筆記彙總
受訪者是11歲開始認識投資，巴菲特是9歲開始。最近10歲的女兒開始看寫給兒童的經濟學書，其實差不多要10歲前後智力發育才稍微比較可以理解投資、金融等相對比較抽象的概念。
心態上要做到在規避風險的同時擁抱風險，知道自己實際上只掌握關鍵資訊的一小部分，保持謙遜心態，不要高估自己，對所知保持持續懷疑態度，這樣就能形成一種紀律－我只會在存在高度不對稱性、潛在上行空間大而下行風險低的情況下冒險。
摘要的段子每一個都可以深入寫更多體悟，但受訪者已經表達得很好，就不多贅述了。
受訪者本質上是老派的價值投資者，歐系（尤其是英國） 的投資人好像多數是如此，推測應該是跟他所處環境英國在這幾十年沒有特別大的科技或商業模式創新有關，商業環境沒有變化，投資方式也就不需要跟著變化。
作者對美國的觀察（在我看來美國似乎已過了全盛時期）值得省思，他的提問（尚不清楚什麼會導致其衰落）也許最近這兩週市場動盪已經給出了答案。
這篇採訪讓尼莫最有新鮮感之處是作者提出的資本／勞動力50年大週期的觀點，就歷史而言50年就是兩代人，這背後應有代際落差和社會僵固性的理由支撐，有待做更多功課學習。
50年大週期之後關於債券、通膨、貨幣...討論有點混亂，一部分是訪談要收尾了主持人在催，這讓受訪者無法交代將思路講完整，一部份也是受訪者思路跳來跳去，說實話看得有點霧颯颯。
彙總摘要
歷史的魅力在於它的故事性，掌握事物本質的最佳方式，是透過故事來講述或聆聽，這比理論性的內容更能生動呈現。
投資時你需要聰明，但若自視過高就會出錯。當你評估投資時，可能只掌握了 6%的關鍵資訊。若自認聰明，或許能將掌握度提升到 10%。但誰願意在 90%未知與 10%已知的懸殊比例下冒進？所以保持謙遜是極重要的特質。
你需要的是在承擔風險的同時厭惡風險。
運用你的技能，利用市場中的基本風險，試圖永遠、永遠、永遠不要虧錢。投資是關於優化上行風險，最小化下行風險。我們實際上試圖做的是優化上行並最小化下行。但重點在於最小化下行，這樣我們就不會在風險市場中虧錢。
投資的另一個關鍵要素就是你的直覺。你是否通過試錯發現了一些關於你直覺的錯誤，並已經進行了調整？
投資有趣之處在於：它有些部分看似簡單得具有欺騙性，許多人卻傾向過度複雜化；而另一些極端複雜的面向，又常被過度簡化。
當我觀察美國時，在我看來它似乎已過了全盛時期，但尚不清楚是什麼會導致其衰落。我更有信心認為，對美國持悲觀看法並試圖稍微修正觀點是正確的。根據我的經驗，在投資者中存在這樣一個潛在假設。即使沒有明說，也有一個潛在假設認為美國公司在經濟上是全球主導的超級大國，而且它們將永遠存在。你只需買入標普 500 指數並永遠持有，你就沒問題了。
馬克思絕對正確的一點是，他認為創造價值的實體有兩種可能的內在本質。要麼是開設工廠的人，要麼是在工廠工作的人。資本與勞動之間的那層不可逾越的界限似乎遵循著 50 年的週期。有時候資本完全掌握了主導權，而 50 年後，勞動力又佔據了上風。因為一旦鐘擺開始擺動，它就會無所不在，直到情況變得極端，迫使鐘擺必須回擺。2021 年 11 月對我而言似乎是資本主義的高水位標記，當時極少數人掌握的財富規模達到了空前絕後的程度。
===== 以下為正文
《洞察投資者播客》於 2025 年 3 月 11 日專訪喬納森·魯弗 主題：金融歷史、市場週期、展望
[MUSIC] I'm delighted to welcome Jonathan Ruffer to the podcast today. Jonathan is the co-founder and chairman of Ruffer, a London-based investor manager, focused on generating absolute returns for its clients. Jonathan, thank you for spending some time with us today. >> That's a great job. >> That's a great job. >> Excellent. >> I will Jonathan, you started your career a little over 50 years ago, but do you feel that investing has always been a core part of who you are, in a sense, do you feel that you are born and investor? >> It's always rather hard to nendians, so that's a question. But I do remember my dad gave me a book which in retrospect must have been about how to invest by a child, because the idea of following Dynas which is the stock that was used in the book absolutely stuck with me and throughout my life, although I'm not actually very interested in investing by a child. That idea are appealed to me, and I must be the but it 11 years old, but that happens. >> Well, you are a dedicated student of financial market history. What do you feel sparked your deep interest in studying the past? >> Well, I think there one can talk more about the way one's made.
[音樂] 今天很高興能邀請喬納森·魯弗來到我們的播客。喬納森是總部位於倫敦的投資管理公司 Ruffer 的聯合創始人兼董事長，專注於為客戶創造絕對回報。喬納森，感謝您今天抽空與我們交流。 >> 這真是太棒了。 >> 這真是太棒了。 >> 非常出色。 >> 喬納森，您 50 多年前開始職業生涯，但您是否覺得投資在某種程度上一直是您身份的核心部分，您是否認為自己天生就是投資者？ >> 這總是很難界定，所以這是個問題。但我確實記得父親給過我一本書，回想起來那應該是本關於兒童如何投資的書，因為書中使用 Dynas 股票作為範例的概念深深烙印在我腦海中，貫穿我的一生，儘管我實際上對兒童投資並不特別感興趣。那個概念吸引了我，當時我大概 11 歲，但這種事就是會發生。 >> 您是金融市場歷史的專注研究者。您覺得是什麼激發了您深入研究過去的深厚興趣？ >> 嗯，我想這可以更多地談論一個人的成長方式。
尼莫 ：受訪者是11歲開始，巴菲特是9歲開始。最近10歲的女兒開始看寫給兒童的經濟學書，其實差不多要10歲前後智力發育才稍微比較可以理解投資、金融等相對比較抽象的概念。
To me, the fascination of history is as its stories. And I find that the best way of grasping the essence of something is that if you can tend it or hear it through a story, it lands more vividly than something theoretical. And when you're investing, you don't really want to be dealing with fairy tales. So from an early age, I've wanted to understand the present through things that have happened in the past. >> That is fascinating. And I think something that's interesting about what you just said is the stories are always unfolding. And when you're even when you're living through the history that we're creating today, it's hard to envision how that story is going to be told in the future. So part of studying the past is looking at the past through the stories that are told after and then trying to relive it real time as you're going through it. >> One of the things I think when I was looking at the today is that Brinthman lost Singapore in 1942 in the sweep of Japan's conquest of Asia. And a decision was made in 1924 when Brinthman was rather strapped for cash, not to reinforce it, not to bring it up to date. And I think he myself, for that was 18 years before. You know, one mistake where we made him 18 years ago that we're paying the price of today, so to speak. You know, there's nothing magic about 18 years, but this idea of a period of time seems to me to be the way to get the
feel of how people's memory is mature on things that were perhaps a
complete non-events when they happened or what perhaps an amazing big
event. But turn that, not to this opportunity, big event. These are the
things that fascinated me. >> If we shift to what qualities make
up a great investor, you obviously hired a lot of smart people to
surround yourself with to allow you to be a great investor. Are there
any specific qualities that you look for? I think that the way I want to
answer that is to talk negatively, you need to be clever, but you must,
if you have a self-image of yourself as clever, you'll go wrong. Some
of the things that you're looking at, you're probably looking at six
percent of all the relevant facts which will determine whether it's a
good investment or not. If you're a clever, and you may you're a clever,
so you'll have to choose for yourself. You can probably get that six
percent to ten percent. But you know, who wants to be leading with a
chin with something where the uncertain is a 90 percent and the
certainty is a 10 percent. So poverty of spirit is quite an important
element. And I think above all, a sense of maybe, I always, among edge,
when people tell them that you administering will be a success. That
will, which doesn't have well with me.
