Berkshire’s 2025 annual shareholder meeting

Berkshire’s 2025 annual shareholder meeting
波克夏 2025 年度股東大會

Morning Session  上午場次

Warren Buffett: If everyone will please take their seats. This is my 60th annual meeting, and it’s the biggest and I think it’ll be the best yet. Before I start, I’d like to give you a few figures from yesterday because we set all kinds of records.
華倫·巴菲特：請各位就座。這是我第 60 次主持年度股東會，規模最大，我相信也會是最精彩的一次。在開始前，我想先分享幾個昨天的數字，因為我們創下了各種紀錄。

Yesterday we had 19,700 people join us in the afternoon between noon and 5:00, up from 16,200 which was the previous record the year before. In every aspect we set records. See’s Candy did $317,000 against $283,000 the year before, and most of these were limited by capacity. There were lines throughout the entire day. Brooks did $310,000 – an all-time record sales day for them. I think they have close to 3,000 runners lined up for Sunday, which is a lot of people. We’ve had 2,200 or 2,400 before, but 3,000 – and that doesn’t count me, and it won’t count me.
昨天下午從中午到五點之間，我們迎來了 19,700 人參與，打破了前一年 16,200 人的紀錄。在各方面我們都創下了新高。See’s Candy 銷售額達到 31.7 萬美元，超越前一年的 28.3 萬美元，而這些大多受產能限制。整天都排著長隊。Brooks 的銷售額為 31 萬美元——這是他們有史以來銷售額最高的一天。我想他們週日大概有近 3,000 名跑者報名，人數相當多。我們之前有過 2,200 或 2,400 人，但 3,000 人——這還不包括我，也不會算上我。

I could go up and down the line. Jazz wares did around $250,000, double the previous years. They just sell as fast as they can sell. Most every place had people lined up at the cash register, sometimes for a longer wait than we’d wish. But we’ll learn the game eventually. Every company set records.
我可以一一列舉。Jazz wares 的銷售額約為 25 萬美元，是前一年的兩倍。他們賣得飛快。幾乎每個地方收銀台前都排著隊，有時等待時間比我們希望的還要長。但我們最終會掌握訣竅。每家公司都創下了紀錄。

There’s no way of knowing how many people we have here today. We have people listening in around the world, but I think we’ll probably set records in a great variety of ways.
今天這裡有多少人實在難以估計。我們在全球各地都有聽眾，但我認為我們很可能在多方面創下紀錄。

I would like to first introduce our directors. I’m Warren Buffett, and I was born and raised here in Omaha. We have Greg Abel – he was born and raised in Canada, and we have Ajit Jain who was born and raised in India. So we have a very diverse group.
首先我想介紹我們的董事會成員。我是華倫·巴菲特，在奧馬哈出生長大。我們有來自加拿大出生長大的格雷格·阿貝爾，還有在印度出生長大的阿吉特·賈恩。所以我們是一個非常多元化的團隊。

I will introduce our directors alphabetically, and if they’ll stand as I introduce them – withhold your applause till the end so we can get through the list:
我將按字母順序介紹我們的董事會成員，當我介紹時請他們起立——請等到最後再鼓掌，這樣我們可以順利完成名單：

Howard Buffett  霍華德·巴菲特
Susan Buffett  蘇珊·巴菲特
Steve Burke  史蒂夫·伯克
Ken Chenault  肯·錢納特
Chris Davis  克里斯·戴維斯
Sue Decker, who’s our lead director
蘇·德克爾，我們的首席董事
Charlotte Guyman  夏洛特·蓋曼
Tom Murphy Jr.  小湯姆·墨菲
Ron Olson – and I’ll have a few more things to say about him
羅恩·奧爾森——關於他，我還有些話要說
Wally Scott  沃利·斯科特
Meryl Witmer  梅麗爾·威特默

And with that, you’ve got our all-star cast. Ron, if you don’t mind standing, I would like to point out that Ron has reached our director age limit at Berkshire. I think we had five directors over 90 not so long ago, but we have the highest age limit of any company Sue has checked. Ron has been on the board for 28 years and has been associated with Charlie Munger at Munger Tolles for many years beyond that. He has been around at various times of crisis, joy, disappointments, and surprises at Berkshire and has been of invaluable help to us. So I’d like to give a special hand to Ron Olson.
這樣一來，我們的明星陣容就齊了。羅恩，如果你不介意站起來的話，我想指出羅恩已經達到我們伯克希爾的董事年齡上限。不久前我們還有五位超過 90 歲的董事，但我們設定的年齡上限是蘇檢查過的所有公司中最高的。羅恩在董事會任職 28 年，在此之前還與查理·芒格在芒格托爾斯律師事務所共事多年。他見證了伯克希爾經歷的各種危機、喜悅、失望和驚喜時刻，對我們提供了無價的幫助。因此，我想特別為羅恩·奧爾森鼓掌致意。

I think I’ll do something else that isn’t usually done at annual meetings. I listened to Apple’s quarterly call on Thursday afternoon – it’s the only investment quarterly call that I listen to. I understand Tim Cook is here, and it’ll be tough for me to see him from up here, but there he is. I’m somewhat embarrassed to say that Tim Cook has made Berkshire a lot more money than I’ve ever made Berkshire Hathaway.
我想我要做一件股東年會上通常不會做的事。我週四下午聽了蘋果的季度財報電話會議——這是我唯一會聽的投資相關季度電話會議。我知道提姆·庫克今天在現場，從我這個位置可能很難看到他，但他就在那裡。我有點不好意思地說，提姆·庫克為伯克希爾賺的錢比我為伯克希爾哈撒韋賺的還要多得多。

I knew Steve Jobs briefly, and Steve of course did things that nobody else could have done in developing Apple. Steve picked Tim to succeed him, and he really made the right decision. Steve died young as you know, and nobody but Steve could have created Apple, but nobody but Tim could have developed it as he has. So on behalf of all of Berkshire, thank you Tim.
我曾與史蒂夫·賈伯斯有過短暫交集，當然，他在開發蘋果公司方面做到了無人能及的事。史蒂夫選擇了提姆接替他的位置，這確實是個正確的決定。如你所知，史蒂夫英年早逝，除了他沒有人能創建蘋果公司，但除了提姆也沒有人能像他那樣發展公司。因此，我代表整個波克夏，感謝提姆。

There are a couple other people I’d like to thank. I don’t do any work in terms of the show or anything else around Berkshire, but what you see today is the product of a lot of people at Berkshire. The people of Berkshire put on this show every year – our chief financial officer and just everybody pitches in. It’s a remarkable organization that way. But it’s led this year and in the last few years by Melissa Shapiro, and she’s made this whole thing work.
還有幾個人我想感謝。雖然我在波克夏的表演或其他事務上沒有參與任何工作，但你們今天所見的一切都是波克夏眾多員工的成果。波克夏的員工每年都籌辦這場盛會——我們的財務長以及每個人都貢獻了力量。這方面來說，這是一個非凡的組織。但近年來，這一切都是由梅麗莎·夏皮羅領導的，她讓整個活動順利運作。

We also had an idea a while back… maybe 65 years ago, I met Carrie Sa’s grandfather and his wife. They had nine children, and Susie and I joined a playhouse group. I don’t look like the kind of guy that would join a playhouse group, but it turned out to be a great move in many ways. I enjoyed the plays, but beyond that I met not only Carrie’s grandfather, who ran an insurance company in Omaha – Bill Kaiser – but I also met the Kiewit boys’ parents, Louis and Francis.
我們之前有個想法…大概 65 年前，我認識了 Carrie 的祖父和他的妻子。他們有九個孩子，Susie 和我加入了一個戲劇社團。我看起來不像是會加入戲劇社團的那種人，但這在許多方面都成了一個很好的決定。我喜歡那些戲劇，但除此之外，我不僅認識了 Carrie 的祖父——他在奧馬哈經營一家保險公司，名叫 Bill Kaiser——還認識了 Kiewit 兄弟的父母，Louis 和 Francis。

In connection with Carrie, her father ran a company called Central States, and later on we bought that company and her father ran it. Her sister went to work for Berkshire some years ago and then left to have a family with four kids. Carrie moved right in and had amazing talents. About 10 or 11 years ago, I asked Carrie to do a 50th anniversary book about Berkshire and just use her imagination. She’d never edited a book, never published a book, never dealt with printers before, but she put together the 50th anniversary book.
關於 Carrie，她的父親經營一家名為 Central States 的公司，後來我們收購了那家公司，並由她的父親繼續管理。她的姐姐幾年前曾在 Berkshire 工作，後來離開去組建了一個有四個孩子的家庭。Carrie 直接加入並展現了驚人的才華。大約 10 或 11 年前，我請 Carrie 製作一本關於 Berkshire 的 50 週年紀念書，並完全發揮她的想像力。她之前從未編輯過書、出版過書，也沒有與印刷廠打過交道，但她完成了這本 50 週年紀念書。

Then Carrie got married and had three kids, so she had to leave us. We go to a baseball game once a year and invite some of our distinguished alumni like Carrie to join us. Even though she was raising three children, she volunteered to create a 60th anniversary book. She kept doing things with her kids and every now and then I’d ask how it was going. She got it done about a week before the meeting because I gave her the assignment very late.
後來凱莉結婚並生了三個孩子，所以不得不離開我們。我們每年會去看一場棒球賽，並邀請像凱莉這樣傑出的校友一起參加。儘管她要撫養三個孩子，還是自願負責製作 60 週年紀念冊。她一邊照顧孩子一邊抽空處理，我偶爾會問問進度。因為我交代任務很晚，她直到會議前一週才完成。

Yesterday we sold about 4,400 books. We printed 8,000 – we intended to print 5,000 – so we have roughly 3,600 left for today. It’s kind of whimsical but accurate, and she came out with just the book I hoped she would. Carrie wouldn’t take a dime, but I did get her to name her favorite charity – the Stephen Center, which takes care of homeless people and does many other things. It’s located about five or six miles south of here and has been doing wonderful work. Her grandfather helped form it, and her husband has now joined the board.
昨天我們賣了大約 4,400 本書。我們印了 8,000 本——原本只打算印 5,000 本——所以今天大概還剩 3,600 本。這有點異想天開但又很準確，她最終完成的正是我期待的那本書。凱莉一分錢都不肯收，但我說服她指定了她最喜歡的慈善機構——史蒂芬中心，該機構照顧無家可歸者並從事許多其他善行。它位於這裡往南約五、六英里處，一直做得非常出色。她的祖父曾協助創立該中心，現在她的丈夫也加入了董事會。

We are selling 20 special copies of the book. We sold 10 prior to the meeting and raised a few hundred thousand doing that – I think we sold one for $100,000. The only difference between these and the $25 version is that Carrie and I signed them. The six we sold yesterday brought $148,000, which is about $25,000 per book. We saved four more, and this afternoon when we disband at 1:00, the area behind us with the bookstore will sell the final four. When we’re all through, I’ll match whatever we’ve raised from the 20 books, and we’ll give the Stephen Center a boost both financially and in awareness.
我們正在出售 20 本特別版書籍。會議前已售出 10 本，籌得數十萬美元——其中一本我記得是以 10 萬美元成交。這些書與 25 美元版本的唯一區別在於有我和卡麗的親筆簽名。昨天賣出的六本共募得 14.8 萬美元，平均每本約 2.5 萬美元。我們保留了最後四本，今天下午一點散會後，後方的書店區域將進行最後四本的義賣。等全部售罄後，我將對等捐贈這 20 本書的總募款金額，為史蒂芬中心提供資金與知名度的雙重助力。

When you look at that book, Carrie really did the whole thing. There’s a lot of information in there, and she dug through it all. She came by a couple times to check a fact or two, but she got material from the Munger family – she just did a wonderful job. I couldn’t get her to take a penny for it, so I’m going to ask her to do a lot of other things in the future.
當你翻閱這本書時，會發現卡麗確實主導了整個創作。書中蘊含大量資訊，全是她一點一滴挖掘整理的。她雖然來找我確認過幾次事實，但所有素材都來自芒格家族——她做得實在太出色了。我怎麼都說服不了她收取分文報酬，看來以後得多找些事情麻煩她了。

With that, I think we’ve covered all the business. We will move to questions, alternating between Becky with questions she’s received from around the country and from our audience which we have organized by zones.
這樣一來，所有議程應該都進行完畢了。接下來將進入問答環節，我們會交替採納貝姬從全國各地收集的問題，以及現場分區就座的觀眾提問。
Q&A Session  問答環節

Becky Quick: Thanks Warren. This first question comes from Bill Mitchell. I received more questions about this than any other question. He writes, “Warren, in a 2003 Fortune article, you argued for import certificates to limit trade deficits and said these import certificates basically amounted to a tariff, but recently you called tariffs an act of economic war. Has your view on trade barriers changed or do you see import certificates as somehow distinct from tariffs?”
貝琪·奎克：謝謝華倫。第一個問題來自比爾·米切爾。我收到關於這個問題的提問比其他任何問題都多。他寫道：「華倫，在 2003 年《財富》雜誌的一篇文章中，你主張使用進口憑證來限制貿易逆差，並說這些進口憑證基本上等同於關稅，但最近你稱關稅是一種經濟戰爭行為。你對貿易壁壘的看法是否有所改變，還是你認為進口憑證在某種程度上與關稅不同？」

Warren Buffett: Well, the import certificates were distinct, but their goal was to balance imports against exports so that the trade deficit would not grow in an enormous way. It had various provisions to help third world countries catch up a little bit. They were designed to balance trade, and I think you can make very good arguments that balanced trade is good for the world.
華倫·巴菲特：嗯，進口憑證確實不同，但它們的目的是平衡進出口，使貿易逆差不會以巨大的方式增長。它們包含各種條款來幫助第三世界國家稍微趕上一點。這些憑證旨在平衡貿易，我認為你可以提出很好的論點，說明平衡貿易對世界是有益的。

It makes sense for cocoa to be raised in Ghana and coffee in Colombia and a few other things. Over time, America has gone from being an agricultural country – this was nothing but an agricultural country 250 years ago – to a very industrial country. We did not want to run greater and greater deficits building up greater and greater debts against the country.
可可適合在迦納種植，咖啡則適合在哥倫比亞及其他少數地區種植，這是很合理的。隨著時間推移，美國從一個純農業國家——250 年前這裡完全就是個農業國——轉變為一個高度工業化的國家。我們不希望透過不斷累積越來越大的赤字，來讓國家背負越來越沉重的債務。

So I designed this import certificate plan, which Charlie thought was a little too much like Rube Goldberg – it’s gimmicky, but it’s certainly better than what we’re talking about now. There’s no question that trade can be an act of war, and I think it’s led to bad things like the attitudes it’s brought out in the United States. We should be looking to trade with the rest of the world. We should do what we do best, and they should do what they do best.
所以我設計了這個進口憑證計劃，查理覺得這有點像魯布·戈德堡機械——雖然花俏，但絕對比我們現在討論的方案要好。毫無疑問，貿易可以是一種戰爭行為，我認為它已經導致了一些糟糕的後果，比如在美國引發的這種態度。我們應該尋求與世界其他地區進行貿易。我們應該做我們最擅長的事，而他們也應該做他們最擅長的事。

With eight countries possessing nuclear weapons, including a few I would call quite unstable, I don’t think it’s a great idea to design a world where a few countries say, “Haha, we’ve won” while other countries are envious.
考慮到現在有八個國家擁有核武器，其中包括幾個我認為相當不穩定的國家，我不認為設計一個讓少數國家可以高喊「哈哈，我們贏了」而其他國家則心懷嫉妒的世界是個好主意。

My import certificate idea went nowhere. The main thing is that trade should not be a weapon. The United States has become an incredibly important country starting from nothing 250 years ago – there’s never been anything like it. And it’s a big mistake when you have 7.5 billion people who don’t like you very well and you have 300 million people crowing about how well they’ve done.
我的進口憑證構想毫無進展。關鍵在於貿易不該被當作武器。美國從 250 年前一無所有起步，成為極其重要的國家——這是史無前例的。但當全球 75 億人對你不太友善，而你們 3 億人卻大肆吹噓自己的成就時，這可是個嚴重錯誤。

I don’t think it’s right and I don’t think it’s wise. The more prosperous the rest of the world becomes, it won’t be at our expense – the more prosperous we’ll become and the safer we’ll feel and your children will feel someday. But don’t expect my import certificate idea to go down in history with Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations.
我認為這既不正確也不明智。世界其他地區越繁榮，並不會損害我們——反而會讓我們更繁榮、更有安全感，你們的子孫將來也會如此。但別指望我的進口憑證構想能像亞當·斯密的《國富論》那樣名留青史。

Audience Member (Zone 1): Mr. Buffett, Mr. Abel, and Mr. Jain. Good morning. I’m St. J. from Hong Kong. Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger did a very good and successful investment in Japan in the past five or six years. The recent CPI in Japan is currently above 3%, not far away from its 2% target. Bank of Japan seems very determined in raising rates while Fed, ECB, and other central banks are considering cutting them. Do you think BOJ makes sense to proceed with the rate hike? Will its planned rate hike deter you from further investing in the Japanese stock market or even considering realizing your current profits? Thank you very much for arranging this greatest event every year. Finally, I wish you health always and to keep holding this shareholder meeting.
觀眾（1 區）：巴菲特先生、阿貝爾先生和賈恩先生，早安。我是來自香港的 St. J.。過去五、六年間，巴菲特先生和蒙格先生在日本做了非常出色且成功的投資。日本最近的 CPI 已超過 3%，距離其 2%的目標不遠。日本央行似乎非常堅決要升息，而聯準會、歐洲央行和其他央行則在考慮降息。您認為日本央行繼續升息合理嗎？其計劃中的升息會阻止您進一步投資日本股市，甚至考慮實現當前的利潤嗎？非常感謝您每年安排這場最棒的活動。最後，祝您永遠健康，並持續舉辦這場股東大會。

Warren Buffett: Well, I’m going to extend the same goodwill to Japan that you’ve just extended to me. I’ll let the people of Japan determine their best course of action in terms of economics. It’s an incredible story.
華倫·巴菲特：嗯，我會將你剛才對我的善意同樣延伸給日本。我會讓日本人民在經濟方面決定他們的最佳行動方針。這是一個令人難以置信的故事。

It’s been about six years now since our Japanese investments. I was just going through a little handbook that probably had two or three thousand Japanese companies in it. One problem I have is that I can’t read that handbook anymore – the print’s too small. But there were these five trading companies selling at ridiculously low prices. So I spent about a year acquiring them. And then we got to know the people better, and everything that Greg and I saw, we liked better as we went along.
我們投資日本企業至今已約六年。當時我正在翻閱一本可能收錄了兩三千家日本公司的小手冊。我遇到的一個問題是，現在已經看不清那本手冊了——字體實在太小。但其中有五家貿易公司的股價低得離譜。於是我花了約一年時間逐步收購它們。隨著我們更了解這些公司的人員，葛雷格和我所見的一切都讓我們越發欣賞這些投資。

So we got fairly close to the 10% limit that we told the companies we would never exceed without their permission. We did ask them whether that limit could be relaxed, and it’s in the process of being relaxed somewhat. I would say that – I’ll speak for Greg beyond me – in the next 50 years, we won’t give a thought to selling those positions.
因此我們的持股比例已接近 10%的上限，我們曾向這些公司承諾未經許可絕不逾越此限。我們確實詢問過能否放寬限制，目前正在逐步放寬中。我想說——我將代表葛雷格發言——未來五十年內，我們完全不會考慮出脫這些持股。

Japan’s record has been extraordinary. My guess is that Tim Cook would tell you that iPhone sales there are about as great as any country outside the United States. American Express would tell you that they sell their product very well in Japan. Coca-Cola, another big investment of ours, does extraordinarily well in Japan. They have a number of habits and a civilization that operates differently than ours. Japan is by far the biggest market for Coca-Cola’s soft drink containers.
日本的表現一直非常出色。我猜提姆·庫克會告訴你，iPhone 在那裡的銷售量幾乎是美國以外任何國家中最高的。美國運通會告訴你，他們的產品在日本賣得非常好。我們另一項重大投資可口可樂，在日本也表現得極為出色。他們有許多習慣和文明運作方式與我們不同。日本無疑是可口可樂軟飲容器最大的市場。

We have been treated extremely well by the five companies. They talk primarily with Greg. I went over there a year or two ago, but Greg’s more cosmopolitan than I am.
這五家公司對我們非常友善。他們主要與葛瑞格溝通。我一兩年前曾去過那裡，但葛瑞格比我更國際化。

Greg Abel: When you think of the five companies, there’s definitely a couple meetings a year, Warren. The thing we’re building with the five companies is, one, it’s been a very good investment, but we really envision holding the investment for 50 years or forever. We also are building relationships to do incremental things with each of those companies. We really hope to do big things with them globally. They bring different perspectives and different opportunities, and that’s why we’re building that long-term relationship with them.
葛瑞格·阿貝爾：當你想到這五家公司時，華倫，每年肯定會有幾次會議。我們與這五家公司建立的關係，首先這是一筆非常好的投資，但我們真正設想的是持有這項投資 50 年或永遠。我們也在建立關係，以便與每家公司進行更多合作。我們真心希望在全球範圍內與他們共同成就大事。他們帶來不同的視角和不同的機會，這就是為什麼我們要與他們建立這種長期關係。

They have different customs, different approaches to business – that’s true around the world. We don’t have any intention of trying to change what they’ve done because they do it very successfully. Our main activity is just to cheer and clap, and I can still do that at 94.
他們有不同的習俗、不同的商業模式——這在世界各地都是如此。我們無意改變他們的成功之道，因為他們做得非常出色。我們的主要活動就是鼓掌喝采，而我 94 歲了依然能做到這一點。

We will not be selling any stock. That will not happen in decades, if then. My guess is that they will find things – they cover the world pretty much – and we will find opportunities that may be very large for any individual company there. They may be assisted by some help we bring to the situation, but that will be an expanding relationship.
我們不會出售任何股票。未來幾十年都不會發生，即便到那時也未必。我猜他們會發現機會——他們的業務幾乎遍及全球——而我們也會找到對當地任何單一公司都可能非常龐大的投資機會。或許我們能提供某些協助促成交易，但這將是一種不斷擴展的合作關係。

It’s too bad that Berkshire has gotten as big as it is because we love that position and I’d like it to be a lot larger. Even with the five companies being very large in Japan, we’ve got at market in the range of $20 billion invested, but I’d rather have $100 billion than $20 billion. That’s how I feel about several other investments we have. But size is an enemy of performance at Berkshire, and I don’t know any good way to solve that problem.
可惜波克夏已經變得如此龐大，因為我們熱愛這個地位，我甚至希望它能更大。即便在日本投資的五家公司規模都已相當可觀，我們投入的市場資金約 200 億美元，但我寧願是 1000 億而非 200 億。我對其他幾項投資也有同樣感受。但規模正是波克夏績效的敵人，而我至今找不到解決這個問題的好方法。

Charlie always told me that having a few problems was good for me. The Japan investment has just been right up our alley.
查理總是告訴我，有些問題對我有好處。日本投資完全符合我們的風格。

Greg Abel: I absolutely agree, Warren. I do believe we’ll see some very large opportunities long term, and that’s just been a great plus of that relationship.
格雷格·阿貝爾：我完全同意，華倫。我確實相信長期來看我們會遇到一些非常大的機會，而這段關係本身就是一個巨大的加分項。

Warren Buffett: I would say they want to present us with opportunities, and we would like to receive them. We’ve got the money. We get along very well with each other. They have some different customs than we have. They drink Georgia coffee as their number one Coca-Cola product. I haven’t converted them to Cherry Coke, and they’re not going to convert me to Georgia Coffee. But it’s a perfect relationship. I just wish we could get more like it.
華倫·巴菲特：我想說他們希望向我們提供機會，而我們也很樂意接收。我們有資金。我們彼此相處得非常融洽。他們有一些與我們不同的習慣。他們最愛的 Coca-Cola 產品是喬治亞咖啡。我還沒能讓他們改喝櫻桃可樂，他們也別想讓我改喝喬治亞咖啡。但這是一段完美的關係。我只希望我們能找到更多這樣的合作夥伴。

I never dreamt of that when I picked up that handbook. It’s amazing what you can find when you just turn the page. We showed a movie last year about “turn every page,” and I would say that turning every page is one important ingredient to bring to the investment field. Very few people do turn every page, and the ones who turn every page aren’t going to tell you what they’re finding. So you’ve got to do a little of it yourself.
當我拿起那本手冊時，我從未想過會這樣。翻開每一頁都能發現驚喜，這真是太神奇了。去年我們放映了一部關於「翻遍每一頁」的影片，我想說在投資領域，翻遍每一頁是一個重要的訣竅。很少有人真的會翻遍每一頁，而那些做到的人也不會告訴你他們發現了什麼。所以你得自己動手做一些這樣的工作。

