？我們正在面臨的困境是什麼？ 其一是這個過程讓我們夜不能寐，當中存在某種脆弱性。我們的想法是分享投資計劃正在進行的項目，這樣我們的有限合夥人(LPs)實際上可以協助我們的研究，並試圖找出這些問題的答案。
Like there's a Eurozone crisis. We reach out to what other networks that we can use, what other resources, that we can bring to bear, in order to try to understand things to bear, and it have our LPs be part of that. They were incredibly responsive at a time. For example, the CIOV are used the endowment travel with us to Greece on a research trip. We met with a bunch of regulators and families and businesses and it helped us understand that situation better. I'm proud to say that with maintain that partnership DNA till today. We don't have many of the trappings of a modern investment firm.
比如說遇到歐元區危機時，我們會動用所有能接觸的網絡和資源，試圖理解事態發展，並讓我們的有限合夥人參與其中。當時他們的反應非常迅速。舉例來說，某大學捐贈基金的投資長(CIO)曾與我們一同前往希臘進行考察。我們會見了多位監管機構人員、家族企業和商業代表，這幫助我們更深入理解當地情況。我很自豪地說，我們至今仍保持著這種合作夥伴關係的核心精神。我們沒有現代投資公司那些繁文縟節的束縛。
We don't have a one-page yet. We don't have fancy offices. We don't have a PowerPoint presentation. Our investors interact directly with me in many ways. We behave truly like an investor's investor, not an investment product. We have been rewarded for that. I'll cut some bias. But it's most thoughtful, potable, patient, long-term partnership might invest us at what could have what truly blessed. Well, we start our conversation about being independent thinking and you just walk this through doing that in practice. It's not easy to do. It's unusual. I believe you did it because you felt like that was the right way to invest the right way to set up your business. But it's still very difficult to convince others of that. So you obviously have had a lot of success in describing your vision and getting people to jump on board even at an early age and early life cycle of your business. Yes, I think we were lucky. It was a handful of people who were willing to make that back on me and looking back at the 33-year-old that was privileged. What would you say are disarrings competitive advantages? I'll name six and they're interrelated.
我們還沒有一頁簡介。我們沒有豪華的辦公室。我們沒有精美的簡報。我們的投資者以多種方式直接與我互動。我們的行為確實像投資者的投資者，而非投資產品。我們因此得到了回報。我會減少一些偏見。但最深思熟慮、便攜、耐心、長期的合作夥伴關係可能讓我們投資於真正被祝福的事物。那麼，我們開始談論獨立思考，你剛剛談到了如何在實踐中做到這一點。這並不容易做到。這很不尋常。我相信你這樣做是因為你覺得這是正確的投資方式，也是建立業務的正確方式。但要說服他人相信這一點仍然非常困難。所以，顯然你在描述你的願景並讓人們加入方面取得了很大成功，即使在業務的早期和生命週期的初期也是如此。是的，我認為我們很幸運。有少數人願意支持我，回顧 33 歲時的我，那是種特權。你會說哪些是令人沮喪的競爭優勢？我會列出六個，它們是相互關聯的。
The first one is we are in fact structured to invest over longer time or as in that many investors which allows us to take advantage of multi-year-time arbitrage. That's a legal structure advantage. Number two, we wonder of the beaten path to look for investment opportunities and we have the broadband introduced or not constrained. We were keeping our in Greece at the height of the great crisis. Number three, our analytical and patterned recognition toolkits are oriented towards the long-term underwriting businesses. Things like focusing on the structural modes of the business or building hard-ass is rather than predicting new-term earnings a share. The focus on our analysis is different. Number four, we have the luxury of maintaining strict price discipline when making an investment. We can say no, no again, no again, and then no strike else. Number five, the empirical evidence suggests that what temperamentally, why it to be long-term, they are investors. Each of the team members is patient and skeptical and contrary and independent minded, so cats are supposed to dance and we think instinctively in terms of probabilistic, district-ricious or not. That's a psychological trait. Number six, we're supported by a high quality investor base with whom we've built muscular actual working relationships.
首先，我們實際上建構了能夠進行長期投資的架構，這使我們能夠利用多年時間套利的優勢，這是一種法律結構上的優勢。第二，我們偏離常規尋找投資機會，並且擁有不受限制的廣泛視野。在希臘危機最嚴重的時期，我們仍堅持在那裡投資。第三，我們的分析與模式識別工具包專注於長期承保業務，例如關注業務的結構性模式或建立硬資產，而非預測短期每股收益。我們的分析焦點有所不同。第四，我們有餘裕在投資時維持嚴格的價格紀律。我們可以一再說不，直到出現合適的機會為止。第五，實證證據顯示，從性格上來說，我們團隊的每位成員都適合成為長期投資者。他們耐心、多疑、逆向思考且獨立自主，因此我們本能地以概率性、非確定性的方式思考。這是一種心理特質。 第六點，我們擁有一個高品質的投資者基礎，與他們建立了堅實且實際的工作關係。
These are not truly independent, they're cumulative and mutually self-been-fossing. For example, because we have long-term capital, we do not need the focus on short-term fluctuations and companies. Business and that allows us to focus on the longer term, structure dynamics of the business and it allows us to spend our time differently and develop different and elder goal-tool kits, which in turn then attracts analysts, or why it's a particular way. It's going to find interesting to come to the screen to hold your craft to be local investors and that gives us access to a different talent pool from other firms. Then we have an investor base that philosophically align, they give us the broad mandate to go to police.
這些並非真正獨立，它們是累積且相互自我強化的。例如，因為我們擁有長期資本，我們不需要關注短期波動和公司。這讓我們能夠專注於業務的長期結構動態，並以不同的方式分配時間，發展出不同且更成熟的目標工具組，這反過來又吸引了分析師，或者解釋了為何會以特定方式運作。這將使來到螢幕前、堅持本地投資者技藝的人感到有趣，並讓我們能夠接觸到與其他公司不同的人才庫。接著，我們擁有一群在理念上契合的投資者基礎，他們給予我們廣泛的授權去執行策略。
That's the goal to achieve to go to police. To go to Turkey in a way that many firms can't. Then we have the ability to wait for the right crisis before we act. We don't have a gun, do I have to put capital away and give a time. These things feed on each other in a lot of ways. Earlier you mentioned the goal of building a 50-year firm. Why do you think that there aren't many firms that have been around for 50 years? And why do you feel that you may defy the odds? I think it's really difficult to think and act long-term in the modern money management industry. I've really discussed building generational partnerships with our lived partners.
這就是要達成去警局的目標。以許多公司無法做到的方式進入土耳其。這樣我們就有能力在行動前等待合適的危機。我們沒有槍，我是否必須把資金撤出並給出時間。這些事情在很多方面相互影響。之前你提到建立一家 50 年公司的目標。你認為為什麼沒有多少公司能存在 50 年？為什麼你覺得自己可能打破常規？我認為在現代資金管理行業中，真正困難的是長期思考和行動。我確實與我們的生活夥伴討論過建立世代合作關係。
The institutional investment management industry is currently constituted. It's just not set up to operate with those time horizons. Even though an institution whether is a sovereign bulb entity, an endowment or family offers or foundation, may have a generational investment horizon. But the people who work for those institutions don't and many of the investment managers that they hire also don't. So structurally it's just hard to do. But then that's just one set of three-legged tools. The second leg of the tool is the team. Many investment analysts would join the industry.
機構投資管理行業目前的構成方式，並未設定以長期時間框架運作。儘管機構本身——無論是主權財富實體、捐贈基金、家族辦公室或基金會——可能擁有跨世代的投資視野，但為這些機構工作的人員並非如此，他們聘請的許多投資經理也同樣缺乏這種長期視角。因此從結構上來看，這本身就難以實現。但這只是三足工具中的其中一組。工具的第二支柱是團隊。許多投資分析師進入這個行業時...
Do not have generational time horizons for their careers. It's not how people manage their careers. We have succeeded in creating a home for right-tellented people who are ambitious. They want to do great things. So they get into the investment. They're all the same. But they're willing to come here, put down roads and actually be patient about their careers. This is very cultural because this is an industry where every end of year you have musical chairs after the bonus season or team here. Things in terms of what that's the firm look like in ten years and what do you want to go together?
並不具備世代時間跨度的職業規劃。這不是人們管理職業生涯的方式。我們成功為那些有抱負、渴望成就大事的優秀人才打造了歸屬之地。他們投身投資領域時都懷抱相同特質，但願意在此紮根，鋪設道路，並對自身職業發展保持耐心。這與文化密切相關，因為在這個行業裡，每年獎金季節後總會上演「音樂椅」人事變動。而我們團隊思考的是：十年後公司會是什麼模樣？大家要共同實現什麼目標？
And that's hard to do. The third leg of a three-legged still is a portfolio company. Because of the modern-day money management industry, being a CEO of a public company can feel like groundhogs day. You'd meet investors and you talk about the same thing over and over and over again. And every time you meet an analyst from a particular investment firm, it's a different analyst. That firm could have on your start for a few years, but the person you're talking to is different each time. And so you cannot actually build a relationship.
這很難做到。三足鼎立的第三條腿是投資組合公司。由於現代資金管理行業的特性，擔任上市公司執行長的感覺就像土撥鼠日一樣。你會不斷地與投資者會面，反覆談論同樣的事情。每次你見到某家投資公司的分析師時，都是不同的人。那家公司可能已經關注你們好幾年了，但每次和你交談的人都不一樣。因此，你實際上無法建立起真正的關係。
We've succeeded in building long-term relationships with CEOs and CFOs and management teams. And that means they drop the guard when they talk to us. You'll open up the kimono and you actually have a working relationship where a shareholders together. The companies that have been on for 15 years in a portfolio that still in a portfolio today were only 15 years old. And qualitatively that's a different kind of relationship that you have with both companies. These things are hard to do and it's hard to have long-term relationships with our business. It's hard to retain people long-term. It's hard to have long-term relationships with both the companies. And that's why it's hard for an investment firm to have a 50 year horizon. We wish to build a firm.
我們成功地與 CEO、CFO 及管理團隊建立了長期關係。這意味著他們在與我們交談時會放下戒心。你會敞開心扉，實際上建立起一種股東間的合作關係。那些在投資組合中已存在 15 年、至今仍在組合中的公司，當初也只有 15 年的歷史。從質性上來說，這是一種與兩家公司之間截然不同的關係。這些事情很難做到，也很難與我們的業務保持長期關係。長期留住人才很難，與兩家公司都保持長期關係也很難。正因如此，投資公司要擁有 50 年的視野是困難的。我們希望建立一家這樣的公司。
We are very proud of Caution with Bill with this three. I guess they're a few enduring sources of competitive advantage in investing. It's a very competitive industry. And Laltumism is one of them. We are students of businesses ourselves. And when we study businesses, we give names on them. Sometimes we call a business a fruit-fly business. They grow and they die really quickly. Yeah, other businesses, they're sea turtle businesses. They grow slowly.
我們對「謹慎理財三人組」感到非常自豪。我認為在投資領域中，能持續保持競爭優勢的因素並不多，這是一個競爭極為激烈的行業。而「長期主義」正是其中之一。我們自身也是企業的學生，在研究企業時會為它們分類命名。有時我們稱某些企業為「果蠅型企業」——它們快速成長也迅速消亡。而另一些企業則屬於「海龜型企業」，它們成長緩慢。
But they die slowly. They last a long time. Within their spectrum from fruit-fly to sea turtle, we take investment managers such as ourselves. Our generally salmon swimming upstream through their debts is a dangerous industry. Very few firms survive. All these actions we've taken to create the three-legged stool do not turn a high clock speed industry. Industry that changes very quickly into a low clock speed one. It's still a high clock speed industry, especially with technological and geopolitical and socioeconomic development around us.
但消亡得也慢，能夠長久存續。在這個從果蠅到海龜的光譜之間，我們將像我們這樣的投資管理機構比作「逆流而上的鮭魚」——這是一個危機四伏的行業，極少公司能存活下來。我們打造「三足鼎立」架構的所有努力，並不能讓這個高時脈速度（變化極快）的行業轉變為低時脈速度的產業。它仍然是個高速變化的行業，特別是在當前科技、地緣政治與社會經濟快速發展的環境下。
What can we aware that we have our work cut out for us if we want to compound over generational time horizons and beyond? It's hard to do. The arts remain stacked against us, even with all the advantages that we build out. Given the base rate of survival that our industry is up in, radically, low, and we're well aware of that. Now, those arts motivate us and we want to beat them. But it's absolutely no guarantee. You said something that stood out to me, which is one of your enduring sources of competitive advantage and investing is long tourism, meaning being a long-term investor. It's interesting because you hear everybody talk about I'm a long-term investor, but you alluded to this earlier. Most people have a different definition of long-term than maybe you and I have. It's much shorter term and it's probably getting shorter with the age of technology and information and so on. So it is interesting how competitive advantages actually being a long-term investor and structuring your business and your investment philosophy that way. Do you view investing as both an art and a science? Yes, I think it's both an art and a social science. Naturally, very investing is embedded in economics and game theory and financial theory.
如果我們想要跨越世代甚至更長的時間進行複利增長，我們能意識到自己面臨的挑戰有多大嗎？這並不容易。即便我們擁有所有優勢，藝術仍然對我們不利。考慮到我們行業的基本存活率極低，這一點我們心知肚明。然而，這些藝術激勵著我們，我們渴望戰勝它們。但這絕對沒有保證。你提到了一個讓我印象深刻的地方，那就是你在投資中持久的競爭優勢來源之一——長期主義，即成為一名長期投資者。這很有趣，因為雖然每個人都說自己是長期投資者，但你之前也暗示了這一點。大多數人對「長期」的定義可能與你我不同，他們的期限要短得多，而且隨著科技和資訊時代的發展，這個期限可能還在縮短。因此，真正成為一名長期投資者，並以此構建你的業務和投資哲學，這種競爭優勢確實很有意思。你認為投資既是藝術也是科學嗎？是的，我認為它既是藝術，也是社會科學。 當然，所有的投資行為都深深植根於經濟學、博弈論和金融理論之中。
Those are very much social science fields. In addition, it also requires an understanding of human psychology and sociology and history and law and politics. It also requires fluency and a language and a counting, but also the language of organizational behavior and incentives. It's core, as we've already discussed, very investing is also embedded in an epistemic stance of a natural scientist. Not just a social scientist, but a natural scientist. The early investors believe that truth lies out there in the world, the be discovered.