對我來說，歷史的魅力在於它的故事性。我發現，掌握事物本質的最佳方式，是透過故事來講述或聆聽，這比理論性的內容更能生動呈現。而在投資時，你並不想處理虛構的童話故事。因此，從很早開始，我就希望透過過去發生的事情來理解當下。>> 這非常吸引人。我認為你剛才提到的有趣之處在於，故事總是在不斷展開。即使我們正經歷著當下創造的歷史，也很難預見未來會如何講述這段故事。因此，研究過去的一部分，是透過後來講述的故事來審視過去，然後在經歷當下時嘗試即時重現。>> 當我審視當下時，想到的一件事是，布林斯曼在 1942 年日本橫掃亞洲時失去了新加坡。而在 1924 年，當布林斯曼資金相當緊張時，做出了一個決定，不對其進行強化，不使其現代化。我認為他自己，因為那是在 18 年前。 你知道，18 年前我們犯了一個錯誤，可以說現在正在為此付出代價。你知道，18 年並沒有什麼神奇之處，但這種時間跨度的概念，在我看來正是體會人們記憶如何成熟的關鍵——那些發生時或許微不足道的小事，或是當時驚天動地的大事。不過重點不在事件規模，而是這種記憶演變的過程。這些現象最令我著迷。>>若談到偉大投資者應具備的特質，你顯然招募了許多聰明人才來輔佐自己。你在挑選人才時是否有特定標準？我想用反向思考來回答：你需要聰明，但若自視過高就會出錯。當你評估投資時，可能只掌握了 6%的關鍵資訊。若自認聰明，或許能將掌握度提升到 10%。但誰願意在 90%未知與 10%已知的懸殊比例下冒進？所以保持謙遜是極重要的特質。 而我認為最重要的是，或許有一種感覺，我總是處於邊緣，當人們告訴他們你所管理的將會成功時。這種想法，與我並不相容。
尼莫：這段的前和後都很好，中間的舉例有點不知所云。
歷史的魅力在於它的故事性，掌握事物本質的最佳方式，是透過故事來講述或聆聽，這比理論性的內容更能生動呈現。
投資時你需要聰明，但若自視過高就會出錯。當你評估投資時，可能只掌握了 6%的關鍵資訊。若自認聰明，或許能將掌握度提升到 10%。但誰願意在 90%未知與 10%已知的懸殊比例下冒進？所以保持謙遜是極重要的特質。
Everything in life is a baby, and investment is made up of babies. Yes, so I guess another way to summarize what you just said is, if you're really smart, maybe you're at that 10 percent level. And the key is that you recognize that it's 10 percent. Not that you're smart for your own good, where you think it's 90 percent when it's actually 10. That's exactly. I'm talking a bit about my dad, that's not for any particular reason, but I remember him telling me we were driving in the car one night. And on the red, there was a red kill of a hair, which had been hit by a car. The hair knows that it's the fastest animal in the region. And so it will always try to run away from danger. So the car hits it, where is every other animal, will shrink to the side, because it knows that it's not that fast run. And it seems to me that that's the we didn't want to be haze, because we'll be hit by that 90 percent. Yeah, and then I suppose part of that is also informed by your actual experience. So if you start off as an investor and in the reality is you're, you know, you have 10 percent of information. But if the first 5 or 10 investments hit, you could easily become overconfident because you attribute skill to what was actually luck. Yes, I guess that's right, but you get pummeled so much in investment. Well, but I think it's the failures that one remembers more than anything else. It took me some time to work, to articulate it to myself. But I've got two characteristics that really shouldn't coexist. I'm risk of earth, and it always amazes me when fun managers make a best to be risk of earth.
生活中的一切都是嬰兒，而投資則是由嬰兒組成的。是的，所以我想另一種總結你剛才所說的方式是，如果你真的很聰明，也許你處於那 10%的水平。關鍵在於你認識到那是 10%。而不是你自以為聰明，以為是 90%實際卻是 10%。正是如此。我稍微談到我父親，這並沒有特別的原因，但我記得他告訴我，有一天晚上我們開車時，路上有一隻被車撞死的野兔。野兔知道自己是該地區跑得最快的動物，因此總是試圖逃離危險。所以車子撞上牠時，其他動物都會縮到一旁，因為牠們知道自己跑不了那麼快。在我看來，我們不想成為野兔，因為我們會被那 90%擊中。是的，我想這部分也來自你的實際經驗。如果你一開始作為投資者，現實中你只有 10%的資訊。 但如果前 5 或 10 筆投資成功了，你可能會過度自信，因為你把運氣誤認為是實力。是的，我想你說得對，但在投資中你會遭受很多打擊。不過，我認為人們記住的更多是失敗。我花了一些時間來思考，並向自己闡明這一點。我有兩個本不該共存的特質：我厭惡風險，而每當基金經理試圖表現得厭惡風險時，總是讓我感到驚訝。
尼莫摘要：如果你真的很聰明，也許你處於那 10%的水平。關鍵在於你認識到那是 10%。而不是你自以為聰明，以為是 90%實際卻是 10%。如果你一開始作為投資者，現實中你只有 10%的資訊。 但如果前 5 或 10 筆投資成功了，你可能會過度自信，因為你把運氣誤認為是實力。是的，我想你說得對，但在投資中你會遭受很多打擊。
To me, that's like being a fighter pilot and saying that you're a coward. You know, if you're a coward, become a zybera, you need to risk of earth while taking on risk. So I tell you that as a confession, I am risk of earth. But I've also got within me, and absolutely compulsion of taking risk, manic risk. You know, the source of risk that one wouldn't even admit to one's dentist. And these two qualities claim like a rangy chance within me. Even as a compulsive side saying, "For, go for it."
對我來說，這就像是一名戰鬥機飛行員說自己是懦夫。你知道，如果你是懦夫，就去當個會計師吧，你需要的是在承擔風險的同時厭惡風險。所以我告訴你這個坦白：我厭惡風險。但我內心還有一種絕對的冒險衝動，一種瘋狂的風險偏好。你知道，那種你甚至不敢向牙醫承認的風險來源。這兩種特質在我體內像野獸般爭鬥，即使強迫症的一面在說：「去吧，放手一搏。」
尼莫摘要： 你需要的是在承擔風險的同時厭惡風險。
The other side, you know, I'm not sure about that. And that's really why I landed on the way of investing to take real risk. That's the rangy time of compulsive risk taking. But to do it in such a way that you were using your skills and you were using the elemental risks in the market to try and never never never to lose money. If you think of a good investment, it's a common place to say. But really, investment is about optimizing upside risk, minimizing downside risk. Now, effectively what we're trying to do is to optimize the upside and minimize the downside. But with the emphasis on minimizing the downside, such that we wouldn't lose money in risk markets. And the first thing I think was that when we started business in 1993, people said it is not possible. You know, I mean, they didn't know about Ponzi and Nestates, but I think they would have said it's they had to. At least Ponzi's hand is like, "He got a good idea." You know, you just got a bloody awful idea because it can't put up. And the thing that makes it possible is the fact that if you're playing through the layers and the engineering's wonky, so some numbers come up more than they should. And the group is drunk, so he's declaring the odds wrong.
另一方面，你知道，我對那不太確定。這正是為什麼我選擇了這種投資方式來承擔真正的風險。那是強迫性冒險的狂熱時期。但要以一種方式進行，即運用你的技能，利用市場中的基本風險，試圖永遠、永遠、永遠不要虧錢。如果你想到一個好的投資，這是一個常見的說法。但實際上，投資是關於優化上行風險，最小化下行風險。現在，我們實際上試圖做的是優化上行並最小化下行。但重點在於最小化下行，這樣我們就不會在風險市場中虧錢。我認為第一件事是，當我們在 1993 年開始業務時，人們說這是不可能的。你知道，我的意思是，他們不知道龐氏和內斯特茲，但我認為他們會說這是他們必須的。至少龐氏的手就像，「他有個好主意。」你知道，你只是有個糟糕透頂的主意，因為它無法成立。而使之成為可能的是，如果你在層層遊戲中，而工程學有問題，所以某些數字出現的次數比應有的多。 這群人喝醉了，所以他宣布的賠率是錯的。
尼莫摘要： 運用你的技能，利用市場中的基本風險，試圖永遠、永遠、永遠不要虧錢。投資是關於優化上行風險，最小化下行風險。我們實際上試圖做的是優化上行並最小化下行。但重點在於最小化下行，這樣我們就不會在風險市場中虧錢。
It's those two facts that become the decisive elements in making investments. And I mean to be honest, I think it was a flu, but you know, turn half decades or more. We actually didn't lose money, at least in the calendar year. And then everybody's sorted. Gosh, you know, not only is this durable, but it's cold for people not to do it. And of course, that brings problems with everybody thinks that if you have a year or as we've just had two years of not making any money, they think that somehow or other. It's not the, the, the, the model that's wrong. It's the something wrong
with us. And you know, the fact is that we're in a constant fire fight.
And that's just the way it is sometimes. Yeah, and I guess if you go
back to what you said earlier, which is being risk averse and being a
risk taker at the same time is very similar to knowing that you're in
the sixth to 10%. And being skeptical that you don't know a lot. And
those two kind of states put together force you into a discipline of,
I'm going to take risk where there's a lot of asymmetry. There's a lot
of upside potential low down side risk.
正是這兩個事實成為投資決策的關鍵因素。老實說，我認為那只是一場流感，但你知道，轉眼半個世紀或更久。我們實際上並沒有虧錢，至少在該日曆年度內。然後每個人都搞定了。天啊，你知道嗎，這不僅持久，而且對不這麼做的人來說很冷酷。當然，這也帶來了問題，每個人都認為如果你有一年或像我們剛剛經歷的兩年沒賺到錢，他們就會覺得某種程度上是我們出了問題。不是模型錯了，而是我們有什麼地方不對。你知道，事實上我們一直處於一場持續的戰鬥中。有時候情況就是這樣。是的，我想如果你回顧之前所說的，即在規避風險的同時又敢於冒險，這與知道自己處於前 6%到 10%的位置非常相似。並且對自己知之甚少持懷疑態度。這兩種狀態結合在一起，迫使你形成一種紀律：我只會在存在高度不對稱性、潛在上行空間大而下行風險低的情況下冒險。
尼莫：心態上要做到在規避風險的同時擁抱風險，知道自己實際上只掌握關鍵資訊的一小部分，保持謙遜心態，不要高估自己，對所知保持持續懷疑態度，這樣就能形成一種紀律－我只會在存在高度不對稱性、潛在上行空間大而下行風險低的情況下冒險。
And I'm going to look for those unique opportunities. I'm going to do a bunch of those things. And then you can effectively take risk, but it's like a calculated risk as opposed to just a risk that, you know, has kind of equal upside and downside. That's exactly right. And of course, you know, they always say that that being a market time at risk, the key to investment. Well, I've been operating this formula to the 40 years of the biggest bull
market that's existed since market's are radius. So in other words, I've
been driving with a handbrake arm. Well, actually, what you wanted to
be doing was this into John Buggle, who was saying, "Take all the risk
that you can." And just if you can shave, hate me off the fees. You
know, that's what will make you better than average. The result is that
the ETFs now rule the world and the rough payment, the myths is still
innocent. I think that's how I feel. Yeah, and when you look back 20, 30
years from now, and the story of the current environment is written,
it's going to be something to the effect of, you know, best companies on
those world, the market just keeps going up, anytime it falls, you just
buy and it rebounds. And that story can easily change. You could easily
go through a 20, 30, 40 year period where you don't have that. And that
story would be very different. Absolutely. And the great thing about
making forward looking observations is that you can't say to Rachel, I'm sorry you're wrong about that. But I fancy that what the
extraordinarily thing about this last 40 years is we haven't had a bear
market. What we've had is a constantly rising market, punctuated by
crevasses. And that's really what stopped the market going up from
nothing to the moon. But if you look at the amount of time that the
market's gone up since 1992, it's really been a high percentage of it.