Becky Quick: This next question comes from Advate Prasad in New York. He writes, “Today, Berkshire holds over $300 billion in cash and short-term investments, representing about 27% of total assets, a historically high figure compared to the 13% average over the last 25 years. This has also led Berkshire to effectively own nearly 5% of the entire US Treasury market. Beyond the need for liquidity to meet insurance obligations, is the decision to raise cash primarily a de-risking strategy in response to high market valuations? Or is it also a deliberate effort to position Berkshire’s balance sheet for a smoother leadership transition, providing Greg Abel with maximum flexibility and a clean slate for future capital allocation decisions?” And I will add one line from another shareholder, Mike Conway, who asks, “Are you encouraged you may see some fat pitches coming your way?”
貝琪·奎克：下一個問題來自紐約的 Advate Prasad。他寫道：「目前波克夏持有超過 3000 億美元的現金及短期投資，約佔總資產的 27%，相較過去 25 年平均 13%的比例處於歷史高位。這也使得波克夏實質持有近 5%的美國國債市場。除了滿足保險業務流動性需求外，囤積現金是否主要因應市場高估值的去風險策略？抑或是刻意為領導層交接鋪路，讓葛瑞格·阿貝爾在未來資本配置決策時能擁有最大彈性與全新起點？」另外我要補充一位股東麥克·康威的提問：「您是否預期將出現值得全力揮擊的好球機會？」

Warren Buffett: Well, I wouldn’t do anything nearly so noble as to withhold investing myself just so that Greg could look good later on. If he gets any edge of what I leave behind, I’ll resent it.
華倫·巴菲特：這個嘛，我可沒高尚到刻意保留投資機會來讓葛瑞格將來表現出色。要是他從我留下的東西裡撈到任何好處，我可是會很介意的。

The amount of cash we have – we would spend $100 billion if something is offered that makes sense to us, that we understand, offers good value, and where we don’t worry about losing money. The problem with the investment business is that things don’t come along in an orderly fashion, and they never will.
我們持有的現金規模——如果有符合我們理解、提供良好價值且不用擔心虧損的投資機會出現，我們會動用 1000 億美元。投資業務的問題在於機會不會按部就班地出現，而且永遠不會。

I’ve had about 16,000 trading days in my career. It would be nice if every day you got four opportunities or something like that with equal attractiveness. If I was running a numbers racket, every day would have the same expectancy that I would keep 40% of whatever the handle was, and the only question would be how much we transacted. But we’re not running that kind of business.
我的職業生涯中經歷過約 16,000 個交易日。如果每天都能遇到四個左右吸引力相當的機會當然很好。如果我經營的是數字賭盤，每天都能預期從賭金中抽成 40%，唯一問題只是交易量大小。但我們從事的不是這種生意。

We’re running a business which is very opportunistic. Charlie always thought I did too many things. He thought if we did about five things in our lifetime, we would end up doing better than if we did 50, and that we never concentrated enough.
我們經營的是極度講究時機的生意。查理總覺得我做事太多。他認為如果我們一生只做五件事，成果會比做五十件事更好，而且我們從來不夠專注。

We would rather have conditions develop where we would have like $50 billion in cash rather than $335 billion in treasuries. But that’s just not the way the business works. We have made a lot of money by not wanting to be fully invested at all times.
我們更希望情況發展到只需持有 500 億美元現金，而非 3350 億美元國債。但這不是商業運作的模式。我們賺取巨額利潤的方法，正是從不追求時刻滿倉投資。

We don’t think it’s improper for passive investors to make a few simple investments and sit with them for life. But we’ve made the decision to be in the business, so we think we can do a little better by behaving in a very irregular manner.
我們不認為被動投資者進行一些簡單的投資並終身持有是不妥的。但我們已決定從事這一行業，因此我們認為通過採取非常規的方式可以做得更好一些。

If you told me that I had to invest $50 billion every year until we got down to $50 billion in cash, that would be the dumbest thing in the world. Things get extraordinarily attractive very occasionally. The long-term trend is up. But nobody knows – Greg doesn’t know, Ajit doesn’t know, nobody knows what the market is going to do tomorrow, next week, or next month. Nobody knows what business is going to do tomorrow, next week, or next month. But they spend all their time talking about it because it’s easy to talk about, though it has no value.
如果你告訴我，我必須每年投資 500 億美元，直到我們的現金降至 500 億美元，那將是世界上最愚蠢的事情。極具吸引力的機會非常罕見。長期趨勢是向上的。但沒有人知道——格雷格不知道，阿吉特不知道，沒有人知道市場明天、下週或下個月會怎樣。沒有人知道企業明天、下週或下個月會怎樣。但他們花費所有時間談論這些，因為談論這些很容易，儘管這毫無價值。

The process of leafing through things like that big Japanese book I can’t read anymore – that’s a treasure hunt. Every now and then you find something. Occasionally, very occasionally – but it’ll happen again, I don’t know when – it could be next week, it could be 5 years off, but it won’t be 50 years off – we will be bombarded with offerings that we’ll be glad we have the cash for.
翻閱那些我現在已經看不懂的日文大部頭書籍的過程——就像一場尋寶遊戲。偶爾你會發現一些東西。非常偶爾地——但這種情況會再次發生，我不知道什麼時候——可能是下週，也可能是 5 年後，但不會是 50 年後——我們將會被大量的投資機會所淹沒，屆時我們會慶幸自己手頭有現金。

It would be a lot more fun if it would happen tomorrow, but it’s very unlikely to happen tomorrow. It’s not unlikely to happen in five years, and the probabilities get higher as you go along. It’s kind of like death – if you’re 10 years old, the chances that you’re going to die the next day are low. If you get to be 115, it’s almost a certainty, particularly if you’re a male, as all the longevity records are held by females. I tried to get Charlie to have a sex change so he could test out whether it would extend his life. He did pretty well for being a male, I’ll put it that way.
如果這件事明天就發生會有趣得多，但明天發生的可能性非常低。五年內發生並非不可能，而且隨著時間推移，概率會越來越高。這有點像死亡——如果你 10 歲，第二天死亡的機率很低。如果你活到 115 歲，這幾乎是必然的，尤其是男性，因為所有長壽紀錄都由女性保持。我曾試圖讓查理變性，看看是否能延長他的壽命。作為男性，他已經做得相當不錯了，我就這麼說吧。

Audience Member (Zone 2): Good morning, Warren, Greg and Ajit. My name is Jackie Han. I’m from China and now work in Toronto, Canada. This is my eighth Berkshire Hathaway meeting. At this point, I’ve probably spent more time with you than most people spend on Netflix. As you might guess, coming from a Chinese family, we always had a soft spot for real estate. So the question isn’t why don’t you own a house, it’s why are you still buying stocks instead of more property? So here is my question: With today’s high interest rates and global uncertainty, do you still believe in being greedy when others are fearful, or is value investing facing new challenges in today’s environment? Thank you.
觀眾（第二區）：早安，華倫、葛瑞格和阿吉特。我是韓傑基，來自中國，現在加拿大多倫多工作。這是我第八次參加波克夏海瑟威的股東大會。到目前為止，我可能已經花在你們身上的時間比大多數人花在 Netflix 上的時間還要多。正如你們可能猜到的，來自一個中國家庭，我們總是對房地產情有獨鍾。所以問題不是為什麼你們不擁有房子，而是為什麼你們還在買股票而不是更多的房產？所以我的問題是：在當今高利率和全球不確定性的情況下，你們仍然相信在別人恐懼時貪婪，還是價值投資在當今環境下面臨新的挑戰？謝謝。

Warren Buffett: Well, in respect to real estate, it’s so much harder than stocks in terms of negotiation of deals, time spent, and the involvement of multiple parties in the ownership. Usually when real estate gets in trouble, you find out you’re dealing with more than just the equity holder.
華倫·巴菲特：嗯，就房地產而言，它在交易談判、時間投入以及所有權涉及多方參與方面比股票要困難得多。通常當房地產陷入困境時，你會發現你面對的不僅僅是權益持有人。

There have been times when large amounts of real estate have changed hands at bargain prices, but usually stocks were cheaper and they were a lot easier to do. Charlie did more real estate. Charlie enjoyed real estate transactions, and he actually did a fair number of them in the last 5 years of his life. But he was playing a game that was interesting to him.
曾幾何時，大量房地產以低廉價格易手，但通常股票更便宜且交易起來容易得多。查理做了更多房地產交易。查理享受房地產交易，實際上在他生命的最後五年裡做了不少這類交易。但他只是在玩一個對他來說有趣的遊戲。

I think if you’d asked him to make a choice when he was 21 – either be in stocks exclusively for the rest of his life or real estate for the rest of his life – he would have chosen stocks. There’s just so much more opportunity, at least in the United States, that presents itself in the security market than in real estate.
我認為，如果你在他 21 歲時讓他做出選擇——要麼餘生只投資股票，要麼餘生只投資房地產——他會選擇股票。至少在美國，證券市場提供的機會比房地產多得多。

In real estate, you’re usually dealing with a single owner or a family that owns a large property they’ve had a long time. Maybe they’ve borrowed too much money against it. Maybe the population trends are against them. But to them, it’s an enormous decision.
在房地產領域，你通常是在與單一業主或一個長期持有大型物業的家庭打交道。也許他們借了太多錢來抵押它。也許人口趨勢對他們不利。但對他們來說，這是一個巨大的決定。

When you walk down to the New York Stock Exchange, you can do billions of dollars worth of business, totally anonymous, and you can do it in 5 minutes. The trades are complete when they’re complete. In real estate, when you make a deal with a distressed lender, when you sign the deal, that’s just the beginning. Then people start negotiating more things, and it’s a whole different game with a different type of person who enjoys the game.
當你走進紐約證券交易所，可以在完全匿名的情況下進行價值數十億美元的交易，而且五分鐘內就能完成。交易完成就是完成了。但在房地產領域，當你與陷入困境的貸款機構達成協議時，簽約只是開始。接著人們會開始協商更多細節，這完全是另一種遊戲，適合享受這種遊戲的不同類型的人。

We did a few real estate deals that came our way in 2008 and 2009, but the amount of time they would take compared to doing something intelligent and probably better in securities – there was just no comparison. In a real estate deal, every sentence is important to the person. In stocks, if somebody needs to sell 20,000 shares of Berkshire and they call us and the price is right, it’s done in 5 seconds and it closes right away.
我們在 2008 和 2009 年做了一些房地產交易，但與在證券市場上進行可能更明智且更有利可圖的操作相比，這些交易所耗費的時間根本無法相提並論。在房地產交易中，每個條款對當事人都至關重要。而在股票交易中，如果有人需要出售 20,000 股波克夏股票，他們打電話給我們，價格合適的話，五秒鐘就能成交並立即結算。

The completion rate for working on anything in stocks, assuming you’ve got a meeting of the minds on price, is essentially 100%. In real estate, the negotiation just begins when you agree on deals, and then they take forever. For a 94-year-old, it’s not the most interesting thing to get involved in something where the negotiations could take years.
在股票市場上，只要雙方對價格達成共識，任何交易的完成率基本上都是 100%。但在房地產領域，價格談妥才只是談判的開始，之後的過程可能拖上好幾年。對於一個 94 歲的人來說，參與這種可能耗時數年的談判實在不是什麼有趣的事。

We have seen some huge failures in real estate. If you go all the way back to Zeckendorf in the 1960s, he was going to change the world, and Century City in California is a product of his vision. If you go to Reichmann with the Canary Wharf buildings in London, he was sitting on top of the world, but people tend to get in trouble in that business.
我們見證過房地產界一些重大失敗案例。追溯到 1960 年代的澤肯多夫，他當年企圖改變世界，加州世紀城就是其願景的產物。再看倫敦金絲雀碼頭大樓的萊克曼，他曾站在世界之巔，但人們往往會在這個行業裡陷入困境。

The banks usually don’t want to recognize problems, but it takes a long time to go through the bank processes. They just got through redoing the Musk loan that he made when he was buying Twitter three years ago. Real estate transactions have parties on both sides that aren’t ready to act. We find it much better when people are ready to pick up the phone and you can do hundreds of millions of dollars worth of business in a day. I’ve been spoiled, but I like being spoiled, so we’ll keep it that way.
銀行通常不願意承認問題，但要走完銀行內部流程得花很長時間。他們才剛重新處理完馬斯克三年前收購推特時申請的貸款。房地產交易的買賣雙方往往都沒準備好採取行動。我們發現當人們準備好拿起電話時，一天內就能完成價值數億美元的交易，這種情況要好得多。我已經被慣壞了，但我喜歡這種慣壞的感覺，所以我們會保持現狀。

Becky Quick: This question comes from Sam England in San Francisco and it’s for Warren and Ajit. As AI systems become more capable and harder to interpret, how do you see that affecting the insurance industry’s ability to assess, price, and transfer risk? Are there parallels to past disruptions Berkshire has navigated in underwriting or capital allocation?
貝琪·奎克：這個問題來自舊金山的山姆·英格蘭，提給華倫和阿吉特。隨著 AI 系統能力增強且更難解讀，您認為這將如何影響保險業評估、定價和轉移風險的能力？伯克希爾過去在核保或資本配置方面經歷過的變革是否有相似之處？

Ajit Jain: There is no question in my mind that AI is going to be a real game-changer. It’s going to change the way we assess risk, we price risk, we sell risk, and then the way we end up paying claims.
阿吉特·賈恩：我毫不懷疑 AI 將成為真正的遊戲規則改變者。它將改變我們評估風險、定價風險、銷售風險的方式，最終還會改變我們理賠的方式。

Having said that, I certainly also feel that people end up spending enormous amounts of money trying to chase the next fashionable thing. We are not very good at being the fastest or the first mover. Our approach is more to wait and see until the opportunity crystallizes and we have a better point of view in terms of risk of failure, upside, and downside.
話雖如此，我也確實認為人們最終會花費巨額資金追逐下一個時髦事物。我們並不擅長做最快或最先行動的人。我們的做法更像是等待觀望，直到機會明確，我們對失敗風險、上行潛力和下行空間有更清晰的觀點。

Right now the individual insurance operations do dabble in AI and try to figure out the best way to exploit it. But we have not yet made a conscious big-time effort in terms of pouring a lot of money into this opportunity. My guess is we will be in a state of readiness, and should that opportunity pop up, we’ll jump in promptly.
目前個別保險業務確實涉足人工智慧，試圖找出最佳利用方式。但我們尚未有意識地大舉投入資金開發這個機會。我猜我們會保持準備狀態，一旦機會出現，就能迅速投入。

Warren Buffett: I wouldn’t trade everything that’s developed in AI in the next 10 years for Ajit. If you gave me a choice of having a hundred billion dollars available to participate in the property casualty insurance business for the next 10 years and a choice of getting the top AI product from whoever’s developing it or having Ajit making the decisions, I would take Ajit anytime – and I’m not kidding about that.
華倫·巴菲特：我不會用未來十年 AI 領域的所有發展來交換阿吉特。如果讓我在未來十年獲得一千億美元資金參與財產意外保險業務，與獲得頂尖 AI 產品（無論是誰開發的）或讓阿吉特做決策之間做選擇，我會毫不猶豫選擇阿吉特——這絕非玩笑。

Audience Member (Zone 3): Hello, I’m Sean Seagull from Chicago, Illinois. Thank you for investing your time and to you and the executive committee for putting on this meeting and for bringing together a diverse group of people in attendance under one roof. Out of all the companies that Berkshire Hathaway owns, there was one that you acquired – the Chicago-based company Portillo’s Hot Dogs. How did you know that this would be a good fit for the overall company’s portfolio?
觀眾（3 區）：大家好，我是來自伊利諾州芝加哥的 Sean Seagull。感謝您投入時間，也感謝您和執行委員會籌辦這場會議，並將與會的各行各業人士齊聚一堂。在所有波克夏·海瑟威持有的公司中，有一家是你們收購的——芝加哥的 Portillo's Hot Dogs 熱狗店。您是如何知道這家公司適合納入整體投資組合的？

Warren Buffett: Well, I’ll have to ask Greg about that because I don’t know anything about it. So, maybe he bought it when I was looking the other way. But I think I got to call a friend on this one. I like to think I know most of our companies, but I really don’t know a thing about it. I’m sorry, but that may be a good thing. I do know something about hot dogs, though. And we do have a lot of companies in Chicago.
華倫·巴菲特：嗯，這個我得問問 Greg，因為我完全不了解這件事。說不定是他趁我沒注意時買下的。看來這題我得求助朋友了。我自認對旗下多數公司都有所掌握，但對這家真的毫無概念。很抱歉，不過這或許是件好事。至少我對熱狗還算懂一些。而且我們在芝加哥確實有不少企業。

Greg Abel: Through Marmon, that’s been a great opportunity where we’ve accumulated a variety of excellent companies under that portfolio, but I don’t believe Portillo’s falls under that.
格雷格·阿貝爾：透過 Marmon 集團，我們累積了許多優秀企業組成該投資組合，但 Portillo's 應該不屬於其中。

Warren Buffett: I look at the financial statements of about 50 or 60 of our companies every month. But in the case of Marmon, for example, Marmon itself owns over 100 companies. It was created by Jay Pritzker and his brother Bob, and it was a remarkable company when we bought it, but it was highly diversified already and then we’ve diversified it further. So it is something of a Berkshire within Berkshire.
華倫·巴菲特：我每個月都會查看我們旗下約 50 到 60 家公司的財務報表。但以馬蒙公司為例，馬蒙本身就擁有超過 100 家公司。它是由傑伊·普利茲克和他的兄弟鮑勃創立的，我們收購它時就已經是一家非常出色的公司，但它當時已經高度多元化，而我們後來又進一步擴展了它的多元化。所以它有點像是波克夏內部的波克夏。

We found that’s working very well as an arrangement. Jay Pritzker was a remarkable manager, and there are various branches of the Pritzker family. In 1954, they changed the federal tax code very dramatically in the United States – quite a blow to me because I’d been at Columbia reading a J.K. Lasser book about the tax code, and then they went and changed the whole thing. But 1954 was a big year of change, and those years come every now and then, like 1986, and you may see a big one one of these days.
我們發現這種安排運作得非常好。傑伊·普利茲克是一位非凡的管理者，普利茲克家族有許多分支。1954 年，他們在美國對聯邦稅法進行了非常重大的修改——這對我來說是個不小的打擊，因為我當時還在哥倫比亞大學讀著 J.K.拉瑟關於稅法的書，結果他們就把整個稅法都改了。但 1954 年確實是個變革的大年，像 1986 年一樣，這樣的年份時不時就會出現，說不定哪天你又會看到一次大變革。

There was a company called Rockwood Chocolates in Brooklyn, and they made Rockwood Chocolate Bits, which we used to sell at the Buffett grocery store for people to make chocolate chip cookies. It turned out that cocoa, which lately has had a big run, was 5 cents a pound in 1941 when LIFO was first allowed for tax purposes. The Rockwood chocolate company went on the LIFO method, so they owned about 30 million pounds of cocoa.
布魯克林有間名為洛克伍德的巧克力公司，生產的洛克伍德巧克力粒曾在巴菲特雜貨店販售，供人們製作巧克力餅乾。1941 年首次允許採用後進先出法(LIFO)計稅時，可可價格僅每磅 5 美分（近期則大幅上漲）。這家巧克力公司採用 LIFO 會計法，因此持有約 3000 萬磅可可庫存。

Then cocoa took a run in 1955. I had just moved to New York. There was a provision in the new tax code that if you were in two or more businesses and did certain things and had been in them for 5 years and got out of one of them, there would be no capital gains tax on LIFO inventory gains. Tax rates were around 48% or 52%, so there was this huge profit because cocoa had gone up in price, but that made it terrible for them selling Rockwood chocolate bits because the retail price of the chocolate bits did not match what was going on at wholesale. Something almost identical has been happening in the chocolate business recently – Hershey just reported they’re going to have a bad quarter as we’re paying $4.50 a pound for chocolate because of events in West Africa.
1955 年可可價格突然飆升，當時我剛搬到紐約。新稅法中有項條款規定：若企業同時經營兩項以上業務滿五年，且符合特定條件後退出其中一項，其 LIFO 庫存增值部分可免繳資本利得稅。當時稅率約 48%至 52%，由於可可批發價格上漲而零售價未能同步調整，導致洛克伍德巧克力粒銷售陷入困境——這與近期巧克力產業情況驚人相似，好時公司最新財報就因西非事件導致巧克力成本達每磅 4.5 美元而預告本季虧損。

In any event, Jay Pritzker bought control of Rockwood. I was 24 or 25 years old, and they called a meeting to split off one of the chocolate businesses in a way that would enable them to recognize the gain on these cocoa beans without paying 50% federal taxes. So I went to the meeting in Brooklyn, and nobody was there except one guy – I was 24 and he was 29, and it was Jay Pritzker.
無論如何，傑伊·普利茲克取得了洛克伍德的控制權。當時我 24、25 歲左右，他們召開會議要拆分其中一間巧克力業務，目的是讓這些可可豆的收益能實現卻不必繳納 50%的聯邦稅。於是我去了布魯克林的會議現場，除了我和另一個傢伙外沒人到場——我 24 歲，他 29 歲，那人正是傑伊·普利茲克。

Jay gave me a lecture or really a lesson on the tax code. I could have gone to graduate school for years and never learned as much as he taught me that day. Later we actually bought the Marmon Company, which after some other transformations grew from what was once Rockwood.
傑伊給我上了一堂課，或者更準確地說，是關於稅法的實戰教學。我就算去研究所讀好幾年書，也學不到那天他教我的那麼多。後來我們真的買下了馬蒙公司，而經過幾番轉變後，它從當年的洛克伍德逐漸壯大起來。

Marmon, among other things, developed the car that won the first Indianapolis Speedway race and invented the rear view mirror. At the Indianapolis 500, they used to have two people in the car – one to look back and see what the other racers were doing and one to drive. When our guy got sick, they invented the rear view mirror. So if you want to see what’s going on in the laboratories of Berkshire Hathaway, we’ve got people working on things like the rear view mirror.
馬蒙公司的事蹟包括開發出贏得首屆印第安納波利斯賽道大賽的賽車，還發明了後視鏡。在印第安納波利斯 500 大賽中，原本車上要坐兩個人——一個負責回頭看其他賽車的動向，另一個負責駕駛。當我們的人手生病時，他們就發明了後視鏡。所以如果你想看看波克夏·海瑟威的實驗室在做什麼，我們可是有人在研發像後視鏡這樣的東西。

Greg Abel: A friend did call. Peter Eastwood, who runs one of our Berkshire subsidiaries and does a great job, tracked down that Portillo’s is owned by a private equity firm called Berkshire Partners. So that was the basis of the question, but it’s not associated with Berkshire Hathaway. So, we got to the bottom of that one.
格雷格·阿貝爾：確實有位朋友來電詢問。彼得·伊斯伍德——他負責營運我們波克夏旗下某家表現出色的子公司——查明了 Portillo's 餐廳是由一家名為 Berkshire Partners 的私募股權公司所持有。這就是問題的由來，但它與波克夏·海瑟威無關。所以我們已經釐清這個誤會了。

Warren Buffett: That’s just a sample of the way we operate around here.
華倫·巴菲特：這只是我們這裡運作方式的一個小例子。

Becky Quick: This question comes from Jessica Pune who says, “You’ve long been a strong believer in the American tailwind and the resilience of the United States, and history has proven you correct. Today, the US appears to be undergoing significant and potentially revolutionary changes. Some investors are now questioning the concept of American exceptionalism. In your view, are investors being overly pessimistic about the US economy or is the country indeed entering a period of fundamental change that requires a reassessment from a new perspective?”
貝琪·奎克：這個問題來自潔西卡·普恩，她問道：「您長期以來堅信美國順風與其韌性，歷史也證明了您的正確。如今美國似乎正經歷重大且可能是革命性的變化。部分投資人開始質疑『美國例外主義』的概念。在您看來，投資人是否對美國經濟過度悲觀？抑或這個國家確實正進入需要以新視角重新評估的根本性變革時期？」