這些都是非常社會科學的領域。除此之外，它還需要對人類心理學、社會學、歷史、法律和政治有所理解。同時也需要精通語言和計算，以及組織行為和激勵機制的語言。正如我們已經討論過的，投資的核心也植根於自然科學家的認知立場，而不僅僅是社會科學家。早期的投資者相信真理存在於這個世界上，等待被發現。
It's not in our heads. It's not constructed in other people's heads. The tool for this growing truth are necessarily the tools of a scientist. What attributes define great and poor investors? We think about this question a lot and the reason for that is we try to hire analysts that we think will develop into great investors over time. Fundamentally, we believe that it takes a certain personality, or collect what's by if you like, for an analyst to believe that he or she can consistently make money by being right, analyzing businesses when others are wrong. Analysts with the most potential are not likely to be the most princesses driven people or the most easygoing people that you meet when we recruit, we actively seek out that free-ternetial spark that almost off-center quality, that many people with high capacity for independent mind that blue sky thinking have. However, that intellectual creativity does not always go hand in hand with analytical discipline. We look for folks with ability to follow through on that independent germ of a thought with rigorous, methodical and perical work, especially seeking out and evaluating this confirming evidence. It evidence that this proves what their intuition say guided by clear, knife through, butter, logic. We find it sometimes, folks with high IQs have never had to push past thinking mostly at an intuitive level, because unfortunately for another girl muscle training purposes, their initial intuitions often have been right or at least persuasive. Such that those intuitions do not often get question or subject to empirical investigation. In particular, a phenomenon we have observed among some folks with high IQs is they've also learned whether consciously and subconsciously, along the way, to how the better blend in and thrive socially. What that means is truth for them becomes a social construct to be figured out within a particular context. Instead of something objective to be discovered from first principles, we believe that we've created an environment where original thinking is allowed to flourish, but we also know that the patterns of behavior for people are generally really a really well established by the time it comes here. It's very hard to rewire people if that way of thinking has already been fully formed. Investment research embraces calibrated new ones, talking to the probabilistic thinking. We look for folks who's raw and now the horse power. It's also embedded in important mental dispositions, including the tendency to collect information before making up one's mind, the tendency to seek out various points of view before coming at that conclusion. The disposition to think extensively about our problem, the nor at the problem before responding.
這不在我們的腦海中，也不在他人腦海中構建。探索這一不斷成長的真相，必然需要科學家的工具。什麼特質定義了優秀與糟糕的投資者？我們經常思考這個問題，原因是我們試圖聘請那些我們認為隨時間發展能成為偉大投資者的分析師。根本上，我們相信分析師需要具備某種性格特質，或者說某種稟賦，才能確信自己能夠通過正確分析企業——在他人犯錯時——持續賺錢。最具潛力的分析師，往往不是我們招聘時遇到的最受公主病驅使或最隨和的人。我們積極尋找那種近乎偏離常規的特質，那種自由不羈的火花，許多擁有高度獨立思考能力、天馬行空思維的人所具備的品質。然而，這種智力上的創造力並不總是與分析紀律並行不悖。我們尋找的是那些能夠將獨立思考的萌芽，通過嚴謹、有條理且堅持不懈的工作——特別是尋找並評估那些佐證證據——貫徹到底的人。 這證明他們的直覺所言不虛，背後有著清晰、如刀切黃油般的邏輯支撐。我們發現，有時高智商者從不需超越直覺層面的思考，因為不幸的是，就心智鍛鍊而言，他們的初始直覺往往正確或至少頗具說服力，以致這些直覺鮮少受到質疑或實證檢驗。特別值得注意的是，我們觀察到某些高智商者還學會了——無論是有意識或潛意識地——如何在社交中更好地融入並茁壯成長。這意味著對他們而言，真相成了需在特定情境下解構的社會建構，而非從基本原理中發掘的客觀存在。我們相信自己營造了讓原創思維得以蓬勃發展的環境，但同時也明白，人們的行為模式到此時通常已根深蒂固。若思維方式已然定型，要重新調整實屬難事。 投資研究接納經過校準的新思維，談論概率性思考。我們尋找那些原始且具備即時運算能力的人才。這也體現在重要的心智傾向上，包括在做出決定前收集資訊的傾向、在得出結論前尋求各種觀點的傾向。深入思考問題的傾向，以及在回應前反覆審視問題的傾向。
The tendency to calibrate the degree in strength of one's opinions of degrees of evidence available. You want convictions to be thought through but likely help, meaning it's subject to investigation. The tendency to think about future consequences before making action. The tendency to explicitly weigh classes and minor surface sedition before making a decision. The tendency to seek nuance and to avoid absolute disemm. And then we also need intellectual humility. And here, I don't mean modesty in a way that well-socialized analysts with pedigrate backgrounds learn the project like I went to this goal in Boston. We're looking for radical intellectual humility.
傾向根據現有證據的程度來校準自己觀點的強度。你希望信念是經過深思熟慮的，但同時保持開放態度，意味著它仍可被檢驗。在採取行動前思考未來後果的傾向。在做出決策前明確權衡利弊和細微差異的傾向。尋求細微差別並避免絕對二分法的傾向。此外，我們還需要知識上的謙遜。這裡，我指的不是那種受過良好社交訓練、擁有顯赫背景的分析師所表現出的謙虛，比如「我畢業於波士頓某名校」這種姿態。我們尋求的是徹底的知識謙遜。
From the true sorrow going at precision or just how little we can actually know and just how contingent probabilistic and slippery knowledge really is. If this humility is combined with a deeply rooted commitment to intellectual honesty that is commitment to finding truth, a combination can be powerful. The commitment to truth also requires intellectual flexibility and melability including a willingness to use contingently help with these about the world as placeholders while simultaneously placing those beliefs under scrutiny. There's a fine line between what lens is describing. Without right nihilism or cynicism, when pursuit or true seizes the motive, then one loses sight of it and a preoccupation for managing the regard for others as opposed to figuring out what's true becomes the dominant more debatable action and that can be really dangerous. Given our epistemology, our health view is that an article rigor is often inversely correlated with rhetorical impudeless.
從真正的悲傷走向精確，或者說我們實際上能知道的有多麼少，以及知識是多麼地依賴於機率、多變且難以捉摸。如果這種謙遜與一種根深蒂固的對知識誠實的承諾——即對尋找真相的承諾——相結合，這種組合將非常強大。對真相的承諾還需要智力的靈活性和可塑性，包括願意暫時使用對世界的偶然性幫助作為占位符，同時對這些信念進行審查。這裡描述的視角之間有一條微妙的界線。如果沒有正確的虛無主義或憤世嫉俗，當追求真相的動機被抓住時，人們就會失去對它的關注，而對管理他人看法的執著，而非弄清楚什麼是真實的，將成為主導且更具爭議的行動，這可能非常危險。鑑於我們的認識論，我們的健康觀點是，文章的嚴謹性往往與修辭上的無禮成反比。
Without intellectual humility, we are aware that a personality traits that encourage unconventional thinking can classify indistableness over time. Our culture works best with and we think attracts natural give us who find joy, real joy in discovering and accumulating and sharing and in putting knowledge. In people we encounter, we find intelligence most compelling when it's coupled with an instinctive generosity, honesty, almost earniveness and fair mindliness. Now, some thinking does not translate the success of practical investing without a goal orientation. You can be very intellectual, it can be very curious but without a goal orientation, it's still not a success of investment. A trait with come to value in people that we work with is a sense of ownership. People who care deeply and passionately but what they do and that sense of ownership carries forth and propels them to action as a motivation boss. The quality and integrity of the work matters to them and there is often innate. They care just as much when no one is looking. It inspires courage and sometimes heroic action. For example, it compels one to speak up when it's against their own interests and it encompasses what to rise up and do things that are difficult. Whenever we discover this trait we find it absolutely winning, it's also uncommon. Then closely intertwined with this sense of ownership, but not identical to it, it's internal drive. That drive is often a source of rates. It allows people to find an extra gear when it gets tough. However, and this is unfortunate for us when hiring, we found that drive is often coupled with impatience over e-codes to action. And both of those things are sometimes counterproductive. It's a very combination for someone who's willing to have their drive and what we really had on the research project. Knowing that after all that work, we may only have the fruit of his work or her work by the years from now. Ten years from now. Rare or steal is the person who's willing to go to the extra mile or a project. Only to make the case hey, I've studied this and we should not make the investment. After all that work, after all that happened, we look for this uncommon combination of commercialism, meaning the appetite for chasing down and finding a good bug in with an uncompromising intellectual honesty and regular. The trace I just described are unlikely to be present in a person without a healthy self-esteem or equal drive. People that we hire often very ambitious in the best sense of the word.
若缺乏智識上的謙遜，我們意識到鼓勵非傳統思維的人格特質可能隨時間演變為難以駕馭。我們的文化運作得最好——同時我們認為能自然吸引那些在發現、積累、分享知識並將其付諸實踐中獲得真實喜悅的人。在相遇的人們身上，我們發現當智慧與本能的慷慨、誠實、近乎熱切的求知慾及公正心態結合時最為動人。然而，某些思維若缺乏目標導向，便無法轉化為實際投資的成功。你可以極具學識、充滿好奇心，但若無目標導向，仍無法成就投資之功。我們在共事者身上逐漸珍視的特質是「當責感」——那些對所為之事懷抱深切熱情的人，這份當責感會推動他們化為行動的動力源泉。工作品質與誠信對他們至關重要，且往往與生俱來。即使無人注目，他們依然同樣在乎。這種特質能激發勇氣，有時甚至促成英勇之舉。 例如，它迫使人在違背自身利益時仍勇於發聲，並涵蓋了挺身而出執行艱難任務的決心。每當我們發現這種特質，總覺得它無比迷人，同時也相當罕見。接著與這種主人翁意識緊密相連卻不盡相同的，是內在驅動力。這股動力往往是成就的泉源，能讓人們在困境中找到突破的契機。然而——這對我們的招聘工作而言實屬不幸——我們發現這種驅動力常伴隨著對行動代碼的不耐煩。這兩者有時反而會產生反效果。對於那些願意保持驅動力的人來說，這正是我們在研究專案中真正需要的特質。要明白經歷這一切努力後，我們可能得等到多年後——甚至是十年後——才能收穫他或她的工作成果。願意為專案付出額外心力的人已屬鳳毛麟角，更遑論能站出來說：「嘿，我研究過了，我們不該進行這項投資」的人。 畢竟經歷了這一切努力與波折後，我們尋求的是這種罕見的特質組合——既有商業頭腦（意味著對追蹤並發現優質漏洞的渴望），又兼具不妥協的學術誠信與規律性。我方才描述的這些特質，很難在缺乏健康自尊或同等驅動力的人身上找到。我們聘用的人才，往往都懷抱著這個詞最正面的雄心壯志。
They want to make a difference. They want to do great things. But we also look for the intangible vision thing which is do they want to do great things as part of something bigger than themselves. Which is share in our vision. Philosophy, our goals and values. At the foundation, we look for integrity and character. Political analysts can quickly destroy our culture, fragile egos, resulting in overly reflexive graibleness or territoriality or defensiveness and anything from an overt attachment to seeming to be right can seriously detractively affectiveness of the team. We want folks who have a strong drive to succeed but not driven by success. And a difference is reflected in what is willing to do or not do don't achieve success and how one behaves if and when one achieves that success.
他們想要有所作為。他們想要成就偉大的事業。但我們也在尋找那種無形的願景特質，即他們是否願意作為比自身更宏大事物的一部分來成就偉大。這意味著要與我們的願景、哲學、目標和價值觀共享。在基礎層面，我們看重誠信與品格。政治分析師可能迅速破壞我們的文化，脆弱的自我會導致過度反射性的貪婪、地盤意識或防禦性，任何對看似正確的明顯依附都可能嚴重削弱團隊的效能。我們需要那些有強烈成功驅動力但不被成功驅使的人。這種差異體現在一個人願意做或不做什麼來達成成功，以及當一個人獲得成功時的行為方式。
We find people who with a strong sense of self are also those who are least mindful of that self and hence possess the highest potential to be effective. That creates a paradox. We want team players but not overly eager consensus builders. We seek out intellectual iconoclasts but not those who set out to be perceived to be iconoclasts. We want detail oriented analysts but not those who are missed the forest for the trees. We have a culture where each person knows that we all want him or her to succeed and we'll be out there backing him or her especially when it shifts around. But that frees us up to be honest, tough, demanding when we're holding each other to high standards of professional output and personal conduct. Our commitment to each person that we hire is to create the conditions that team environment and run way for each person to learn, grow and flourish.
我們發現，那些擁有強烈自我意識的人，往往也是最不執著於自我的人，因此他們擁有最高的效能潛力。這形成了一種悖論。我們需要團隊合作者，但不是那些過度熱衷於建立共識的人。我們尋找思想上的反傳統者，而非刻意追求被視為異類的人。我們需要注重細節的分析師，而非見樹不見林的人。在我們的文化中，每個人都知道大家希望他或她成功，尤其當情況變化時，我們會全力支持。但這也讓我們能夠在要求彼此達到高標準的專業產出和個人行為時，保持誠實、嚴厲和苛求。我們對每位雇員的承諾是創造條件，打造團隊環境和跑道，讓每個人都能學習、成長和茁壯。
This is giving a space to be vulnerable and mistakes to learn and ask why more often than is generally expected in the workplace. And then have the autonomy and rock the work out solutions and problems for themselves and have the ability to turn to others for coaching and mentoring and then have the ability to try to truly develop and must the craft of investing all of the while being held to every highest that is a productive the performance and continuity. Are there any aspects of investing that you find to be most counter-intuitive that many may not fully appreciate? I've been doing this over 20 years now and I still find it incredible that investors tend to like the investments more when they get more expensive and less when they get cheaper from first principles that's just never made sense to me. So that's pretty comfortable. How do you go about determining the intrinsic value of companies because as a value investor you're trying to find something that's cheaper than what it's actually worth? Interesting value of any company. It's just a net present value of its future cash flows. And by always true, any asset. Very simple concept we learn that and finance 101.