And what I think it could easily happen in the further next 3, 5, 10
years, whenever it starts, is that it will be a constant following
market, punctuated by, is it stalled by, it's you never wants to give
shooting up.
而我將尋找那些獨特的機會。我會做很多這樣的事情。然後你就能有效地承擔風險，但這是一種經過計算的風險，而不是那種你知道上下行空間相當的風險。正是如此。當然，他們總是說把握市場時機是投資的關鍵。嗯，我運用這個公式來應對過去 40 年來市場有史以來最大的牛市。換句話說，我一直帶著手煞車在開車。實際上，你真正該做的是聽從約翰·柏格的建議，他說：「盡可能承擔所有風險。」只要能削減費用，就算恨我也沒關係。你知道嗎？這正是讓你超越平均水準的關鍵。結果就是現在 ETF 主宰了世界，而粗糙的報酬分配機制依然天真無邪。我想這就是我的感受。沒錯，當你回顧 20、30 年後的現在，當前環境的故事會被寫成這樣：全球最優秀的公司，市場只會不斷上漲，每次下跌你只要買進就會反彈。但這個故事很可能會改變。你很可能會經歷 20、30、40 年完全不是這樣的時期，那時的故事將截然不同。絕對如此。而進行前瞻性觀察最棒的一點是，你無法對瑞秋說——很抱歉，你對這點的看法是錯的。但我認為過去 40 年最不尋常之處在於我們並未經歷真正的熊市。我們所擁有的是一個不斷上揚的市場，其間只穿插著些許裂縫般的下跌。這些短暫下跌確實阻止了市場從零直衝雲霄。但若你統計 1992 年以來市場上漲的時間占比，就會發現絕大多數時間確實處於升勢。而我認為在未來 3 年、5 年甚至 10 年內（無論何時開始），很可能會出現持續跟隨的市場走勢，其間只會被——該說是受阻於——你永遠不願看到的暴漲行情所中斷。
So you can't just operate on the bear attack because you will suddenly confront it with the market doubling as it did in January 1975. I didn't think for us that next phase will be in a, it'll send me easier in the sense that we will be direction with, in simplicity, with the idea that markets can get, but I think we will be able to be caught out. Just like the next, from these sharp, rising expressions of bullets. So another, I think, key component to invest in is just your intuition. Are there, are there some things you've discovered through trial and error to be incorrect about your intuition that you have now adjusted? One of the striking things, which I would definitely call a weakness in the way I invest, is that I have never, never, I didn't think, had properly invested in the company, which went from being a little to a bigger. I've held my skill, and I'm nicely arrogant about how to buy stocks, but sooner or later, particularly if they were well bought, I tend to see the sale of those stocks as the vindication or otherwise of the purchases that I've made. What was it does mean is that in, in, in, in, in, you industry's called the magnificent seven half of them, and I've been innocent of all this, so I've traded in and I just, but when I, I was trustee a lot of old family, and most frankly, when I look at them, is usually fine, that they bought, you know, glasses, misclined at 100 deposits, where it's now shell or at 100 deposits, where it's now, you know, yeah, sure they've ended up 40 or 50 years, but actually, I'm strongly suspect that there's decisions never to sell, or find companies, has taken their performance beyond what I've done. Yeah, and then that's obviously a byproduct of this bull market age that we live through for several decades. Yeah. The other thing that I think is interesting by investing is that there are components of it that are deceptively simple, and many people tend to overcomplicate them, and at the other end of the extreme, there are aspects that are incredibly complex that are prone to oversimplification. Do you agree with that? I think that is right. I, I, I mean, one thing that I've pondered is the, where is it investment has professionalised and not to its advantage. I have, I think, the perfect, um, cerebral makeup for investments, and I've got a print might, so I can pick things up almost instantly. I've got a greater imagination, so I can make connections straight away that other people can't make, and I'm stupid. Now, um, it sounds like I'm paying myself two compliments, and, um, uh, missing myself on the third, but does a great advantage in being unable to understand what other people, what other products can understand, because it keeps it simple. I never read, um, I didn't think I've ever read the whole of any fed government statement, as mystic as I can't understand, but partly because they're boring, but um, it was in the middle of the 19th century that, um, the discipline of, um, political science changed, uh, from being people watching, to mathematical, um, the thing about it in people watching is that that comes to everyone, but the minimums you, you introduce the element of mathematics, it is really an open to culture of people who can understand the mathematics, and I, even above the things, I talked earlier about Singapore, but there was the Battle of Chapsuva, and, um, when the Germans and the grits, uh, not saying bells out of one another, and then they'll see, because there's also defining naval battle in the first world war, and the Germans turned that to be rather good at gunner, they were quite accurate, and the brits turned out to be perfectly hopeless, and the reason I reckon for that was that the navy, uh, was only open to gentlemen, so you had to be a tough and buffed them, to be able to join the navy, and, um, when gunnery came along, uh, when the gunnery was rather messy, and that messed up your nice white does that you wore to gentlemen, and so you didn't do too much practice, and the people who were good at gunnery were considered, um, not really sort of, sort of, as sort of people who wanted it to be navy, so once you had was an irrelevance, uh, getting in the way of effectiveness, now I think that's what the mass, you know, all there's zoom, those other, whatever they're called, they sort of ease that look like they've been lying in the sun for two long, I think what they do is they keep real investors from having the confidence, the seed that investment is really little to do with these questions, bottom of the price, through the last proper political, uh, uh, scientists in the way that I think of it as a social discipline, he described economics as elevated common sense, now that feels to me spot on, you know, it's not enough simply to observe how people behave, if you have to take that raw material and spend a lifetime working out, what that means in the investment world, and doing it through the prison history is the way that's why it's done, and everybody who works at rough, at least pretends to pay the service to that one. And along the same lines, do you see investing as both a science, you know, an engineering or math-like exercise, and then art that's rooted in investor psychology, and I guess these two elements interrelate and contribute to the complexity and predictability of markets. I would say yes, and I would say that the science is to do with short-term performance, and the soft EQ applied, the elevated common sense gives you the long-term edge, and I cover it both. So you know, then man has all the elements that you want, or if they exist, I've never met such a person, but I think as a group, you can find that, and also helps the humility, because what you can see is people with qualities that you're not in their own strengths, but you may not even have a tool, that's how you can build, you can see a team built, I would say I built a team, but if that's how a team gets built. We talked about generating returns while minimizing risk, and returns are easy to see, you can see them every day, but risk is often invisible, yet it's ever present and it's a quietly built over time, and I guess paradoxically, the longer it remains hidden, the greater its potential impact becomes. Do you agree with this and what's your general perspective on risk?