Warren Buffett: Well, I would say that Jessica, who I believe is the step-granddaughter of one of our managers that I mentioned in the annual report, asks a good question. America has been undergoing significant and revolutionary change ever since it was developed. I mentioned that we started out as an agricultural society with high promises that we didn’t deliver on very well. We said all men were created equal, and then we wrote a constitution that counted blacks as three-fifths of a person. In Article 2, you’ll find male pronouns used 20 times and no female pronouns. So it took until 1920, with the 19th amendment, to finally give women the vote that we had promised back in 1776.
華倫·巴菲特：嗯，我想說的是，傑西卡——她應該是我們年報中提到某位經理的繼孫女——問了個好問題。美國自建國以來，一直經歷著重大且革命性的變革。我提過我們最初是個農業社會，懷抱崇高理想卻未能妥善實現。我們宣稱人人生而平等，卻在憲法中將黑人計為五分之三個人。在憲法第二條裡，男性代名詞出現了 20 次，女性代名詞一次都沒有。直到 1920 年通過第 19 修正案，才終於兌現了 1776 年就許諾給女性的投票權。

We’re always in the process of change, and we’ll always find all kinds of things to criticize in the country. But the luckiest day in my life is the day I was born, because I was born in the United States. At that time, about 3% of all births in the world were taking place in the United States. I was just lucky, and I was lucky to be born white, among other things.
我們始終處於變革的進程中，總能找到各種可批評之處。但我生命中最幸運的一天就是出生那天，因為我生在美國。當時全球約 3%的新生兒誕生在美國。我只是幸運，而且幸運地生為白人，這只是眾多幸運因素之一。

If you don’t think the United States has changed since I was born in 1930, you’re not paying attention. We’ve gone through all kinds of things – great recessions, world wars, the development of the atomic bomb that we never dreamt of when I was born. So I would not get discouraged about the fact that we haven’t solved every problem that’s come along.
如果你不認為美國自我 1930 年出生以來有所改變，那你肯定沒在注意。我們經歷了各種事情——大蕭條、世界大戰、原子彈的研發，這些在我出生時都是難以想像的。所以我不會因為我們還沒解決所有出現的問題而感到氣餒。

If I were being born today, I would just keep negotiating in the womb until they said I could be in the United States. We’re all pretty lucky. We’ve got two non-United States guys here who now live in the US.
如果我是今天才要出生，我會在子宮裡一直協商，直到他們同意讓我生在美國為止。我們都相當幸運。這裡有兩位原本非美國籍的人士現在住在美國。

Audience Member (Zone 4): Hi, Mr. Buffett. My name is Daniel and I’m from Tenafly, New Jersey. First of all, I just want to say how grateful I am for getting the opportunity to ask you a question. When it comes to your principles of investing, you often talk about how important it is to be patient. Has there ever been a situation in your investing career where breaking that principle and acting fast has benefited you? Thank you.
觀眾（第四區）：嗨，巴菲特先生。我是丹尼爾，來自新澤西州的特納夫萊。首先，我想說非常感謝能有機會向您提問。談到您的投資原則，您經常提到耐心的重要性。在您的投資生涯中，是否有過打破這項原則、迅速行動反而讓您獲益的情況？謝謝。

Warren Buffett: That’s a good question. There are times when you have to act fast. In fact, we’ve made a great deal of money because we’re willing to act faster than anybody around.
華倫·巴菲特：這是個好問題。有時候你必須迅速行動。事實上，我們因為比周圍任何人都願意快速行動而賺了很多錢。

Jessica Pune is the step-granddaughter of Ben Rosner, a manager of ours. In 1966, I got a call from a fellow named Phil Steinberg in New York. He said, “I represent Mrs. Anenberg. We have a business we’d like to sell you.” So I called Charlie up, got a few details, and it sounded very interesting.
潔西卡·普恩是我們一位經理班·羅斯納的繼孫女。1966 年，我接到紐約一位名叫菲爾·史坦柏格的人來電。他說：「我代表安能伯格夫人。我們有個生意想賣給你們。」於是我打電話給查理，了解一些細節後，聽起來相當有意思。

Charlie and I went to Will Steinberg’s office in New York – he was a marvelous guy. He was handling things for Mrs. Anenberg, whose husband had been the partner of Ben Rosner, but he had died, and Ben got kind of tense about working with her.
查理和我去了威爾·史坦柏格在紐約的辦公室——他是個了不起的人。他當時在處理安能伯格夫人的事務，她的丈夫曾是班·羅斯納的合夥人，但已過世，而班對於與她共事感到有些緊張。

So he offered us this business at a bargain price – $6 million. It had $2 million of cash, a $2 million piece of property on Market Street in Philadelphia, and it was making $2 million a year pre-tax.
所以他以 600 萬美元的優惠價格把這個生意賣給了我們。公司有 200 萬美元的現金，位於費城市場街價值 200 萬美元的房產，每年稅前盈利 200 萬美元。

Ben Rosner was there, and he was upset about doing business with his partner’s widow. She was extremely wealthy. He said to me and Charlie, “I’ll run this business for you until December 31st, and then I’m out of here.” Charlie and I went out in the hallway, and I said, “If this guy quits at the end of the year, you can throw away every book on psychology I’ve ever read.”
班·羅斯納當時在場，他對於與合夥人的遺孀做生意感到不悅。她非常富有。他對我和查理說：「我會為你們經營這個生意直到 12 月 31 日，之後我就不幹了。」查理和我走到走廊上，我說：「如果這傢伙年底真的辭職，那我讀過的所有心理學書籍都可以扔了。」

That began a wonderful relationship. We bought the company and had a great partnership. People in the East had a stereotype in their mind of what people from the Midwest were like. Ben had been married first to a woman from Iowa, and he just figured that anybody from the Midwest was okay.
這開啟了一段美好的關係。我們收購了這家公司，並建立了極佳的合作夥伴關係。東方人心中對中西部人有著刻板印象。班的第一任妻子來自愛荷華州，所以他認為只要是中西部來的人都不錯。

The trick when you get in business with somebody who wants to sell you something for $6 million that’s got $2 million of cash, a couple million of real estate, and is making $2 million a year, is you don’t want to be patient at that moment. You want to be patient in waiting to get the occasional call. My phone will ring sometime with something that wakes me up. You just never know when it’ll happen.
當你與某人做生意，對方想以 600 萬美元賣給你一項資產——其中包含 200 萬現金、價值約 200 萬的不動產，且年收益達 200 萬時——關鍵在於此刻不該耐心等待。你該耐心等待的是偶爾那通會讓你驚醒的電話。我的電話總有一天會響起，帶來這樣的機會，只是你永遠無法預知何時會發生。

That’s what makes it fun. So patience is a combination of patience and a willingness to do something that afternoon if it comes to you. You don’t want to be patient about acting on deals that make sense, and you don’t want to be very patient with people talking to you about things that will never happen.
這正是樂趣所在。所謂耐心，是兼具等待的耐性與機會來臨時當機立斷的行動力。對於合理的交易，你不該遲疑不決；而對於那些永遠不會實現的提案，你更不該浪費時間與對方周旋。

Greg Abel: As you’re being patient, I happen to know – and I think that goes for Ajit also and all our managers – while we’re looking at opportunities and as you touched on, we want to act quickly, but never underestimate the amount of reading and work that’s being done to be prepared to act quickly. We know that when the opportunity presents itself, whether it be equities or private companies, we’re ready to act, and that’s a large part of being patient – using the time to be prepared.
格雷格·阿貝爾：正如你所保持的耐心，我恰好知道——我想這對阿吉特和我們所有的經理人來說都適用——當我們在尋找機會時，正如你所提到的，我們希望迅速行動，但千萬不要低估了為了能夠迅速行動而進行的閱讀和準備工作。我們知道，當機會出現時，無論是股票還是私人公司，我們都準備好行動，而這正是耐心的很大一部分——利用時間做好準備。

Warren Buffett: And of course it doesn’t come in anything like an even flow. It’s the most uneven sort of activity you could get into. The main thing is you have to be willing to hang up after 5 seconds and you have to be willing to say yes after 5 seconds. You can’t be filled with self-doubt in this business.
華倫·巴菲特：當然，機會的到來絕不是均勻的。這是你所能從事的最不規律的活動。關鍵是你必須願意在 5 秒鐘後掛斷電話，也必須願意在 5 秒鐘後說「是」。在這個行業裡，你不能充滿自我懷疑。

One of the great pleasures – it is the great pleasure actually in this business – is having people trust you. That’s really why I work at 94 when I’ve got more money than anybody could count. It means nothing in terms of how I’m going to live or how my children are going to live or anything else.
這行業最大的樂趣之一——實際上就是最大的樂趣——就是有人信任你。這真的是為什麼我在 94 歲時還在工作的原因，即使我擁有的錢多得數不清。這對我的生活方式、我的孩子們的生活方式或其他任何事情都沒有任何影響。

But both Charlie and I just enjoyed the fact that people trusted us. They trusted us 60 or 70 years ago in partnerships we had. We never sought out professional investors to join our partnerships. Among all my partners, I never had a single institution – I never wanted an institution. I wanted people. I didn’t want people who were sitting around having presentations every three months and being told what they wanted to hear. That’s what we got, and that’s why we’ve got this group here today.
但查理和我都很享受人們對我們的信任。早在 60 或 70 年前我們合夥時，他們就信任我們。我們從未主動尋找專業投資者加入我們的合夥事業。在我所有的合夥人中，從來沒有一個機構——我從來不想要機構。我想要的是人。我不想要那些每三個月就得聽一次簡報、聽些他們想聽的話的人。這就是我們得到的，也是為什麼今天我們能有這樣一群人聚在這裡。

It’s all worked out. But you don’t want to be patient when the time comes to act – you want to get it done that day.
一切都水到渠成。但當行動時機來臨時，你絕不想耐心等待——你會希望當天就完成它。

Becky Quick: This question is from Flavio Montenegro, a shareholder from Guatemala. A couple of years ago in this meeting, Mr. Jain outlined the significant challenges GEICO faced in modernizing and integrating its IT systems. It was also mentioned that competitors were ahead in their pricing strategies because of the use of telematics. Today, Geico’s turnaround is evident through strong pricing and operational improvements. Could you provide more details on the specific actions taken under Todd’s leadership and how those changes will help sustain a long-term competitive advantage in the coming years?
貝琪·奎克：這個問題來自瓜地馬拉的股東弗拉維奧·蒙特內哥羅。幾年前在這場會議上，賈恩先生概述了 GEICO 在現代化和整合其 IT 系統方面面臨的重大挑戰。當時也提到，由於使用遠程信息處理技術，競爭對手在定價策略上處於領先地位。如今，GEICO 的轉型通過強勁的定價和運營改善顯而易見。您能否詳細說明在托德的領導下採取的具體行動，以及這些變化將如何在未來幾年幫助維持長期競爭優勢？

Ajit Jain: Todd has done a great job in turning around the operations. When he took over, there were two major issues that GEICO was behind its competitors on. First, the term we’ve been using is “matching rate to risk,” and second, telematics. We were at the bottom of the list in telematics about five or six years ago. Since then, we have made rapid strides. Telematics, which used to be a source of competitive disadvantage to us, is no longer so, and I would argue that our telematics at GEICO is about as good as anyone else’s today.
阿吉特·賈恩：托德在扭轉運營方面做得非常出色。他接手時，GEICO 在兩個主要問題上落後於競爭對手。首先，我們一直使用的術語是「按風險定價」，其次是遠程信息處理技術。大約五、六年前，我們在這方面排名墊底。從那時起，我們取得了快速進展。遠程信息處理技術曾經是我們的競爭劣勢，現在不再是了，我甚至可以說 GEICO 的遠程信息處理技術現在和其他任何公司一樣好。

In terms of matching rate to risk, there again, I think we have caught up with our competitors and we’re as good as anyone else in the field. All this, together with the cost reduction effort that Todd gets a lot of credit for – he has basically reduced the workforce by 20,000. Starting with around 50,000, he’s brought it down to 30,000, which translates to at least $2 billion per year in savings.
在風險與費率匹配方面，我認為我們已趕上競爭對手，與業內任何同行一樣出色。加上陶德主導的成本削減措施——他將員工總數從約 5 萬人精簡至 3 萬人，這至少帶來每年 20 億美元的成本節省，功不可沒。

So all this has allowed GEICO to become a much more focused competitor. So much so that in the last seven quarters, GEICO has shown a combined ratio that has an eight in front of it. I never thought I’d live to see the day when anyone could have a combined ratio as low as it is right now. GEICO has done a great job – its 80 combined ratio translates to the largest profit anyone is making on the underwriting side in the personal automobile business.
這一切使 GEICO 成為更專注的競爭者。過去七季，GEICO 的綜合成本率始終保持在 80 開頭的水準。我從未想過有生之年能看到如此低的綜合成本率——80 的數字意味著 GEICO 目前在個人汽車保險承保業務中創造了業界最高的利潤。

We’ve achieved a lot, but I don’t want to be so arrogant as to say “mission accomplished.” We’ve achieved a lot, but I still think we need to do a lot more in technology. AI is going to be a big force, and we need to be in a state of readiness.
我們已取得許多成就，但我不願傲慢地宣稱「任務完成」。在技術領域仍有許多待改進之處，AI 將成為重要變革力量，我們必須做好準備。

Warren Buffett: It’s a fascinating case study, and that’s what’s so interesting about the whole game of business – each one is a little different. They all have challenges of certain sorts, but they also have opportunities.
華倫·巴菲特：這是個引人入勝的案例研究，而這正是商業遊戲最有趣的地方——每個案例都略有不同。它們都面臨某種挑戰，但也蘊含著機會。

We paid $50 million for half of GEICO in 1976. We now own 100%, and $50% of the $2 billion that we earned in the first quarter is $1 billion, which on a $50 million investment is 20-to-1 in a quarter. That takes years to develop, but the interesting thing is that the auto insurance policy, which didn’t even exist 120 years ago, is by far the largest item in the property casualty insurance business. It’s huge.
我們在 1976 年以 5000 萬美元買下 GEICO 一半股權。如今我們擁有 100%股權，而第一季 20 億美元盈利中我們佔 10 億美元，相較 5000 萬美元的投資，單季報酬率達 20 倍。這需要多年耕耘，但有趣的是，120 年前根本不存在的汽車保險政策，如今已是產險業務中最大宗的項目，規模非常龐大。

Ajit Jain: The only thing I’d like to add is that in addition to the underwriting profit, GEICO provides $29 billion of float.
阿吉特·賈恩：我想補充的是，除了承保利潤外，GEICO 還提供了 290 億美元的浮存金。

Warren Buffett: Yes, and that’s not unimportant when you paid $50 million to get a business that’s giving you $29 billion to work with for nothing and on top of that gives you a billion dollars of profit in a quarter.
華倫·巴菲特：沒錯，這絕非小事。你當初只花了 5000 萬美元就獲得一個事業，現在它不僅免費給你 290 億美元資金運用，還額外奉上一季 10 億美元的利潤。

The interesting thing about auto insurance is that we’re selling the same product as in 1936 when the company was started. We’re just being more sophisticated about pricing it. The founder, who came from USAA, made the judgment that government employees (the name GEICO stands for Government Employees Insurance Company) were better drivers than average. He wasn’t an actuary, but he made that observation, left USAA, and started GEICO with a few hundred thousand dollars. He made money from underwriting the first year and the second year.
汽車保險的有趣之處在於，我們現在銷售的產品與 1936 年公司創立時完全相同。我們只是在定價上更加精細。創始人來自 USAA，他判斷政府員工（GEICO 的全稱是政府員工保險公司）比一般駕駛者更優秀。他並非精算師，但憑此觀察離開 USAA，用幾十萬美元創立了 GEICO。第一年和第二年他就從承保中獲利。

This isn’t a public offering type deal with phony accounting for 10 years – he just priced it to make money, and that’s exactly what’s been done since 1936. The policy really looks a lot like the one from back then. This huge field has sprung up around us and it’s still growing. Nobody likes to buy insurance, but they sure like to drive.
這不是那種用虛假會計手段維持十年的公開募股交易——他只是定價以賺取利潤，而這正是自 1936 年以來一直的做法。保單看起來與當年非常相似。這個龐大的領域在我們周圍蓬勃發展，至今仍在增長。沒有人喜歡買保險，但他們確實喜歡開車。

GEICO is a fascinating story. About three times over the years, the company has gotten sidetracked one way or another and then gotten back to basics. It’s a wonderful business.
GEICO 是個引人入勝的故事。多年來，公司大約有三次偏離了方向，但最終都回歸基本面。這是一門絕妙的生意。

We showed at this annual meeting one time a message from Lorimer Davidson. In January 1951, he was the only person in the building when I’d gone down on a Saturday to visit. It turned out they didn’t work on Saturdays in Washington, and I pounded on the door until finally a janitor let me in. I said to the janitor, “Is there anybody I can talk to here except you?” and he didn’t take it personally. He said, “Well, there’s one guy up on the sixth floor,” and a fellow named Lorimer Davidson did wonderful things for me.
我們曾在某次年度會議上播放過洛里默·戴維森的一段話。1951 年 1 月某個週六，我去華盛頓拜訪時，整棟大樓只有他一個人在。原來華盛頓週六是不上班的，我不斷敲門直到一位清潔工讓我進去。我問清潔工：「除了您之外，這裡還有我能談話的人嗎？」他沒覺得被冒犯，回答說：「六樓倒是有位先生。」而那位名叫洛里默·戴維森的人，後來為我做了許多美好的事。

You get a few breaks in life in terms of people you meet who just change your life dramatically. If you’ve had a handful of those, you treasure them. We’ve had them on this board of Berkshire – Tom Murphy, Sandy Gottesman, Walter Scott, Bill Scott – we’ve made lifelong assets out of people that are the right sort, with incredible talent, who are lots of fun to work with, always doing more than their share. To get a chance to talk to Lorimer Davidson on a Saturday afternoon, you just listen carefully. That comes in the category of “turn every page.” You just get lucky in life, and you want to take advantage of your luck.
人生中總會遇到幾個徹底改變你命運的貴人。若能遇到幾個這樣的人，你定會珍視他們。伯克希爾董事會就有這樣的人——湯姆·墨菲、桑迪·戈特斯曼、沃爾特·斯科特、比爾·斯科特——我們與這些才華橫溢、合作愉快、總是超額完成任務的良師益友結成了終生資產。能在週六下午與洛里默·戴維森交談，你只需仔細聆聽。這正是「翻遍每一頁」的典範。人生需要些運氣，而你要懂得把握這份幸運。

Audience Member (Zone 5): My name is Benjamin Graham Sanderson from Pasadena, California. Warren, thank you for all you’ve taught us over the years. Earlier, you said nobody but Steve Jobs could have created Apple, but nobody but Tim Cook could have developed it like he has. Warren, nobody but you could have created Berkshire. And I presume you view Greg as an outlier among outliers, but he seems so normal. Sorry, Greg. So, I was hoping you could share what specifically about Greg makes him your preferred successor. And Greg, we’re excited to get to know you more over the next few decades. Thank you.
觀眾（5 區發言）：我是來自加州帕薩迪納的本傑明·葛拉罕·桑德森。華倫，感謝你多年來的教誨。稍早你提到除了史蒂夫·賈伯斯沒人能創造蘋果，但除了提姆·庫克也沒人能像他那樣經營公司。華倫，除了你也沒人能打造出波克夏。我猜你把葛瑞格視為頂尖中的頂尖，但他看起來如此平凡。抱歉了葛瑞格。所以，希望你能分享葛瑞格哪些特質讓他成為你屬意的接班人。葛瑞格，我們很期待在未來幾十年更認識你。謝謝。

Warren Buffett: You’ve hit on the most important question in terms of the business. We’ve got a wonderful group of businesses. We’ve got an ability to do things that nobody else can do, which is hard to get in a capitalistic system that’s been developed as fully as the United States has been. I mean, imagine being able to create something in a very big playing field – it would be very hard to develop anything like it. I don’t think you could develop the people around it, let alone the capital position, history, and everything else.
華倫·巴菲特：你觸及了企業經營最關鍵的問題。我們擁有絕佳的企業組合，具備其他企業無法複製的獨特優勢——在美國這樣高度成熟的資本主義體系中，這是非常難得的。試想在如此龐大的競技場中開創事業，要複製類似的成功幾乎不可能。我認為你甚至無法複製周邊的人才團隊，更不用說資本實力、歷史底蘊等所有其他條件。

It takes a long long time and it takes getting around you a small cadre of people which then spreads out somewhat. Where you’ve got mutual trust, where people do more than their share. I’ve been around a lot of businesses over the years, and by nature I’m somewhat critical of everything. I’m looking for what’s wrong in things because that’s part of investing – looking at what you’re missing.
這需要非常漫長的時間，並且需要圍繞著一小群核心人物逐漸向外擴展。在彼此信任的環境中，人們會付出超過自己份內的努力。這些年來我接觸過許多企業，天性使我對一切事物都抱持批判態度。我總是在尋找事物中的缺陷，因為這正是投資的一部分——審視那些你可能忽略的地方。

But we have people that, if they’re asked to put on a show like this instead of doing their regular job, they participate. I went around the groups of people who were exhibiting yesterday for an hour and a half, and these are people thanking me and totally enthused about coming and doing a lot of work for which they don’t get paid anything extra. They work hard and they enjoy their work.
但我們有一群人，即使被要求放下日常工作來籌辦這樣的展覽，他們依然全力參與。昨天我花了一個半小時巡視各組參展人員，這些人不但向我道謝，還對前來投入大量無償工作充滿熱情。他們辛勤工作，並樂在其中。

You really want to work at something you enjoy. I’ve had five bosses in life and I liked every one of them – they were all interesting. I still decided that I’d rather work for myself than anybody else. But if you find people that are wonderful to work with, that’s the place to go. I’ve told my kids basically that you don’t get lucky like I did when I found what interested me at seven or eight years of age. It could have taken a lot longer, but you want to find what you love.
你應該要從事自己真正熱愛的工作。我這輩子有過五位老闆，每一位我都喜歡——他們都很有趣。但我最終還是決定，與其為別人工作，不如為自己打拼。不過，如果你能找到志同道合的夥伴共事，那絕對值得投入。我常告訴我的孩子們，不是每個人都能像我這麼幸運，在七、八歲時就找到自己的興趣所在。這可能需要更長的時間，但關鍵在於找到你的熱情所在。

There’s a movie called “The Glenn Miller Story,” and Glenn Miller went from having a broken-down band for 15 years to turning out the first gold record. He “found the sound” and created the first gold record – the Chattanooga Choo Choo in 1941. He turned around from being a nothing with a band to finding the sound.
有部電影叫《葛倫米勒傳》，講述葛倫米勒如何從帶領一個默默無聞的樂團長達十五年，到後來創作出第一張金唱片。他「找到了屬於自己的聲音」，並在 1941 年以《查塔努加小火車》創下首張金唱片紀錄。從一個名不見經傳的樂團指揮到找到獨特風格，他徹底扭轉了自己的命運。

I’ve always told my kids that their sound isn’t my sound, but you don’t necessarily find it on the first job you take. But if you get lucky like I did, you find it when you’re very young and then you just keep doing it. Don’t worry too much about starting salaries and be very careful who you work for because you will take on the habits of the people around you. There are certain jobs you shouldn’t take.
我總是告訴孩子們，他們的聲音不是我的聲音，但你不一定能在第一份工作中找到它。但如果你像我一樣幸運，在很年輕的時候就找到了，然後就一直堅持下去。不要太在意起薪，要非常謹慎選擇你為誰工作，因為你會受到周圍人習慣的影響。有些工作你是不應該接受的。

You’ve got the greatest country in the world and the greatest time in the world. You can’t even dream all the dreams you could have about a place like Berkshire. But the big thing you have to do is always be sure you can play the next day. In terms of financial activities on a meaningful scale, you don’t want to do anything that risks what’s been created.
你擁有世界上最偉大的國家和最美好的時代。你甚至無法想像像波克夏這樣的地方能帶給你多少夢想。但最重要的是，你必須確保自己每天都能繼續參與這場遊戲。在進行有意義的金融活動時，不要冒險去破壞已經創造的一切。

If very stupid things are happening around you, you do not want to participate. If people are making more money because they’re borrowing money or participating in securities that are pieces of junk but they hope to find a bigger sucker later on, you have to forget that. That’ll bite you at some point. The basic game is so good, and you’ve been so lucky to be born now.
如果周圍正在發生非常愚蠢的事情，你就不應該參與其中。如果人們因為借錢或參與那些本質上是垃圾但希望以後能找到更大傻瓜的證券而賺更多錢，你必須忘記這些。這些遲早會反咬你一口。基本的遊戲規則已經非常好了，而且你能生在這個時代已經非常幸運了。