這提供了一個在工作場所中比一般預期更常展現脆弱、犯錯以學習並多問「為什麼」的空間。接著，擁有自主權，自己解決方案與問題，並有能力向他人尋求指導與建議，同時具備嘗試真正發展並精通投資技藝的能力，這一切都被要求達到最高標準，以確保生產力、表現與持續性。在投資中，有哪些方面你認為最違反直覺，而許多人可能未能充分理解？我從事這行已超過 20 年，至今仍覺得不可思議的是，投資者往往在投資標的變得更貴時更喜歡它們，而在變得更便宜時卻減少興趣，從基本原理來看，這對我來說從來就不合理。這點相當令人困惑。你如何確定公司的內在價值？因為作為價值投資者，你試圖找到比其實際價值更便宜的東西？任何公司的有趣價值，不過是其未來現金流的淨現值。這永遠成立，對任何資產都是如此。這是我們在財務學 101 學到的非常簡單的概念。
This value, that's not fluctuating moment to moment based on how others perceive it at any given time. Our job as value investors is try to figure out what this is. The best we can and of course with info information in that by tools, info by skills. Anyone who's bill a DCF know that it's an imperfect tool. We are all in play those cave as it were because we're grasping and truth imperfectly. But the fact that we measure interest in perfectly imperfectly and we can change our minds on it does not mean that interest value doesn't exist. With the passage of time, we'll find out exactly how much cash flow of business generates.
這個價值，並非隨著他人隨時的認知而時刻波動。我們作為價值投資者的工作，就是盡我們所能去釐清這個價值究竟是多少，當然要借助資訊工具與技能。任何建立過折現現金流模型的人都知道，這並非完美的工具。我們都在某種程度上摸著石頭過河，因為我們對真相的掌握本就不完美。但即便我們對內在價值的衡量存在缺陷且可能隨時修正，並不代表內在價值就不存在。隨著時間推移，我們終將確切知曉企業能產生多少現金流。
Objective truth actually happens. Even if no one has a monopoly of it because no one is able to do the time travel. Therefore figuring out intrinsic value becomes a weighing exercise, not a voting exercise. The extent that which will write or wrong does not depend on how many other people agree with us will make money if the business we bought actually generates a cash flow that we thought they were generate and were able to buy it had sufficiently compelling price. Let me ask you about risk. How do you define and think about risk and what you consider not risky that maybe many others do consider risky? We view risk as the probability and potential magnitude of permanent capital impairment. There is not volatility. The industrial market price of any asset be owned becomes irrelevant if we intend to hold it for a long term.
客觀事實確實會發生。即使沒有人能壟斷它，因為沒有人能夠進行時間旅行。因此，弄清楚內在價值變成了一種權衡練習，而不是投票活動。我們是否正確並不取決於有多少人同意我們，只要我們買入的企業確實產生了我們預期的現金流，並且我們能以足夠吸引人的價格買入，我們就能賺錢。讓我問你關於風險的問題。你如何定義和思考風險，以及你認為不具風險的事情，可能其他人卻認為有風險？我們將風險視為永久性資本損失的概率和潛在幅度。這不是波動性。如果我們打算長期持有任何資產，其市場價格的工業波動就變得無關緊要。
Except when we get offers we can't refuse to sell an asset or alternatively to buy more of it. The equity risk only matters in so far as it exacerbates the loss resulting from the crystallization of the risk that we will discuss over long term investment prices. The risks that we care about and we believe dominate our number one, business, calibration risk. The risk of being wrong, you know, evaluation of a business and therefore overpaid for it. Two fundamental business risk. Even if we're right in evaluating the business and we calibrated correctly, April, right? April is the real thing happened and there can be adverse outcomes.
除非我們收到無法拒絕的報價，無論是出售資產或是增持。股權風險的重要性僅在於它加劇了我們將在長期投資價格討論中風險具體化所導致的損失。我們所關心且認為主導我們首要考量的風險，是商業評估風險。也就是評估企業時出錯，因而付出過高代價的風險。其次是基本商業風險。即使我們對企業的評估正確且校準無誤，現實情況仍可能發生變化，導致不利結果。
That draws and there are also unknown or abnormal adverse outcomes. Things that are not comparable. Things that are not comparable. That can happen as well. That's also risk. Then there are people and situational judgment risk. There is a being wrong in evaluation on the honesty and competence and incentive alignment of the people we are unaware or are right to be concerned about. Then there is four salaries. We could be right on the people we could be right on a calibration of potential draws but that doesn't matter if there is an asset like the image match and we can't hold on to the investment because of short term liquidity needs or panic. That's how we think about it.
這會導致一些未知或異常的不良後果。那些無法相提並論的事情。那些無法相提並論的事情。這種情況也可能發生。這也是風險之一。接著還有人員與情境判斷的風險。在評估我們未察覺或理應關注之人的誠信、能力及激勵一致性時，可能存在誤判。此外還有四種薪資情況。即使我們對人員的判斷正確，對潛在損失的評估也準確，但若遇到像「圖像匹配」這類資產，且因短期流動性需求或恐慌而無法持有投資，這些正確判斷也無濟於事。這就是我們的思考方式。
Because of that, we size our investments from a risk management perspective. Bottom up, one right one. We don't use bar models or maximum draw down or mean various models, etc. We think about how much money we can lose in any one investment on a fundamental basis. If one of these risks that we've talked about actually happens and if there's a common risk across multiple investments for which the fundamental risks are the same, then we grew them together and think about the asset position. To answer the second part of your question, because we don't view fault of the risk. We're happy to own certain businesses that some other investors tend to avoid. For example,
因此，我們從風險管理的角度來決定投資規模。自下而上，一個一個來。我們不使用槓桿模型、最大回撤或各種均值模型等等。我們思考的是，在基本面基礎上，我們在任一投資中可能損失多少錢。如果我們談到的這些風險中的任何一個真的發生了，或者如果多個投資中存在共同的基本面風險，那麼我們會將它們放在一起考慮，並思考資產配置。回答你問題的第二部分，因為我們不認為這些風險是錯誤的。我們樂於持有某些其他投資者傾向於避開的企業。例如，
we think that investors tend to conflict the idea of productivity with the idea of stability. Predigable and stable. People can use it synonymously. With this thing which the concepts, for example, protecting the gamble is both predictable and stable. The earnings move around dramatically from the other deal. But there are other companies that are predictable but not stable because of business security. But such security can be quite predictable. For example, you can literally write a math equation for a sign with. In such a case, what's the average earnings power of that cyclical business through a full economic cycle? It's not an earnings and a given year by the earnings power of business through cycle. And step in and buy that business as is going through the downpass of the cycle. And that often is how for investors to do because you don't want to step in front of a falling knife. Your description of how you think about risk. I think provides some insights into how you think about investing. Which is the risk to you is it change in intrinsic value. It's like what the fundamentals of the business as opposed to the way most people think about risk, which is the volatility of the price. It's really interesting how you make that distinction.
我們認為投資者往往將生產力的概念與穩定性混為一談。可預測且穩定。人們可以將這兩個詞視為同義詞。以保護賭注為例，這個概念既是可預測的也是穩定的。收益會因其他交易而大幅波動。但還有其他公司是可預測但不穩定的，這是由於業務安全性所致。然而這種安全性本身可能是相當可預測的。例如，你完全可以為某個標誌寫出一個數學方程式。在這種情況下，這個週期性業務在完整經濟週期中的平均盈利能力是多少？它不是某個特定年份的收益，而是業務在整個週期中的盈利能力。然後在該業務處於週期下行階段時介入並買入。這往往是投資者的做法，因為你不希望接下跌的刀子。你對風險思考方式的描述。我認為這提供了你如何看待投資的一些見解。對你而言，風險就是內在價值的變化。 這就像是企業的基本面，與大多數人對風險的看法——即價格的波動性——形成對比。你如何做出這樣的區分真的很有趣。
You also talked about catching a falling knife. Would you describe your approach to avoiding value traps? Stir. Well, we distinguish two different archetype of the gold value traps. The first one is the 50 cents on a dollar that does not grow. We think that that's an old gold policy. Here's why a 50 cent that does not grow is not worth the decent at all. For example, a zero coupon button that matures 50 years of now. But it's not worth power. A 50 cent has to grow at its cost of capital.
你還談到了「接落下的刀子」。你能描述一下你如何避免價值陷阱嗎？嗯，我們區分了兩種不同類型的黃金價值陷阱。第一種是價值 50 美分但不增長的資產。我們認為那是舊的黃金策略。這就是為什麼一個不增長的 50 美分根本不值得投資。例如，一張 50 年後到期的零息債券，它現在不值錢。一個 50 美分的資產必須以其資本成本增長。
A bit worth 50 cents in that present value terms. All two common value traps for naive bug in hunters is buying worthless assets at big discounts to its portfolio. For example, steel plants in excess supply and half of its historical costs or real estate on a balance sheet. It just comes to what. Someone paid for it. But if those assets are likely to producing African cash flows for the foreseeable future, then those things are not worth much at all. They're not worth a dollar. So you're not buying it for the cent's on a dollar.
從現值角度來看，這只值 50 美分。對於那些天真的價值陷阱獵手來說，常見的兩個錯誤就是以大幅折價購買毫無價值的資產。例如，過剩產能的鋼鐵廠，其成本僅為歷史水平的一半，或是資產負債表上的房地產。問題歸根結底在於——當初有人為此買單。但如果這些資產在可預見的未來不太可能產生正向現金流，那麼它們實際上並不值多少錢。它們連一美元都不值。所以你並不是在以「一美分換一美元」的價格買入。
But once we've had just a time value of money, we can value many different kinds of assets on an apples to apples. It's the shape of the cash flows of each asset. It's different. Some assets, cycles, some nuts, some earnings are back and loaded. Some earnings are front and loaded. But at the end of the day, you can do the NPV or all those assets. You can compare them to apples to apples. But the second one, it is buying it for $0.50 a dollar. But you never get a dollar.
但一旦我們考慮了貨幣的時間價值，就能以統一標準評估各類資產。關鍵在於每項資產現金流的形態差異——有些資產呈現週期性波動，有些收益集中在後期，有些則前置兌現。但歸根結底，你可以計算所有資產的淨現值(NPV)，實現跨資產類別的標準化比較。第二種情況看似是以「半價換全價」買入，但你永遠無法真正獲得全額價值。
Because it's never paid out of shelves. There's a different kind of value trap. This is where a company actually generates cash. But as minded and audited, shareholders, you don't get a return. Because the management team does take to the cash. But doesn't create value. As minority shareholders underwriting the capital allocation decisions of management teams, with which we invest, it's a vital part of what we do. The problem in investing is that it's often mediocre businesses with low returns of capital that require the most capital. Ironic, low RIC businesses need a lot of cash.
因為它從未從貨架上支付過。這是一種不同類型的價值陷阱。這種情況下，公司實際上產生了現金。但作為股東，你並未獲得回報。因為管理團隊確實掌握了現金，但並未創造價值。作為少數股東，我們為管理團隊的資本配置決策提供支持，這是我們工作中至關重要的一部分。投資中的問題在於，往往是那些資本回報率低的平庸企業需要最多的資本。諷刺的是，低資本回報率的企業需要大量現金。
High RIC businesses are often capital light. Therefore, that very few businesses can absorb a lot of capital at higher RICs. So you have very capital interest businesses, industrial businesses, infrastructure businesses, all in gas businesses, real estate utilities. And then you have very high RIC businesses, brands and database companies and netwabies companies and service companies and software companies. But the intersection of the two, which is businesses that generate high RIC, but also need a lot of capital, that's a very small set of companies.
高資本回報率的企業通常是資本輕型的。因此，很少有企業能夠在高資本回報率下吸收大量資本。所以你有資本密集型的企業，工業企業、基礎設施企業、天然氣企業、房地產公用事業。然後你有非常高資本回報率的企業，品牌和數據庫公司、網絡公司、服務公司和軟件公司。但這兩者的交集，即那些既能產生高資本回報率又需要大量資本的企業，這是一個非常小的公司群體。
What that means is regardless of whether companies as a heavy or as a light with very few exceptions, we as investors are likely to be able to reinvest capital and better prospective returns than our underlying portfolio companies can. Even the high RIC businesses that we own, because they don't need a capital. We can deliver portfolio companies that are run by management teams that are good at returning capital to us. If the market price of a portfolio company is fail in that case, they're very heavy to buy more, because we know that what we're going to see that cash. And if capital markets close permanently, your return is going to come from the return of cash to us over time, as opposed to some market market valuation in the future. What are your thoughts on the time horizon arbitrage, something that we talked about a little bit earlier, and it's practical implementation? Yeah, as we discussed from the outset, we wanted this ring to be a mutant sea turtle now teenage in a sea of salmon. This requires the main unconventional strategic decisions. For example, we've really discussed how the Crete Hubs, which is way longer than the industry norms, and slow our asset growth frankly, from the get-go, because it's hard for folks to commit for that long, but it gave us a capital base a continuous bit source of enduring competitive advantage. We saw out partners that truly shed our relational DNA, and we generally viewed them as a long-term relationship rather than a temporary arrangement of mutual convenience. Over the years, we've turned away more capital than we cared to admit, and when we believed that there was not a million of the minds in terms of shared expectations and goals and partnership values, or really serious about that. We've hired slowly, because as we discussed, we wanted to build a thick culture with a people that we do hire, and we knew that that needed time to take shape with students of all good-exyre culture, culture cannot be forced, it has to be organic, and that takes time. We've invested cautiously with large margins of safety that too has been a little bit counter-cultural, but this has allowed us to find a C-legs, as we continue to thinker and improve the different investment machines. We tried not to grow too fast, we have these capital structures with slowly capital down over time, it's been a patient process. In general, we've continued to be willing to trade out Shatown profits for potential autumn gains. We look for the same thing in the companies that we study.