所以你不能僅僅因為熊市攻擊就採取行動，因為你可能會突然面臨市場翻倍的情況，就像 1975 年 1 月那樣。我不認為對我們來說，下一階段會是一個更簡單的時期，因為我們將在方向上與市場可能達到的想法保持一致，但我認為我們可能會措手不及。就像接下來，從這些急劇上升的子彈般表現中。因此，我認為投資的另一個關鍵要素就是你的直覺。你是否通過試錯發現了一些關於你直覺的錯誤，並已經進行了調整？其中一個顯著的弱點，我肯定會稱之為我投資方式中的一個缺陷，就是我從未、從未，我認為，沒有正確投資過一家從小變大的公司。我一直堅持我的技能，並且對於如何買股票相當自負，但遲早，特別是如果它們買得好，我傾向於將這些股票的出售視為我購買決定的證明或否定。 這意味著在你們行業所謂的「壯麗七雄」中，有一半我其實都沒參與過，所以我是清白的。我曾經交易過，但當我擔任許多古老家族的受託人時，坦白說，大多數情況下他們買的東西都沒問題——比如以 100 英鎊買入的股票，現在可能已經漲到 100 英鎊，或者當初 100 英鎊的投資如今已翻倍。當然，這些資產可能經歷了 40 或 50 年的持有期，但我強烈懷疑，真正讓它們表現超越我操作成果的關鍵，是那些「永不賣出」的決策或找到的好公司。沒錯，這顯然是我們經歷數十年牛市時代的副產品。 另一點我覺得投資有趣之處在於：它有些部分看似簡單得具有欺騙性，許多人卻傾向過度複雜化；而另一些極端複雜的面向，又常被過度簡化。你同意嗎？ 我認為確實如此。我一直在思考的是：投資專業化究竟發展到哪裡了？這未必是好事。 我認為自己擁有完美的投資腦力結構，而且記憶力驚人，幾乎能瞬間掌握事物。我的想像力更為豐富，能立即建立他人無法建立的關聯，同時我也很愚鈍。這聽起來像是在給自己兩個讚美，而第三點卻像是在自嘲，但無法理解他人所能理解的事物其實具有巨大優勢——因為這讓一切保持簡單。 我從未讀過，嗯，我不認為我讀過任何聯邦政府聲明的全文，神秘到我無法理解，但部分原因是它們很無聊，但嗯，是在 19 世紀中葉，嗯，政治學這門學科改變了，呃，從觀察人們，變成了數學化，嗯，關於觀察人們這點是每個人都能做到的，但當你引入了數學元素，這實際上只對能理解數學的文化開放，而我，甚至在這之上，我之前談到了新加坡，但還有查普蘇瓦戰役，嗯，當德國人和英國佬，呃，不是說彼此敲鐘，然後他們會看到，因為那也是第一次世界大戰中決定性的海戰，德國人結果在炮術上相當出色，他們相當準確，而英國人則完全不行，我認為原因是海軍，呃，只對紳士開放，所以你必須是個強壯且受過訓練的人，才能加入海軍，而嗯，當炮術出現時，呃，炮術相當髒亂，會弄髒你穿來當紳士的漂亮白色服裝，所以你不會做太多練習，而那些擅長炮術的人被認為，嗯，不太像是，像是，像是想成為海軍的人，所以一旦你有的是無關緊要的東西，呃，妨礙了效率，現在我認為這就是大眾，你知道，所有那些 Zoom，那些其他，不管它們叫什麼，它們看起來像是在太陽下躺了太久，我認為它們所做的就是阻止真正的投資者擁有信心，種子投資與這些問題幾乎無關，價格的底部，通過最後一位真正的政治，呃，呃，科學家，以我認為的社會學科方式，他將經濟學描述為提升的常識，現在這對我來說正中要害，你知道，僅僅觀察人們的行為是不夠的，如果你必須拿這些原始材料並花一輩子時間弄清楚，這在投資世界意味著什麼，並通過監獄歷史來做，這就是為什麼這樣做，每個在 Rough 工作的人，至少假裝對這一點表示敬意。 同樣地，你是否認為投資既是科學——你知道的，一種類似工程或數學的練習——同時也是一門植根於投資者心理學的藝術？我猜這兩者相互關聯，共同造就了市場的複雜性與可預測性。我會說是，而且我認為科學關乎短期表現，而應用的軟性情商、提升的常識則能帶來長期優勢，我兩者都涵蓋。所以你知道，這樣的人就具備了你想要的所有元素，或者如果他們存在——我從未遇過這樣的人——但我認為作為一個群體，你可以找到這種特質，這也有助於謙遜，因為你能看到別人擁有你所不具備的優點，甚至可能是你連工具都沒有的能力，這就是你如何能建立、你能看到一個團隊被建立的方式。我會說我建立了一個團隊，但團隊就是這樣形成的。我們談到了在最小化風險的同時創造回報，回報很容易看到，你每天都能見到，但風險往往是隱形的，卻又無處不在，它是隨著時間悄悄累積的。我想矛盾的是，它隱藏得越久，潛在影響就越大。 你同意這點嗎？你對風險的總體看法是什麼？
尼莫摘要：
投資的另一個關鍵要素就是你的直覺。你是否通過試錯發現了一些關於你直覺的錯誤，並已經進行了調整？
投資有趣之處在於：它有些部分看似簡單得具有欺騙性，許多人卻傾向過度複雜化；而另一些極端複雜的面向，又常被過度簡化。
Well, that was the only thing that you read, which I actively disagree with, it seems to me that the end of the reason that the risk seems to grow is because it any grays like that in a unidirectional market. So, I mean, one of the people we discovered earlier that he's now better known was Heinemann Minsk, and the Minsk moment when the sounds that goes through the egg timer has formed a little hill that it then collapses, and the more prominent that hill of sand is the greater the form of it when it does. So, I think it is absolutely fair to say that when this market goes, it will be an extremely colorful one, not because of the fact that the chairman has got an election, or you think it's happening in Colombia, it shouldn't happen in Colombia, but simply because the world has grown into the shape it has, is because we haven't had a setback that has allowed to be a setback. I mean, my infielding is that the two sets of the names was a proper game changer, and the authorities simply used the balance sheet to create a more powerful dynamic on the other side. And in the short, if 15 years can be regarded as a short term, they've got to wait with it, but it's left all the balances greater in Minsk and language than they were in 2008, and that was bad enough.
嗯，這是你讀到的唯一一點我強烈不同意的內容。在我看來，風險之所以看似增長，是因為在單向市場中任何類似灰度的東西都會如此。我是說，我們之前發現的一位現在更為人所知的人物是海因曼·明斯基，而「明斯基時刻」就像沙漏中的沙子形成一個小山丘後崩塌，那個沙丘越突出，崩塌時的規模就越大。因此，我認為完全可以說，當這個市場崩潰時，將會非常壯觀，這不是因為主席面臨選舉，或是你認為這種事應該發生在哥倫比亞（它本不該發生在哥倫比亞），而是因為世界已經發展成現在的形態，正是因為我們沒有經歷過一次足以成為挫折的挫折。我的看法是，那兩組名字的出現是一個真正的遊戲規則改變者，而當局只是利用資產負債表在另一邊創造了更強大的動力。 短期來看，如果 15 年可以被視為短期，他們必須耐心等待，但這讓明斯克和語言中的所有餘額都比 2008 年時更為龐大，而那時的情況已經夠糟了。
So, let me ask you some questions about financial markets, because you have this very zoomed out perspective of looking backwards over a long period of time across countries. But if I ask you to look forward to 50 years into the future, are there any timeless principles you feel will endure, and what aspects of the world do you feel might fundamentally change? I think one of the mistakes people make is that what happened yesterday will probably happen tomorrow, what happened last year will probably happen next year, and that is insane. I think the shape of the vehicles that we invest in will change enormously. I think equities are finished.
那麼，讓我問你一些關於金融市場的問題，因為你擁有這種極具遠見的視角，能夠回顧跨越國家和長時間的歷史。但如果我要你展望未來 50 年，你覺得有哪些永恆的原則會持續存在？你認為世界的哪些方面可能會發生根本性的改變？我認為人們常犯的一個錯誤是，以為昨天發生的事很可能明天會再發生，去年發生的事很可能明年會再發生，這種想法是瘋狂的。我認為我們投資的工具形式將會發生巨大變化。我認為股票已經走到盡頭了。
Now, why do I say that? The concept of the equity is pretty young, it really, it's a post-war phenomenon, and it doesn't before that, equities will not importance, but the reason you are in stocks and shares was primarily either to earn a business or to control business. So, that was where you went if you were in the business of controlling it, and if you were trying to make an investment, what you wanted to do was to find in a long list of potent fixed interests in Britain, you had to bench and secure the loan stocks. You had to have five on secure the stocks, which traded preferentially, then you'd have preferences beyond that. And if you could find a company that you thought was more powerful than the market thought, you'd buy a junior source of the debt on a higher yield, and you would watch it trade up to a great train of treasury yield. I was how you were doing in the capital game, but you weren't basically trading the equities. Now, I think, when I think of a profit making business, I think that there are four things on that business. You got the government who wants to tax it. You got the workforce that for some other reason wants to get paid.
那麼，為什麼我會這麼說呢？股權的概念其實相當年輕，它真正成為一個現象是在戰後，在此之前，股權並不重要，人們持有股票的主要目的要不是為了經營企業，就是為了控制企業。所以，如果你從事的是控制企業的業務，那就是你的方向；而如果你想進行投資，你要做的是在一長串英國潛在的固定收益項目中找到合適的，你必須評估並確保貸款股票的穩定性。你必須有五項擔保來確保這些股票，它們享有優先交易權，然後你還能獲得比這更優先的權利。如果你能找到一家你認為比市場預期更強大的公司，你會以更高的收益率購買其次級債務，然後看著它交易到接近國債收益率的水平。這就是你在資本遊戲中的玩法，但你基本上不是在交易股權。現在，當我想到一個盈利的企業時，我認為這個企業涉及四個方面。政府想要對它徵稅，員工出於其他原因想要獲得報酬。
You got the management who run the business. And you've got the shareholders who earn the business. Now, if you put it like that, what you can see is that the shareholders have naturally two weaknesses. One is that they are spread among the great many people. So, everybody has only a small fractional interest in the business. And they're sleeping. They don't have anything to say. I mean, if you said that earlier, I think you've already disagree, and say, he's got quite a lot to say about business.
企業由管理層經營，而股東則擁有企業。如果這樣表述，你會發現股東天生有兩個弱點。一是他們分散在眾多人之中，每個人只持有企業的一小部分權益。二是他們處於沉睡狀態，沒有發言權。當然，如果你早先這麼說，我想你已經表示不同意，認為股東對企業其實很有話語權。
But the basic position of an institution investor is to be a sleeper of a small interest. I've that. We came transformed when managers decided to unite with the stockholders through stock options. So, you'll get paid hundreds of thousands of dollars for your salary, but you get millions or tens of millions of return through your stock options. So, those two together became more powerful than anything else. But I think that that phenomenon is basically over. The growth in the private equity and private credit market is an indication that if you want to earn the equity of business, you need to have control of it. The provider of private equity does that.