If I’d been born in 1700, I’d say, “I want to go back in the womb. What the hell with this? It’s too hard.” But now I’ve come along to do something where I can just play around all day with things I enjoy doing. It’s a pretty wonderful life.
如果我出生在 1700 年，我大概會說：「我想回到子宮裡。這到底是什麼鬼日子？太艱難了。」但現在我能整天做自己喜歡的事，這樣的生活實在美好極了。

Greg Abel: I couldn’t be more humbled and honored to be in this role, but to have actually been part of Berkshire for 25+ years, to have had the opportunity to work with you and Ajit and our board and many other people in our company – as you touched on, when you find something like Berkshire that’s so special, you fall in love with it and it becomes what you want to do every day. It’s just an incredible opportunity. So, thank you.
葛瑞格・阿貝爾：擔任這個職位讓我感到無比謙卑與榮幸。但更重要的是，能在波克夏服務超過 25 年、有機會與您（巴菲特）、阿吉特、董事會成員及許多同仁共事——正如您所說，當你遇到像波克夏這樣特別的存在，你會愛上它並願意為之奉獻每一天。這真是難以置信的機遇。謝謝您。

Warren Buffett: And to the gentleman who asked the question, if you don’t find it immediately, don’t starve to death in the meantime, but you will find it. It’s somewhat like finding the right person in marriage – you may not marry the person you met on your first date. Sometimes it pays to wait.
華倫・巴菲特：對於提問的先生，如果你還沒立刻找到熱愛的工作，別讓自己餓死，但終究會找到的。這有點像尋找婚姻中的另一半——你未必會和第一次約會的對象結婚。有時候等待是值得的。

Becky Quick: This is a question from Mark Bonnke and Helen Friedrien in Rapid City, South Dakota. As the US dollar quickly loses value in relation to other foreign currencies in 2025, is Berkshire Hathaway taking steps to minimize this currency risk and its impact on quarterly and annual earnings? If so, please explain. And I’ll just add from Mary Chang, another shareholder: Berkshire currently borrows in Japanese yen to offset its currency risk and its Japanese stock investments. In the future, will you invest in foreign currency denominated assets unhedged?
貝琪·奎克：這是來自南達科他州拉皮德城的馬克·邦克和海倫·弗里德里恩的問題。隨著 2025 年美元相對於其他外幣快速貶值，波克夏·海瑟威是否正採取措施來最小化這種匯率風險及其對季度和年度收益的影響？如果是的話，請解釋。另外瑪麗·張股東補充提問：波克夏目前透過借入日圓來對沖其日股投資的匯率風險。未來是否會考慮投資未避險的外幣計價資產？

Warren Buffett: Well, we always have – the Japanese situation is different because we intend to stay so long with that position and the funding situation is so cheap that we’ve attempted to some degree to match purchases against yen-denominated funding. But that’s not a policy of ours. In fact, that’s the first time we’ve done that. We’ve owned lots of securities in foreign currencies.
華倫·巴菲特：嗯，我們一直以來...日本的情況比較特殊，因為我們打算長期持有該部位，且融資成本極低，所以我們某種程度上嘗試用日圓融資來匹配收購。但這並非我們的既定政策。事實上這是我們首次這麼做。我們過去持有過許多外幣計價的證券。

We do nothing in terms of its impact on quarterly and annual earnings. We don’t do anything based on its impact on quarterly and annual earnings. There’s never been a board meeting I can remember where I’ve said, “If we do this, our annual earnings will be this, therefore we ought to do it.” The number will turn out to be what it’ll be. What counts is where we are five or 10 or 20 years from now.
我們從不因季度或年度盈利的影響而採取任何行動。我記不起有任何一次董事會會議上我曾說過：「如果我們這樣做，年度盈利會是多少，因此我們應該這麼做。」數字最終會自然呈現。真正重要的是五年、十年或二十年後我們所處的位置。

If you start focusing on what number you’re going to produce, you will quickly get tempted to play around with the numbers and sometimes seriously play around with the numbers. I’ve seen people I trust in all kinds of other ways, but they regard playing around with numbers as perfectly okay. That’s just not something we do – we just don’t think about that.
一旦開始關注你要產出的數字，很快就會受到操弄數字的誘惑，有時甚至是嚴重地玩弄數字。我見過在其他各方面都值得信賴的人，卻認為玩弄數字完全無可厚非。但我們絕不這麼做——我們根本不會考慮這種事。

Actually, the yen relationship in the last quarter resulted in certain GAAP charges, but it doesn’t make any difference. It’ll change next month or next year. Obviously, we wouldn’t want to own anything in a currency that we thought was really going to hell.
實際上，上季日圓匯率關係導致了某些 GAAP 費用，但這無關緊要。下個月或明年情況就會改變。顯然，我們不會持有任何我們認為其貨幣即將崩潰的資產。

That’s the big thing we worry about with the United States currency. The tendency of a government to want to debase its currency over time – there’s no system that beats that. You can pick dictators, you can pick representatives, you can do anything, but there will be a push toward weaker currencies.
這就是我們對美國貨幣最擔憂的地方。政府傾向於隨時間推移貶值其貨幣——沒有什麼制度能抵擋這種趨勢。你可以選擇獨裁者，可以選擇代議制，可以做任何事，但貨幣貶值的壓力始終存在。

I mentioned very briefly in the annual report that fiscal policy is what scares me in the United States because of the way it’s made, and all the motivations are toward doing things that can cause trouble with money. But that’s not limited to the United States – it’s all over the world, and in some places, it gets out of control regularly. They devalue at rates that are breathtaking, and that’s continued.
我在年報中簡短提到，美國的財政政策令我擔憂，因為其制定方式及所有動機都傾向於做出可能引發貨幣問題的行為。但這不僅限於美國——全球皆然，在某些地區甚至經常失控。他們以驚人的速度貶值貨幣，這種情況持續發生。

People can study economics and you can have all kinds of arrangements, but in the end, if you’ve got people who control the currency, you can issue paper money or engage in clipping currencies like they used to centuries ago. There will always be people who, by the nature of their job – I’m not singling them out as particularly evil – but the natural course of government is to make the currency worthless over time. That’s got important consequences, and it’s very hard to build checks and balances into the system to keep that from happening.
人們可以研究經濟學，也可以有各種制度安排，但最終只要有人掌控貨幣發行權，就能像幾個世紀前那樣印製紙幣或進行貨幣剪削。總會有些人——我並非特指他們特別邪惡，而是基於職務本質——政府的自然傾向就是讓貨幣隨時間變得一文不值。這將帶來重大後果，而要在體制內建立制衡機制來防止這種情況發生，實屬極其困難。

We’ve had a lot of fun here watching what happens when people try to make sure they aren’t running fiscal risks. That game isn’t over and never will be over in finality. If you look up the great inflations of post-World War II, it’s just a list that goes on forever, and the same names keep popping up.
我們在這裡見證人們試圖規避財政風險的種種舉措，過程充滿趣味。這場遊戲尚未結束，也永遠不會真正終結。若你翻閱二戰後重大通脹史，名單會不斷延伸，同樣的名字總會反覆出現。

So currency value is a scary thing, and we don’t have any great system for beating that. We do in this particular Japanese position because we expect to hold it for 50 or 100 years or more, and we’ll be owning something denominated in yen and easily predictable. As long as the carry on it is right, we’ll attempt to issue Japanese-denominated liabilities, but that’s not because of anything we care about in terms of quarterly or annual earnings.
貨幣價值確實是件令人擔憂的事，我們並沒有什麼絕佳系統能克服這點。但在這項日本投資中我們確實有優勢，因為我們預期持有它 50 年、100 年甚至更久，屆時我們將持有以日圓計價且易於預測的資產。只要利差合適，我們就會嘗試發行日圓計價的負債，但這並非出於我們對季度或年度收益的任何考量。

Greg Abel: Relative to the question, there’s no question we were fundamentally very comfortable with investing in the five Japanese companies and recognizing we’re investing in yen. The fact we could then borrow in yen was almost just a nice incremental opportunity. But we were very comfortable both with the Japanese companies and with the currency we would ultimately realize in yen.
格雷格·阿貝爾：關於這個問題，毫無疑問我們從根本上對投資這五家日本公司感到非常放心，也清楚我們是以日圓進行投資。而能夠以日圓借款這點，幾乎只是個額外的好機會。但我們對這些日本公司以及最終將以日圓實現的貨幣回報都感到非常安心。

Warren Buffett: We only made one big currency play, which was connected a little bit with when I wrote that article for Fortune. We went long 12 other currencies – I remember only four or five of them are really big currencies. When I say we got long, that means we’re short the dollar. We held that position for a couple years and made several billion dollars on it, which was significant to us then and still is.
華倫·巴菲特：我們只做過一次重大的貨幣操作，這與我當時為《財富》雜誌寫的那篇文章有點關聯。我們做多了 12 種其他貨幣——我記得其中只有四、五種是真正的主要貨幣。當我說我們做多時，意味著我們做空了美元。我們持有這個部位幾年，從中賺了幾十億美元，這對當時的我們來說很重要，現在依然如此。

Charlie always felt that if he had to pick an area outside of stocks in which to invest – and he knew a lot about bonds, real estate, and other things – he thought he could make a lot of money in foreign currency. But we’ve done it once. It’s not inconceivable we would do it again, but it’s unlikely.
查理總是覺得，如果他必須在股票以外的領域選擇投資——而且他對債券、房地產和其他領域都很了解——他認為在外匯市場可以賺大錢。但我們只做過一次。雖然不排除我們會再次這樣做，但可能性不大。

There could be things happen in the United States that would make us want to own a lot of other currencies. I suppose if we made some very large investment in a European country, there might be a situation where we would do a lot of financing in their currency. But it’s not a regular activity. It was something that was obvious to do in the Japanese situation where we had the ability to borrow at a very low carrying cost, and we felt very good about the income we’d be receiving from these securities.
美國可能會發生一些情況，使我們想要持有大量其他貨幣。假設我們在某個歐洲國家進行了非常龐大的投資，可能會出現需要以該國貨幣進行大量融資的情況。但這不是常規活動。在日本的情況中這樣做很明顯，因為我們能夠以非常低的持有成本借款，而且我們對這些證券將帶來的收入感到非常樂觀。

If the present conditions, which they won’t – they never do – prevail for decades and decades, we would probably keep doing the same sort of thing. But things change in the world, so don’t take that as a prediction.
如果當前條件（雖然它們不會——也從未——持續幾十年）長期維持，我們可能會繼續做類似的事情。但世界在變化，所以不要把這當作預測。

Audience Member (Zone 6): Good morning Warren, Greg, and Ajit. Thank you so much for hosting this event. Good to be here. My name is Dash Boyar and I’m from the great country of Mongolia. A little background about my country: Mongolia is an emerging market and landlocked country sandwiched between Russia and China. But we are rich in history and minerals and have full democracy and a growing economy.
觀眾成員（第六區）：早安，華倫、葛雷格和阿吉特。非常感謝你們舉辦這次活動。很高興來到這裡。我是達什·博亞爾，來自偉大的蒙古國。關於我的國家的一些背景：蒙古是一個新興市場和內陸國家，夾在俄羅斯和中國之間。但我們擁有豐富的歷史和礦產資源，實行完全民主制度，經濟也在不斷增長。

Last week, we hosted our second annual Mongolia investor conference in New York to attract investors like yourself. I know you meet and give advice informally to government leaders such as South Korea, China, and India. What advice would you give to government and business leaders of emerging markets like Mongolia to attract institutional investors like yourself? It’d be great if you have long-term plans for exposure to emerging markets as a hedge or an opportunistic investment. Lastly, I welcome all of you to Mongolia, and my country folks would be very happy if you can make it to our economic forum this July.
上週我們在紐約舉辦了第二屆年度蒙古投資者會議，旨在吸引像您這樣的投資者。我知道您會非正式地會見並給予韓國、中國和印度等政府領導人建議。對於像蒙古這樣的新興市場，您會給政府和商界領袖什麼建議來吸引像您這樣的機構投資者？如果您有長期計劃將新興市場作為對沖或機會性投資，那將非常棒。最後，歡迎大家來蒙古，如果您能參加我們今年七月的經濟論壇，我的同胞們會非常高興。

Warren Buffett: I have trouble planning a trip to Council Bluffs, which is just a few miles from here. But thank you for the invitation.
華倫·巴菲特：我連計劃去幾英里外的康瑟爾布拉夫斯都有困難。不過還是謝謝您的邀請。

I actually met a fellow here at the annual meeting about 20 years ago or more who did a lot in Mongolia. He did very well there and actually moved there for quite a while.
其實大約 20 年前或更早，我在年度股東大會上遇到過一位在蒙古做了很多事的人。他在那裡做得非常好，甚至在那裡住了相當長一段時間。

If you’re looking for advice to give the government over there, it’s to develop a reputation for having a solid currency over time. We don’t really want to go into any country where we think there’s a significant probability of runaway inflation. That’s too hard to figure. Other people have figured out ways to make money in hyperinflationary situations, but that’s not our game, and I don’t think I’d play it well. So that would be a factor for us.
如果你要給那邊的政府建議，那就是要建立長期穩固貨幣的信譽。我們真的不想進入任何我們認為有嚴重通貨膨脹風險的國家。那太難預測了。其他人或許有辦法在惡性通膨的情況下賺錢，但那不是我們的遊戲，我也不認為我能玩得好。所以這對我們來說會是一個考量因素。

The chances are we won’t find anything in Mongolia that fits our size requirements aside from that. But like I say, I think my friend that I met here 20 years ago has done very well in Mongolia.
除了那點之外，我們在蒙古找到符合我們規模需求的機會可能不大。但就像我說的，我認為我 20 年前在這裡認識的朋友在蒙古做得非常好。

If the country develops a reputation for being business-friendly and currency-conscious, that bodes very well for the residents of that country, particularly if it has some natural assets that it can build around. I don’t know that much about the minerals there or anything of the sort, but who would have bet on the United States in 1790?
如果一個國家建立了對商業友好且重視貨幣穩定的聲譽，這對該國居民來說是非常好的徵兆，特別是如果它擁有可以圍繞建設的自然資源。我對那裡的礦產或其他資源了解不多，但誰會在 1790 年押注美國呢？

We didn’t have to have perfection. We just had to be better than the other guy for quite a while. We started out with nothing and ended up with close to 25% of the world’s GDP, faster growth rates, generally sounder currencies, and all kinds of things. So I wish you well.
我們不需要做到完美。我們只需要在相當長的時間裡比其他人做得更好。我們從一無所有開始，最終掌握了接近全球 25%的 GDP、更快的增長率、普遍更穩健的貨幣，以及各種成就。所以我祝你們一切順利。

Becky Quick: This question is from Peter Shen in New Jersey. It’s for Mr. Buffett and Mr. Jain. In recent years, large private equity firms like Blackstone, Apollo, and KKR have aggressively expanded into insurance, raising permanent capital, managing float, and aiming to replicate the model that Berkshire pioneered decades ago. Given that these firms are now directly competing for insurance assets, often using higher leverage and more aggressive investment strategies, how do you view their impact on Berkshire’s insurance operations and underwriting discipline? Do you believe that the private equity model poses risks to policyholders in the broad financial system, and has this competition made it more challenging for Berkshire to find and price insurance opportunities safely and profitably today?
貝琪·奎克：這個問題來自新澤西州的彼得·沈，提給巴菲特先生和賈恩先生。近年來，像黑石、阿波羅和 KKR 這樣的大型私募股權公司積極進軍保險業，籌集永久資本、管理浮存金，並試圖複製波克夏幾十年前開創的模式。考慮到這些公司現在直接競爭保險資產，通常使用更高的槓桿和更激進的投資策略，您如何看待它們對波克夏保險業務和核保紀律的影響？您認為私募股權模式是否會對保單持有人和整個金融體系構成風險？這種競爭是否使得波克夏更難在當今環境中安全且有利地找到並定價保險機會？

Ajit Jain: Part of the question is very easy. There’s no question the private equity firms have come into the space, and we are no longer competitive in the space. We used to do a fair amount in this space, but in the last 3-4 years, I don’t think we’ve done a single deal.
阿吉特·賈恩：問題的一部分非常簡單。毫無疑問，私募股權公司已經進入這個領域，而我們在這個領域已不再具有競爭力。我們過去在這個領域做了不少交易，但在過去 3 到 4 年裡，我想我們一筆交易都沒做成。

You should separate this whole segment into two parts: the property casualty end of the business and the life end of the business. The private equity firms you mentioned are all very active in the life end of the business, not the property casualty end.
你應該把整個業務分成兩部分來看：財產意外險業務和人壽保險業務。你提到的那些私募股權公司都在人壽保險業務端非常活躍，而不是財產意外險端。

You are right in identifying the risks these private equity firms are taking on both in terms of leverage and credit risk. While the economy is doing great and credit spreads are low, these firms have taken the assets from very conservative investments to ones where they get a lot more return. As long as the economy is good and credit spreads are low, they will make money – they’ll make a lot of money because of leverage.
你指出的這些私募股權公司在槓桿和信用風險方面所承擔的風險是正確的。當經濟表現良好且信用利差較低時，這些公司會將資產從非常保守的投資轉向能獲得更高回報的投資。只要經濟好轉且信用利差維持低位，他們就能賺錢——由於槓桿作用，他們會賺很多錢。

However, there is always the danger that at some point the regulators might get cranky and say they’re taking too much risk on behalf of their policyholders, and that could end in tears. We do not like the risk-reward that these situations offer, and therefore we put up the white flag and said we can’t compete in this segment right now.
然而，總存在這樣的風險：監管機構可能在某個時候變得嚴厲，認為他們代表保單持有人承擔了過多風險，這可能以悲劇收場。我們不喜歡這種情況下的風險回報比，因此我們舉白旗投降，表示目前無法在這個領域競爭。

Warren Buffett: I think there are people that want to copy Berkshire’s model, but usually they don’t want to copy it by also copying the model of the CEO having all of his money in the company forever. They have a different equation – they’re interested in something else. That’s capitalism, but they have a whole different situation and probably a somewhat different fiduciary feeling about what they’re doing.
華倫·巴菲特：我認為有人想複製波克夏的模式，但通常他們不想同時複製執行長將所有資金永久投入公司的模式。他們有不同的考量——他們對其他事物感興趣。這就是資本主義，但他們處於完全不同的情境，可能對自己所做的事有著稍異的受託責任感。

Sometimes it works and sometimes it doesn’t work. If it doesn’t work, they go on to other things. If what we do at Berkshire doesn’t work, I spend the end of my life regretting what I’ve created. So it’s just a whole different personal equation.
有時這方法有效，有時則不然。如果無效，他們就會轉向其他事情。如果我們在波克夏的做法失敗，我將在餘生懊悔自己所創造的一切。所以這完全是個人層面的不同考量。

There is no property casualty company that can basically replicate Berkshire. That wasn’t the case at the start – at the start we just had National Indemnity a few miles from here, and anybody could have duplicated what we had. But that was before Ajit came with us in 1986, and at that point the other fellows should have given up.
基本上沒有哪家財產意外保險公司能夠複製波克夏的模式。這在最初並非如此——起初我們只有距離這裡幾英里遠的國家賠償公司，任何人都可以複製我們當時的規模。但這是在阿吉特於 1986 年加入我們之前的情況，從那時起，其他競爭者就該放棄了。

Audience Member (Zone 7): Hi, my name is Marie. I’m from Melrose, Massachusetts. Thank you for the time today. As a young person interested in investing like myself, I would love to hear your insights, Mr. Buffett. What were some pivotal lessons you learned early in your career? And what advice do you have for young investors who are looking to develop their investment philosophy? Thank you.
觀眾提問（第七區）：嗨，我是瑪麗，來自麻薩諸塞州的梅爾羅斯。謝謝你們今天的時間。作為一位像我這樣對投資感興趣的年輕人，巴菲特先生，我很想聽聽您的見解。在您職業生涯早期，有哪些關鍵的教訓？對於正在建立自己投資哲學的年輕投資者，您有什麼建議？謝謝。

Warren Buffett: Those are good questions. Who you associate with is just enormously important. Don’t expect that you’ll make every decision right on that, but you are going to have your life progress in the general direction of the people that you work with, that you admire, that become your friends.
華倫·巴菲特：這些都是很好的問題。你與誰交往極其重要。不要指望你在這方面能做出每一個正確的決定，但你的生活大致會朝著你共事的人、你敬佩的人、成為你朋友的人的方向發展。

I mentioned a few fellows that have died in the last couple years. All of those people were people that, if we were working together on something one-ten-thousandth the size of Berkshire, they’d be the kind of people you’d choose. They’re people that make you want to be better than you are. You want to hang out with people that are better than you are and that you feel are better than you are because you’re going to go in the direction of the people you associate with.
我提到了幾位在過去幾年去世的朋友。所有這些人都是那種，如果我們一起合作做某件事，規模只有波克夏的萬分之一，他們也會是你會選擇的那種人。他們是那種讓你想要變得比現在更好的人。你會想和那些比你優秀、你覺得比你優秀的人在一起，因為你會朝著你交往的人的方向發展。

That’s something you learn later in life – it’s hard to really appreciate how important some of those factors are until you get much older. But when you’ve got people around you like Tom Murphy and Sandy Gottesman and Walter Scott, you’re just going to live a better life than if you just go out and look at somebody that’s making a lot of money and decide you’re going to try and copy them.
這是你在人生後期才會學到的事情——在你年紀更大之前，很難真正體會到這些因素有多重要。但當你身邊有像湯姆·墨菲、桑迪·戈特斯曼和沃爾特·斯科特這樣的人時，你的生活就會比只是出去看看那些賺很多錢的人並決定要模仿他們來得更好。

I would try to be associated with smart people too where I could learn a lot from them, and I would try to look for something that I would do if I didn’t need the money. What you’re really looking for in life is something where you’ve got a job that you’d hold if you didn’t need the money, and I’ve had that for a very long time.
我也會試著和聰明的人交往，這樣我可以從他們身上學到很多，並且我會尋找一些即使不需要錢我也會去做的事情。你真正在生命中尋找的是一份即使不需要錢你也會做的工作，而我已經擁有這樣的工作很長一段時間了。

All the fellows I named had it, and they also always did more than their share and never sought more than their share of the credit. They behaved the way you’d like anybody you work with to behave. When you find them, you treasure them, and when you don’t find them, you still keep doing whatever enables you to eat. But you don’t give up on looking around, and you will find people who do wonderful things for you.
我所提到的這些人都具備這種特質，他們總是付出超過自己份內的努力，卻從不爭搶功勞。他們的行為舉止正是你希望與之共事的人該有的樣子。當你遇到這樣的人，你會珍視他們；若暫時未遇見，你仍會繼續做能讓自己餬口的工作。但你不會放棄尋找，終將發現那些能為你創造奇蹟的人。

I mentioned earlier going down to GEICO and knocking on the door when the door was locked. Who knows what was behind that door? But in 10 minutes, I found that I had a man that was going to be just wonderfully helpful to me. And of course, if somebody’s going to be helpful to you, you want to try to figure out ways to be helpful to them. So you get a compounding of good intentions and good behavior. Unfortunately, you can get the reverse of that in life, too.
我先前提到去 GEICO 敲門的故事，當時大門緊閉。誰知道門後藏著什麼機遇？但十分鐘內，我就發現有位先生將成為我生命中的貴人。當然，當有人願意幫助你時，你也會想方設法回報對方。於是善意與善行便會產生複利效應。可惜的是，人生中也常會出現完全相反的狀況。

I was lucky in having a good environment for living that kind of life, and other people have a whole different environmental situation they have to overcome. But don’t feel guilty about your good luck if you’ve got it. If you live in the United States, with 8 billion people in the world and 330 million in the United States, you’ve already won the game to a great degree. Just keep making the most of it.
我很幸運生活在一個適合這種生活方式的好環境中，而其他人則必須克服完全不同的環境困境。但如果你有幸擁有這份好運，不必為此感到愧疚。當你生活在擁有 80 億人口的世界裡，身處美國這 3.3 億人的國度時，某種程度上你已經贏得了這場人生競賽。只要持續善用這份優勢就好。

You don’t want to associate with people or enterprises that ask you to do something that you shouldn’t be doing. Different professions select for different types of people. It’s interesting to me that in the investment business, so many people get out of it after they’ve made a pile of money. You really want something that you’ll stick around for whether you need the money or not.
你應該遠離那些要求你做出不當行為的人或企業。不同職業會篩選出不同類型的人。令我感到有趣的是，在投資界有那麼多人賺到大錢後就選擇退出。你真正該追求的，是那種即使不需要錢也願意持續投入的事業。