這意味著，無論公司是資本密集還是輕資產，除了極少數例外，我們作為投資者很可能能夠以比我們所投資的組合公司更好的預期回報來再投資資本。即使是我們持有的高資本回報率業務，因為它們不需要資本。我們可以提供由善於將資本返還給我們的管理團隊經營的投資組合公司。如果投資組合公司的市場價格在這種情況下下跌，我們會大量買入更多，因為我們知道我們將會看到這些現金。而如果資本市場永久關閉，你的回報將來自於現金隨著時間返還給我們，而不是未來某個市場估值。你對時間套利的看法是什麼，我們之前稍微談到過，以及它的實際執行？是的，正如我們一開始討論的，我們希望這個環節成為變種海龜，現在在鮭魚海中處於青少年階段。這需要做出主要的非傳統戰略決策。 例如，我們確實討論過克里特樞紐（Crete Hubs）的運作方式遠超行業標準，坦白說，這從一開始就拖慢了我們的資產增長速度，因為人們很難承諾如此長期的投入，但它為我們提供了資本基礎，成為持續且持久的競爭優勢來源。我們看到那些真正體現我們關係 DNA 的合作夥伴，並普遍將他們視為長期關係，而非暫時的互利安排。多年來，我們拒絕的資本比我們願意承認的還要多，當我們認為在共同期望、目標及合作價值觀上未能達成一致時，我們對此非常認真。我們招聘緩慢，因為正如我們所討論的，我們希望與所聘請的人共同建立深厚的文化，我們知道這需要時間來形成，就像所有優秀文化一樣，文化無法強求，它必須是有機的，這需要時間。我們謹慎投資，保持巨大的安全邊際，這在某種程度上也與主流文化背道而馳，但這讓我們能夠找到立足點，同時持續思考並改進不同的投資機制。 我們試圖避免過快增長，我們的資本結構隨著時間推移逐漸減少資本，這是一個需要耐心的過程。總的來說，我們一直願意用短期利潤換取潛在的長期收益。我們在研究的公司中也尋找相同的特質。
We watch for how much public companies pender to the Greek chorus of Shatown investors by means of managing earnings guidance and the extent to which they re-watt executives on such KPIs. We believe that companies get the invested state deserve and will act accordingly. We judge the extent to which companies treat their stakeholders, including customers, the shareholders, the employees, the suppliers, as true-long-term partners rather than temporary arrangements of mutual convenience. Here, we focus on what the companies do not on what they say. We look for companies with thick rather than thin cultures and I use air quotes here because it's a term of art. At companies with thick cultures, the corporate mission and their use statements are lived out and experienced by their stakeholders. We talk to the employees, they can recount how the company's commitment to these statements drove important decisions at companies with thin cultures, employees are hard pressed to even recall what the mission and the values are. We also admire companies that have this continuous and pro-gene to the willing to try to tinker with new things. They're winning the field, but they feel smart and they feel quickly. They sell them bad all on red in the hope their red turns up, even though companies will make these big bets sometimes get the front picture of Wall Street Journal, most follow-up acts as a drug. So they get all the glory. But the people who try to work on the project of the employer, we see companies who willingly and consistently trade short-term gains for long-term ones.
我們觀察上市公司如何透過管理盈利預期來迎合 Shatown 投資者的希臘合唱團式訴求，以及他們基於這些關鍵績效指標重新調整高管薪酬的程度。我們相信企業終將獲得與其投資狀態相稱的結果，並據此採取行動。我們評估企業將利益相關者——包括客戶、股東、員工、供應商——視為真正長期夥伴而非權宜之計的程度。在此，我們關注企業實際作為而非口頭宣示。我們尋找具有深厚（此處我用引號強調，因這是專業術語）而非淺薄企業文化的公司。在文化深厚的企業裡，企業使命與價值宣言會被利益相關者親身實踐與體驗。當我們與員工交談時，他們能詳述公司對這些宣言的承諾如何推動重大決策；而在文化淺薄的企業中，員工甚至難以回憶起公司使命與價值觀為何。我們同樣欣賞那些持續保持實驗精神、願意嘗試新事物的企業。 他們在市場上贏得了勝利，但他們感覺自己很聰明且反應迅速。他們把所有賭注都押在紅色上，希望紅色會出現，儘管有時這些大膽下注的公司會登上《華爾街日報》的頭版，大多數後續行為卻像毒品一樣。因此，他們獲得了所有的榮耀。但那些努力為雇主項目工作的人，我們看到的是那些自願且持續地以短期利益換取長期收益的公司。
There's a delayed gratification gene. They reinvest in customer price rebates and improved offerings. They reinvest in their employees, their training and retention tools. They reinvest in the future, via R&D and capital expenditure, even though shareholders often don't like that. So in many ways they behaved in the exact opposite way that most private equity rule ups do. It's interesting. Just the term time, Verizon arbitrage, is in many ways counterintuitive. You would think that there's no arbitrage by being a long-term investor because that's how people should think about investing, but that's just not the reality of how things work, which offers this arbitrage to be a truly long-term investor. Yeah, we joke about this. Why is an arbitrage at all? It's just common sense and yet, here we are. So it's one thing to state that objective. It's another to actually do an impractice because you're managing other people's money, not your own money. And so what would you say is a longest period of relative underperformance you've experienced and how did your clients react through those stretches? You know what? That's an interesting question.
有一種延遲滿足的基因。他們將資金再投資於客戶價格回饋和改善產品服務。他們再投資於員工，包括培訓和留才工具。他們透過研發和資本支出再投資於未來，儘管股東通常不喜歡這樣。因此，從許多方面來看，他們的行為與大多數私募股權收購的做法完全相反。這很有趣。光是「威瑞森套利」這個術語，在許多方面就違反直覺。你可能會認為，作為長期投資者不存在套利，因為這本應是人們思考投資的方式，但現實運作並非如此，這反而為真正的長期投資者提供了套利機會。是的，我們常開玩笑說，這怎麼能算套利呢？這根本是常識，但現實就是如此。所以，陳述這個目標是一回事，實際執行又是另一回事，因為你管理的是別人的錢，而非自己的資金。那麼，你經歷過最長的相對表現不佳時期是多久？在這段期間，你的客戶有何反應？你知道嗎？這是個有趣的問題。
Frankly, I don't think we know what our longest period of relative underperformance was, which is telling in itself because we're not actually that benchmarking where. But off the top of my head, I can talk about two periods. The first period was right out of the gate at launch in 2010. And this is kind of crazy. We ended up investing a significant chunk of our portfolio right at launch in a handful of Greek companies in the middle of the great crisis. These investments got cheaper and cheaper after we bought them. From 2010 to 2012, naturally, they were tracks on our Mark the Mark and Returns in those early years.
坦白說，我不確定我們經歷過最長的相對表現不佳時期有多久，這本身就說明了問題，因為我們實際上並沒有那麼注重基準比較。但憑記憶所及，我可以談談兩個時期。第一個時期是在 2010 年剛成立時。這聽起來有點瘋狂。我們在成立之初就將投資組合中的一大筆資金投入了幾家希臘公司，當時正值希臘危機最嚴重的時期。這些投資在我們買入後變得越來越便宜。從 2010 年到 2012 年，自然這些投資在早期的帳面價值和回報上拖累了我們。
And as you know, the first three years are crucial for any emerging manager to the L attractric and here we were without size Greek holdings that didn't work, quote unquote, in the first three years. You're attached right off the bat, right off the bat, obviously worked well, but at the time we didn't know that. The second period was 2018 to 2019. And this is years after we had existed a number of our investments, including some of our Greek investments and they were profitable. And that meant that it was a bunch of cash in the portfolio. And we didn't find anything we wanted to buy.
如你所知，對於任何新興經理人來說，前三年對於吸引 L 型投資者至關重要，而當時我們持有的希臘資產規模不大，在前三年「表現不佳」。你一開始就緊密參與，顯然運作良好，但當時我們並不知道這一點。第二階段是 2018 年至 2019 年。那時我們已經退出多項投資多年，包括部分希臘投資，且這些投資都獲利了。這意味著投資組合中有大量現金，但我們找不到任何想買的標的。
So we were struggling to put capital work. What we did is we reached out to our partners and offered to return 30% of our capital to them. And that's when we created this capital drawdown structure. Yeah, I described earlier in our conversation. It was highly unusual for funds to want to be ten capital back to health peace. That's highly unusual for LPs to be so punishment minded. LPs worked with us to design the structures and we created new funds with the right called the capital back. One phenomenon that I've noticed through the many years that I've been investing is many investors report time-weighted returns, returns at day see. But the investors get what's called the dollar way to return, meaning it's that earnings on the dollars that they invest. And if they buy high and hold on to that manager and then sell low over time, they actually earn less than what the time-weighted return is. One thing that I noticed when I looked at your historical returns is your dollar way to returns have been higher than your time-weighted returns. Would you walk us through a wide-out spin the case? Yeah, absolutely. And rather the proud of that fact. We believe that this is because of our capital drawdown structure that we created in 2018. We tend to call more capital for our partners and double down on up-of-all-year positions when they trade down. We return capital.
所以我們當時苦於無法有效運用資金。我們的做法是聯繫我們的合作夥伴，提議返還他們 30%的資本。正是在那時，我們建立了這種資本回撤機制。是的，正如我之前在對話中提到的，基金主動要求將資金返還給投資人是相當罕見的。有限合夥人(LPs)通常不會如此傾向於懲罰性思維。LPs 與我們共同設計了這套機制，我們隨後創立了名為「資本回撤權」的新基金。在我多年投資生涯中觀察到一個現象：許多投資者報告的是時間加權報酬率，即每日可見的報酬。但投資者實際獲得的是所謂的美元加權報酬，這意味著他們賺取的是所投入資金的實際收益。如果他們在高點買入並長期持有該經理人的產品，最終在低點賣出，其實際收益會低於時間加權報酬率。當我研究你們的歷史報酬時注意到：你們的美元加權報酬始終高於時間加權報酬。能否詳細說明這個現象？當然，這正是我們引以為傲之處。 我們認為這是由於我們在 2018 年建立的資本提取結構所致。我們傾向於為合作夥伴調集更多資金，並在全年表現上漲的持倉出現下跌時加倍投入。我們會返還資本。
Often when we exit investments, which typically correlate with the rise of strong market returns. So we actually increase the size of our fund when we have drawdowns through new capital inflows. And then we shrink the size of our funds when we have exits. And we fall into the return capital in investors. And that affects the dollar way that returns. This is the opposite of the multiple industry experience. Public market funds tend to not control when money comes in. And when money comes up, in fact, more money comes in and they get more interest on investors after the period of strong returns.
通常當我們退出投資時，這往往與市場強勁回報的上升相關。因此，實際上我們會通過新資本流入在出現提取時擴大基金規模。然後在退出投資時縮減基金規模。我們會將資本返還給投資者。這影響了回報的美元計算方式。這與多數行業的經驗相反。公開市場基金通常無法控制資金流入的時機。事實上，當資金流入時，特別是在強勁回報期後，他們會獲得更多投資者的興趣。
And they tend to get redemissions after the period of week returns. Performance choosing is the rule, not the exception, on investor behavior. As a result, typical experience is that the dollar with the returns of public markets funds tends significantly lag time with the returns. LPs don't get the experience of the time with the returns of the fund. Related to this topic that we just covered is this question. What would you say is the value of maintaining dry powder in an investment portfolio to potentially buy low? And how do you avoid cash drag if you're sitting on cash? Cash is most valuable when it's scarce. For example, we had a war chest when markets sold out during the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, which allowed us to put a lot of fresh capital to work. At what we believe were wonderful companies at wonderful prices in the middle of the pandemic. We were able to be greedy when others are fearful. And the reason we were able to do that is we had this unfunded capital commitments that we could call down from investors because of our structure. We didn't need to maintain dry powder in the funds. We had significant unfunded capital commitments from our partners that we call quite aggressively in much and equal of 2020. In fact, we struck a monthly personal capital in the middle of the end of the end of the pandemic. Of course, because these were unfunded capital commitments, we rendered this that our partners would not send us cash. Even though they were contracted committed to do so for one of the reason. But all our partners funded our capital calls, default on five businesses, they noticed, including in the middle of the month, from their bedrooms. It was a testament to their partnership, and they were not able to do that. So the 15 years of you have been investing has been a tremendous time for US stocks, particularly the big tech names, and has not been so great for most of the rest of the stock market. But you've done reasonably well over that period, even though you have not focused on the tech names. Would you tell us about that? Sure. You're exactly right. On nearly 15 year track record was generated despite having almost half of a loan portfolio invested in imaging markets companies, and just 20% proxamely invested in the US. By way of comparison, EM currently accounts for about 10% of the MSIA equity, and the US is a whopping 66% of the equity. So the weeds are almost flipped around in our portfolio versus the equity index. And from June 2010, when we launched till December 2024, the US S&P index has compounded 14.4% while the MSIA EM index has compounded just 3.6%. Huge difference. In addition, the past decade and a half has been a difficult environment for value investors because of the astonishing effects of monetary policy and tech boom among other factors. The MSIA equity value index has compounded at 7.6%. Over the same period type, June 2010, December 2024, while the MSIA equity growth index analyzed at 10.5%. So a significant difference between it too. The disarray investment program has held its own despite this difficult top-down positioning because of all fashion bottom-up sub-biting. At the foundation, we've been right a lot more often than we've been wrong. And even when we've been wrong, our mystics haven't been very costly to the overall portfolio. And that's why we've been able to generate a tech so we have. So you don't own many of the popular tech stocks. Can you explain your reasoning? Precisely because they're popular and therefore expensive. We do own several not-so-popular tech companies, though. What are your views on reflexivity and its role in investing? Apart from things about age and issues, I think that reflexivity is a major reason the real wall doesn't operate in accordance with idealized economic models. Let's use right-hilling as an example. We've wondered why right-hilling companies don't use AI tools more in pricing and driver-peart models. Could a right-hilling company not use external data, for example, where they focus? All-in-scadels, sports schedules, concert schedules, other event calendars, as inputs to drive demand prediction models in a local market. For example, you know that really jaws forming a medicine square garden get drivers to get to a medicine square garden before the concert ends.