但機構投資者的基本立場就是作為小權益的沉睡者。我們經歷了轉變——當管理層決定透過股票期權與股東結盟時。於是管理層薪資可能只有數十萬美元，但透過股票期權卻能獲得數百萬甚至數千萬回報。這兩者結合形成的力量勝過一切。但我認為這種現象基本上已結束。私募股權和私人信貸市場的增長表明：若想獲取企業股權收益，就必須掌握控制權。私募股權提供者正是這麼做的。
They will earn enough of a business really to be able to control it on behalf of their investors. So, it's an enterprise to be at all to see the health of stock kids declining sharply, so that you're a pinboss is too small to remain viable. You can't have an Australia big enough really to have a say. And if you look at the American market, the dominance of the magnificent government really tells you quite a lot about the undemocracy of the pool of corporations who shares a trade it on the market. So, it might view that what George Ross Guby worked out in the early 50s that equity is coming at asset class. That was true for the period there.
他們將賺取足夠的業務，真正能夠代表投資者控制它。因此，這是一個企業，看到股票孩子的健康狀況急劇下降，以至於你的 pinboss 太小而無法維持生存。你無法擁有一個真正有發言權的澳大利亞。如果你看看美國市場，強大政府的統治地位確實告訴你很多關於那些在市場上交易股份的公司群體的非民主性。因此，可能會認為喬治·羅斯·古比在 50 年代初所研究出的，即股票作為一種資產類別正在到來。在那個時期，這是真的。
But now, 75 years are, I didn't think the conditions, I didn't think he discovered in the term of shoes. I think he discovered a market shoes, a market shoes come and go. And I think equities are going to be not the place to be as we possess a bad market, but I think we're lost. Do you feel like that's a realization that the market participants will gradually observe and catch on or is it something that you had a tipping point in all of the sudden becomes obvious to everyone? What will happen is that management will become increasingly, manages interests will become increasingly different from the shareholders. The consumer in the 1970s, the Charles Bluthor, the Gulf of Western, the Timkenvoid, the LTV, the normal businessmen, and one of the guys running it, realized that if they did a value destroying, take it, and the business was twice the size as it was. The chief executive got paid more. So that's what happened in the 1970s, the quality of the business is decreased. And it was in the generations that followed that. That mischief, which would be basically quite sinister, when I first started investing in the university, the university in Germany, because the businesses were around for the management and the workforce. The business was a part of the share of the business. So I didn't see this as a new phenomenon.
但現在，75 年過去了，我不認為當時的條件、我不認為他是在鞋類領域有所發現。我認為他發現的是市場的潮流，而市場潮流來來去去。我認為在我們面臨糟糕市場的情況下，股票將不再是理想的投資選擇，但我覺得我們已經迷失了方向。你是否覺得這是市場參與者會逐漸意識到並跟上的認知，還是說這是一個突然對所有人變得明顯的臨界點？將會發生的情況是，管理層的利益將變得與股東越來越不同。1970 年代的消費者，那些像查爾斯·布魯索、海灣西方、鐵姆肯公司、LTV 這樣的企業，以及經營它們的商人們，意識到如果他們進行價值破壞性的收購，企業規模就能翻倍。執行長因此獲得更高報酬。這就是 1970 年代發生的事，企業品質隨之下降。這種影響延續了好幾個世代。 這種本質上相當陰險的惡作劇，當我最初在德國的大學開始投資時，因為企業是圍繞著管理層和勞動力運轉的。企業是業務的一部分。所以我並不認為這是新現象。
You alluded to the US as being a global, dominant economic power since World War II. How sustainable is that position? And what historical lessons might inform our view of America's future economic role and perhaps the success of its stock market? The real rise that it needed to build into its model commercial success. So it became a sort of heap of scrap metal, really, and fell with it and weighed.
你提到美國自二戰以來一直是全球主導的經濟強權。這種地位能持續多久？有哪些歷史教訓可以幫助我們看待美國未來的經濟角色，或許還有其股市的成功？它真正需要建立的崛起是其商業成功的模式。因此它變成了一堆廢鐵，真的，隨之倒下並拖累。
And Britain discovered was that the empire that created, which was not disseminated to the Spanish one, provided a different sort of excellence to commercial excellence. That of that really, really other nations to build past what the UK was doing. The UK felt very distressed. There were two great exhibitions, one in 1851, when absolutely every best invention seemed to be British and 1867, which was in its 16 years later. When they also did a German or French or American.
而英國發現的是，它所創造的帝國，與西班牙帝國不同，提供了一種不同於商業卓越的卓越。那種讓其他國家真正能夠超越英國所做的事情。英國感到非常苦惱。有兩次大型展覽，一次在 1851 年，當時似乎所有最棒的發明都是英國的，另一次在 1867 年，也就是 16 年後。當時他們也展示了德國、法國或美國的發明。
And in the confetti, there was a made Britain great had disappeared. When one looks at America, it looks to me that it has passed itself by date, but it's not yet clear to me what will bring it down. It's rather like looking at the sort of the view-ness of the chief lie in the pack of lies. You can say, "You know, he's getting on a bit." That's not quite the same thing, and that's the lie that will replace him or as a result of that. It's just an observation that the dynamism, that created dynamism, which drives nationalism to great things, seems to me to be becoming shadow. That's a fairly discursive answer. I've been more confident that it being a bear of America taking a try to view a little bit right. And being able to put any kind of conscience, which was profound. I think that is a very important insight because in my experience amongst investors, there is this underlying assumption. Even if it's not stated, there's an underlying assumption that US companies are the dominant global superpowers economically, and they're going to last forever. You just buy the S&P 500 and you hold on forever and you're good.
而在這片五彩紙屑中，一個曾經讓英國偉大的時代已然消逝。當我觀察美國時，在我看來它似乎已過了全盛時期，但尚不清楚是什麼會導致其衰落。這就像看著一堆謊言中最主要的謊言。你可以說：「你知道，他有點年紀了。」這不完全是一回事，而那個謊言將會取代他，或是因此而被取代。這只是一種觀察，即那種創造活力、推動民族主義成就偉業的動力，在我看來正在變得黯淡。這是一個相當散漫的回答。我更有信心認為，對美國持悲觀看法並試圖稍微修正觀點是正確的。並且能夠提出任何深刻的見解，這非常重要。因為根據我的經驗，在投資者中存在這樣一個潛在假設。即使沒有明說，也有一個潛在假設認為美國公司在經濟上是全球主導的超級大國，而且它們將永遠存在。你只需買入標普 500 指數並永遠持有，你就沒問題了。
尼莫摘要：
當我觀察美國時，在我看來它似乎已過了全盛時期，但尚不清楚是什麼會導致其衰落。
我更有信心認為，對美國持悲觀看法並試圖稍微修正觀點是正確的。根據我的經驗，在投資者中存在這樣一個潛在假設。即使沒有明說，也有一個潛在假設認為美國公司在經濟上是全球主導的超級大國，而且它們將永遠存在。你只需買入標普
500 指數並永遠持有，你就沒問題了。
You don't have to worry about an extended period of performance or anything like that. That's just a general sense. You've described a couple things. One is US dominance, maybe on the other side of its arc, heading down, and that may be gradual until it speeds up. You've also pointed out this whole notion of just don't assume that stocks for the long run is a trueism. That could not, that can change. So there's multiple factors. And that kind of goes back to what we started with is that's six to 10 percent of what you, your intelligence might know.
你不必擔心長期表現或其他類似問題。這只是個大致的概念。你提到了幾件事。一是美國的主導地位，可能已過了巔峰，正在走下坡，這個過程或許緩慢，但會加速。你還指出，不要想當然地認為「長期持有股票」是真理，這可能會改變。所以有多重因素。這又回到我們一開始談的，這些只佔你知識儲備的 6%到 10%。
There's a lot that is out there that can become a negative surprise. That's it. When you put it as bold as that, I do it back wrong. I mean, I tend to, one of the things that's struck me from the high-discombination is going, is that I believe the valuations of the key to good or bad investment more than the comparative success or failure of the underlying investments. So I read investment review about three months ago when I said, you know, what's happening in the American, in the markets now, feels like combination of two things that don't come in at the time of the century. And the nifty fifties of the generation before that.
外界存在許多可能成為負面驚喜的因素。就是這樣。當你如此大膽地表述時，我反而會弄錯。我的意思是，高解構性讓我印象深刻的一點是，我認為估值對投資好壞的影響，比基礎投資的相對成敗更重要。大約三個月前，我在閱讀投資評論時提到，現在美國市場的情況，感覺像是兩個不屬於這個時代的事物結合——上世紀的「漂亮五十」和更早一代的某種特質。
尼莫摘要：I believe the valuations of the key to good or bad investment more than
the comparative success or failure of the underlying investments. 我認為估值對投資好壞的影響，比基礎投資的相對成敗更重要。（引用原文是因為翻譯沒有把意思完全翻出來）
And the thing that caught the dot com boomers was that people bought the wrong companies, they bought young companies, which however, several places are always vulnerable because new businesses, particularly in frontier industries. Need a lot of cash and the cash isn't always available. Whereas the nifty fifties, the market, as they absolutely got the idea that online was going to replace retail. So they got the phenomenon rate, but they played the wrong stocks. And in the nifty fifties, they absolutely got the right stocks. You know, 48 hours of their 50 really didn't, you know, were a generation later, the great stocks of America. So they picked the right stocks that by paying the wrong price. They were absolutely done for. So if you turn that on its head, I think that probably explains why I didn't spend enough time trying to find the next and did it, or you know, the next wall mart or the next this or that. Because I can have more success or lack of success by playing valuation. That makes sense. And I guess along the same lines, if we zoom out a little bit, you can have extended periods of prosperity that can inherently lead to feature instability. And that is largely because of increased risk taking or focused on short
term gains over long term resilience and valuations, I guess, is one
component of that. Absolutely. And I do think prosperity is more
dangerous phenomenon for all of us. It isn't just investment cuts. But
that is more than adversity. Because adversity is something that the
human spirit rails against and wants to see corrected. Whereas
prosperity invites you to be a laser theatre. And if you think that is a
great way of making it. Well, by the time you've driven your car
without having it set up for eight years, you didn't do it for surprise.