Greg doesn’t need the money, Ajit doesn’t need the money – not remotely – but they enjoy what they do and they’re so damn good at it. I’ve had the advantage of seeing how that works over time.
葛瑞格不需要錢，阿吉特也完全不需要——根本連邊都沾不上——但他們熱愛自己的工作，而且表現出色至極。我很有幸能長期見證這種工作態度的成效。

The best manager I ever knew – and there’s a lot of contention for who that would be – but actually was Tom Murphy Sr., who lived to almost 98. I’ve never seen anybody who could get the potential out of other people more than Murph. If you wanted to become a better person, you’d want to work for Tom Murphy. There are all kinds of successful people that don’t bring that to the party. I’m not saying that’s the only way to succeed, but I think it’s the most pleasant way to succeed for sure.
我所認識最優秀的經理人——雖然這個頭銜競爭激烈——但實際上非活到將近 98 歲的湯姆·墨菲老莫屬。我從未見過比墨菲更能激發他人潛力的人。如果你想成為更好的人，你會想為湯姆·墨菲工作。世上有各式各樣的成功人士，但並非所有人都能做到這點。我並非說這是成功的唯一途徑，但我認為這無疑是最令人愉悅的成功方式。

The Berkshire experience is pretty dramatic – to operate with Sandy Gottesman from 1963 until he died a couple years ago, Walter Scott for 30 years – you really can’t miss it. You’ll learn all the time, but you’ll not only learn how to be successful at business, you’ll learn how to be successful at life.
波克夏的經歷相當戲劇性——從 1963 年開始與桑迪·戈特斯曼共事直到他幾年前去世，與沃爾特·斯科特共事 30 年——你絕對不會錯過。你將不斷學習，不僅學會如何在事業上成功，更學會如何在人生中成功。

So that’s my recommendation. And for some reason, apparently you live longer too. It’s pretty amazing – these people I’m talking about, including myself. I think a happy person lives longer than somebody that’s doing things they don’t really admire that much in life.
所以這是我的建議。而且不知為何，這樣似乎還能活得更久。這相當神奇——包括我在內，我所談論的這些人。我認為快樂的人比那些終日從事自己不太認同之事的人更長壽。

Becky Quick: The first quarter ended March 31st and it did show that Berkshire’s cash pile expanded from the end of the last year. But the greatest market turmoil came in April. Martin Devine, a shareholder from Scotland who is attending the meeting today, wants to know: has the recent market volatility presented Berkshire with opportunities? And Martin just wrote in an addendum in the last 40 minutes or so, pointing out that you mentioned Berkshire almost invested $10 billion recently and wanting to know if you could talk more about that.
貝琪·奎克：第一季截至 3 月 31 日，確實顯示波克夏的現金儲備較去年底有所增加。但最大的市場動盪發生在四月。今天與會的蘇格蘭股東馬丁·迪瓦恩想了解：近期的市場波動是否為波克夏帶來機會？馬丁在過去 40 分鐘左右還補充寫道，提到您曾說波克夏近期差點投資 100 億美元，想請問能否多談談這部分。

Warren Buffett: Well, I can give you a good answer to the second part, which is no. But $10 billion wouldn’t have done that much anyway.
華倫·巴菲特：關於第二部分我可以給你一個明確答案，就是不行。況且 100 億美元也起不了太大作用。

What has happened in the last 30-45 days, 100 days, whatever this period has been, is really nothing. There have been three times since we acquired Berkshire that Berkshire has gone down 50% in a fairly short period of time – three different times. Nothing was fundamentally wrong with the company at any time. This is not a huge move.
過去 30 到 45 天、100 天，無論這段期間具體多長，其實都微不足道。自我們收購波克夏以來，公司股價曾有三度在短時間內下跌 50%——三次不同的時期。任何時候公司的基本面都沒有問題。這次波動根本不算什麼。

The Dow Jones average was at 381 in September of 1929 and got down to 42. That’s going from 100 to 11. This has not been a dramatic bear market or anything of the sort. I’ve had about 17,000 or 18,000 trading days. There have been plenty of periods that are dramatically different than this.
1929 年 9 月道瓊指數平均為 381 點，後來跌至 42 點。這相當於從 100 跌到 11。這次根本算不上什麼戲劇性的熊市。我經歷過約 17,000 至 18,000 個交易日。比這更劇烈的時期多的是。

When I was born on August 30, 1930, the Dow Jones was at 240. Between that and the low, it went from 240 to 41. So if people think there’s been a really major change, there hasn’t been. If it had gone up 15% instead of down 15%, people would take that with remarkable grace. But if it makes a difference to you whether your stocks are down 15% or not, you need to get a somewhat different investment philosophy because the world is not going to adapt to you. You’re going to have to adapt to the world.
我出生於 1930 年 8 月 30 日，當時道瓊指數是 240 點。從那時到最低點，指數從 240 跌到 41。所以如果有人認為現在發生了重大變化，其實並沒有。如果指數是上漲 15%而非下跌 15%，人們會異常平靜地接受。但如果你會因為股票下跌 15%而受影響，那你就需要調整投資哲學了，因為世界不會適應你，你得適應這個世界。

You will see a period in the next 20 years that will be a “hair curler” compared to anything you’ve seen before. That just happens periodically. The world makes big mistakes, and surprises happen in dramatic ways. The more sophisticated the system gets, the more the surprises can come out of left field.
未來 20 年內，你們將會經歷一段「令人毛骨悚然」的時期，遠超過往所見。這種情況會週期性發生。世界會犯下大錯，驚喜總以戲劇性方式出現。系統越複雜，越可能出現意想不到的驚嚇。

That’s part of the stock market, and that’s what makes it a good place to focus your efforts if you’ve got the proper temperament for it and a terrible place to get involved if you get frightened by markets that decline and get excited when stock markets go up. I don’t mean to sound particularly critical – I know people have emotions, but you’ve got to check them at the door when you invest.
這就是股票市場的一部分，也是它之所以成為一個值得投入精力的好地方——前提是你具備合適的心態。但如果你會因市場下跌而驚慌、因股市上漲而亢奮，那這裡對你來說就是個糟糕的選擇。我無意過於苛責，我理解人們都有情緒，但在投資時必須把情緒關在門外。

Audience Member (Zone 8): Good morning, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Abel, and Mr. Jain. My name is Peter Chen. I’m from Shanghai, China. This is my first time attending this shareholders meeting. I would like to ask a question about the wisdom of life. Have you ever encountered any major setbacks or low points in your life, and how did you get through and overcome them? Thank you very much.
觀眾席成員（8 區）：早安，巴菲特先生、阿貝爾先生和賈恩先生。我是陳彼得，來自中國上海。這是我第一次參加股東大會。我想請教一個關於人生智慧的問題：您們是否曾遭遇重大挫折或人生低谷？又是如何度過並克服這些困境的？非常感謝。

Warren Buffett: Well, everybody gets setbacks. Some people have particularly bad luck in that respect, and others get through with fairly minor ones. Charlie had setbacks, I had setbacks – it’s part of life, and they’re not any fun.
華倫·巴菲特：嗯，每個人都會遇到挫折。有些人在這方面特別倒霉，有些人則能相對輕鬆地度過。查理遇到過挫折，我也遇到過——這就是人生的一部分，而且這些經歷一點都不有趣。

I don’t have any great advice about having the time of your life while you’re having some major setback, but it comes with life. You certainly have a setback when you die, and everybody’s got that one guaranteed. Some people get extraordinary bad luck, and other people get extraordinary good luck. Usually the people who get good luck don’t really think it was so much luck as themselves, but you’re just going to have setbacks.
我沒有什麼絕妙的建議，能讓你在遭遇重大挫折時依然享受人生，但這就是生活的一部分。死亡無疑是每個人都注定會面臨的挫折，有些人遭遇異常厄運，有些人則獲得非凡好運。通常那些幸運兒並不認為這純屬運氣，而覺得是自己努力的結果，但人生本就充滿波折。

I think you’re less likely to have setbacks now in terms of medical problems and various things in life. You were born at a good time. If you look all the way through the history of China, when would you rather have been born? 100 years ago, 500 years ago, 1,000 years ago, or now? It’s just hands down – you’ve been lucky.
我認為現在你們遇到醫療問題或其他生活挫折的機率已經降低許多。你們生在一個好時代。縱觀中國歷史，你更願意出生在什麼時候？100 年前、500 年前、1000 年前，還是現在？答案顯而易見——你們很幸運。

If I came from 20 generations of shepherds, I think I’d get kind of tired of looking at sheep every day. Everything in life has been made so much better. You’ve got to figure that you drew a lucky straw by staying in the womb for a couple hundred thousand years and then emerging at the right time.
如果我祖上二十代都是牧羊人，我想我每天看著羊群應該會感到厭倦。如今生活的每個面向都變得美好得多。你必須承認自己很幸運——在子宮裡等待了數十萬年後，終於在對的時機降臨人世。

So I would focus on the things that have been good in your life rather than the bad things that happen, because bad things do happen. It can often be a wonderful life even with some bad breaks. So far that really hasn’t happened with me, but it’s happened with some of my friends.
所以我會專注於你生命中美好的事物，而非那些發生的壞事，因為壞事確實會發生。即便遭遇一些不幸，人生仍可能非常美好。到目前為止，我個人尚未經歷這些，但我的某些朋友確實遇過。

For 94 years I’ve been able to drink whatever I want to drink. They predict all kinds of terrible things for me, but it hasn’t happened yet. If you look at the lifespan of professional athletes after a while, you really decide that you’re better off if you weren’t the first one chosen to be on the baseball team or the basketball team.
94 年來我一直能隨心所欲地喝我想喝的。他們預測我會遭遇各種可怕後果，但至今仍未發生。如果你觀察職業運動員的壽命，過段時間後你確實會覺得，當初沒被選為棒球隊或籃球隊的首選反而是件好事。

Charlie and I never really exercised that much or did anything – we were carefully preserving ourselves for these years.
查理和我其實從未做太多運動或特別保養——我們只是小心翼翼地為這些年歲保存自己。

Look at the bright side of things to the extent that you can. You’re lucky enough to be here today, you’re healthy, you’ve come from a long distance, and you’re getting a chance to learn more about something that interests you. Compare that with the situation a couple hundred years ago that you would have been offered.
盡可能去看事情的光明面。你今天能健康地來到這裡，從遙遠的地方前來，有機會學習感興趣的事物，已經非常幸運。對比兩百年前你可能面臨的處境，就會明白這點。

Becky Quick: This question comes from Himanshu Bendal for Ajit and Warren. Autonomous vehicles are already driving across roads in American cities with no driver involvement. How do Warren and Ajit think about any disruption risk from these autonomous vehicles to GEICO’s auto insurance business, which is built around understanding and underwriting human drivers? Wouldn’t what we call auto insurance today just become product liability for autonomous vehicles and autonomous software companies?
貝琪·奎克：這個問題來自 Himanshu Bendal，提給阿吉特和華倫。自動駕駛車輛已經在美國城市的道路上無需駕駛員參與地行駛。華倫和阿吉特如何看待這些自動駕駛車輛對 GEICO 汽車保險業務可能帶來的顛覆風險？該業務是圍繞理解和承保人類駕駛員建立的。今天我們所稱的汽車保險，是否會變成針對自動駕駛車輛和自動駕駛軟體公司的產品責任險？

Ajit Jain: There’s no question that insurance for automobiles is going to change dramatically once self-driving cars become a reality. The big change will be what you identified. Most of the insurance that is sold and bought revolves around operator errors – how often they happen, how severe they are, and therefore what premium we ought to charge.
阿吉特·賈恩：毫無疑問，一旦自駕車成為現實，汽車保險將會發生巨大變化。最大的變化正如你所指出的那樣。目前大部分買賣的保險都是圍繞操作員錯誤——它們發生的頻率、嚴重程度，以及因此我們應該收取多少保費。

To the extent these new self-driving cars are safer and involved in fewer accidents, that insurance will be less required. Instead, it’ll be substituted by product liability. So we at GEICO and elsewhere are certainly trying to get ready for that switch, where we move from providing insurance for operator errors to being more ready to provide protection for product errors and errors and omissions in the construction of these automobiles.
就這些新型自駕車更安全且事故更少而言，對保險的需求將會降低。取而代之的將是產品責任險。因此，我們 GEICO 及其他公司正積極準備應對這種轉變，從為操作失誤提供保險，轉向更準備好為這些汽車製造中的產品缺陷及錯誤與疏漏提供保障。

Warren Buffett: We expect change in all our businesses. If I’d settled for being in New England textiles – even though it worked well for 70 years or so prior – the world changes. If the game didn’t change, it really wouldn’t be very interesting. If every time you swung at a baseball you hit a home run, or every time you hit a golf ball you had a hole in one, it wouldn’t be interesting.
華倫·巴菲特：我們預期所有業務都會發生變化。如果我當初滿足於新英格蘭紡織業——儘管它在之前 70 年左右運作良好——世界在改變。如果遊戲規則一成不變，那真的會很無趣。如果每次揮棒都能打出全壘打，或者每次高爾夫球都能一桿進洞，那就沒意思了。

The fact that there will be things you have to think about all the time as you go along and you’ll make mistakes – that’s really part of the fun. Your brain would turn to mush if you didn’t have a few problems now and then.
事實上，隨著進展你總是需要不斷思考某些事情，並且你會犯錯——這其實是樂趣的一部分。如果偶爾沒有一些問題需要解決，你的大腦就會變得遲鈍。

Auto insurance will change, although it’s remarkable how little it has changed in its relatively short history. Who knows what we’ll be doing in transportation 100 years from now? If you go back a couple hundred years ago, who could have predicted the United States would look like what it does and people would move like they do and enjoy themselves like they do?
汽車保險將會改變，儘管在其相對短暫的歷史中變化之小令人驚嘆。誰知道一百年後我們的交通方式會是什麼樣子？如果回溯兩百年前，誰能預測美國會變成現在這樣，人們會以這樣的方式移動和享受生活？

It’s a dynamic world. The biggest thing we have to worry about, unfortunately, is that we’ve learned how to destroy the world too. We’ve got this wonderful world, but now we know there are eight countries – and probably a ninth coming – that can destroy it, and we don’t necessarily have the perfect people leading each of those countries.
這是個動態的世界。不幸的是，我們最需要擔心的是，我們已經學會如何摧毀這個世界。我們擁有這個美好的世界，但現在我們知道有八個國家——可能很快會有第九個——有能力摧毀它，而這些國家的領導者未必都是最理想的人選。

When Einstein came up with E=mc² back in 1905, he didn’t dream that mass could be converted into energy in a way that would change the world. When I was born in 1930, they had known about Einstein’s law of physics for 25 years, but nobody had thought about what it could do to change warfare in the future.
當愛因斯坦在 1905 年提出 E=mc²時，他並未夢想到質量能以改變世界的方式轉化為能量。我出生於 1930 年，那時人們知曉愛因斯坦的物理定律已有 25 年，但沒有人想過它會如何改變未來的戰爭形態。

Then in August 1939, Roosevelt got the most famous letter in history from Leo Szilard. Szilard couldn’t get his letter in front of Roosevelt because who had heard of Leo Szilard? But he got Einstein to sign it. Roosevelt probably understood about as much about physics as I do, but he understood that Einstein signed it. So he called in General Groves and said, “We should do something about this.” All we did was learn how to destroy the world.
1939 年 8 月，羅斯福收到了史上最著名的信件——來自利奧·西拉德。西拉德無法讓自己的信直接呈遞給羅斯福（畢竟誰聽過利奧·西拉德？），但他成功讓愛因斯坦簽了名。羅斯福對物理學的理解大概和我差不多，但他明白愛因斯坦簽署的份量。於是他召見格羅夫斯將軍說：「我們該對此採取行動。」而我們最終只學會了如何毀滅世界。

We needed to do it – Germany had Heisenberg and he looked like he was ahead of us. We can’t put that genie back in the bottle. The world changes, and we’ve got wonderful things, but we also have a guy in North Korea with nuclear weapons. What does North Korea need nuclear weapons for? Can that be a good thing in the world? But they’re not going to go away.
我們不得不這麼做——德國有海森堡，而且他看起來領先我們。我們無法讓精靈重回瓶子。世界在改變，我們獲得了美好的事物，但也讓北韓那傢伙擁有了核武。北韓要核武器做什麼？這對世界能是好事嗎？但它們不會消失。

So it’s a world of change. We are enjoying incredible change that’s contributed to everybody in this room living so much better than people were living a couple hundred years ago. But we haven’t changed human beings very much so far. We’ve certainly changed weapons of mass destruction, but we haven’t made much progress with the human race. We’ll see what happens with that.
所以這是個不斷變化的世界。我們正享受著驚人的變革，這讓在座每位的生活都比幾百年前的人優越許多。但迄今我們並未真正改變人類本性。我們確實發展了大規模毀滅性武器，卻在人類物種的進化上停滯不前。未來如何，且讓我們拭目以待。

But in the meantime, we’ll see changes in auto insurance and cars, and that will be easier for us to deal with than when we had to deal with the problems of turning out textiles in New England. You deal with the world as it develops, and like I say, everybody here is living in the luckiest period. Enjoy your luck and try to figure out the answers to what’s going to happen. We’ve done pretty well actually adapting to the changes.
但與此同時，我們將看到汽車保險和汽車行業的變化，這對我們來說比當年在新英格蘭處理紡織業轉型問題要容易應對得多。你要隨著世界的發展來應對變化，就像我說的，在座的每一位都生活在最幸運的時代。享受這份幸運，並試著找出未來變化的答案。事實上，我們在適應變化方面做得相當不錯。

Ajit Jain: I’d like to add that we talked about the shift to product liability and protection for accidents that take place because of an error in product design or supply. In addition to that shift, I think what we’ll see is a major shift where the number of accidents will drop dramatically because of automatic driving. But on the other hand, the cost per repair every time there’s an accident will go up very significantly because of the amount of technology in the car.
阿吉特·賈恩：我想補充的是，我們談到了向產品責任險的轉變，以及因產品設計或供應鏈錯誤導致事故的保障。除了這一轉變外，我認為我們還將看到一個重大變化：由於自動駕駛技術的普及，事故數量將大幅下降。但另一方面，由於汽車搭載的技術含量增加，每次事故的維修成本將會顯著上升。

How those two variables interact with each other in terms of the total cost of providing insurance, I think, is still an open issue.
我認為，這兩個變量如何相互作用，進而影響提供保險的總成本，仍然是一個未決問題。

Warren Buffett: I’ll give you two interesting figures to ponder. When I walked into GEICO’s office in 1951, the average price of a policy was around $40 a year. Now it’s easy to get up to $2,000 depending on location and other factors. During that same time, the number of people killed in auto accidents has fallen from roughly six per 100 million miles driven to a little over one.
華倫·巴菲特：我給你們兩個有趣的數字思考。1951 年我走進 GEICO 辦公室時，一份保單的平均價格大約是每年 40 美元。現在根據地區和其他因素，很容易就漲到 2000 美元。同一時期，每行駛 1 億英里因車禍死亡的人數從大約 6 人下降到略高於 1 人。

So the car has become incredibly safer, and it costs 50 times as much to buy an insurance policy. When people talk about developments in car driving, it’s a lot easier to look at the Buck Rogers aspect of it, but they don’t actually think about what really happens to the math of the business.
所以汽車變得難以置信地安全，但買一份保險的費用卻漲了 50 倍。當人們談論汽車駕駛的發展時，很容易只看到那些科幻般的進步，但他們實際上沒有考慮到這對商業數學的真正影響。

The auto insurance industry has been a huge growth industry. Homeowners insurance prices in Nebraska have doubled in the last 10 years, adjusted for general inflation, and convective storms have just gone on a tear. It’s still unprofitable to write homeowners insurance in Nebraska after doubling in the last 10 years.
汽車保險業一直是一個巨大的成長產業。內布拉斯加州的房屋保險價格在過去 10 年翻了一倍，這還是經過通膨調整後的數字，而對流風暴造成的損失更是驚人。即使在過去 10 年保費翻倍後，內布拉斯加州的房屋保險業務仍然無利可圖。

So it’s very hard to predict what these big changes mean. You just have to keep thinking all the time. But you don’t want to read some research report that says the world’s coming to an end or the world’s going to be wonderful because of this or that – there are about 50 other developments going on at the same time that you need to think about and keep observing as you go along.
因此很難預測這些重大變化意味著什麼。你必須持續不斷地思考。但你不該只讀某份研究報告就斷言世界將因此毀滅或變得美好——同時還有約 50 項其他發展需要你持續關注與思考。

You never reach a final answer in this business – you reach a point of action that you take. We try to get into high probability things and play the game in the same way. But it will be different than you think, and you should wake up every morning and think about that if you’re in the business of managing businesses.
在這行你永遠得不到最終答案——你只能得到採取行動的時機點。我們試圖投入高機率事件並以相同方式運作。但實際情況總會與你想的不同，如果你從事企業管理，每天早晨醒來都該思考這點。

Greg Abel: Warren, as we approach the break, would you like to address the operating earnings?
葛瑞格·阿貝爾：華倫，在休息前您要談談營運收益嗎？

Warren Buffett: Yes, let’s put up the information. We released our 10-Q this morning. We always try to do it on a Saturday so nobody gets a jump on other people.
華倫·巴菲特：好的，讓我們把資料放上來。我們今早發布了 10-Q 財報。我們總是選在週六公布，這樣就不會有人搶得先機。

You’ll see that our insurance underwriting income was down dramatically for the first quarter. Last year was as good a year as you’ll see in insurance – everything broke our way. Prices are down this year, and risks are up this year. But we do have unusual advantages in the insurance business that can’t really be replicated by our competition.
你會發現我們第一季的保險承保收入大幅下降。去年是保險業難得一見的好年景——所有事情都對我們有利。今年價格下跌，風險卻上升了。但我們在保險業務中確實擁有競爭對手難以複製的獨特優勢。

We just announced within the last 24 hours that we, Zurich, and Chubb have arranged a joint operation to be the writer of really large sums that very few people can do. Of course, we’ve got to write them at the right price in terms of liability, but we can do that sort of thing without blinking.
我們在過去 24 小時內剛宣布，與蘇黎世保險和安達保險共同安排了一項聯合業務，專門承接極少數公司能處理的巨額保單。當然，我們必須以合理的責任險價格承保，但我們做這種事連眼睛都不用眨一下。

Our investment income did not change that much because we have a float that grows a little bit, which gives us more money for investment, and then we have retained earnings which grow. So we would expect in any year to have like $40 billion or more that we’ll build up unless we find things to do with it.
我們的投資收入變化不大，因為浮存金略有增長，這給了我們更多資金進行投資，再加上保留盈餘也在增加。因此除非找到其他用途，否則我們預期每年都能累積約 400 億美元或更多的資金。

The interest rates on short-term bills are less than they were before, so you had that negative effect pulling investment income down, but not that much, and we had more money. So we came up with a little more in the way of earnings.
短期票據的利率比之前低，這對投資收入產生了負面影響，但幅度不大，而且我們資金更充裕了。所以最終收益反而略有增加。

The railroad is earning a little more than last year, but it’s not earning what it should be earning at the present time. But that’s solvable and is getting solved. It’s still an incredible asset for Berkshire.
鐵路業務的盈利比去年略高，但目前仍未達到應有的盈利水準。不過這是可以解決的，而且正在解決中。對波克夏來說，這依然是一項極具價值的資產。

The energy company last year was having particular problems, and those are absent this year. So those earnings are up. Then among our range of general businesses, they were pretty much a push.
能源公司去年遇到了一些特殊問題，但今年這些問題已不復存在。因此該業務的盈利有所提升。至於我們其他一般業務的表現，整體來說大致持平。

Greg Abel: Of our 49 businesses that we measure closely, 21 were up and 28 were down. So you can tell it was really a mixed quarter when you go across the non-insurance operating businesses.
葛瑞格·阿貝爾：在我們密切追蹤的 49 家企業中，21 家業績上升，28 家下滑。由此可見，非保險營運業務在本季度的表現確實好壞參半。

Warren Buffett: Our financial condition continues to hold a lot more in cash and treasuries than I would like, but that’s simply a question of when opportunities occur. If you get real opportunities every five or six years, you have to be patient.
華倫·巴菲特：我們的財務狀況仍持有遠超我理想水準的現金與國債，但這只是機會何時出現的問題。如果你每五、六年才會遇到真正的機會，就必須保持耐心。