而且它們往往在經歷一週回報不佳後就會面臨贖回。績效選擇是投資者行為的常態，而非例外。因此，典型的經驗是，公開市場基金的美元回報往往明顯落後於時間回報。有限合夥人（LPs）無法體驗到基金回報與時間同步的經歷。與我們剛剛討論的話題相關的是這個問題：你認為在投資組合中保持「乾火藥」（dry powder）以潛在低價買入的價值是什麼？如果你持有現金，如何避免現金拖累（cash drag）？現金在稀缺時最有價值。例如，在 2020 年初 COVID-19 大流行期間市場暴跌時，我們有一個「戰爭基金」（war chest），這讓我們能夠投入大量新資金運作。我們相信這些資金投資於在大流行期間以極佳價格交易的優秀公司。當別人恐懼時，我們能夠貪婪。我們之所以能做到這一點，是因為我們的結構允許我們從投資者那裡調用未動用的資本承諾。我們不需要在基金中保持乾火藥。 我們從合作夥伴那裡獲得了大量未撥款的資本承諾，我們在 2020 年相當積極地調用了這些資金。事實上，我們在疫情接近尾聲時達成了月度個人資本的里程碑。當然，由於這些是未撥款的資本承諾，我們當時認為合作夥伴不會向我們提供現金，儘管他們合約上承諾會這樣做，出於某種原因。但我們所有的合作夥伴都履行了資本調用，沒有對五家企業違約，他們注意到了這一點，包括在月中從他們的臥室裡。這證明了他們的合作精神，而他們原本可能做不到這一點。所以，過去 15 年對你來說是投資美國股票的絕佳時期，尤其是大型科技股，而對股市的其他大部分來說則不那麼理想。但在這段時間裡，你的表現相當不錯，儘管你沒有專注於科技股。你能談談這方面嗎？當然。你說得完全正確。我們近 15 年的投資記錄是在幾乎一半的貸款組合投資於新興市場公司，僅約 20%投資於美國的情況下產生的。 相較之下，新興市場目前僅占馬來西亞股市約 10%的比重，而美國則高達 66%。因此，在我們的投資組合中，這兩者的比重幾乎與股市指數相反。從 2010 年 6 月我們啟動投資至 2024 年 12 月，美國標普指數的複合年增長率為 14.4%，而馬來西亞新興市場指數僅為 3.6%，差距巨大。此外，過去十五年對價值型投資者來說是艱難的時期，這要歸因於貨幣政策的驚人效果及科技熱潮等因素。馬來西亞股市價值指數的複合年增長率為 7.6%，同期間（2010 年 6 月至 2024 年 12 月），馬來西亞股市成長指數的增長率則為 10.5%，兩者之間也存在顯著差異。儘管面臨這種艱難的由上而下配置環境，我們的分散投資計畫仍能保持其獨立性，這全歸功於由下而上的精選策略。基本上，我們正確的次數遠多於錯誤，即使出錯，這些失誤對整體投資組合的代價也不高。這就是我們能夠創造出如此績效的原因。所以你並沒有持有許多熱門的科技股。 你能解釋一下你的理由嗎？正是因為它們受歡迎，所以價格昂貴。不過，我們確實持有幾家不太受歡迎的科技公司。你對反身性及其在投資中的作用有何看法？除了年齡和問題之外，我認為反身性是現實市場不按照理想化經濟模型運作的主要原因。讓我們以叫車服務為例。我們一直想知道為什麼叫車公司不在定價和司機分配模型中更多地使用 AI 工具。難道叫車公司不能使用外部數據嗎？例如，他們可以關注哪些方面？所有可能的活動，如體育賽程、音樂會時間表、其他活動日曆，作為輸入來驅動當地市場的需求預測模型。舉例來說，你知道在麥迪遜廣場花園舉辦大型演唱會時，會促使司機在演唱會結束前趕往麥迪遜廣場花園。
Like a such price is a lag indicator. If so, could the market not clear at a better equilibrium where you have a supply and demand meet before such prices come in and then you realize that a few people end up paying very high prices for the right and many people don't get right at all. With the help of big data, you can unlock certain latent demand and a total adjustable market for bright-hilling would expect. The issue we learn from our research is that if a right-hilling company started offering drive this too much money upfront to get to a specific location in anticipation of demand increases, then drivers would not be willing to go to these locations if they're not given incentive to do so. Some drivers may also start cutting back on their driving during normal times when they aren't paid drive incentives. They income satisfies not maximise. So paying off a drivers took unlock, otherwise latent and unfulfilled demand in certain areas may actually cause market failure in other areas because of the impact these payments have on drive-over behavior, hence the reflexibility. And reflexively exists in financial markets just as it does in right-hilling markets and is often similarly underappreciated. For example, we believe that among the bigger investment stories of the last decade is how ultra-lose monetary policy, which were intended by central banks, around the world as a tool to counter-s�ely reduce economic and financial system risks. Instead, dramatically exacerbated those risks. This is the result of three money changing the behavior of economic actors. Start-ups with hill-married business models, were given and this is a little geeky, but I'm going to say new scum on the suitcases of cash to pursue these data ideas and obscene valuations. Investment managers were given new scum on the suitcases of cash to roll up perfectly mediocre businesses with mountains of debt and the whistles of equity and equipped with the license of self-determined value of those businesses using prices and they pay and other like that pay. So they mocked their own book. Public company promoters were given new scum on the suitcases of cash to perpetrate unz-like roll-ups of other companies and will re-w audit by shareholders when they're capitaling out of the company. So it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Create market participants willingly lent new scum on the suitcases of cash to anyone and everyone who were often able to offload the risks to others for example through the good taxation. The central bank puts changes the behavior of the actors in the system and assess the risks in the system. We think that this story is not yet fully told. As Charlie Munger-quipped, easy money corrupts and really easy money corrupts absolutely. What widely followed investment methodology seems flawed to you? You asked earlier where I disagree with Warren and Charlie. This is not a disagreement with Warren and Charlie themselves but your commentary on the disdortionity effects of mimetic echo chimbers because Warren and Charlie had the prophecy half they've tended to become brochure in quotes upon which investors simply involved their own biases and predilections, clothing them with immediate credibility. For example, Charlie's influence on Warren, the buy wonderful businesses at fair prices over the years has been co-opted by so many investors to justify paying insane prices for good businesses. thereby guaranteeing poor returns on those investments even though they're good businesses. When you pay insane prices, you're going to get poor returns. Over time, as too much capital began chasing too few such good businesses because everyone was the buy high quality compounded businesses so much money goes to do that. The definition of quality or unquote change such the investors began throwing insane money behind shockingly poor businesses were structurally challenged economics and called them high quality compounds. You just slapping a label. Of course, Warren and Charlie themselves did not participate in the escalating insanity instead they continued to be revises of common sense in the age of epic financial un-reason. And I suppose some of that becomes much more obvious with time, meaning as you're living through it, it's easy for many investors to get sucked into that mindset because it seems to be working for an extended period and then when you zoom out and you fast forward many years and you look back, it was very obviously a very risky thing to do. In my experience, there seems to be a spectrum of money managers.
像這樣的價格是一個滯後指標。如果是這樣，市場是否無法在一個更好的均衡點上出清，即在這樣的價格出現之前，供需就已經相遇，然後你意識到有少數人最終為權利支付了非常高的價格，而許多人根本得不到權利。在大數據的幫助下，你可以解鎖某些潛在需求，並為預期的光明山丘創造一個完全可調節的市場。我們從研究中學到的問題是，如果一個正確山丘的公司開始提供過多的前期資金來達到特定地點，以預期需求增加，那麼司機將不願意前往這些地點，除非他們獲得這樣做的激勵。一些司機也可能在沒有獲得駕駛激勵的正常時期開始減少駕駛。他們的收入並未最大化。因此，支付司機以解鎖某些地區原本潛在且未滿足的需求，實際上可能因為這些支付對駕駛行為的影響而導致其他地區的市場失靈，這就是反身性。 而這種反射性在金融市場中同樣存在，就如同在右傾市場中一樣，且往往同樣被低估。例如，我們認為過去十年中較大的投資故事之一，是全球央行原本旨在透過極度寬鬆的貨幣政策來對抗並減少經濟與金融系統風險，卻反而戲劇性地加劇了這些風險。這是因為資金改變了經濟參與者的行為。那些商業模式勉強可行的新創公司，獲得了——這聽起來有點書呆子氣，但我還是要說——現金行李箱上的新浮渣，去追逐這些數據概念和荒謬的估值。投資經理們則得到了現金行李箱上的新浮渣，用來堆積大量債務和股權的哨子，將表現平平的企業打包起來，並利用他們支付的價格和其他類似支付方式，自我決定這些企業的價值，從而偽造自己的帳本。上市公司推手們則獲得了現金行李箱上的新浮渣，進行類似 Unz 式的企業併購，並在他們從公司抽資時，股東們將重新審計。 因此，這變成了一個自我實現的預言。市場參與者心甘情願地將新資金借給任何人，而這些人往往能夠將風險轉嫁給他人，例如通過良好的稅收政策。中央銀行的行為改變了系統中參與者的行為，並評估了系統中的風險。我們認為這個故事尚未完全揭露。正如查理·芒格所說，容易的錢會腐蝕人，而非常容易的錢則絕對會腐蝕人。你認為哪些廣受追隨的投資方法論似乎有缺陷？你之前問我在哪裡與華倫和查理意見相左。這不是與華倫和查理本人的分歧，而是你對模仿回聲室扭曲效應的評論，因為華倫和查理擁有預言的一半，他們傾向於成為被引用的「手冊」，投資者只是將自己的偏見和偏好投射其中，賦予它們即時的可信度。例如，查理對華倫的影響——多年來以公平價格買入優秀企業——已被許多投資者挪用，來為以瘋狂價格買入好企業辯護。 從而保證了這些投資的回報不佳，儘管它們是優秀的企業。當你支付荒謬的價格時，你將獲得糟糕的回報。隨著時間的推移，由於太多資金開始追逐太少這樣的優質企業，因為每個人都在購買高質量複合型企業，大量資金湧入這一領域。所謂「質量」的定義或引用改變，以至於投資者開始將瘋狂的資金投向那些結構上存在經濟挑戰、表現驚人地差的企業，並稱它們為高質量複合型企業。這不過是貼上一個標籤而已。當然，華倫和查理自己並沒有參與這種不斷升級的瘋狂行為，相反，在這個史詩級金融非理性時代，他們繼續保持著常識的清醒。我想，隨著時間的推移，其中一些問題會變得更加明顯，意思是當你身處其中時，許多投資者很容易被這種心態所吸引，因為它在很長一段時間內似乎有效，然後當你拉遠視角，快進許多年後再回顧，就會發現這顯然是一件非常冒險的事情。根據我的經驗，資金管理者似乎存在一個光譜。
Those truly in the business of generating returns for clients and on the other end of the spectrum, those primarily aiming to gather assets. While everyone claims to prioritize returns, their actions may not always support this narrative. Like you said earlier, you can't just go by what they say, you have to look at what they do. You don't engage in any marketing and all your clients come from referrals. How do you think about this spectrum of gathering assets versus generating returns for clients? I think that this comes down to a quite fundamental question about what drives someone and why someone does what they do. And what one wants one's life-pinning look like is a very fundamental in somewhat personal question.
那些真正致力於為客戶創造回報的人，以及另一端主要目標在於累積資產的人。雖然每個人都聲稱將回報視為優先事項，但他們的行為未必總是支持這種說法。就像你之前說的，不能只聽他們怎麼說，還得看他們怎麼做。你完全不從事任何行銷活動，所有客戶都來自推薦。你如何看待這種累積資產與為客戶創造回報之間的差異？我認為這歸根結底是一個相當根本的問題，關乎一個人的驅動力以及為何選擇從事某項工作。而一個人希望自己的人生支柱呈現何種樣貌，在某種程度上是個非常根本且帶有個人色彩的問題。
Don't get me wrong. We love our partners and we will be delighted to have more. But only if they are philosophy alive. Only if they truly know them focus and only if they're genuinely punished. We do not consider capital to be fungible. The who behind the capital, the relationships will deal with them, are core to our DNA. We hope to celebrate our 50th anniversary and we talk about this often with a room full of sub-tourgynerians and octogenarians and non-agenerians with travel with us on our investing journey. And we will love for them to say, look at what we achieve together, look at what we learn, look at how much fun it was, look at how profitable and look at how worthwhile it's been. At the end of the journey, what we want our partners to say is they did all things well. And this is a very personal thing. These things not asset on the management, not how big we are. That's what animates us and that's what makes us step out of debt every day. You can't fake that. In a recent podcast that I did, I discussed four major mistakes investors often make. Number one, four diversification.
別誤會我的意思。我們熱愛我們的合作夥伴，並且樂於擁有更多。但前提是他們必須與我們的理念契合。只有當他們真正了解自己的專注點，並且真心實意地投入時，我們才會接納。我們不認為資本是可以隨意替代的。資金背後的人是誰、與我們建立的關係，這些才是我們 DNA 的核心。我們期待慶祝五十週年紀念，經常談論這個話題時，想像房間裡坐滿了與我們一同走過投資旅程的六旬、七旬、八旬甚至更年長的夥伴。我們希望他們能說：看看我們共同取得的成就，看看我們學到了什麼，看看這段旅程多麼有趣、多麼有利可圖、多麼值得。在旅程的終點，我們希望夥伴們能說，我們把每件事都做得很好。這是非常個人化的事情。這些不是資產管理上的數字，也不是我們規模有多大。正是這些驅動著我們，讓我們每天都能充滿幹勁地投入工作。這是無法偽裝的。在最近的一次播客中，我討論了投資者常犯的四個主要錯誤。第一，過度分散投資。
Number two, they tend to buy high in cell low. We touch on that earlier. Number three, they tend to have a short time horizon. We cover that as well. And then number four, there's a general overconfidence in predicting the future. Do you generally agree with these observations and are there any other significant mistakes you've noticed investors commonly make? Yes, very much so. I was nodding along as you were describing the tendency of investors to buy high in cell low and think over far too short time horizons and being over confident about a future. I'm like, yeah, exactly.