If it breaks down, the guy had to go or she has buy another one. And I
guess when you go through a period of adversity, it strengthens you.
Right? It builds character. And it's a period. And the longer those
periods go, the easier it is to extrapolate that into the dis-in future.
And that can drive your behavior and all of that feeds into these
cycles that we see happen. You need it.
而讓網路泡沫世代栽跟頭的是，人們買錯了公司——他們買了年輕企業，但這些新創公司尤其在尖端產業中往往特別脆弱。它們需要大量現金，而資金並非總能到位。反觀「漂亮五十」時期，市場完全抓住了線上將取代實體零售的趨勢。他們看準了現象級浪潮，卻押錯了股票標的。而在「漂亮五十」年代，他們選股精準無誤——要知道，那 50 檔股票裡有 48 檔在二十年後依然稱霸美股。問題在於他們用錯誤價格買進好股票，最終全盤皆輸。若把這個邏輯倒過來，或許就能解釋為何我不願耗費心力尋找「下一個某某巨頭」——因為透過估值操作，我反而更能掌握成敗關鍵。這很合理。順著這個思路放大來看，長期繁榮本身就可能埋下未來動盪的種子。這主要是因為風險承擔增加，或是過於專注短期獲利而非長期韌性與估值，我想這是其中一個因素。確實如此。而且我確實認為繁榮對我們所有人來說是更危險的現象。這不僅僅是投資削減的問題。但這比逆境更甚。因為逆境是人類精神會反抗並希望看到糾正的東西。而繁榮則誘使你成為雷射劇院（註：此處應為比喻，可能意指在繁榮中盲目追求光鮮亮麗）。如果你認為這是成功的絕佳方式。那麼，當你開了八年沒保養的車，車子壞掉時你也不會感到意外。那個人只能去買輛新的。我想當你經歷一段逆境時期，它會讓你變得更強大。對吧？它能塑造性格。這是一個階段。這些時期持續得越久，就越容易將其推斷為未來的「去-」（此處可能指「去風險」或「去槓桿」等未完整表述的概念）。而這會驅動你的行為，所有這些都融入了我們所見的週期循環中。你需要它。
尼莫：這邊講述漂亮50年代的公司後來都持續存在而且維持良好的市場地位，但在高價追逐這些股票的投資人卻沒有賺到錢，原因在於他們用錯誤價格買進好股票。基於這個思路，作者下了一個很好的結論－長期繁榮本身就可能埋下未來動盪的種子，主要是因為風險承擔增加，或是過於專注短期獲利（此處應指企業獲利而非投資操作獲利）而非長期韌性與估值。
It's my fun bandages are at the most dangerous when they've had long experiences of success. I say that with two bad years behind us. But I didn't find myself holding my head layer and wondering what when I go on. Because the concept, I think the concept of now, how long does now last for if I say to you, if you say to middle captors, for this egg is it ready for each egg? And I say, yeah, yeah, you can use it now. If I'm wrong and you still got it on on the flame, I'm talking to be wrong for more than about 25 seconds. I'm telling that if you say, you know, there's a volcano appeared in ice-sort when it gets blurred. But if you're a volcanologist, they give you 80 years. If you say, no, and you give 75 years time, they say, wow, man, you're really cool. The difference in 25 minutes in 75 years, where does the needle fall? If I say, I think the market is going to go into a really dark phase now. Now that's, you know, have I got more than 25 minutes? Have I got to wait 75 years? And the truth is that the now of these very big issues is longer than is comfortable or wearing an investment hat. In fact, we were wrong for nearly a 2.5 years before the 2008 crash.
當它們長期經歷成功時，我的有趣繃帶處於最危險的狀態。我說這話時，背後已有兩年的糟糕時光。但我並沒有發現自己抱著頭層，思考接下來該怎麼辦。因為這個概念，我認為「現在」這個概念能持續多久？如果我對你說，如果你對中間的捕獲者說，這個蛋準備好了嗎？每個蛋都準備好了嗎？而我說，是的，是的，你現在就可以用了。如果我錯了，而你還把它放在火上，我說的錯誤時間不會超過 25 秒。我告訴你，如果你說，你知道，當冰層模糊時，火山就會出現。但如果你是一位火山學家，他們會給你 80 年。如果你說不，你給 75 年時間，他們會說，哇，老兄，你真酷。25 分鐘和 75 年之間的差別，指針會落在哪裡？如果我說，我認為市場現在將進入一個非常黑暗的階段。那麼，你知道，我有超過 25 分鐘嗎？我需要等待 75 年嗎？事實是，這些重大問題的「現在」比戴著投資帽子時感到舒適的時間要長。事實上，在 2008 年崩盤前，我們錯了將近 2.5 年。
I think we made a 2.5 percent. Then of course, everybody said, gosh, how they've written up in the office and everybody forgot about the 2.5 years. But if you've been a plant of my 2.2, 2008, I've been making a contact with you. I just say, oh, I'm in a, I just don't think we're right, you're a garlic garlic glass. And you know, the inherent danger of being a plant is that you can't tell a difference between the people who actually know what they're doing. And the people who either think they know what they're doing, and they're all pretend they're not doing, but they know they're dead. And you know, it makes sense to tackle it. Then take, then has a shift by trying to be absolutely right. And I think in a my attitude to that is, my job is not having a business with a seamless track record, which is suboptimal because I've been guarding its, its future reputation. I'm at the absolute extent, the best I possibly can. One of the things I say to people is, isn't it funny how we're all happy to say that we are very much service industry, but actually some of the things that make you a servant, we get a bit shetic, we have to say 7, but we are, that's what we are, we're servants. And my job is providing a good service for my plants. I had a plan at the accident at 1990, who was so cross with me, for not making any money at the top, but he took all his money, he was 100,000 pounds. I mean, you know, the key was not because it was actually not that much money, it was all his money. He took it away and put it in 2.com, based on which we passed.
我想我們賺了 2.5%。然後當然，大家都說天啊，他們在辦公室裡寫得多好，所有人都忘了那 2.5 年。但如果你是我 2008 年 2.2%那棵植物，我一直在與你保持聯繫。我只是說，哦，我在一個，我只是不認為我們是對的，你是個大蒜大蒜玻璃杯。你知道，作為一棵植物的固有危險是，你無法分辨那些真正知道自己在做什麼的人，和那些要麼認為自己知道在做什麼，要麼假裝自己不在做，但其實他們知道自己完蛋了的人。你知道，解決這個問題是有道理的。然後採取行動，然後通過試圖做到絕對正確來轉變。我對這件事的態度是，我的工作不是擁有一個無縫的完美記錄，這是最不理想的，因為我一直在守護它的未來聲譽。我盡我所能做到極致。我對人們說的一件事是，我們都樂於說我們是非常服務型的行業，這不是很奇怪嗎？但實際上，那些讓你成為僕人的事情，我們有點害羞，我們必須說 7，但我們就是這樣，我們是僕人。 我的工作是為我的植物提供良好的服務。1990 年那次意外中，我有個計畫，那人對我相當不滿，因為我沒有在市場高點賺到錢，但他把他所有的錢——我是說，你知道的，關鍵不是因為那筆錢其實不算多，而是那是他全部的積蓄。他把錢全數提走，投入了 2.com，而我們也因此錯過了機會。
Now I didn't think what a fool he was. I thought I did that to him. If I had been so doctrine there, it was to have nothing to do with the top company, you need to grow a bit, but he put up. I think the responsibility we fundamentally have. You know, this isn't a game, we can destroy people, and it's a terrible responsibility to have that. That's for sure. And one thing that you just referenced goes back to one of the four big mistakes that I've observed is the time horizon mismatch, because in the investment world, the time horizon, it's like an alternate universe. The time horizon is longer, you know, it's longer than it is in the rest of the world. Yeah, but like you think about four years, you can graduate college in four years, but in the investment world, four years isn't that long. It's like a blink of an eye could just be one environment. It's actually, and one of the things I left doing is, so keep it mistakes that people have made, it makes me feel good about myself. But one of my favorite ones was the Duke of Bedford, who was an ultimate tough investor who earned most of the bloom of spring in London. And in the 1930, he thought that the yields were getting a bit low, which they've been translated, meant he thought that capital values were a bit high. So he sells with a great chunk of central London in 1930, and was gratified to discover that he was investing in parallel Russian bombs on a 5% year old, which he'd usually received for four years and so they defaulted. So he sells something was going to be massively valuable, and bought something that was worth it. And he did it. On a hernity theoretical, you know, he was just sort of, you know, this was a sort of detail. And basically, he crumpled the Duke of Bedford on that one. So earlier you talked about the four players that command a share of the revenue pie from a company. You know, shareholders, management, the labor force and the government. Would you discuss the historical shifts and power between capital and labor and how that pendulum has swung over time and, you know, what key turning points cause that reversal. It's so interesting that I've noticed that when I talk about Karl Marx, my chance to shift from one but to another, a fact like, a fun manager's need to be not left of the world of democracy. But once Marx absolutely got right was to think of an entity that has the, the, the, the, the, the creates value as having two possible inners. Either it's the guy who puts the factory out or it's the guys who work in the factory. In one or rather, those have in the theory of statements, a chain to in the ship and the commoners say they're all to belong to the, to the workforce. And the, the capitalism says no, they have to be seen, seen right, but actually the business belongs to the person who put the capital into the business.