Charlie always pointed out that we made most of our money out of about eight or nine ideas over 50 years. We talked about it every day and read every report and did everything else. But if you think you can get an idea a day from listening to your broker or reading financial information, forget it. Every now and then you get extraordinary opportunities, and most of the time you don’t have much of an edge.
查理總是強調，我們在 50 年間賺的大部分錢來自大約八九個點子。我們每天討論、閱讀每份報告並做其他所有事情。但如果你以為每天聽經紀人或閱讀財經資訊就能獲得一個好主意，那還是算了吧。偶爾你會遇到非凡的機會，但大多數時候你並沒有太大優勢。

We also have our float which continues to build. There’s no property casualty company that has our float.
我們還有持續增長的浮存金。沒有任何一家財產意外險公司擁有像我們這樣的浮存金。

Ajit Jain: Clearly we are heads and shoulders above anyone else.
阿吉特·賈恩：顯然我們比任何人都要出色得多。

Warren Buffett: That is money that, as long as we’re writing at an underwriting profit, is absolutely free money. We would expect that over a 50 or 100-year period that we would be able to say the same thing. But there will be years when you have a very bad underwriting record, and it’ll eat into the float earnings.
華倫·巴菲特：只要我們在承保時有盈利，這筆錢就完全是免費的。我們預期在 50 或 100 年後還能說同樣的話。但也會有幾年承保記錄非常糟糕，這會侵蝕浮存金的收益。

Ajit Jain: I think if you look at the entire range including life insurance, our cost of float is negative 2.2%. That means we’ve got the float plus somebody’s given us 2.2% of cash.
阿吉特·賈恩：我認為如果看整個範圍包括人壽保險，我們的浮存金成本是負 2.2%。這意味著我們不僅獲得浮存金，還有人額外給了我們 2.2%的現金。

Warren Buffett: It’s like running a bank where people leave their money with you and you pay a minus 2.2% and you don’t have any check clearing or anything else to do. We run our business with a different mindset than any other P&C company in the world, and I wouldn’t be talking about it if I thought they could duplicate it.
華倫·巴菲特：這就像經營一家銀行，人們把錢留在你那裡，而你支付負 2.2%的利息，而且你不需要處理任何支票清算或其他事情。我們以與世界上任何其他財產保險公司不同的心態經營業務，如果認為他們能複製這種模式，我就不會談論它了。

The final page is on share repurchases. Clearly we haven’t made any share repurchases so far this year. If Berkshire buys Berkshire shares in repurchases, we now pay more than you will pay if you buy Berkshire shares.
最後一頁是關於股票回購的。顯然，我們今年迄今為止還沒有進行任何股票回購。如果伯克希爾在回購中購買伯克希爾股票，我們現在支付的價格會比你購買伯克希爾股票時支付的更多。

I don’t think people generally know that, but there is a tax that was introduced a year or so ago where we pay 1%. That not only hurts us because we pay more for it than you do – it’s a better deal for you than for us – but it actually hurts some of our investee companies quite substantially.
我不認為人們普遍知道這一點，但大約一年前引入了一項稅，我們需要支付 1%。這不僅傷害了我們，因為我們支付的比你多——對你來說是比對我們更划算的交易——而且實際上對我們的一些被投資公司造成了相當大的損害。

Tim Cook has done a wonderful job running Apple, but he spent about $100 billion in a year repurchasing shares, and there’s a 1% charge attached to that now. So that’s a billion dollars a year that he pays when he buys Apple stock compared to what you pay. It doesn’t sound like much, but there are people who want to increase that particular rate dramatically.
提姆·庫克在經營蘋果公司方面做得非常出色，但他一年內花了約 1000 億美元回購股票，而現在這項操作要附加 1%的費用。因此，與你購買蘋果股票的成本相比，他每年得多支付 10 億美元。聽起來或許不多，但有些人想大幅提高這個特定費率。

We will only buy in our shares if we think that they are almost certainly underpriced as valued very conservatively. We get that opportunity occasionally, but the higher that charge goes that the federal government charges us for doing it, the less we will be able to do repurchases.
我們只會在認為股票幾乎肯定被低估且估值非常保守時，才會回購自家股票。我們偶爾會遇到這樣的機會，但聯邦政府對這項操作收取的費用越高，我們能進行的回購就越少。

So on that happy note, we will rejoin at 11:00, continue till 1:00, and in the meantime enjoy yourself. I think all our exhibit doors are still open. So bring your wallets to the cash registers.
那麼，在這個愉快的時刻，我們將於 11 點重新集合，持續到下午 1 點，在此期間請盡情享受。我想我們所有的展覽門都還開著。所以帶著你的錢包到收銀台來吧。
Afternoon Session Transcript
下午場會議記錄

Warren Buffett: Okay, everyone. We’re ready to go. I’m going to lead off by actually recommending a movie. I know that’s why you came, but I would recommend to all of you that you go to Amazon Prime. I’ve got no financial interest in this. But go to Amazon Prime and click on a documentary called “Becoming Katherine Graham.” It’s an incredible story from 50 or so years ago. To some extent, I had the good luck to be kind of a viewer of some American history that I think is fascinating. If you feel that I misled you, you can write me a note, but I promise to report how many readers didn’t agree. But check out “Becoming Katherine Graham” and you’ll see a remarkable story of American history.
華倫·巴菲特：好的，各位。我們準備開始了。首先我要推薦一部電影。我知道你們不是為這個而來，但我建議大家上 Amazon Prime。我與此沒有任何財務利益關係。但請上 Amazon Prime 搜尋一部紀錄片《成為凱瑟琳·葛蘭姆》。這是大約 50 年前的一個非凡故事。某種程度上，我很幸運能親眼見證這段我認為極其迷人的美國歷史。如果你覺得我誤導了你，可以寫信給我，但我保證會統計有多少讀者不認同。去看看《成為凱瑟琳·葛蘭姆》吧，你會看到一段精彩的美國歷史篇章。

Audience Member (Zone 9): Hi Warren. My name is Robert and I’m a shareholder from Toronto, Canada. Three years ago Charlie Rose asked you a question to the effect of what you wanted to be remembered for and your reply was “he was a teacher.” So in that spirit, Greg, I’m curious to hear maybe a story of where you learned something very profound from Warren. And vice versa, if we have the time, Warren, what’s something that you maybe learned from Greg?
觀眾席成員（9 區）：嗨，華倫。我是來自加拿大多倫多的股東羅伯特。三年前查理·羅斯曾問過您一個問題，大意是您希望後人如何記住您，您的回答是「他是個老師」。因此本著這種精神，葛雷格，我很好奇是否能聽聽您從華倫身上學到的深刻教訓。如果有時間的話，華倫，也請分享您從葛雷格身上學到的事情。

Greg Abel: Well, Warren is obviously a remarkable teacher and I benefit from that every day and for many years. I’m fortunate that if I had to be remembered as something right now, I’d want to be remembered as a great father, but equally a coach. And that goes to family, friends, and just being involved with the kids I coach in hockey or baseball or whatever it may be. I think we’ve got a great opportunity to give back to them at a very young age.
格雷格·阿貝爾：顯然，華倫是一位非凡的老師，我每天都從中受益，多年來都是如此。如果現在要我選擇被記住的身份，我很幸運能希望被視為一位偉大的父親，同時也是一位教練。這包括對家人、朋友，以及我參與指導的冰球或棒球等運動的孩子們。我認為我們有絕佳的機會在他們很小的年紀就給予回饋。

I love thinking of Warren truly as a teacher and I get the opportunity to continue to learn every day. Warren and I have strong dialogue every week and we’re always talking around opportunities in Berkshire or things that are going on globally or in the US, and each one’s truly a learning moment.
我喜歡真正把華倫視為一位老師，而我每天都有機會持續學習。華倫和我每週都有深入的對話，我們總是討論伯克希爾的機會或全球及美國正在發生的事情，每一次都是真正的學習時刻。

I’ll maybe go back to the very first meeting with Warren because it still stands out in my mind. Warren was thinking about acquiring Mid-America Energy Holdings Company at that time, and we had the opportunity with my partners to go over there on a Saturday morning. We were discussing the business and Warren had the financial statements in front of him. Like anybody, I was sort of expecting a few questions on how the business was performing, but Warren locked in immediately to what was on the balance sheet and the fact we had some derivative contracts, the “weapons of mass destruction.”
或許我該從與華倫的第一次會面說起，那場景至今仍歷歷在目。當時華倫正考慮收購中美能源控股公司，我和合夥人得以在某個週六上午前往洽談。討論業務時，華倫面前攤著財務報表。和常人一樣，我本預期他會詢問營運表現，但他立刻鎖定資產負債表內容——特別是那些被稱為「金融核彈」的衍生性金融商品合約。

In the utility business, we do have derivatives because they’re used to match certain positions. They’re never matched perfectly, but we have them and they’re required in the regulated business. I remember Warren going to it immediately and asking about the composition and what was the underlying risk, wanting to thoroughly understand. It wasn’t that big of a position, but it was absolutely one of the risks he was concerned about as he was acquiring Mid-America, especially in light of Enron and everything that had gone on.
在公用事業領域，我們確實會使用衍生性商品來對沖特定部位，雖然無法完全匹配，但在受監管的業務中這是必要操作。我清楚記得華倫當場直指核心，追問合約結構與潛在風險，要求徹底釐清。儘管部位規模不大，但考量到安隆案等事件，這正是他收購中美能源時特別關注的風險之一。

The followup to that was a year or 18 months later. There was an energy crisis in the US around electricity and natural gas, and various companies were making significant sums of money. Warren’s follow-up question to me was, “How much money are we making during this energy crisis? Are we making a lot? Do we have speculative positions in place?” The answer was we weren’t making any more than we would have been six months ago because all those derivatives were truly to support our business and weren’t speculative. That focus on understanding the business and the risks around it still stands out in my mind.
後續大約過了一年或 18 個月，美國爆發了電力與天然氣的能源危機，許多公司趁機大賺一筆。華倫當時追問我的問題是：「我們在這場能源危機中賺了多少？賺很多嗎？我們有投機性部位嗎？」答案是由於所有衍生性商品純粹是為了支持本業，並非投機操作，我們的獲利與半年前相比並無異常增長。這種對業務本質與風險的透徹理解，至今仍讓我印象深刻。

Warren Buffett: It’s one thing we’ve really never talked about here, but I spend more time looking at balance sheets than I do income statements. Wall Street doesn’t pay much attention to balance sheets, but I like to look at balance sheets over an 8 or 10 year period before I even look at the income account because there are certain things it’s harder to hide or play games with on the balance sheet than with the income statement.
華倫·巴菲特：這是我們從未在此深入討論過的事——我花在研讀資產負債表的時間遠多於損益表。華爾街不太關注資產負債表，但我喜歡先檢視 8 到 10 年期的資產負債表，甚至早於查看損益帳戶。因為相較於損益表，資產負債表更難隱藏或玩弄某些財務手法。

Neither one gives you the total answer on anything, but you should understand what the figures are saying and what they don’t say and what they can’t say and what the management would like them to say that the auditors wouldn’t like them to say. You learn more from balance sheets in my view than most people give them credit for.
沒有一種方法能給你所有問題的完整答案，但你應該理解這些數字在說什麼、它們沒說什麼、它們無法說什麼，以及管理層希望它們表達但審計師不願讓它們表達的內容。在我看來，資產負債表能教會你的東西，遠比大多數人給予它們的評價要多得多。

I’m not worried about being remembered. People don’t remember enough about Katherine Graham, for example, in terms of this story that shaped America in many ways.
我不擔心被人記住。舉例來說，人們對凱瑟琳·格雷厄姆的記憶已經不夠深刻，儘管她的故事在許多方面塑造了美國。

Charlie was probably the best person you could imagine in what he learned. Charlie was never satisfied with just superficial things about any subject. He really wanted to understand it and he always would tell me that you shouldn’t take a position on anything until you can describe the arguments against it better than the person who is arguing with you – that you should be able to argue their case better than they can. He was a remarkable teacher. And so were those other fellows I mentioned. And of course my dad was an incredible teacher. Make the most of the people you meet that are going to make you a better person and probably forget about the rest to quite an extent.
查理可能是你能想像中學習能力最強的人。查理從不滿足於任何主題的表面知識。他真正想要的是深入理解，而且他總是告訴我，在你能夠比反對者更清楚地描述反對論點之前，不應該對任何事情採取立場——你應該能夠比他們更好地論述他們的立場。他是一位非凡的老師。我提到的其他幾位也是。當然，我的父親也是一位了不起的老師。要善於從那些能讓你成為更好的人身上學習，至於其他人，很大程度上可以忘掉他們。

Becky Quick: This question comes from David Rubin, a shareholder from Scottsdale, Arizona. It’s a question for Greg. We’ve heard over the decades and are familiar with Warren and Charlie’s investment thesis and their circle of competence. During the first 10 years after taking over as CEO, Greg will be tasked with allocating more capital during that time than Berkshire has had to allocate in its history. Given this, I’d like to hear from Greg about his views on capital allocation, particularly into new businesses.
貝琪·奎克：這個問題來自亞利桑那州斯科茨代爾的股東大衛·魯賓。問題是給格雷格的。幾十年來我們已經聽過並熟悉華倫和查理（指巴菲特與蒙格）的投資理念及其能力圈。在接任執行長後的頭十年裡，格雷格將面臨比伯克希爾歷史上任何時期都更龐大的資金配置任務。有鑑於此，我想聽聽格雷格對於資本配置的看法，尤其是對新事業的投資觀點。

Greg Abel: This bar is not too high! We start from a great place at Berkshire. We’ve got a great culture within the business. We have values that we as a management team, as defined by Warren and Charlie and everybody associated with the business – we’ve got great values that really set Berkshire up well for the future.
格雷格·阿貝爾：這個門檻不算太高！伯克希爾的起點非常優越。我們擁有優良的企業文化，管理團隊遵循華倫、查理及所有相關同仁定義的價值觀——這些深厚的價值觀為伯克希爾的未來奠定了堅實基礎。

As we deploy capital and allocate capital, it’s critical to Berkshire going forward, and equally it’s around managing risk. When I think of our values, a couple are absolutely critical. One: we will maintain the reputation of Berkshire and that of our company. I view that in investing or how we operate things across each of our businesses. That will always be a priority and something we’ll ensure is in the forefront of our minds.
當我們進行資本配置與分配時，這對波克夏的未來至關重要，同時也涉及風險管理。當我思考我們的價值觀時，有幾點絕對是核心所在。第一：我們將維護波克夏及其旗下公司的聲譽。無論在投資決策或各事業體的營運方式上，這始終會是優先考量，也是我們時刻銘記在心的要務。

Looking at our balance sheet, as Warren commented, we will have a fortress of a balance sheet. I thought Sue Decker, our lead director, said it well yesterday. We’ve got a significant amount of cash right now, but it’s an enormous asset to have that and that will continue to be a philosophy. When we can deploy it, we’ll deploy it well. We recognize it as a strategic asset that allows us to weather difficult times and not be dependent on anybody.
如華倫所言，審視我們的資產負債表時，我們將保持銅牆鐵壁般的財務結構。首席獨立董事蘇·德克爾昨日說得很好：當前我們持有大量現金，但這正是極具價值的資產，此一理念將持續貫徹。當我們能有效運用這些資金時，必會妥善部署。我們深知這是讓我們能度過難關、不仰賴他人的戰略性資產。

We will remain Berkshire and will never be dependent on a bank or some other party for Berkshire to be successful. With allocation of capital comes management of risk and understanding risk. That falls upon all our managers, insurance and non-insurance, but we’ll bring that across Berkshire.
我們將始終保持波克夏本色，絕不會倚賴銀行或其他外部力量來成就成功。資本配置伴隨著風險管理與風險認知，這責任落在所有經理人身上——無論保險或非保險業務，但我們會將此理念貫徹至整個波克夏體系。

The other value I would touch on relates to where I’m going: ultimately we have a great set of operating companies that produce significant cash flows, be it in the insurance companies creating float or our various non-insurance companies producing significant cash flows on an annual basis. We intend to continue to ensure that’s a strength of Berkshire going forward.
另一個我想談的價值與我們未來的方向有關：歸根結底，我們擁有一系列優秀的營運公司，它們能產生顯著的現金流，無論是保險公司創造的浮存金，還是我們各種非保險公司每年產生的可觀現金流。我們打算繼續確保這成為伯克希爾未來的一項優勢。

With those cash flows and with the float, and with significant resources already on our balance sheet, we’ll continue to move forward with a very similar philosophy. It’s an identical philosophy to what we’ve had currently and for the past 60 years.
憑藉這些現金流、浮存金，以及資產負債表上已有的龐大資源，我們將繼續以非常相似的哲學前進。這與我們當前及過去 60 年所秉持的哲學完全一致。

We’ll start by looking at opportunities within our business – are our insurance and non-insurance businesses properly capitalized and do they have the opportunity to manage their business? They’ll operate in an autonomous way, but Berkshire still manages the capital that will go into those businesses or what potentially will come out of them.
我們首先會審視企業內部的機會——我們的保險與非保險業務是否資本充足，是否有機會自主經營業務？它們將以自治的方式運作，但伯克希爾仍會管理投入這些業務的資本，或可能從中抽離的資金。

The next opportunity is to acquire businesses in their totality, 100%. There are great times when we can do that. Warren touched on the $10 billion acquisition in the last quarter. But the value relative to the risk have to be right. If it’s right, we want to own it. If it’s not the time, there’ll be another time to own assets like that.
下一個機會是全面收購企業，100%持股。有些絕佳時機我們能做到這點。華倫提到上季度那筆 100 億美元的收購案。但價值與風險必須相稱。若條件合適，我們就想擁有它。若時機未到，未來總會再有機會持有這類資產。

Then there’s the opportunity to own pieces of companies through equity. But as Warren’s always highlighted, though we own a piece of a company, we own a piece of that cash flow, a piece of their balance sheet. It’s not just a share certificate. We’ll approach it with the thought that we’re going to own this company for the long term.
其次是透過股權持有企業部分股份的機會。但正如華倫始終強調的，雖然我們只持有企業的一部分，但我們擁有其現金流的一部分、資產負債表的一部分。這不僅僅是一張股票憑證。我們會以長期持有這家公司的思維來看待它。

We need to thoroughly understand what the economic prospects of those companies will look like – as Warren said earlier – 5 years from now, 10 years from now, 20 years from now. If we don’t have a view of that, we won’t be investing, be it 100% or 2% of a company through equities. We have to thoroughly understand what those prospects look like and the underlying risks of the businesses. It’s really the investment philosophy and how Warren and the team have allocated capital for the past 60 years. It will not change, and it’s the approach we’ll take going forward.
我們需要徹底理解這些公司未來的經濟前景會是什麼樣子——正如華倫先前所說——5 年後、10 年後、20 年後。如果我們對這一點沒有看法，我們就不會投資，無論是透過股權持有公司 100%還是 2%的股份。我們必須徹底理解這些前景以及企業的潛在風險。這正是過去 60 年來華倫及其團隊所秉持的投資哲學與資本配置方式。這不會改變，也是我們未來將採取的方法。

Warren Buffett: I don’t want to go on too long on this, but this is important. It’s very obvious that the country needs an incredible improvement, rethinking, redirection to some extent in the electric grid. We’ve outgrown what would be the model that America should have. In a sense, it’s a problem something akin to the interstate highway system where you needed the power of the government really to get things done because it doesn’t work so well when you get 48 or 50 jurisdictions that each has their own way of thinking about things.
華倫·巴菲特：我不想在這點上講太多，但這很重要。很明顯，國家需要在電網方面做出巨大改進、重新思考、某種程度上的重新規劃。我們已經超越了美國應有的模式。在某種意義上，這是一個類似於州際公路系統的問題，在那裡你需要政府的力量才能真正把事情做好，因為當你有 48 或 50 個轄區，每個轄區都有自己的思考方式時，事情就不會那麼順利。

In World War II, we called in people at a dollar an hour. We knew we had to turn out ships like crazy. We knew that we had to convert Ford Motor from being a car manufacturer into an aircraft manufacturer in a matter of days, not weeks or months.
在第二次世界大戰期間，我們以每小時一美元的工資招募工人。我們深知必須瘋狂地生產船艦，也明白要在短短數日內將福特汽車從汽車製造商轉型為飛機製造商，而不是幾週或幾個月。

There are certain really major investment situations where we have capital like nobody else has in the private system. We have particular knowhow in the whole generation and transmission arena. The country is going to need it. But we have to figure out a way that makes sense from the standpoint of the government, from the standpoint of the public, and from the standpoint of Berkshire, and we haven’t figured that out yet.
在某些極其重大的投資情境中，我們擁有私人體系中無人能及的資本。我們在整個發電與輸電領域具備特殊專業知識。國家未來將需要這項能力。但我們必須找到一個對政府、公眾以及波克夏公司三方都合理的方案，而目前我們尚未找到這樣的解決之道。

It’s a clear and present use of hundreds of billions of dollars. You have people that set up funds and they’re getting paid for just assembling stuff, but that’s not the way to handle it. The way to handle it is to have some kind of government-private industry cooperation similar to what you do in a war. When they were doing the highway system, I don’t think the government set up its own guys that were going to pour cement, but you needed cooperation. We’re at that point in terms of energy, but I don’t think we’ve made any progress particularly.
這是數千億美元顯而易見的用途。有些人設立基金，他們只是把東西拼湊起來就能獲得報酬，但這不是處理問題的方式。正確的做法應該是建立某種政府與私營企業的合作模式，類似於戰爭時期的做法。當年建設公路系統時，我不認為政府會自己派人去澆灌水泥，但你需要合作。我們在能源領域也處於這樣的階段，但我認為我們並沒有取得特別的進展。

Greg Abel: These are very unique situations that reflect where we’re at. There will be very significant investment opportunities across a variety of industries. As Warren touched on, in the electric industry or energy space, we obviously know that well with our existing business. The capital required to meet the long-term needs of what’s currently projected as demand is enormous, and we as Berkshire will be in a good position to help address those needs. But the model around it and the risks that need to be addressed to deploy that type of capital will be different than they are today.
格雷格·阿貝爾：這些是非常特殊的情況，反映了我們所處的階段。未來在各個行業都將出現非常重大的投資機會。正如華倫提到的，在電力行業或能源領域，我們憑藉現有業務對此非常了解。滿足當前預測需求所需的長期資本是巨大的，而我們波克夏將處於有利位置來幫助應對這些需求。但圍繞這一目標的運作模式，以及部署這類資本所需應對的風險，將與現今有所不同。

The muscle of the federal government will be needed. But the test of whether you can have 48 or 50 jurisdictions that are cooperating to do something that has opposition – there will be opposition in every single state. If they’d taken a vote during World War II or on the interstate highway system, it would have been slowed down to an incredible degree.
聯邦政府的力量將不可或缺。但真正的考驗在於，當面對各州都可能出現的反對聲浪時，能否讓 48 或 50 個轄區協同完成某項任務——二戰期間若就州際公路系統進行表決，推進速度恐怕會緩慢得難以置信。

So the question is how to use the strengths that this country has to actually turn it into what it should be capable of while still preserving a republic with 48 connected and a couple unconnected states. It’ll be interesting to see what happens. We do have capital and we actually have some knowledge that very few places have. We know what the game’s about, but putting together that energy with knowledge and with capital is just not easy.
因此關鍵在於如何運用這個國家的優勢，將其轉化為應有的潛能，同時維持由 48 個緊密相連與少數疏離州組成的共和政體。後續發展值得觀察。我們確實擁有資金與近乎獨步全球的知識儲備，我們深諳遊戲規則，但要將這股能量與知識資本相結合絕非易事。

It should be something that we’re capable of in the country, but the country was not designed for having 48 different jurisdictions that could mess up anything that you were attempting to do. During wartime, it’s one thing to get agreement, but during peace time, it’s a different problem. That’s going to be one for the next generation.
這本應是我們國家能力所及之事，但建國之初並未預見 48 個轄區可能阻撓任何重大嘗試。戰時達成共識已屬不易，和平時期更是截然不同的難題——這將成為下一代必須面對的課題。