第二，他們往往高買低賣。我們之前提到過這一點。第三，他們的投資時間視野往往很短。這點我們也討論過。接著第四，普遍存在對預測未來過度自信的情況。你大致同意這些觀察嗎？還有沒有注意到投資者常犯的其他重大錯誤？是的，非常同意。當你描述投資者傾向於高買低賣、思考的時間框架過短以及對未來過度自信時，我不斷點頭。我心想，沒錯，正是如此。
I will add two observations. One relating to stock because and one relating to L.O.C. is the first one. In recent years, it's an infashionable for stock because the poor scorn on Ben Graham value investing. A school of investing the emphasises scrubbing balance sheets and reconciling inconstainments to cash lost in learns and reading the food nodes and we believe that this is a mistake. In fact, we believe that good value investors must pass through Ben Graham on their journey to Buffet. In one's 20s and early 30s, one is often reaching the height of one's analytical horsepower. And that stage, we believe that young animals must develop a fluency in accounting, which is the language I'm investing by working to understand the financial mechanics of investors, including quote unquote boring things, like working capital terms and cash conversion and operating financial leverage, price and volume and cost drivers, etc. In the process of working through these mechanics, young animals begin to develop pattern recognition for what's good business. And the opposite of that, looking at that business is an vulnerable balance sheet and fragile business models. But that language of accounting, by which you understand the good business is numbers piece. Now, as analysts continue to progress in the development and being to appreciate that not all valuable businesses are under accounting vouchers. For example, ran recognition, habitual consumption, global distribution, disargh as a self-accompanied Coca-Cola and they're not all under balance chain of Coca-Cola and endless begin to understand that accounting earnings do not always reflect the true economies of business. For example, the structure had the way re-insured as group produces a lot more free cash flow than the actual accounting earnings suggest because of the foot that the business generates. Over time, young animals begin to average the power of intangible assets. In addition, analysts begin to recognize the true outlightest, the exceptional businesses that buck the trend of molecular industries.
我將補充兩點觀察。第一點與股票有關，第二點則與 L.O.C.相關。近年來，由於對班傑明·葛拉漢價值投資法的輕視，股票投資已不再流行。有一種投資學派強調徹底審視資產負債表、調節現金流動中的不一致性，並仔細研讀財務附註，我們認為這是一個錯誤。事實上，我們相信優秀的價值投資者在邁向巴菲特式投資的過程中，必須先經歷班傑明·葛拉漢的洗禮。在二十多歲到三十出頭的年紀，人們通常處於分析能力的巔峰期。在這個階段，我們認為年輕的投資者必須培養會計語言的流暢度——這正是我透過理解投資財務機制（包括所謂「枯燥」的事物，如營運資金條款、現金轉換、營運財務槓桿、價格與數量及成本驅動因素等）來進行投資的語言。在深入這些機制的過程中，年輕投資者會逐漸培養出識別優質企業的模式感，反之亦然——能看出哪些企業擁有脆弱的資產負債表與不堪一擊的商業模式。 但會計的語言，透過它你理解好生意是數字的一部分。如今，隨著分析師在發展中持續進步，並開始意識到並非所有有價值的企業都體現在會計憑證上。例如，品牌認知、習慣性消費、全球分銷，像可口可樂這樣自成一體的品牌，它們並非全都反映在可口可樂的資產負債表上，人們逐漸理解會計收益並不總是反映企業真實的經濟狀況。例如，該結構透過再保險集團產生的自由現金流遠多於實際會計收益所顯示的，因為業務本身創造了這一基礎。隨著時間推移，年輕的分析師開始領悟無形資產的力量。此外，分析師也開始辨識出真正的佼佼者，那些逆分子行業趨勢而行的卓越企業。
For example, the rare retailer that makes sustainably high sub-normal offers. The eight typical industrial supplier that sustainably commands high margins are the uncommon software company that benefits from low industry cox speeds. These are all uncommon, these are outliers. As analysts continue to mature and as fluid intelligence becomes crystallizing intelligent, they begin to appreciate the incorporal elements that make a difference including incentives and leadership, cultures and values and the software things that ask you gain wisdom, you begin to appreciate more of. But there is no shortcut for this process. A grammar function is a feature not a bug in the education and makeup of a very invested one cannot reasonably expect to be able to spot exceptional companies.
例如，那些罕見的零售商能夠持續提供低於正常水平的優惠。那八家典型的工業供應商能夠持續保持高利潤率，或是那些因行業競爭速度緩慢而受益的非典型軟體公司。這些都是不常見的，它們屬於異常值。隨著分析師逐漸成熟，流體智力轉化為結晶智力，他們開始欣賞那些無形卻能帶來差異的元素，包括激勵機制與領導力、文化與價值觀，以及那些隨著智慧增長而逐漸被重視的軟性因素。但這一過程沒有捷徑可走。語法功能是教育與構成中不可或缺的特徵，而非缺陷；一個投入不足的人，無法合理地期望自己能夠識別出卓越的公司。
If one has not yet sufficiently studied their economics and accounting of an average business so that you can establish a base rate by which to recognize exceptionals. Without being fluent in the language of a company and micro economics, analysts are unable to process narratives as descriptors of real or phenomena that can be independently tested. In maybe the case that many outstanding companies are led by driven out of box thinking larger than life operators that seek to upend existing industries and disrupt industry structures. But how many field companies are also led by such outside specialty? We don't hear about those. You know, here we are. And the question becomes, well, which outcome is more likely and they are confounding variables for example monetary policy. They're not endogenous businesses that increases the likelihood of success for a while.
如果一個人尚未充分研究一般企業的經濟學與會計學，以致無法建立一個基準比率來識別例外情況。若分析師不精通企業語言與微觀經濟學，便無法將敘述視為可獨立驗證的真實現象描述。或許許多傑出企業是由那些打破常規、超越常人的經營者領導，他們試圖顛覆現有產業並重構行業結構。但又有多少領域的公司同樣由這類外部專業人士領導？我們鮮少聽聞這類案例。問題在於，哪種結果更有可能發生？此外，還存在混淆變數，例如貨幣政策。這些並非企業內生因素，卻可能暫時提高成功機率。
But these confounding variables get lost in a narrative. If you peel the onion, you find that genuine outliers to the economy of business are rare. We will get a realistic business as economics of a real estate company. You begin to realize that the narrative needs to be tested a lot more. Many investors re-respect from Warren Buffett to Nick Sleep have had to travel in the evolutionary journeys with skills that are built on classical grandma foundations. Now on top of the observation about allocators, we observe that many allocators view alpha as something attached to beta like an appendage. For example, if an allocator expects a public market investor to generate 3% of alpha a year, they expect that investor to beat the market back 3% every year. In our experience, alpha tends to be rather lumpy. The alpha is an appendage view is highly dangerous because returns compound geometrically and not aerosatically. At the limit, if an investor is up 100% a year one and down 100% a year two in a flat market, the alpha of the investor is not zero. You've lost everything. When companies with little or no intrinsic value are the ones that run up the most, it is especially exigent for long-term investors to maintain a sufficient and to resist the pressure of keeping up chances. For example, in 2021, when there was a rather unsuttle inverse correlation between the intrinsic value of a business and the market price of the business, just about the only way for an investor to beat the market coin or generate alpha in that year was to be even more irrational as a brand than other investors. The financial market's value in that year was very narrow and very concentrated on high growth businesses and here I use airports, both public and private with growth expectations that investors took to blast extremes. To be willing to power into these investments in 2021, require a suspension of disbelief and a shushing of common sense judgment. But not power into these investments meant being willing to be left behind as investors propel one another to shell out ever more godly prices for Empress Newclos asset space on ever more friends in an ever more fiever narratives. Being willing to opt out of the language of alpha as a package and to be willing to be common sense. What's it hard to do? So when you've been very generous with your time, I have one final question to ask you. What advice do you have for aspiring portfolio managers or individual investors who are looking to pick securities? My advice is colored by my own worldview and utility functions so that they get for what it's worth. For aspiring portfolio managers, my advice is to treat investing as a craft and not a business. You may be surprised by how fun and fulfilling that craft can be. For individual investors, it's to remember buffers take them that investing in most successful when it's most business like. So think like a business owner, don't think like a stop joking. Tune out the noise in the chat of the markets and really think about the business as that you want to own.
但這些混淆變數在敘事中消失了。如果你剝開洋蔥，會發現真正偏離商業經濟的異常值其實很少。我們會得到一個符合現實的商業模式，就像房地產公司的經濟學一樣。你開始意識到，這些敘事需要更多的驗證。許多投資者，從華倫·巴菲特到尼克·斯利普，都必須在進化的旅程中前行，他們的技能建立在經典的「祖母法則」基礎上。現在，除了對配置者的觀察，我們還注意到許多配置者將阿爾法視為附著於貝塔的附屬品。例如，如果配置者期望公開市場投資者每年產生 3%的阿爾法，他們就期望該投資者每年都能擊敗市場 3%。根據我們的經驗，阿爾法往往是相當不規則的。將阿爾法視為附屬品的觀點極其危險，因為回報是以幾何方式而非算術方式複合的。極端情況下，如果一位投資者在平穩市場中第一年上漲 100%，第二年下跌 100%，這位投資者的阿爾法並非零。你已經失去了一切。 當那些幾乎或完全沒有內在價值的公司股價飆升得最厲害時，長期投資者尤其需要保持足夠的定力，並抵抗追逐機會的壓力。例如，在 2021 年，當企業的內在價值與市場價格呈現出相當明顯的負相關時，投資者在那一年擊敗市場或創造超額回報的唯一方法，就是比其他投資者更加不理性。那一年金融市場的價值觀非常狹隘，且高度集中在高增長企業上——這裡我指的是那些無論是公有還是私有、投資者對其增長預期推至極端的機場類資產。要在 2021 年願意投入這些投資，需要暫時擱置懷疑並壓抑常識判斷。但不投入這些投資，則意味著甘願被甩在後面，因為投資者相互推動，以越來越離譜的價格追捧「皇后新衣」式的資產，在越來越狂熱的敘事中不斷加碼。 願意放棄將阿爾法語言視為一套包裝，並願意回歸常識。這有什麼難的？既然你已經慷慨地花費了這麼多時間，我最後還有一個問題要問你。對於那些希望挑選證券的未來投資組合經理或個人投資者，你有什麼建議？我的建議受到我自己的世界觀和效用函數的影響，所以僅供參考。對於未來的投資組合經理，我的建議是將投資視為一門手藝，而不是一門生意。你可能會驚訝於這門手藝能帶來多少樂趣和滿足感。對於個人投資者來說，要記住緩衝區告訴他們，當投資最像生意時，它往往最成功。所以要像企業主一樣思考，不要像開玩笑一樣思考。忽略市場中的噪音，真正思考你想要擁有的企業。
Once you decide on them, own them for the long term. I know this is a final question. So I want to end this conversation by saying that our compliance policies restrict me from discussing performance in a forum like this and our compliance team has asked me the point out that nothing I said is an offer to sell our solicitation offer to buy any security and investment decisions should be made on customary and thorough due diligence procedures and should include but not be limited to a review of all relevant documents as well as consultation with legal, tax and regulatory experts. So you try and I appreciate your time. Thank you. Thank you. This was a lot of fun. Thanks for listening. We hope you enjoyed this episode.