現在我不認為他是個傻瓜。我以為是我對他做了那件事。如果我當時那麼教條，就該與頂尖公司毫無瓜葛，你需要成長一點，但他卻堅持住了。我想這是我們根本上該負的責任。你知道，這不是遊戲，我們可以毀掉別人，擁有這樣的權力是極其沉重的責任。這一點毋庸置疑。而你剛才提到的其中一點，又回到了我所觀察到的四大錯誤之一——時間視野的錯配，因為在投資世界裡，時間視野就像是平行宇宙。它比現實世界更長，你知道的，要長得多。是啊，但想想四年，你可以用四年大學畢業，但在投資界，四年不算長。就像眨眼之間，可能只是一個週期而已。實際上，我停止做的一件事就是，持續關注別人犯的錯誤，這讓我自我感覺良好。但我最喜歡的例子之一是貝德福德公爵，他是個極其強硬的投資者，賺取了倫敦春天大部分的繁榮。 而在 1930 年，他認為收益率有點低，這意味著他認為資本價值有點高。因此，他在 1930 年賣掉了倫敦市中心的一大片地產，並欣慰地發現自己當時正以 5%的年利率投資於俄羅斯債券，這些債券他通常持有四年後就會違約。所以他賣掉了未來可能極具價值的資產，轉而購買了當時看似划算的東西。而且他確實這麼做了。從理論上來說，這只是他的一個小策略，算是細節操作。基本上，他在這件事上徹底擊敗了貝德福德公爵。 之前你提到有四類參與者能分享企業的收益：股東、管理層、勞動力和政府。你能談談歷史上資本與勞動力之間權力的消長變化嗎？這個鐘擺是如何隨時間擺動的，以及哪些關鍵轉折點導致了這種逆轉？有趣的是，我注意到每當我談到卡爾·馬克思時，話題總會從一個點轉到另一個點，比如某位經理人必須避免被民主世界的浪潮拋在後面。 但馬克思絕對正確的一點是，他認為創造價值的實體有兩種可能的內在本質。要麼是開設工廠的人，要麼是在工廠工作的人。在某種理論陳述中，這兩者形成了一條鏈——水手們說他們都屬於勞動力。而資本主義則說不，他們必須被正確看待，但實際上企業屬於投入資本的人。
Now, I, I, I, I park that, but I knew that and if you get back through back to the black death, it's usually the place that people start. There's a very good book by somebody called Hackett Fisher, the 1919s, which whenever I'm feeling rather accused of myself, I've been has a reader. So I read it together in the care, but what's very striking about that is that the, the, the insup layer between capital and labor seems to operate on both a 50 year cycle. And sometimes capital absolutely has the, has the, the strangle held and then in a 50 year later, it's labor that has the strangle held. And because once the pendulum swam, it goes on swinging absolutely everywhere to graph it. And until the thing that has become so extreme, the pigeon was always forced to swing back. Now, I, if you look at it through English, prison, the mid-1970s, with the absence of how watermark of the unions, we used to have beer and sandwiches with a primeister. And you know, if you and I were setting up a business and we discovered the source of life and we thought we're surely investing there. We think that wine bother because all that will happen is it is fair, we'll do badly, if it succeeds, our workforce will capture all the benefits of it. Watch your city, you know, what, in the November 2021, seemed to me to be the high watermark of capitalism in the sense that when it takes all, with the amount of wealth that was owned by incredibly few people, absolutely matched. America in the early 1890s, even before the trusts were busted. In that was a point when the extraordinarily rich were as rich as they were ever going to get.
現在，我，我，我，我把這個想法先放一邊，但我早就知道，如果你回溯到黑死病時期，人們通常會從那裡開始談起。有一本非常好的書，作者是 Hackett Fisher，書名是《1919 年代》，每當我覺得自己備受指責時，我就會重讀這本書。我很仔細的讀完，但最引人注目的是，資本與勞動之間的那層不可逾越的界限似乎遵循著 50 年的週期。有時候資本完全掌握了主導權，而 50 年後，勞動力又佔據了上風。因為一旦鐘擺開始擺動，它就會無所不在，直到情況變得極端，迫使鐘擺必須回擺。現在，如果你透過英國的歷史來看，1970 年代中期，工會的影響力達到了頂峰，我們那時甚至能和首相一起喝啤酒、吃三明治。你知道嗎，如果你和我現在要創業，發現了生命之源，我們肯定會投資在那裡。 我們認為葡萄酒之所以令人困擾，是因為無論結果如何——若失敗我們將處境艱難，若成功則所有利益都將被我們的勞動力所獲取。觀察你所處的城市，你知道嗎，2021 年 11 月對我而言似乎是資本主義的高水位標記，當時極少數人掌握的財富規模達到了空前絕後的程度。這就像 1890 年代初的美國，甚至在托拉斯被瓦解之前。那是一個超級富豪們的財富達到頂峰的時刻。
尼莫摘要：馬克思絕對正確的一點是，他認為創造價值的實體有兩種可能的內在本質。要麼是開設工廠的人，要麼是在工廠工作的人。資本與勞動之間的那層不可逾越的界限似乎遵循著 50 年的週期。有時候資本完全掌握了主導權，而 50 年後，勞動力又佔據了上風。因為一旦鐘擺開始擺動，它就會無所不在，直到情況變得極端，迫使鐘擺必須回擺。2021 年 11 月對我而言似乎是資本主義的高水位標記，當時極少數人掌握的財富規模達到了空前絕後的程度。
So the reason I'm interested in this is because I'm in a flesh and I think in flesh comes back. And in flesh is always a creation when the commercial world is in charge and is always dominant, when the workforce is in charge. I mean if you look, and if you really want to have a boring read, look at by metalism and the battle in America between silver and gold and silver. Because the father had discovered great chunks of silver, all the people who were growing stuff wanted to depreciate currency, whereas the northeastern pissed of America as manufacturers wanted steady state money. And actually the northeast North and New Yorkers won in that battle. But I think from now, currencies are going to be sacrificed and the workforce will be the beneficiaries of that. And if I'm an instrumentation list, I think globalization is a deflation workforce. And at the Balkanization, which must have increased in pressure since Donald Trump to power, this is another force for crisis going up. Now, if you take inflation, they have been poor performers because they have traded off the price of conventional bonds and conventional bonds, they match like what's going on at the metalism. But I think you have to look at index linked bonds as being two things, they're a conventional bonds, they've got all the elements of a conventional bond with one extra, which is the fact they protect you against inflation. And they are priced. As under the way you see with an inflation bond with a tips or an expensive against conventional is to see what the real yield, what the difference is between the nominal yields and the yield on an inflation bond. And the answer is it's about two and three quarters per cent at the very long end. Now, if we do anything for natural repression, which is an absolute ding-dong certainty, when times get hurt because you're the amount of debt simply has to be washed with a bridge of brilliance.
我之所以對這個感興趣，是因為我身處其中，而且我認為這種情況會再次出現。當商業世界主導且始終強勢時，勞動力掌握主導權的情況總會出現。我的意思是，如果你仔細觀察——如果你想讀些枯燥的東西，不妨看看金屬主義以及美國關於白銀與黃金、白銀之間的鬥爭。因為當時發現了大量白銀礦藏，所有從事生產的人都希望貨幣貶值，而美國東北部的製造商則希望貨幣保持穩定。實際上，東北部和紐約人在那場鬥爭中獲勝了。但我認為從現在開始，貨幣將被犧牲，而勞動力將成為受益者。如果我是工具主義者，我會認為全球化是勞動力的通縮力量。而自唐納德·川普掌權以來，巴爾幹化（分裂主義）的壓力必然增加，這將成為另一股加劇危機的力量。現在，如果你看通膨，它們表現不佳，因為它們已經用傳統債券的價格進行了交易，而傳統債券的表現就像金屬主義中發生的情況一樣。 但我認為你必須將指數連結債券視為兩種東西，它們是傳統債券，具備傳統債券的所有要素，外加一項額外特性，那就是它們能保護你免受通膨影響。而它們的定價方式，正如你在通膨債券（如 TIPS）或相對於傳統債券較昂貴的債券上所見，關鍵在於觀察實質收益率，也就是名目收益率與通膨債券收益率之間的差異。目前答案顯示，在極長期端這個差距約為 2.75%。現在，如果我們採取任何措施應對自然壓抑（這絕對是板上釘釘的事），當情況惡化時，因為債務規模必然需要透過某種高明手段來沖銷。
We realize we couldn't pay our debt from the second world war. So what we did, we simply kept interest rates, but they're the rate of inflation. So we've already got a built-in margin for that difference. But the inflation is running somewhat ahead of where it will be. Perhaps it's five percent, six percent, sometimes you say it's five percent. The difference between the yield that you should receive on conventional and inflation reforms is very, very different to the one that attends at the moment. The actual thing is, I remember, as a teenager in the 1970s, holding a half-crime, which was a 12-month-half-piece, holding a half-crime and looking at it. And thinking, there's two years' time, it would be a flooring, which was worth ten points. So I was looking at 12 and a half-piece and I could see nowhere and more could anybody else. So that would become worth ten points and then eight and six points. Now, these inflation, they've already understand them. They were issued in 1980 in Britain. Absolutely, as the problem of inflation had been solved. So they've been basically a wrong play for 45 years.