Audience Member (Zone 10): Good morning Mr. Buffett and Mr. Abel. I’m Darcus Tang. I’m 14 years old. My father brought me here for two consecutive years, and I promise I will come back every year. I queue up at 2 in the morning for every meeting you hold. My dad owned BRKA shares and he said I need to work hard to earn my piece of BRKB. We are both from China, Hong Kong, and I would like to ask what’s the essential element for a global teenager like me if we want to be part of Berkshire? What piece of knowledge should I learn so you hire me in the future?
觀眾（10 區）：早安，巴菲特先生和亞伯先生。我是鄧達斯，今年 14 歲。我父親連續兩年帶我來參加會議，我保證以後每年都會來。每次會議我都凌晨 2 點就來排隊。我父親持有波克夏 A 股，他說我必須努力工作才能賺到自己的波克夏 B 股。我們來自中國香港，我想請問像我們這樣的全球青少年，若想成為波克夏的一員，最關鍵的要素是什麼？我該學習哪些知識才能讓你們未來願意雇用我？

Finally, Mr. Buffett, I learned a lot from this meeting and of course I will come here every year. I wish you can attend as many as possible. You and Mr. Charlie Munger are the most respectful people who have inspired me and my father a lot. I wish you happy and healthy, and maybe one day in the future we can make the world more prosperous all together like you said.
最後，巴菲特先生，我從這次會議中學到很多，當然我每年都會來參加。希望您能盡可能多出席。您和查理·蒙格先生是最令我敬重的人，給予我和父親極大啟發。祝您幸福健康，也許未來某天我們能像您說的那樣，一起讓世界更加繁榮。

Greg Abel: Well, I think your dad said it best. He highlighted that to become part of Berkshire, to own some Berkshire shares, you’re going to have to work hard. Hard work takes all of us a long way in life, and I would never diminish that. There’s a lot of things that matter in life, but if you start with a great work ethic and have that attitude that you want to contribute, you’re going to go a long way in life. You’ll find great enjoyment because, as Warren said, if you work hard, you’re going to find the things you love in life and it’ll lead to that. We truly look forward to the day you’re part of Berkshire.
格雷格·阿貝爾：嗯，我想你父親說得最好。他強調要成為波克夏的一部分，擁有波克夏的一些股份，你必須努力工作。努力工作讓我們在生活中走得更遠，我從不輕視這一點。生活中有很多重要的事情，但如果你從良好的職業道德開始，並抱有想要貢獻的態度，你將在生活中走得很遠。你會找到極大的樂趣，因為正如華倫所說，如果你努力工作，你會找到生活中熱愛的事物，這將引領你走向成功。我們真誠期待你成為波克夏一員的那一天。

Warren Buffett: Keep a lot of curiosity and read a lot, as Charlie would say.
華倫·巴菲特：保持強烈的好奇心並多讀書，就像查理常說的那樣。

Becky Quick: This question comes from Matthew Teisac in Leighton, Utah. He said, “Please discuss your strategy on how to protect our company from future liabilities due to wildfires blamed on our electric utility companies out west.”
貝基·奎克：這個問題來自猶他州萊頓的馬修·泰薩克。他說：「請討論你們的策略，如何保護我們的公司免受未來因西部電力公司被指責引發野火而產生的責任。」

Warren Buffett: That’s a very good question. We made some mistakes in the past when we bought PacifiCorp in 2005. Walter Scott, David Sol, and myself – three guys who were capitalists at heart and dealing with our own money – we made a mistake by not carving it up into the seven states that we were buying. It came with an aggregation where it wasn’t state by state, and we kept the same structure. That was a big mistake.
華倫·巴菲特：這是個非常好的問題。我們在 2005 年收購 PacifiCorp 時犯了一些錯誤。沃爾特·斯科特、大衛·索爾和我——三個骨子裡的資本主義者，用我們自己的錢做交易——我們犯了一個錯誤，沒有將收購的業務按七個州拆分。它是以一個整體的形式出現的，不是按州劃分的，而我們保持了相同的結構。這是個大錯誤。

Every part of the country is going to need electricity, and there are going to be places where privately held electric utilities would be very foolish to operate. How that gets resolved in a democracy, we will find out.
美國的每個地區都需要電力，而且有些地方私營電力公司運營會非常不明智。在民主制度下如何解決這個問題，我們拭目以待。

Greg Abel: The reality is the risk around wildfires – do the wildfires occur – they’re not going away, and we know that. The risk probably goes up each year. But what we can do is reduce the risk of it impacting our system and our underlying assets, and unfortunately the liabilities that come with such events. We can’t eliminate the risk, but we can reduce it.
格雷格·阿貝爾：現實是關於野火的風險——野火是否會發生——它們不會消失，我們知道這一點。風險可能每年都在增加。但我們能做的是降低它影響我們的系統和基礎資產的風險，以及不幸伴隨此類事件而來的責任。我們無法消除風險，但我們可以降低它。

Our teams in the west are addressing this across all our energy infrastructure because wildfires have now occurred in Texas and throughout the US. We’re all very focused on how we manage that risk. We start by addressing the actual assets, how we’re maintaining them and where we invest in them. We try to make sure that they’re either not causing the fire or potentially even hardening the system as to what they can withstand. It’s very much an operational focus.
我們西部的團隊正在全面處理這個問題，因為德州乃至全美各地都發生了野火。我們都非常關注如何管理這種風險。我們首先從實際資產著手，考慮如何維護它們以及在哪些方面進行投資。我們努力確保這些資產不會引發火災，甚至可能強化系統以承受更多挑戰。這非常注重運營層面。

We then take it even further. The utilities started to recognize when we have these unusual weather events – and Warren touched on what’s been happening in Nebraska with storms – but they’re equally occurring out west. When we have those, we’ve gotten very good at saying we have to manage the system differently and potentially de-energize because there’s likely to be an event.
我們還進一步採取措施。公用事業公司開始意識到，當我們遇到這些異常天氣事件時——華倫提到了內布拉斯加州遭遇的風暴——但西部同樣發生了類似情況。面對這些情況時，我們已經非常擅長判斷必須以不同方式管理系統，甚至可能需要斷電，因為很可能會發生事故。

But the one thing we hadn’t tackled – this is very relevant to the significant event we had back in 2020 in PacifiCorp – is we didn’t de-energize the system as the fire was approaching. Our employees and the whole management team have been trained all their lives to keep the lights on, and the last thing they want to do is turn those lights off and have a system de-energized.
但有一件事我們尚未解決——這與 2020 年我們在 PacifiCorp 遇到的重大事件密切相關——那就是我們沒有在火勢逼近時切斷電力系統。我們的員工和整個管理團隊一生所受的訓練都是要維持供電，他們最不願意做的就是關閉電源、讓系統斷電。

After those events and as we looked at how we’re going to move forward in managing the assets and reducing risk, we recognized as a team that we have to de-energize those assets. Now as we get fires encroaching at a certain number of miles, we de-energize because we do not want to contribute to the fire nor harm any of our consumers or contribute to a death. We had to take our team to managing a different risk now. It’s not around keeping the lights on, it’s around protecting the general public and ensuring the fire does not spread further.
在那些事件後，當我們審視如何繼續管理資產並降低風險時，團隊意識到我們必須切斷那些資產的電力。現在只要火勢逼近到一定距離內，我們就會斷電，因為我們不希望助長火勢、傷害用戶或導致死亡。我們必須帶領團隊轉向管理不同的風險——不再是維持供電，而是保護公眾安全並防止火勢蔓延。

We’re probably the one utility or across our utilities that does that today, and we strongly believe in that approach.
我們可能是當今公用事業公司中唯一採取這種做法的企業（或跨事業體），我們堅信這種做法是正確的。

Moderator (Becky): Doesn’t that open you up to other risk if you shut down your system, a hospital gets shut down, somebody dies?
主持人（貝琪）：這樣關閉系統難道不會讓你們面臨其他風險嗎？比如醫院停電導致有人死亡？

Greg Abel: That’s something we do deal with a lot because we have power outages that occur by accident. When we look at critical infrastructure, that’s an excellent point and we’re constantly re-evaluating it. We do receive a lot of feedback from our customer groups as to how to manage that.
格雷格·阿貝爾：這確實是我們經常處理的問題，因為意外停電時有發生。在審視關鍵基礎設施時，這是一個極佳的切入點，我們持續進行重新評估。我們從客戶群體那裡獲得大量關於如何管理此類情況的反饋。

We spend a lot more time educating the consumers and our customer groups. We explain what will happen and need to understand their unusual situations and how we can best tackle that so we don’t take on another liability. There’s a lot around de-energization.
我們投入更多時間教育消費者和客戶群體。我們會解釋可能發生的狀況，並需要理解他們的特殊處境，以及我們如何能最妥善應對，以避免承擔額外責任。關於斷電措施有許多細節需要考量。

To take it to the last step – and Warren touched on this in general on energy policy – we have to work with our states and our regulators to ensure they understand this was never a risk we took on or envisioned when we were investing in utilities, nor would any of the investors who’ve invested in other energy companies.
進一步來說——正如華倫在能源政策方面泛論的那樣——我們必須與各州政府及監管機構合作，確保他們明白這從來不是我們投資公用事業時承擔或預見的風險，其他能源公司的投資者也同樣未曾預料。

You earn a very set return for taking on a very defined risk associated with that asset, and this has gone well beyond that. We don’t earn the type of returns nor can you earn a large enough return to take on these risks. So it’s not just solving the return side. We really have to solve the risk side, which means we work with our regulators and state legislators to get to the right answer. That’ll be an ongoing process. There are no silver bullets, but every day our teams across utilities are working hard to reduce that risk, recognizing the fundamental risk of the wildfires is not going away.
你承擔與該資產相關的明確風險，就能獲得非常固定的回報，而這已經遠遠超出了這個範疇。我們無法獲得這種回報，也無法獲得足夠高的回報來承擔這些風險。因此，這不僅僅是解決回報面的問題。我們真的必須解決風險面的問題，這意味著我們需要與監管機構和州立法者合作，以找到正確的解決方案。這將是一個持續的過程。沒有什麼萬靈丹，但每天我們各公用事業團隊都在努力降低這種風險，同時認識到野火的根本風險不會消失。

Warren Buffett: There’s some problems that can’t be solved, and we shouldn’t be in the business of taking investors’ money and tackling things that we don’t know the solution for. You can present the arguments, but it’s a political decision when you are dealing with states or the federal government.
華倫·巴菲特：有些問題是無法解決的，我們不應該拿投資人的錢去處理那些我們不知道解決方案的事情。你可以提出論點，但當你與州政府或聯邦政府打交道時，這是一個政治決策。

If you’re in something where you’re going to lose, the big thing to do is quit. You present your case as well as you can, but if you don’t hold the pen in the end, we don’t have any business taking your money and doing dumb things with it. We can do our best to explain what the intelligent things are, but it’s your money.
如果你參與的事情註定會失敗，最重要的就是退出。你可以盡力陳述你的立場，但如果最終決策權不在你手上，我們就不該拿你的錢去做愚蠢的事。我們會盡力說明什麼才是明智之舉，但錢終究是你的。

It’s very hard to tell how to handle politically determined decisions that are going to go to court in many cases. We know what we think a sensible system would be, and we ought to explain what we think it is and do the best to get our position because it’s pro-social to have the right solution. But there’s some problems that can’t be solved, and we are not in the business of trying to solve insolvable problems.
面對那些政治決策（很多最終會鬧上法庭）該如何應對，實在難以判斷。我們清楚自己認為合理的制度是什麼，也應該闡明立場並努力爭取，因為正確的解決方案對社會有益。但有些問題就是無解，我們從事的不是解決無解問題的行業。

The problem you have, of course, is that the people that work for you – that’s their job. So they want to have reasons to keep going. Those are tough choices if you’re managing, but that’s why they have managers.
當然，你面臨的問題在於：為你工作的人——那是他們的職責所在。所以他們會想方設法持續推進。這些對管理者來說都是艱難抉擇，但這正是需要管理者的原因。

Greg Abel: I was just going to add that effectively, for example with the utilities and the wildfires, we can’t just become the insurer of last resort that’s going to cover any cost and all costs irrespective of what occurred. That’s a little bit of the situation we’re in right now with our largest challenge, a 2020 wildfire.
格雷格·阿貝爾：我正要補充說明，實際上，以公用事業和野火為例，我們不能單純成為最後的保險人，承擔無論發生什麼情況的所有成本。這正是我們目前面臨的最大挑戰——2020 年野火事件所處的狀況。

There were four fires occurring at a challenging time. One we’ve always asserted was a lightning strike that was not inside our service territory. The fire burnt into our service territory and we became responsible for that fire effectively through the courts. We continue to hold firm that we’re not responsible for that – we didn’t contribute to it, we didn’t initiate it, nor did we feel we ever contributed to it. But it’s getting to where if you look at the risk that’s there, we have to manage through things like that.
當時有四場火災在一個極具挑戰性的時期同時發生。其中一場我們始終堅稱是由雷擊引起，且起火點不在我們的服務區域內。火勢蔓延至我們的服務區後，法院判決我們需對該火災負責。我們持續堅持認為自己不應對此負責——我們既未促成火災，也未引發火災，更不認為自己曾對此有過任何影響。但現實情況是，當你審視現存風險時，我們必須透過各種方式來應對此類事件。

We’ll get through that litigation. We’re happy to report, for example, on that one, after 5 years, the Oregon Forestry Department has come out and said the other fires we did have that we were able to manage and extinguish did not contribute to that fire. And that fourth fire is the largest fire of the four – it’s 60% of the claims. We’re 5 years into effectively getting that information into the courts.
我們終將度過這場訴訟。例如我們很高興能報告，經過五年後，俄勒岡州林業部門已出面說明，我們當時確實有其他火災但成功控制並撲滅的火勢，並未助長那場大火。而那第四場火災是四場中規模最大的——佔索賠金額的 60%。我們花了五年時間才有效地將這些資訊提交至法院。

That will outline our legal strategy going forward, but these are things we’re dealing with. We continue to learn from this as a utility industry. We’re working with each of the legislators to make sure we get clear definition of where liability falls, what the economic damages can be, but most importantly, what the non-economic damages can be. Again, with the thought we can’t be the insurer of last resort. We just can’t be responsible for everything that happens in a state.
這將概述我們未來的法律策略，但這些都是我們正在處理的事項。作為公用事業行業，我們持續從中學習。我們正與每位立法者合作，以確保能明確界定責任歸屬、可能的經濟損害賠償，但最重要的是非經濟損害賠償的範圍。再次強調，我們不能成為最後的保險人。我們無法對州內發生的所有事情負責。

Warren Buffett: If we want to do it with our own money, we can do it, but we’re not going to do things with your money that we think are stupid. You ought to get rid of us if we do. It’s easier to do stupid things with other people’s money than it is with your own. That’s one of the problems government has generally – we don’t want to bring it to private enterprise.
華倫·巴菲特：如果我們想用自己的錢去做，我們可以做到，但我們不會用你們的錢去做我們認為愚蠢的事。如果我們這麼做，你們應該擺脫我們。用別人的錢做蠢事比用自己的錢容易得多。這是政府普遍面臨的問題之一——我們不想把它帶到私營企業中。

But it is important that the United States have an intelligent energy policy, just as it was important during World War II that we learned how to make ships instead of cars extremely fast. We figured out the answer. We combined private enterprise with the power of government.
但重要的是美國需要有一個明智的能源政策，就像二戰期間我們學會如何極快地製造船隻而不是汽車一樣重要。我們找到了答案。我們將私營企業的力量與政府的力量結合起來。

But how feasible that is in a democracy – it was clearly obvious during World War II what needed to be done and we did it. But it’s not so clear when you get 330 million people all arguing their own self-interest and having the people often who are making the decisions reacting as they did 20 years earlier, when they don’t really bear the responsibility for the decision. But anyway, that’s management and we’ll do our best.
但在民主制度中這有多可行——二戰期間需要做什麼是顯而易見的，我們做到了。但當你有 3.3 億人都在爭論自己的利益，而決策者常常像 20 年前那樣反應，卻不真正承擔決策責任時，情況就不那麼清楚了。但無論如何，這是管理問題，我們會盡力而為。

Audience Member (Zone 11): Hello, my name is Alitia Burk and I’m from Poland but I currently live in Chicago. This question is on behalf of an inspiring man that I know, Wid Ahmed, who’s here with us today.
觀眾（11 區）：您好，我是 Alitia Burk，來自波蘭但現居芝加哥。這個問題是代表今天在場的一位激勵人心的男士 Wid Ahmed 所提出的。

Mr. Buffett, nearly 74 years ago, on a cold Saturday in January 1951, you traveled 8 hours by train from New York to Washington. You went all the way on nothing but hope that someone might teach you more about the insurance industry. Arriving at GEICO’s office to find the doors locked, you persisted until a janitor let you inside. You credit that meeting with Lorimer Davidson for the insurance float that was the rocket fuel behind Berkshire’s success.
巴菲特先生，將近 74 年前，在 1951 年 1 月一個寒冷的星期六，您從紐約坐了 8 小時火車到華盛頓。您僅憑著希望有人能教您更多保險業知識的念頭一路前行。抵達 GEICO 辦公室發現大門緊鎖時，您堅持不懈直到一位清潔工讓您進入。您將那次與 Lorimer Davidson 的會面視為伯克希爾成功背後火箭燃料——保險浮存金的關鍵。

In 2011, when I was 15, I wrote to you with similar determination asking to meet. You kindly wrote back saying you had only 3,000 days left and more pressing priorities. Well, Mr. Buffett, it’s now been 5,000 days since you replied. And so inspired by your persistence in 1951 and the tenacity of Mrs. B, I humbly renew my request for just a quarter of the time Davey gave you – a single hour in your office.
2011 年，當我 15 歲時，我懷著相似的決心寫信請求與您會面。您友善地回信表示您只剩 3,000 天且還有更緊迫的優先事項。如今，巴菲特先生，距離您回信已過了 5,000 天。受到您 1951 年的堅持和 B 夫人的韌性啟發，我謙卑地再次請求您給予我戴維當初給您時間的四分之一——僅需在您辦公室停留一小時。

You may wonder why must it be you? You have often shared an anecdote about a Polish Jew who survived Auschwitz who said to you once, “Warren, I’m very slow to make friends because when I look at someone I ask myself, would they hide me?” You said that the number of people would hide you was the best test of a life well lived. Well, I believe that at this meeting you have not 40,000 shareholders but 40,000 people who would hide you. You are testament to a life extraordinarily well-lived.
你可能會想，為什麼非得是你？你常分享一個關於一位從奧斯威辛集中營倖存的波蘭猶太人的軼事，他曾對你說：「華倫，我交朋友很慢，因為當我看著一個人時，我會問自己，他們會藏匿我嗎？」你說，願意藏匿你的人數，是衡量人生是否過得好的最佳標準。嗯，我相信在這次會議上，你擁有的不是四萬名股東，而是四萬名願意藏匿你的人。你非凡精彩的人生就是最好的證明。

So respectfully I ask again Mr. Buffett, before father time wins, will you please grant Wid Ahmed an hour of your time or any time you can dedicate?
因此，我再次恭敬地請求巴菲特先生，在時間老人獲勝之前，您能否撥冗給予 Wid Ahmed 一小時或任何您能抽出的時間？

Warren Buffett: I grant an hour to everybody of the 40,000 here. We’ll have an interesting time the rest of my life.
華倫·巴菲特：我給在場四萬人每人一小時。我們將在我餘生中擁有有趣的時光。

But I will give you one tip. I found that when I was very young, I would drive around to various companies all over the country. Because I was very young and these were offbeat companies, they didn’t have investor relations departments then, almost every CEO would see me because they figured they’d never see me again. And they weren’t getting calls like that.
但我會給你一個小建議。我發現當我很年輕的時候，我會開車跑遍全國各地拜訪各種公司。因為我那時非常年輕，而且這些都是非主流的公司，那時候它們還沒有投資者關係部門，幾乎每位執行長都會見我，因為他們覺得以後再也不會見到我了。而且他們那時也沒接到過這樣的電話。

I would ask them two questions. I would explain to them – it’s not a bad idea, incidentally – if you’re going to walk into somebody’s office and you say you want 10 minutes of their time, take an hourglass and stick it on the desk of the person you’re talking to and turn it up so it’s going to go for 10 minutes. You say you’re going to leave in 10 minutes unless they ask you to stay. That sets the terms.
我會問他們兩個問題。我會向他們解釋——順帶一提，這不是個壞主意——如果你要進某人的辦公室並表示需要 10 分鐘時間，不妨帶個沙漏放在對方桌上，倒過來計時 10 分鐘。告訴對方除非他們要求你留下，否則你會在 10 分鐘後離開。這樣就設定了時間條件。

But once you have that, if they’re in the coal business, which happened to be one that I was interested in 70 years ago or so, you just ask them one question: if they were to be stuck on a desert island and they had to own only one of their competitors’ stock during the 10 years they were going to be on that island, which one would it be, and why? And then after they give you that answer, you ask the same thing if they were to short one of their competitors’ stock, which would it be and why?
但一旦獲得許可（對方若從事煤礦業——這恰好是我約 70 年前感興趣的行業），你只需問一個問題：如果他們被困在荒島上，十年間只能持有競爭對手其中一家的股票，他們會選哪家？為什麼？等他們回答後，再問：如果要放空競爭對手其中一家的股票，他們會選哪家？為什麼？

Because every manager likes to talk about their competitors. They’re like little school kids when they get into talking about their competitors. I probably learned more about various industries by just making sure that they didn’t think I’d stay too long and that in the meantime they would have the floor and talk about their competitors. I kept my own mouth shut in those days. That’s a lesson I’ve lost somewhere along the line.
因為每位經理人都喜歡談論他們的競爭對手。當他們開始談論競爭對手時，就像小學生一樣興奮。我可能只是確保他們不認為我會待太久，同時讓他們暢所欲言地談論競爭對手，就從中學到了各行各業的許多事情。那時候我總是保持沉默。這個教訓我後來不知怎麼就忘了。

They’ve departmentalized investor relations in all companies of size frankly now. You’ve got 3,000 companies or whatever they have and they all have departments and each one of them has an investor relations department. Their job is to say this is the best thing you can do today is buy our stock. Well, that whole concept is total idiocy. But it’s a big business and it gets bigger and the investor relations department gets bigger. It’s what we have now.
坦白說，現在所有規模的公司都將投資者關係部門化了。大概有三千家公司吧，每家公司都有部門，每個部門又設有投資者關係部門。他們的工作就是告訴你：今天最該做的事就是買我們公司的股票。這種概念簡直荒謬至極。但這是一門大生意，而且越做越大，投資者關係部門也越來越龐大。這就是我們現在的狀況。

But do a little of your own work your own way. Berkshire Hathaway has got plenty of material out there for you to read. And when you get through reading it all, you’ll know way more than most the people that work at Berkshire. So, you don’t need a personal interview. If we take an hour times even the 40,000 people we may have here, plus Becky’s many listeners and viewers, it just doesn’t work. I admire your effort, but you’ll just have to settle for the admiration that you get.
但請用你自己的方式做些功課。波克夏·海瑟威有大量資料供你閱讀。當你全部讀完後，你會比大多數在波克夏工作的人懂得更多。所以，你不需要個人面談。如果我們花一小時，乘以這裡可能有的四萬人，再加上貝琪的眾多聽眾和觀眾，這根本行不通。我欣賞你的努力，但你只能滿足於獲得的讚賞。

Becky Quick: This is a question that you touched on in a lot of ways in the last answer, but I did get this question from a few different people, so I’d like to ask it.
貝琪·奎克：這個問題你在上一個回答中已經以多種方式觸及，但我確實從幾位不同的人那裡收到這個問題，所以我想提出來。

Ricardo Bri, a longtime shareholder based in Panama, says that he was very happy to see Berkshire acquire 100% of BHE. It was done in two steps: one in late 2022 – 1% was purchased from Greg Abel for $870 million implying a valuation of BHE of $87 billion, and then in 2024 the remaining 8% was purchased from the family of Walter Scott Jr. for $3.9 billion implying a valuation of $48.8 billion for the enterprise. That second larger transaction represented a 44% reduction in valuation in just two years.
來自巴拿馬的長期股東里卡多·布里表示，他非常高興看到波克夏收購了 BHE 的 100%股權。這分兩步完成：第一步是在 2022 年底——以 8.7 億美元從格雷格·阿貝爾手中收購了 1%的股份，這意味著 BHE 的估值為 870 億美元；然後在 2024 年，以 39 億美元從沃爾特·斯科特 Jr.的家族手中收購了剩餘的 8%，這意味著企業估值為 488 億美元。這第二筆較大的交易代表估值在短短兩年內下降了 44%。