一旦你決定投資它們，就長期持有。我知道這是最後一個問題。所以我想以這句話結束這次對話：我們的合規政策限制我在這樣的論壇上討論績效，我們的合規團隊要求我指出，我所說的任何內容都不是出售或招攬購買任何證券的要約，投資決策應基於慣常且徹底的盡職調查程序，並應包括但不限於審查所有相關文件，以及諮詢法律、稅務和監管專家。所以請你嘗試，我感謝你的時間。謝謝。謝謝。這次對話非常愉快。感謝收聽。希望你喜歡這一集。
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20250508讀後摘要重點
很有好奇心，不斷問問題，家長和學校環境也都支持包容。
頂尖學經歷，進入牛津，後來到麥肯錫。
分享網際網路泡沫時期，很多大公司擔心會被那時很多小的網路公司摧毀，這個感受和真實狀況有很大差異，受訪者結論是［我領悟到，客觀且寓言式的真理往往與當時人們的主流信仰是分屬不同形上學範疇的事物。］
受訪者拿麥肯錫獎學金去唸ＭＢＡ，那時候巴菲特去學校演講，同學推薦他讀給給股東的信才開始接觸價值投資，之後就決定不回麥肯錫。
華倫和查理說過許多令人難忘的話，但我最喜歡的是查理一句相當謙遜的話：「一個人能為他人做的最好的事，就是幫助另一個人，僅此而已。」華倫和查理以身作則實踐了這句話，慷慨地與包括我在內的許多人分享他們的智慧。他們本不必這麼做。許多富人選擇以截然不同的方式度過時光。
2018年我見到查理孟格時——那是在他去世前幾年——我告訴查理我們當時很難找到符合我們投資標準的好標的，並請教他我們是否該調整做法。他透過他那副半月形眼鏡一瞬不瞬地看著我，說道：「誰說這會很簡單？」這話當然完全正確，也及時給了我當頭棒喝。查理確實配得上他那著名的社會經濟評論家名聲，但我親身接觸後發現，比起他那些精闢犀利、公開言論所塑造的形象，他本人其實更為審慎、更模稜兩可，甚至帶著幾分惆悵。隨著時間推移，我越發確信，華倫和查理留給世人最珍貴的禮物，就是幫助人們增長見識——這正是我們每個人能為周遭之人所做最有意義的事。世上少有比這更純粹的關懷，也少有比這更易獲得的禮物。
在他們（巴菲特與孟格）的一生中，美國創造了大量財富。因此，在他們特定的生命週期內，長期持有 See's Candy 或 Geico 或可口可樂或瑞克快遞等企業，跨越世代時間視野，一直是非常美好的。這個投資環境是 2010 年，而非 1950 年。今天的世界是一個更加全球化的地方。信息、貿易技術、資本、人才、勞動力的各種壁壘都已降低。我不是美國人，而世界各地正在建立重要且令人難以置信的企業。語言、文化、制度及本土偏好所形成的障礙依然顯著，使得全球資本市場的效率遠不如美國。例如，即便到了 2025 年的今天，馬來西亞的資本市場仍像是美國 60 甚至 70 年前的模樣。我相信，在我個人的投資生涯中，願意放眼全球尋找能世代持有的企業，而不僅限於美國，這對原則而言是正確的做法。
能否請您談談約 15 年前創立 disarraying 時的願景？我 33 歲時創立了這間公司。年輕且理想主義有時是件好事。當時我並不知道這會有多困難，這或許是件好事，否則我可能就不會開始了。
因為我是如此熱衷於巴菲特，我想效仿巴菲特的做法，即運行一個跨越 50 年時間視野的投資計劃。當時我 33 歲，我想如果保持健康、堅持鍛鍊並且運氣好的話，或許我能擁有 50 年的投資生涯，這就是我的時間框架。我寫了一份白皮書，從基本原理出發，探討一個 50 年投資計劃應該是什麼樣子。在文中，我提到我們將採用一套基本面、長期、國家及全球視角的投資哲學。當然，我們並非重新發明輪子，這些元素都是經典價值投資哲學的組成部分。幾乎所有時候這些原則都適用，只有少數人會聲稱他們不注重基本面或不採取長期視角。
首先是「基本面」。這個詞有時被用來與「技術面」相對，但這並非我們所指。對我們而言，「基本面」意味著我們擁有的是企業本身，而非股票。如果你與任何企業主交談，即便是像汽車經銷商、加油站或自助洗衣店這樣的小生意，你也知道那家企業必然會經歷起起落落。這是理所當然的。沒有企業主會說：「哦，我的經銷店生意太糟了。讓我拋售它，等盈利恢復再買回來。」這種說法簡直荒謬。企業主會在好光景與壞時機中都持有那門生意。當然，你可以選擇完全不涉足某個行業——如果那是個你需要投入過多資本卻無法獲得足夠回報的生意，那麼從一開始就不該進入。但如果整個週期中的回報是可觀的，這門生意值得投資，那麼就該預期自己會伴隨經濟週期持有它，無論順境逆境。
這直接引出了第二個要素，那就是鎖定期限。有時候當市場投資者說自己是長期投資者時，他們的意思是持有一支股票超過一年。或者可能是兩年，甚至是三年。但我們談論的是透過經濟週期持有企業。每個週期大約是七到十年。所以，如果你想持有一家企業超過一個經濟週期，你實際上是在談論一個世代性的時間跨度。因此，我們在 2010 年立下了一個標誌，表示我們將嘗試以世代為單位持有上市公司。
第三個要素是逆向操作。這是價值投資的關鍵要素。但這個要素最近已經不受歡迎，因為那些表現優異的企業持續表現優異，它們的股價不斷攀升。大公司變得越來越大。因此，在不受歡迎時買入某樣東西的想法本身就不受歡迎。
我相信現在和過去一樣，如果你想通過世代持有公司來創造超額回報，那麼你需要以提供巨大安全邊際的價格買入企業，因為市場通常是有效的，但並非總是有效。總的來說，市場是有效的。所以如果你只是支付一個公平的價格，或者企業，那麼你將獲得一個公平的回報。因此，你需要為企業支付一個不公平的價格。但不公平的價格並不經常出現。通常當你以不公平的價格獲得一家企業時，是因為它出了問題。
有時問題非常公司特定。像是他們搞砸了，失去了一些客戶或發生了營運失誤。但有時是整個行業經歷震盪。2010 年我們成立時，美國醫療保健行業就經歷了這樣的震盪，因為平價醫療法案剛剛通過，記得嗎？這在同行和供應商中製造了大量不確定性，導致美國醫療保健類股票遭到拋售。有時是整個國家陷入衰退、通脹或失業等困境。還有時是全球性的，比如一場大流行病。但市場失序可能非常微觀，也可能非常宏觀，或介於兩者之間。當這種失序發生時，資產往往會被拋售，因為人類天生不喜歡不確定性。人們不會擁抱恐懼，恐懼會迫使他們賣出。這時候用一句緩衝語來說，你可以在別人恐懼時貪婪。換句話說，在那個時刻，你幾乎可以介入成為企業的承銷商——以這個價格，我願意接手這門生意，賣給我吧。你感到恐懼。你想拋售它。我將採取相反的立場。我要買進它。不是因為我相信可以轉手賣給別人，而是因為在那個價格下，我願意成為這筆交易的最終買家。這就是逆向操作。
最後一部分是全球化，這我們已經討論過了。我們的信念過去是，現在依然是，這些原則描述起來非常簡單。我剛剛在五分鐘內就描述完了，但執行起來卻很困難，因為每個人都想像巴菲特那樣投資，但極少人能做到，這是由於資產結構的問題，比如資金管理行業中的不匹配。
之後受訪者分享他們是如何解決LP投資期間和公司規劃的跨世代（十年期以上）投資週期不匹配的問題，主要還是透過設計特殊的投資框架結構讓投資者願意停留更久，對價是團隊在投資人獲取收益前也不分配利潤。
［幸運的是，我們背後有少數幾家深思熟慮的長期機構和唐曼家族等支持。他們擁有的資源、經驗和人脈遠超過我們。基於共同利益，我們提議成為合作夥伴，這讓我們得以接觸所有這些資源和人脈。］模式上還是如此，找到願意長期合作的機構或家族。
我們不能單純要求合作夥伴——無論是機構還是家族——像團隊成員一樣與我們合作。我的理論過去是、現在依然是：你必須實際投入才能做到這一點。你要以合作夥伴的方式行事，保持一定程度的透明度，這在投資機構中並不常見。有時人們談到透明度，僅僅是指普通合夥人願意分享他們在嘗試前所擁有的東西。但對我來說，這遠遠不夠。透明度意味著分享我們正在努力的事項是什麼？我們正在面臨的困境是什麼？ 其一是這個過程讓我們夜不能寐，當中存在某種脆弱性。我們的想法是分享投資計劃正在進行的項目，這樣我們的有限合夥人(LPs)實際上可以協助我們的研究，並試圖找出這些問題的答案。
受訪者列出公司最主要六個的競爭優勢：
首先，我們實際上建構了能夠進行長期投資的架構，這使我們能夠利用多年時間套利的優勢，這是一種法律結構上的優勢。
第二，我們偏離常規尋找投資機會，並且擁有不受限制的廣泛視野。在希臘危機最嚴重的時期，我們仍堅持在那裡投資。
第三，我們的分析與模式識別工具包專注於長期承保業務，例如關注業務的結構性模式或建立硬資產，而非預測短期每股收益。我們的分析焦點有所不同。
第四，我們有餘裕在投資時維持嚴格的價格紀律。我們可以一再說不，直到出現合適的機會為止。
第五，實證證據顯示，從性格上來說，我們團隊的每位成員都適合成為長期投資者。他們耐心、多疑、逆向思考且獨立自主，因此我們本能地以概率性、非確定性的方式思考。這是一種心理特質。
第六點，我們擁有一個高品質的投資者基礎，與他們建立了堅實且實際的工作關係。
首先，我們實際上建構了能夠進行長期投資的架構，這使我們能夠利用多年時間套利的優勢，這是一種法律結構上的優勢。第二，我們偏離常規尋找投資機會，並且擁有不受限制的廣泛視野。在希臘危機最嚴重的時期，我們仍堅持在那裡投資。第三，我們的分析與模式識別工具包專注於長期承保業務，例如關注業務的結構性模式或建立硬資產，而非預測短期每股收益。我們的分析焦點有所不同。第四，我們有餘裕在投資時維持嚴格的價格紀律。我們可以一再說不，直到出現合適的機會為止。第五，實證證據顯示，從性格上來說，我們團隊的每位成員都適合成為長期投資者。他們耐心、多疑、逆向思考且獨立自主，因此我們本能地以概率性、非確定性的方式思考。這是一種心理特質。 第六點，我們擁有一個高品質的投資者基礎，與他們建立了堅實且實際的工作關係。
之前你提到建立一家 50 年公司的目標。你認為為什麼沒有多少公司能存在 50 年？為什麼你覺得自己可能打破常規？
我認為在現代資金管理行業中，真正困難的是長期思考和行動。我確實與我們的生活夥伴討論過建立世代合作關係。
機構投資管理行業目前的構成方式，並未設定以長期時間框架運作。儘管機構本身——無論是主權財富實體、捐贈基金、家族辦公室或基金會——可能擁有跨世代的投資視野，但為這些機構工作的人員並非如此，他們聘請的許多投資經理也同樣缺乏這種長期視角。因此從結構上來看，這本身就難以實現。但這只是三足工具中的其中一組。工具的第二支柱是團隊。許多投資分析師進入這個行業時並不具備世代時間跨度的職業規劃。這不是人們管理職業生涯的方式。我們成功為那些有抱負、渴望成就大事的優秀人才打造了歸屬之地。他們投身投資領域時都懷抱相同特質，但願意在此紮根，鋪設道路，並對自身職業發展保持耐心。這與文化密切相關，因為在這個行業裡，每年獎金季節後總會上演「音樂椅」人事變動。而我們團隊思考的是：十年後公司會是什麼模樣？大家要共同實現什麼目標？這很難做到。三足鼎立的第三條腿是投資組合公司。由於現代資金管理行業的特性，擔任上市公司執行長的感覺就像土撥鼠日一樣。你會不斷地與投資者會面，反覆談論同樣的事情。每次你見到某家投資公司的分析師時，都是不同的人。那家公司可能已經關注你們好幾年了，但每次和你交談的人都不一樣。因此，你實際上無法建立起真正的關係。我們成功地與 CEO、CFO 及管理團隊建立了長期關係。這意味著他們在與我們交談時會放下戒心。你會敞開心扉，實際上建立起一種股東間的合作關係。那些在投資組合中已存在 15 年、至今仍在組合中的公司，當初也只有 15 年的歷史。從質性上來說，這是一種與兩家公司之間截然不同的關係。這些事情很難做到，也很難與我們的業務保持長期關係。長期留住人才很難，與兩家公司都保持長期關係也很難。正因如此，投資公司要擁有 50 年的視野是困難的。我們希望建立一家這樣的公司。我們對「謹慎理財三人組」感到非常自豪。我認為在投資領域中，能持續保持競爭優勢的因素並不多，這是一個競爭極為激烈的行業。而「長期主義」正是其中之一。我們自身也是企業的學生，在研究企業時會為它們分類命名。有時我們稱某些企業為「果蠅型企業」——它們快速成長也迅速消亡。而另一些企業則屬於「海龜型企業」，它們成長緩慢。但消亡得也慢，能夠長久存續。在這個從果蠅到海龜的光譜之間，我們將像我們這樣的投資管理機構比作「逆流而上的鮭魚」——這是一個危機四伏的行業，極少公司能存活下來。我們打造「三足鼎立」架構的所有努力，並不能讓這個高時脈速度（變化極快）的行業轉變為低時脈速度的產業。它仍然是個高速變化的行業，特別是在當前科技、地緣政治與社會經濟快速發展的環境下。