我們意識到自己無法償還第二次世界大戰的債務。因此我們採取的做法是維持利率不變，但讓利率等同於通膨率。這樣我們就已經為兩者間的差異預留了內建緩衝空間。但當前通膨率略高於未來應有的水平，可能是 5%、6%，有時你會說是 5%。傳統債券與通膨連結債券的收益率差異，與當前實際情況存在極大差距。事實上，我記得 1970 年代青少年時期，曾持有過一種名為"半犯罪"的 12 個月期半份債券，當時看著這張債券心想：兩年後這會變成價值 10 點的"地板債"。那時我看著這 12.5%的債券，完全看不到未來走勢，其他人也一樣。後來它果然貶值到 10 點，接著 8 點、6 點。這些通膨連結債券其實在 1980 年英國發行時，通膨問題早已解決。所以過去 45 年來，它們基本上是個錯誤的投資選擇。
But when they're right, and people are just in discharging and preserving their money and discovering that back today, you could buy the more than 2.3 percent real yield. I think they could get to a minus eight percent yield. We need a must-play or money. I can't imagine it's 20 times or 50 times. But it's definitely quite a lot. So here is something, oh by the way, we just sell our entire position. So that doesn't mean that I said raising raising, raising, raising, raising, but direction.
但當他們判斷正確時，人們只是忙於處置和保存資金，卻發現如今可以買到超過 2.3%的實質收益率。我認為收益率可能跌至負 8%。我們需要一個必選項或資金。我無法想像會是 20 倍或 50 倍，但肯定相當可觀。所以這裡有件事——順帶一提，我們剛剛清空了全部持倉。這不代表我說要一直加碼、加碼、加碼，而是方向性的判斷。
That's where they're headed. And I suppose if you look forward for the next 10, 15, 20 years, and you think about what could happen, that would cause a negative shock to most investors and most portfolios. One is obviously significant US equity under performance, because there's a heavy overweight there. But one of the areas that there's a heavy underweight too, or perhaps no weight, are inflation hedge assets, because other than post COVID and short blip of inflation, we really haven't had inflation volatility for decades.
這就是他們的走向。我猜想，如果你展望未來 10、15、20 年，思考可能發生的、會對多數投資者和投資組合造成負面衝擊的事件，其中之一顯然是美國股市顯著表現不佳，因為目前該部位配置過重。但另一個配置嚴重不足甚至零配置的領域，是抗通膨資產——因為除了疫情後短暫的通膨波動外，我們已經數十年沒有經歷過真正的通膨波動了。
So you could easily see that causing significant harm in a widespread fashion. Is caused by overheating economies. And the answer is to some slight extent that is true. But the much better way of regard to inflation is a partial destruction of your currency. And in other words, it's happened as much more you should when things are not adding up. The other big issue that I see is that we have these excessive deficits, and that just keeps accumulating. You could just keep feeding the machine and things go up. But at some points, you had a tipping point.
因此你可以輕易看出這將在廣泛範圍內造成重大損害。這是由經濟過熱所導致的。某種程度上來說確實如此。但更好的理解通膨的方式是將其視為貨幣的部分貶值。換言之，當事情開始不對勁時，這種情況就會更常發生。我看到的另一個重大問題是這些過度的赤字不斷累積。你可以持續向這台機器輸送資金，讓數字持續上升。但總會到達某個臨界點。
Did you feel like we're near that point? But 1984. I had a marvelous friend who was nearest I've ever come to a country indicator. And he was late into girls. But by 1997 the night he was fully invested in girls. And he wrote a book in 1992. So he was the only place to have your money. And I wrote a very sympathetic to that few proposals myself. Then this is David. He's a bunch of a rock. So who was saved by the name of the author of the Force of the Audrey?
你覺得我們接近那個臨界點了嗎？但在 1984 年，我有位了不起的朋友，他是我見過最接近國家指標的人物。他當時對女孩們還不太感興趣。但到了 1997 年那晚，他已完全投入女孩們的懷抱。他在 1992 年寫了一本書。所以當時他是你資金的唯一歸宿。我自己也寫了幾份非常贊同那些提案的文章。這位是大衛。他是塊堅硬的岩石。那麼這位被《奧黛麗的力量》作者之名所救的人是誰呢？
And that example you just shared is one of those four big mistakes by high cell low. So I remember gold was up 30% a year in the 70s. And it was negative in the 80s and 90s. So he literally bought at the top. He was a real executive right. Gosh. I'm beginning to feel like I'm a sort of retired major general, remember regular. How well I decided to rock, stiff. I'm a very happy conversation back to these far away days.
你剛才分享的例子就是「高買低賣」四大錯誤之一。我記得 70 年代黃金每年上漲 30%，到了 80、90 年代卻變成負報酬。所以他根本是在最高點買進。他可是真正的企業高管啊。天啊。我開始覺得自己像個退役少將，記得嗎？當時我決定要沉穩堅毅。能重溫這些遙遠往事真是令人愉快的對話。
But gosh, they're rather than today. They really are. And the key is not to put all your weight on what you secretly think is the next move. And I think it's a very important thing to do with the fact that I'm a very happy person. And I think that's a very important thing to do with the fact that I'm a very happy person. Well, if we didn't like equities and the danger is that we have two more years of great economic growth, would we do better to be in commodities? In in 323 that well of course it's hard. So those were investments in greed, which were designed to do well in a good market. But they did bad at the market merit. But the reason for that isn't so foolish. It's hard to see how earnings, corporate earnings, compare heads across an entire index without people using more raw materials or whatever they're. And that's a very good one because if the dealer is announcing 100 to one odds, if you bet on black as opposed to red. Well, you know that's a great bet, but you're still going to lose all your money half the time. But there's something that can be a brilliant investment, but you could lose half your money. I mean, funny enough, one of the areas where I actually think it doesn't just mean I think, brain can't tell the difference between something that is bound to happen. I think that you cannot articulate your, you can see and stare at it that something is bad to happen. It might be quite long delayed. But when it comes to the fiscal sense, you have that idea, because it must happen. If you're not a canoeing, a doctor's in paper, and somebody says,
但天啊，它們與今日大不相同。確實如此。關鍵在於不要將全部賭注壓在你暗自認為的下一步行動上。我認為這與我是一個非常快樂的人這一事實密切相關，而這點至關重要。嗯，如果我們不喜歡股票，而風險在於我們還將迎來兩年的強勁經濟增長，那麼投資大宗商品是否會更好？在 323 年，這當然很難。那些是基於貪婪的投資，旨在市場向好時表現出色。但它們在市場表現不佳時卻很糟糕。然而，這背後的原因並非愚蠢。很難想像在整個指數中，企業盈利如何能夠在不使用更多原材料或其他資源的情況下相互較量。這是一個很好的例子，因為如果莊家宣布賠率為 100 比 1，而你押注黑色而非紅色。你知道這是一個極好的賭注，但仍有半數機會會輸光所有資金。有些投資可能極其出色，但你仍可能損失一半的資金。 我的意思是，說來有趣，我認為在某些領域中，大腦其實無法分辨某件事是否注定會發生。你可以看見並直視某件壞事即將發生，卻無法明確表達出來。這件事可能會拖延很久。但當談到財政層面時，你會有這種想法，因為它必然會發生。如果你不是個划獨木舟的醫生，而有人說，
"Do you realize the Victoria Falls is on this river?" You're the UNI will look upon it now, and the soon that the Victoria Falls is just around the next bend. But it might be three days canoeing before you get to feel the full force of gravity on that one. And obviously the markets are more like that example than they are. The roulette will example where there are clear odds that everybody can see. So the last question I'll ask you Jonathan, and I appreciate all your time and all your insights. Are there any investments that you feel are currently under-preciated or overlooked? You talked about inflation, link bonds, but is there anything else that you feel really stands out today? That feels to me like the standouts. I can see nothing in any way matches it for the size of the market. For me to say, "Well, gosh, there's a little AI company in Denver. I've capitalised 200 million." I think that's really a game to fly. I think that there are some of them as well. And as a class, that people don't even hate, they're mystified by it and it takes quite a lot of understanding. I think that's where I be.
「你知道維多利亞瀑布就在這條河上嗎？」你現在會看到它，而維多利亞瀑布就在下一個轉彎處。但你可能還得划上三天的獨木舟，才能真正感受到那股重力的震撼。顯然，市場更像是這個例子，而非輪盤賭那種人人可見明確機率的狀況。 喬納森，這是最後一個問題，非常感謝你抽空分享所有見解。你認為目前有哪些投資是被低估或忽視的？你提到通膨、連結債券，但還有其他你覺得特別突出的嗎？對我來說，這些才是真正的亮點。我看不出有任何市場規模能與之匹敵。要我說「丹佛有家市值兩億的小型 AI 公司」這種話，我覺得那根本是場投機遊戲。 確實也存在這類標的——作為一個類別，人們甚至不是厭惡它，而是感到困惑，需要相當多的理解。我想這正是我會關注的領域。
And I very much hope that you will put this compensation into the deep freeze until such time as it's right. And then you try to eventually bring me to ISA next day. That is the plan. We'll pull it out at the exact moment and all of your forecast will come true at that point. Thank you for being such a encouragement and keeping a compensation on its days. Thank you, Jonathan. Thanks for listening. 我非常希望你能將這筆補償金暫時封存，直到適當時機來臨。然後你試著最終在隔天將我帶到 ISA。這就是計劃。我們會在精準的時刻取出它，屆時你所有的預測都將實現。感謝你如此激勵人心，並在這些日子裡持續保留補償金。謝謝你，Jonathan。感謝收聽。
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