你認為投資既是藝術也是科學嗎？是的，我認為它既是藝術，也是社會科學。 當然，所有的投資行為都深深植根於經濟學、博弈論和金融理論之中。這些都是非常社會科學的領域。除此之外，它還需要對人類心理學、社會學、歷史、法律和政治有所理解。同時也需要精通語言和計算，以及組織行為和激勵機制的語言。正如我們已經討論過的，投資的核心也植根於自然科學家的認知立場，而不僅僅是社會科學家。早期的投資者相信真理存在於這個世界上，等待被發現。這不在我們的腦海中，也不在他人腦海中構建。探索這一不斷成長的真相，必然需要科學家的工具。什麼特質定義了優秀與糟糕的投資者？我們經常思考這個問題，原因是我們試圖聘請那些我們認為隨時間發展能成為偉大投資者的分析師。根本上，我們相信分析師需要具備某種性格特質，或者說某種稟賦，才能確信自己能夠通過正確分析企業——在他人犯錯時——持續賺錢。最具潛力的分析師，往往不是我們招聘時遇到的最受公主病驅使或最隨和的人。我們積極尋找那種近乎偏離常規的特質，那種自由不羈的火花，許多擁有高度獨立思考能力、天馬行空思維的人所具備的品質。然而，這種智力上的創造力並不總是與分析紀律並行不悖。我們尋找的是那些能夠將獨立思考的萌芽，通過嚴謹、有條理且堅持不懈的工作——特別是尋找並評估那些佐證證據——貫徹到底的人。 這證明他們的直覺所言不虛，背後有著清晰、如刀切黃油般的邏輯支撐。我們發現，有時高智商者從不需超越直覺層面的思考，因為不幸的是，就心智鍛鍊而言，他們的初始直覺往往正確或至少頗具說服力，以致這些直覺鮮少受到質疑或實證檢驗。特別值得注意的是，我們觀察到某些高智商者還學會了——無論是有意識或潛意識地——如何在社交中更好地融入並茁壯成長。這意味著對他們而言，真相成了需在特定情境下解構的社會建構，而非從基本原理中發掘的客觀存在。我們相信自己營造了讓原創思維得以蓬勃發展的環境，但同時也明白，人們的行為模式到此時通常已根深蒂固。若思維方式已然定型，要重新調整實屬難事。 投資研究接納經過校準的新思維，談論概率性思考。我們尋找那些原始且具備即時運算能力的人才。這也體現在重要的心智傾向上，包括在做出決定前收集資訊的傾向、在得出結論前尋求各種觀點的傾向。深入思考問題的傾向，以及在回應前反覆審視問題的傾向。傾向根據現有證據的程度來校準自己觀點的強度。你希望信念是經過深思熟慮的，但同時保持開放態度，意味著它仍可被檢驗。在採取行動前思考未來後果的傾向。在做出決策前明確權衡利弊和細微差異的傾向。尋求細微差別並避免絕對二分法的傾向。此外，我們還需要知識上的謙遜。這裡，我指的不是那種受過良好社交訓練、擁有顯赫背景的分析師所表現出的謙虛，比如「我畢業於波士頓某名校」這種姿態。我們尋求的是徹底的知識謙遜。從真正的悲傷走向精確，或者說我們實際上能知道的有多麼少，以及知識是多麼地依賴於機率、多變且難以捉摸。如果這種謙遜與一種根深蒂固的對知識誠實的承諾——即對尋找真相的承諾——相結合，這種組合將非常強大。若缺乏智識上的謙遜，我們意識到鼓勵非傳統思維的人格特質可能隨時間演變為難以駕馭。
在相遇的人們身上，我們發現當智慧與本能的慷慨、誠實、近乎熱切的求知慾及公正心態結合時最為動人。然而，某些思維若缺乏目標導向，便無法轉化為實際投資的成功。你可以極具學識、充滿好奇心，但若無目標導向，仍無法成就投資之功。我們在共事者身上逐漸珍視的特質是「當責感」——那些對所為之事懷抱深切熱情的人，這份當責感會推動他們化為行動的動力源泉。
我們發現，那些擁有強烈自我意識的人，往往也是最不執著於自我的人，因此他們擁有最高的效能潛力。這形成了一種悖論。我們需要團隊合作者，但不是那些過度熱衷於建立共識的人。我們尋找思想上的反傳統者，而非刻意追求被視為異類的人。我們需要注重細節的分析師，而非見樹不見林的人。
在投資中，有哪些方面你認為最違反直覺，而許多人可能未能充分理解？
我從事這行已超過 20 年，至今仍覺得不可思議的是，投資者往往在投資標的變得更貴時更喜歡它們，而在變得更便宜時卻減少興趣，從基本原理來看，這對我來說從來就不合理。這點相當令人困惑。
你如何確定公司的內在價值？因為作為價值投資者，你試圖找到比其實際價值更便宜的東西？任何公司的有趣價值，不過是其未來現金流的淨現值。這永遠成立，對任何資產都是如此。這是我們在財務學 101 學到的非常簡單的概念。這個價值，並非隨著他人隨時的認知而時刻波動。我們作為價值投資者的工作，就是盡我們所能去釐清這個價值究竟是多少，當然要借助資訊工具與技能。任何建立過折現現金流模型的人都知道，這並非完美的工具。我們都在某種程度上摸著石頭過河，因為我們對真相的掌握本就不完美。但即便我們對內在價值的衡量存在缺陷且可能隨時修正，並不代表內在價值就不存在。隨著時間推移，我們終將確切知曉企業能產生多少現金流。客觀事實確實會發生。即使沒有人能壟斷它，因為沒有人能夠進行時間旅行。因此，弄清楚內在價值變成了一種權衡練習，而不是投票活動。我們是否正確並不取決於有多少人同意我們，只要我們買入的企業確實產生了我們預期的現金流，並且我們能以足夠吸引人的價格買入，我們就能賺錢。
讓我問你關於風險的問題。你如何定義和思考風險，以及你認為不具風險的事情，可能其他人卻認為有風險？
我們將風險視為永久性資本損失的概率和潛在幅度。這不是波動性。如果我們打算長期持有任何資產，其市場價格的工業波動就變得無關緊要。除非我們收到無法拒絕的報價，無論是出售資產或是增持。股權風險的重要性僅在於它加劇了我們將在長期投資價格討論中風險具體化所導致的損失。我們所關心且認為主導我們首要考量的風險，是商業評估風險。也就是評估企業時出錯，因而付出過高代價的風險。其次是基本商業風險。即使我們對企業的評估正確且校準無誤，現實情況仍可能發生變化，導致不利結果。這會導致一些未知或異常的不良後果。那些無法相提並論的事情。那些無法相提並論的事情。這種情況也可能發生。這也是風險之一。接著還有人員與情境判斷的風險。在評估我們未察覺或理應關注之人的誠信、能力及激勵一致性時，可能存在誤判。此外還有四種薪資情況。即使我們對人員的判斷正確，對潛在損失的評估也準確，但若遇到像「圖像匹配」這類資產，且因短期流動性需求或恐慌而無法持有投資，這些正確判斷也無濟於事。這就是我們的思考方式。因此，我們從風險管理的角度來決定投資規模。自下而上，一個一個來。我們不使用槓桿模型、最大回撤或各種均值模型等等。我們思考的是，在基本面基礎上，我們在任一投資中可能損失多少錢。如果我們談到的這些風險中的任何一個真的發生了，或者如果多個投資中存在共同的基本面風險，那麼我們會將它們放在一起考慮，並思考資產配置。回答你問題的第二部分，因為我們不認為這些風險是錯誤的。我們樂於持有某些其他投資者傾向於避開的企業。例如，我們認為投資者往往將生產力的概念與穩定性混為一談。可預測且穩定。人們可以將這兩個詞視為同義詞。以保護賭注為例，這個概念既是可預測的也是穩定的。收益會因其他交易而大幅波動。但還有其他公司是可預測但不穩定的，這是由於業務安全性所致。然而這種安全性本身可能是相當可預測的。例如，你完全可以為某個標誌寫出一個數學方程式。在這種情況下，這個週期性業務在完整經濟週期中的平均盈利能力是多少？它不是某個特定年份的收益，而是業務在整個週期中的盈利能力。然後在該業務處於週期下行階段時介入並買入。這往往是投資者的做法，因為你不希望接下跌的刀子。
能描述一下你如何避免價值陷阱嗎？嗯，我們區分了兩種不同類型的黃金價值陷阱。第一種是價值 50 美分但不增長的資產。我們認為那是舊的黃金策略。這就是為什麼一個不增長的 50 美分根本不值得投資。例如，一張 50 年後到期的零息債券，它現在不值錢。一個 50 美分的資產必須以其資本成本增長。從現值角度來看，這只值 50 美分。對於那些天真的價值陷阱獵手來說，常見的兩個錯誤就是以大幅折價購買毫無價值的資產。例如，過剩產能的鋼鐵廠，其成本僅為歷史水平的一半，或是資產負債表上的房地產。問題歸根結底在於——當初有人為此買單。但如果這些資產在可預見的未來不太可能產生正向現金流，那麼它們實際上並不值多少錢。它們連一美元都不值。所以你並不是在以「一美分換一美元」的價格買入。但一旦我們考慮了貨幣的時間價值，就能以統一標準評估各類資產。關鍵在於每項資產現金流的形態差異——有些資產呈現週期性波動，有些收益集中在後期，有些則前置兌現。但歸根結底，你可以計算所有資產的淨現值(NPV)，實現跨資產類別的標準化比較。第二種情況看似是以「半價換全價」買入，但你永遠無法真正獲得全額價值。因為它從未從貨架上支付過。這是一種不同類型的價值陷阱。這種情況下，公司實際上產生了現金。但作為股東，你並未獲得回報。因為管理團隊確實掌握了現金，但並未創造價值。作為少數股東，我們為管理團隊的資本配置決策提供支持，這是我們工作中至關重要的一部分。投資中的問題在於，往往是那些資本回報率低的平庸企業需要最多的資本。諷刺的是，低資本回報率的企業需要大量現金。高資本回報率的企業通常是資本輕型的。因此，很少有企業能夠在高資本回報率下吸收大量資本。所以你有資本密集型的企業，工業企業、基礎設施企業、天然氣企業、房地產公用事業。然後你有非常高資本回報率的企業，品牌和數據庫公司、網絡公司、服務公司和軟件公司。但這兩者的交集，即那些既能產生高資本回報率又需要大量資本的企業，這是一個非常小的公司群體。這意味著，無論公司是資本密集還是輕資產，除了極少數例外，我們作為投資者很可能能夠以比我們所投資的組合公司更好的預期回報來再投資資本。即使是我們持有的高資本回報率業務，因為它們不需要資本。我們可以提供由善於將資本返還給我們的管理團隊經營的投資組合公司。如果投資組合公司的市場價格在這種情況下下跌，我們會大量買入更多，因為我們知道我們將會看到這些現金。而如果資本市場永久關閉，你的回報將來自於現金隨著時間返還給我們，而不是未來某個市場估值。
多年來，我們拒絕的資本比我們願意承認的還要多，當我們認為在共同期望、目標及合作價值觀上未能達成一致時，我們對此非常認真。我們招聘緩慢，因為正如我們所討論的，我們希望與所聘請的人共同建立深厚的文化，我們知道這需要時間來形成，就像所有優秀文化一樣，文化無法強求，它必須是有機的，這需要時間。我們謹慎投資，保持巨大的安全邊際，這在某種程度上也與主流文化背道而馳，但這讓我們能夠找到立足點，同時持續思考並改進不同的投資機制。 我們試圖避免過快增長，我們的資本結構隨著時間推移逐漸減少資本，這是一個需要耐心的過程。總的來說，我們一直願意用短期利潤換取潛在的長期收益。我們在研究的公司中也尋找相同的特質。
你經歷過最長的相對表現不佳時期是多久？在這段期間，你的客戶有何反應？
你知道嗎？這是個有趣的問題。坦白說，我不確定我們經歷過最長的相對表現不佳時期有多久，這本身就說明了問題，因為我們實際上並沒有那麼注重基準比較。但憑記憶所及，我可以談談兩個時期。第一個時期是在 2010 年剛成立時。這聽起來有點瘋狂。我們在成立之初就將投資組合中的一大筆資金投入了幾家希臘公司，當時正值希臘危機最嚴重的時期。這些投資在我們買入後變得越來越便宜。從 2010 年到 2012 年，自然這些投資在早期的帳面價值和回報上拖累了我們。如你所知，對於任何新興經理人來說，前三年對於吸引 L 型投資者至關重要，而當時我們持有的希臘資產規模不大，在前三年「表現不佳」。你一開始就緊密參與，顯然運作良好，但當時我們並不知道這一點。第二階段是 2018 年至 2019 年。那時我們已經退出多項投資多年，包括部分希臘投資，且這些投資都獲利了。這意味著投資組合中有大量現金，但我們找不到任何想買的標的。所以我們當時苦於無法有效運用資金。我們的做法是聯繫我們的合作夥伴，提議返還他們 30%的資本。正是在那時，我們建立了這種資本回撤機制。是的，正如我之前在對話中提到的，基金主動要求將資金返還給投資人是相當罕見的。有限合夥人(LPs)通常不會如此傾向於懲罰性思維。LPs 與我們共同設計了這套機制，我們隨後創立了名為「資本回撤權」的新基金。
在最近的一次播客中，我討論了投資者常犯的四個主要錯誤。第一，過度分散投資。第二，他們往往高買低賣。我們之前提到過這一點。第三，他們的投資時間視野往往很短。這點我們也討論過。接著第四，普遍存在對預測未來過度自信的情況。你大致同意這些觀察嗎？還有沒有注意到投資者常犯的其他重大錯誤？
是的，非常同意。當你描述投資者傾向於高買低賣、思考的時間框架過短以及對未來過度自信時，我不斷點頭。我心想，沒錯，正是如此。我將補充兩點觀察。第一點與股票有關，第二點則與 L.O.C.相關。近年來，由於對班傑明·葛拉漢價值投資法的輕視，股票投資已不再流行。有一種投資學派強調徹底審視資產負債表、調節現金流動中的不一致性，並仔細研讀財務附註，我們認為這是一個錯誤。事實上，我們相信優秀的價值投資者在邁向巴菲特式投資的過程中，必須先經歷班傑明·葛拉漢的洗禮。在二十多歲到三十出頭的年紀，人們通常處於分析能力的巔峰期。在這個階段，我們認為年輕的投資者必須培養會計語言的流暢度——這正是我透過理解投資財務機制（包括所謂「枯燥」的事物，如營運資金條款、現金轉換、營運財務槓桿、價格與數量及成本驅動因素等）來進行投資的語言。在深入這些機制的過程中，年輕投資者會逐漸培養出識別優質企業的模式感，反之亦然——能看出哪些企業擁有脆弱的資產負債表與不堪一擊的商業模式。 但會計的語言，透過它你理解好生意是數字的一部分。如今，隨著分析師在發展中持續進步，並開始意識到並非所有有價值的企業都體現在會計憑證上。例如，品牌認知、習慣性消費、全球分銷，像可口可樂這樣自成一體的品牌，它們並非全都反映在可口可樂的資產負債表上，人們逐漸理解會計收益並不總是反映企業真實的經濟狀況。例如，該結構透過再保險集團產生的自由現金流遠多於實際會計收益所顯示的，因為業務本身創造了這一基礎。隨著時間推移，年輕的分析師開始領悟無形資產的力量。此外，分析師也開始辨識出真正的佼佼者，那些逆分子行業趨勢而行的卓越企業。例如，那些罕見的零售商能夠持續提供低於正常水平的優惠。那八家典型的工業供應商能夠持續保持高利潤率，或是那些因行業競爭速度緩慢而受益的非典型軟體公司。這些都是不常見的，它們屬於異常值。隨著分析師逐漸成熟，流體智力轉化為結晶智力，他們開始欣賞那些無形卻能帶來差異的元素，包括激勵機制與領導力、文化與價值觀，以及那些隨著智慧增長而逐漸被重視的軟性因素。但這一過程沒有捷徑可走。語法功能是教育與構成中不可或缺的特徵，而非缺陷；一個投入不足的人，無法合理地期望自己能夠識別出卓越的公司。
我最後還有一個問題要問你。對於那些希望挑選證券的未來投資組合經理或個人投資者，你有什麼建議？
我的建議受到我自己的世界觀和效用函數的影響，所以僅供參考。對於未來的投資組合經理，我的建議是將投資視為一門手藝，而不是一門生意。你可能會驚訝於這門手藝能帶來多少樂趣和滿足感。對於個人投資者來說，要記住緩衝區告訴他們，當投資最像生意時，它往往最成功。所以要像企業主一樣思考，不要像開玩笑一樣思考。忽略市場中的噪音，真正思考你想要擁有的企業。一旦你決定投資它們，就長期持有。
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