Ricardo writes that PacifiCorp liabilities seem too small to explain this. Therefore, what factors contributed to the difference in value for BHE between those two moments in time?
里卡多寫道，PacifiCorp 的負債似乎太小，無法解釋這一點。那麼，是什麼因素導致了 BHE 在這兩個時間點的價值差異？

Warren Buffett: Well, we don’t know how much we’ll lose out of PacifiCorp and decisions that are made, but we also know that certain of the attitudes demonstrated by that particular example have analogues throughout the utility system. There are a lot of states that so far have been very good to operate in, and there are some now that are rat poison, as Charlie would say, to operate in.
華倫·巴菲特：嗯，我們不知道我們會因為 PacifiCorp 和所做的決定損失多少，但我們也知道，那個特定例子所展示的某些態度在整個公用事業系統中有相似之處。有很多州到目前為止對運營非常友好，但也有一些現在就像查理會說的，對運營來說是老鼠藥。

That knowledge was accentuated when we saw what happened in the Pacific Northwest, and it’s eventuated by what we’ve seen as to how utilities have been treated in certain other situations. So it wasn’t just a direct question of what was involved at PacifiCorp. It was an extrapolation of a societal trend.
當我們看到太平洋西北部發生的事情時，這種認識更加強烈，並且我們在其它某些情況下看到的公用事業如何被對待也證實了這一點。所以這不僅僅是關於 PacifiCorp 所涉及的直接問題，而是對社會趨勢的一種推斷。

Secondly, we also had a decision we didn’t expect at all in the real estate business. Those kind of things can change values, and courts can change values. It’s a lot easier to make those decisions when you just own marketable securities than when you own businesses. I’ve made plenty of those decisions as I’ve watched what has happened in various industries and companies over 70 years.
其次，我們在房地產業務中也遇到了一個完全出乎意料的決策。這類事情會改變價值，法院也能改變價值。當你只持有可流通證券時，做出這些決定要容易得多，而當你擁有企業時就沒那麼簡單了。過去 70 年來，我在觀察各行各業和公司變遷的過程中，已經做過無數這樣的決定了。

Greg made the decision, which was fine with us, to get out. He had no knowledge of what was going to be happening in either the real estate field or the utility field.
葛雷格做出了退出的決定，我們對此沒有異議。他當時對房地產領域或公用事業領域即將發生的事情一無所知。

We’re not in the mood to sell any business. But Berkshire Hathaway Energy is worth considerably less money than it was two years ago based on societal factors. And that happens in some of our businesses. It certainly happened to our textile business. The public utility business is not as good a business as it was a couple of years ago.
我們目前無意出售任何業務。但基於社會因素，波克夏能源現在的價值比兩年前低得多。這種情況在我們某些業務中確實會發生。我們的紡織業務就曾遭遇過。現在的公用事業已不如幾年前那麼優質了。

If anybody doesn’t believe that, they can look at Hawaiian Electric and look at Edison in the current wildfires situation in California. There are societal trends that are changing things.
若有人不信，可以看看夏威夷電力公司，再看看加州當前野火形勢下的愛迪生公司。社會趨勢正在改變許多事情。

I just got a note here on my monitor that says the books are now sold out. So you’ll have to spend your money on other things.
我剛剛在螢幕上看到一則通知，說書已經賣完了。所以你們得把錢花在其他東西上了。

But that’s the explanation – values change and they don’t always change upward. When we made the deal with Greg, we would have been happy to buy out the Scott family at that price. And when we made a deal with the Scott company, we wouldn’t have been happy to pay Greg the price that he received.
但這就是原因——價值會改變，而且不總是向上變動。當我們和 Greg 達成協議時，我們本來很樂意以那個價格買斷 Scott 家族。而當我們和 Scott 公司達成協議時，我們就不會願意付給 Greg 他後來得到的那個價格了。

But that’s like Berkshire shares – we bought in stock at X and we buy in stock at less than X if conditions change. Over the years we pay more and more because it builds in value, but it doesn’t do it in a straight line.
但這就像 Berkshire 的股票——我們以 X 價格買進股票，如果條件改變，我們也會以低於 X 的價格買進。多年來我們支付的價格越來越高，因為它在增值，但這不是一條直線上升的過程。

I would say that our enthusiasm for buying public utility companies is different now than it would have been a couple years ago. That happens in other industries, too, but it’s pretty dramatic in public utilities. And it’s particularly dramatic in public utilities because they are going to need lots of money. So, if you’re going to need lots of money, you probably ought to behave in a way that encourages people to give you lots of money.
我會說，我們現在對收購公用事業公司的熱情，和幾年前相比已經不同了。這種情況在其他行業也會發生，但在公用事業領域特別明顯。而且公用事業之所以特別明顯，是因為它們將需要大量資金。所以，如果你需要大量資金，你或許應該以一種能鼓勵人們給你大量資金的方式行事。

We will see where we go. We’d like to see public utilities do well, but our responsibilities are to the shareholders of Berkshire.
我們會看看未來走向何方。我們希望公用事業能表現良好，但我們的首要責任是對波克夏的股東負責。

Audience Member (Zone 1): Dear Warren, dear Greg, dear fellow owners, it’s such a pleasure to be here. My name is Revy Paneida. I was born in communist Albania, but I’m now teaching economics in London, England. The wonderful writing of Warren and Charlie has significantly shaped my thinking and teaching. I thank you both very much for the many insights over the years.
觀眾席成員（第一區）：親愛的華倫、親愛的葛雷格，親愛的各位股東同僚，非常榮幸能來到這裡。我是瑞維·帕內達，出生於共產主義時期的阿爾巴尼亞，現在英國倫敦教授經濟學。華倫和查理精彩的著作深深影響了我的思考與教學方式，非常感謝兩位多年來帶來的諸多洞見。

Warren has often written about the importance of Berkshire’s earning power to owners. My question is, what was in your estimate Berkshire’s earning power in the latest fiscal year? It would be great if you can comment on any significant items that either increased or decreased the earning power as compared to reported net income measures for Berkshire. Thank you.
華倫經常在著作中談到波克夏盈利能力對股東的重要性。我的問題是，根據您的估算，波克夏在最近一個財政年度的盈利能力如何？若能進一步說明相較於財報淨利潤指標，有哪些重大項目提升或削弱了盈利能力，將不勝感激。謝謝。

Warren Buffett: Well, I think our underlying earning power was affected negatively here a while back by what happened in the utility field. I think that our earning power was not enlarged by any large acquisitions that come along, but they come along periodically. We will see something at some point that could add to earning power. I mean, why else would we do it?
華倫·巴菲特：嗯，我認為我們的基礎盈利能力在一段時間前受到公用事業領域事件的負面影響。我認為我們的盈利能力並未因任何大型收購而擴大，但這些收購會定期出現。我們將來會看到可能增強盈利能力的機會。我的意思是，否則我們為什麼要這麼做呢？

That’s very situational and of course it depends so much on what the general market is doing and what interest rates are doing and what psychology is doing. We will make our best deals when people are the most pessimistic. That’s been true ever since I was born in 1930. Things got much more attractive over the next two years, and apparently I didn’t do anything about it – I blew it by worrying about the kid in the next crib or something.
這非常取決於具體情況，當然也很大程度上取決於整體市場的表現、利率的變化以及市場心理。我們總是在人們最悲觀的時候達成最佳交易。這自我 1930 年出生以來就是如此。接下來的兩年情況變得更加誘人，但顯然我當時什麼也沒做——我可能忙著擔心隔壁嬰兒床的小孩之類的，結果錯過了機會。

Over my lifetime I’ve had fabulous opportunities sometimes, and they happen because humans are human. I don’t get fearful by things that other people are afraid of in a financial way. The idea that if Berkshire went down 50% next week – I would regard that as a fantastic opportunity and it wouldn’t bother me in the least. Most people react differently.
在我的一生中，有時會出現絕佳的機會，而這些機會之所以存在正是因為人性使然。對於金融領域中他人恐懼的事物，我從不感到害怕。如果伯克希爾下週股價下跌 50%——我會視之為絕佳機會，這完全不會困擾我。大多數人的反應則截然不同。

It’s not that I don’t have emotions, but I don’t have emotions about the prices of stocks. Those decisions get all the way to my brain, whereas emotions can get bogged down some other place.
不是說我沒有情緒，而是我對股票價格沒有情緒。這些決策會直達我的大腦，而情緒可能會在其他地方受阻。

Berkshire will increase its earning power over time as we retain money. We are making decisions every day. People are working. We’re retaining earnings. We will build the earning power, but it won’t be coming in any even stream. And it certainly won’t be matched dollar for dollar on either the upside or the downside in market prices. But that’s what makes it a good business – the investment business is that everything isn’t properly appraised, and the more fearful other people get, the better your opportunities get.
隨著我們保留資金，波克夏的盈利能力將隨著時間推移而增強。我們每天都在做決策。人們在工作。我們在保留盈餘。我們將建立盈利能力，但它不會以任何均勻的流動呈現。當然，它也不會在市場價格的上漲或下跌中一美元對一美元地匹配。但這正是使它成為一門好生意的原因——投資業務就是並非所有東西都被正確估價，其他人越恐懼，你的機會就越好。

Becky Quick: This question comes from Achie Patel and it’s about the big cap technology stocks. In the 2017 annual meeting, you said Warren, you really don’t need any money to run these companies and referred to them as ideal businesses, referring to the big tech companies – Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft, and Amazon. With all of those companies now announcing massive capital investment endeavors around AI ambitions, have you rethought the above comment just in terms of them being asset light and what you think of them as a result?
貝琪·奎克：這個問題來自 Achie Patel，是關於大型科技股的。在 2017 年的年度股東大會上，華倫，你說過這些公司基本上不需要任何資金就能運營，並稱它們為理想的企業，指的是那些大型科技公司——蘋果、字母控股（谷歌母公司）、微軟和亞馬遜。現在這些公司都宣布圍繞 AI 野心進行大規模資本投資計劃，你是否重新考慮了上述評論，特別是在它們資產輕盈這方面，以及你因此對它們的看法？

Warren Buffett: Well, it’s always better to make a lot of money without putting up anything than it is to make a lot of money by putting up a lot of money.
華倫·巴菲特：嗯，能不用投入任何資本就賺大錢，當然比投入大量資本才能賺大錢要好得多。

A business that takes no capital to speak of – Coca-Cola, the finished product which has gone through bottling companies takes a lot of capital, but in terms of selling the syrup or concentrate, that doesn’t take a lot of capital. So, one is a fabulous business and one depends where it is.
一個幾乎不需要資本的企業——可口可樂，成品經過裝瓶公司需要大量資本，但就銷售糖漿或濃縮液而言，這不需要太多資本。所以，一個是極好的生意，另一個則取決於它所處的位置。

Coca-Cola is popular every place, but if you’re in the bottling business, it costs real money. You have real trucks out there and all kinds of machinery and capital expenditures coming up. We’ve got businesses that take very little capital that make really high returns on capital. The ones the politicians talk about as making high returns actually aren’t making high returns usually in terms of capital.
可口可樂在全球各地都很受歡迎，但如果你從事裝瓶業務，那需要投入真正的資金。你需要實際的卡車、各種機械設備，以及即將到來的資本支出。我們有些業務只需極少資本，卻能實現極高的資本回報率。政客們口中那些所謂高回報的企業，通常從資本角度來看其實回報並不高。

Property casualty insurance is kind of a rare business because you need capital as a guarantee fund that you will keep your promises, but you can use it to buy other low capital-intensive businesses. You can buy Apple and have it support that business. That can be a pretty good business and it’s one of the reasons we’ve done well over time.
財產意外保險是一種特殊的業務，因為你需要資本作為履行承諾的保證基金，但你可以用這些資金收購其他低資本密集型的業務。你可以買進蘋果公司的股票來支持這項業務。這可能是相當不錯的生意，也是我們長期以來表現優異的原因之一。

It’ll be interesting to see how much capital intensity there is now with the Magnificent 7 compared to a few years ago. Basically, Apple has not really needed any capital over the years and it’s repurchased shares with a dramatic reduction. Whether that world is the same in the future or not is something yet to be seen.
觀察現在的「科技七巨頭」與幾年前相比的資本密集度會很有趣。基本上，蘋果這些年來幾乎不需要任何資本，反而透過大幅度的股票回購減少了資本。未來這個世界是否會保持相同模式，還有待觀察。

Hollywood’s answer was always to get their money from other people to put up the capital. A lot of people have gotten very rich in the country by essentially figuring out how to get others to put up the capital. That’s what people do in the money management business – they get very rich because they get an override on other people’s capital.
好萊塢的解決方案總是從他人那裡獲取資金來提供資本。在這個國家，許多人通過實質上想出如何讓他人提供資本而變得非常富有。這就是人們在資金管理業務中所做的——他們變得非常富有，因為他們能從他人的資本中抽取佣金。

Incidentally, if all of you were paying 1% for investment management fees at Berkshire last year, you would have paid $8 billion for managing, and you really wouldn’t have had to do it. Investment management is a very good game because other people put up the capital and you charge them for the capital whether they do well or not, and then you charge them a lot more if they do well. It’s a well-designed business for the people who practice it – and who can blame them? That is capitalism.
順帶一提，如果去年你們所有人都在波克夏支付 1%的投資管理費，你們將為管理支付 80 億美元，而實際上你們根本不需要這麼做。投資管理是一門非常有利可圖的生意，因為別人提供資本，無論他們表現好壞，你都會對這些資本收費，如果他們表現好，你還會收取更多費用。這對從事這一行的人來說是一門設計精良的生意——誰又能責怪他們呢？這就是資本主義。

I saw that in operation when I was working at Salomon, but I didn’t need to see it. I knew what existed anyway. The trick in life is to get somebody else’s capital and get an override on it. Charlie and I decided it wasn’t too elegant a business after a while. We were not criticizing the efficacy of it – it just didn’t appeal to us after a while. I did it for 12 years though.
我在所羅門工作時親眼見證過這種操作，但其實不需要親眼所見，我早就知道這種模式存在。人生的訣竅在於運用他人資金並從中獲取超額收益。查理和我後來認為這終究不是門體面的生意——我們並非質疑其有效性，只是逐漸對它失去了興趣。不過我確實幹了十二年。

The one difference that Charlie and I did from other people is we put all our own money into it. So we really did share the losses with our own capital, but we got an override on other people’s capital. People have made advances where they get the override on other people’s capital without putting up any of their own capital to speak of. That’s a very good business, but it can lead to a lot of abuse.
查理和我與眾不同之處在於，我們把自己的全部資金都投入其中。因此我們確實是用自己的資本與他人共擔虧損，但同時也從他人資金中獲取超額收益。有些人發展出更先進的模式——他們幾乎不用投入自有資金，就能從他人資本中獲取超額收益。這確實是門好生意，但也可能導致大量弊端。

Warren Buffett: Capitalism in the United States has succeeded like nothing you’ve ever seen. But what it is is a combination of this magnificent cathedral which has produced an economy like nothing the world’s ever seen, and then it’s got this massive casino attached.
華倫·巴菲特：美國資本主義取得的成功前所未見。但這個體系本質上由兩部分組成——一座創造出史無前例經濟奇蹟的宏偉教堂，旁邊卻附設著巨型賭場。

In the casino, everybody’s having a good time and there’s lots of money changing hands, but the cathedral is what you’ve got to make sure gets fed too. The temptation is very high now to go over to the casino where people say we’ve got magic boxes and all kinds of things that’ll do wonderful things for you. That’s where people are happiest, where you get the most promises, where the most money is for the people that are pushing things.
在賭場裡，每個人都玩得很開心，大量金錢在流轉，但你必須確保大教堂也能得到滋養。現在誘惑非常大，人們會走向賭場那邊，那裡有人說我們有神奇的盒子，還有各種能為你創造奇蹟的東西。那裡是人們最快樂的地方，也是承諾最多的地方，更是推動這些事物的人能賺取最多金錢的地方。

The balance between the casino and the cathedral – it’s very important that the United States in the next hundred years make sure that the cathedral is not overtaken by the casino. People really like to go to casinos – it’s just so much more fun. They bring bells when you win, they bring you drinks and everything else. It’s designed to move money from one pocket to another.
賭場與大教堂之間的平衡——對美國來說，在未來一百年確保大教堂不被賭場超越是非常重要的。人們真的很喜歡去賭場——那裡有趣多了。你贏錢時他們會搖鈴，還會給你送飲料等等。這一切都是設計來讓金錢從一個口袋轉移到另一個口袋。

In the cathedral, they’re designing things that will be producing goods and services for 300 and some million people like it’s never been done before in history. It’s an interesting system we developed, but it’s worked. It dispenses rewards in what seems like a terribly capricious manner. The idea that people get what they deserve in life – it’s hard to make that argument. But if you argue with it that any other system works better, the answer is we haven’t found one.
在這座大教堂裡，他們正在設計一些將為三億多人生產商品和服務的東西，這是歷史上從未有過的。我們開發的這個系統很有趣，但它確實有效。它以一種看似極其反覆無常的方式分配獎勵。認為人們在生活中得到了他們應得的東西——這個觀點很難成立。但如果你認為其他任何系統會更好，答案是我們還沒有找到一個。

Audience Member (Zone 2): Hi, my name is Patrick Nester. I am 13 years old and from Tampa, Florida. I’m here with my brother John who’s 15 and my dad. Thank you for hosting this meeting. This is my first ever shareholder meeting. My question is, what high school class or activity helped influence you to who you are today as the greatest investor of all time?
觀眾成員（第二區）：嗨，我是派翠克·內斯特。我 13 歲，來自佛羅里達州的坦帕市。我和 15 歲的弟弟約翰以及爸爸一起來這裡。謝謝你們舉辦這次會議。這是我第一次參加股東大會。我的問題是，哪門高中課程或活動對您成為有史以來最偉大的投資者產生了影響？

Warren Buffett: The teachers you get in your life have this incredible impression on you, and a lot of it are the formal teachers you have, but some are informal teachers too. I’ve learned from certain employers so much. You really hope you’re learning from everybody you find who’s well-intentioned and has had a lot of experience. I had a lot of good luck in that.
華倫·巴菲特：你生命中的老師對你有著難以置信的影響，其中很多是你正式的老師，但也有一些是非正式的老師。我從某些雇主那裡學到了很多。你真的希望你能從每一個你遇到的、有良好意願且經驗豐富的人那裡學習。在這方面我很幸運。

I would say that where I was really lucky was my dad was in the investment business. So I would go down on Saturday and I’d wait for him to go to lunch, and I’d read the books that were around there that nobody else ever read. Numbers talk to me, and I could never get my fill of them.
我想說我真正幸運的是，我父親從事投資行業。所以每週六我會跟著他去辦公室，等他去吃午餐時，我就會翻閱那些擺在那裡、沒人會讀的書。數字對我說話，而我永遠無法滿足於它們。

Then I discovered the public library and I read every book there was on investments, literally, in the Omaha public library. I enjoyed learning about that. Unlike Charlie – if Charlie was reading about electricity, he would want to have known everything that Thomas Edison knew and more, and go through the same thought processes and understand how everything worked. I didn’t care how it worked. I just cared whether it worked. That’s a limitation – I’m confessing here, I’m not bragging.
後來我發現了公共圖書館，我讀遍了奧馬哈公共圖書館裡所有關於投資的書，真的是每一本。我享受學習這些知識的過程。不像查理——如果查理在讀關於電力的書，他會想知道湯瑪斯·愛迪生所知道的一切甚至更多，並且經歷相同的思考過程，理解一切是如何運作的。我不在乎它是如何運作的，我只在乎它是否有效。這是一個限制——我在這裡坦白，不是在吹噓。

As Charlie would say, people would always ask, “If you could only have lunch with one person living or dead, who would it be?” And Charlie said, “I’ve already had lunch with all of them because I’ve read all their books.”
就像查理常說的，人們總是會問：「如果你只能和一個在世或已故的人共進午餐，那會是誰？」而查理說：「我已經和他們所有人都共進過午餐了，因為我讀過他們所有的書。」

I think having curiosity and finding sympathetic teachers is very useful. I ran into a couple of teachers both in high school and college. In fact, I would say that I went to three different universities and I went to high school in Washington, and at each place I found about two or three really outstanding people. I just spent my time with them and didn’t pay much attention to the other classes.
我認為保持好奇心並找到志同道合的老師非常有用。我在高中和大學期間都遇到了幾位這樣的老師。事實上，我讀過三所不同的大學，高中則是在華盛頓讀的，在每個地方我都找到了兩三位真正出類拔萃的人。我只把時間花在他們身上，對其他課程就不太在意。

I was lucky to find something that fit me very early on. If my ambition had been to become a ventriloquist or whatever it might have been, it wouldn’t have worked. I just spent hours and hours and hours on investing.
我很幸運很早就找到適合自己的方向。如果我的志向是成為腹語師或什麼的，那可能就行不通了。我只是把無數個小時都花在投資上。

I don’t believe in that book that talked about spending 10,000 hours at something. I could spend 10,000 hours at tap dancing and you’d throw up if you watched me. But if I spent 10 hours reading Ben Graham, I would be damn smart when I got through.
我不相信那本談論花一萬小時在某件事上的書。就算我花一萬小時學踢踏舞，你看我跳的話大概會吐。但如果我花十小時讀班·葛拉漢的書，讀完後我會變得很聰明。

Minds are really different. I watch great bridge players, great physicians – people have really different talents. I think you’re supposed to have 88 billion cells in your brain. I’m not sure that all of mine are flashing bright lights, but you are different than anybody else. That’s what my dad always used to tell me – that you’re something different. It may not be good at the moment, but you find your own path and you will find the people in schooling that want to talk to you.
每個人的心智確實大不相同。我觀察過頂尖的橋牌玩家、傑出的醫生——人們擁有截然不同的天賦。據說人腦應該有 880 億個細胞，我不確定我的每個細胞都在閃耀光芒，但你就是與眾不同。這是我父親常對我說的話——你是獨一無二的。當下或許不見得順遂，但你要找到自己的路，在求學過程中會遇到願意與你對話的人。

People that teach, in general, love having a young student who’s actually really interested in the subject, and they’ll spend extra time with you. I ran into that. I had Graham and Dodd at Columbia. Dave Dodd treated me like a son basically. But I was interested in what they were saying and they found it kind of entertaining that I was so interested, so I would look around at what really fascinates you. I wouldn’t try and be somebody else.
通常來說，教師們都喜歡遇到真正對學科感興趣的年輕學生，他們會願意為你多花時間。我就遇到這樣的情況——在哥倫比亞大學有葛拉漢與多德指導我。大衛·多德幾乎把我當兒子看待。因為我對他們講授的內容充滿興趣，他們也覺得我這股熱忱頗為有趣。所以建議你尋找真正令你著迷的事物，別試圖成為別人的複製品。

You’ll find the teachers at a school, and you’ll find some outstanding people that are teachers. I’ve had at least 10 people that have had huge impacts on my life, and every one of them was positive because I got to select, in a sense. A number of people really like helping younger people. I found that in school, and it probably helps to look a little bit lost like you need help.
在學校裡你會遇到老師，其中不乏一些非常出色的教育工作者。至少有十位老師對我的人生產生了巨大影響，而且每一位的影響都是正面的，因為某種程度上是我自己選擇了他們。許多人確實很樂意幫助年輕人。我在學校裡發現了這一點，而且表現得有點迷茫、看起來需要幫助可能反而有好處。

I would say my school experiences were good, but I attribute it much more to the individual than to the institutions.
我會說我的求學經歷是美好的，但我認為這更多歸功於個人而非教育機構。

Becky Quick: This question comes from Scott Williams in Portland, Oregon. He said, “Do you think the net benefit of DOGE will be positive or negative for the long-term health of the United States?”
貝琪·奎克：這個問題來自波特蘭的斯科特·威廉斯。他問：「你認為狗狗幣的淨效益對美國的長期健康發展會是正面還是負面？」

Warren Buffett: I think that bureaucracy is something that is amazingly prevalent and contagious even in our capital system, and big corporations overwhelmingly most of them look like they could be run better. I’m sure Berkshire does in many respects. And government is the ultimate. It really doesn’t have any checks on it.
華倫·巴菲特：我認為官僚主義在我們的資本體系中異常普遍且具有傳染性，絕大多數大企業看起來都可以經營得更好。我確信波克夏在很多方面也是如此。而政府是終極形態——它實際上沒有任何制衡機制。

That’s why it scares you to some extent about what the future of the currency will be, because they can print currency. If you have people that get elected by promising people things – that doesn’t mean that they aren’t sincere about all kinds of items, but there’s no politician that says to anybody that has money, “I really think you have bad breath and if you don’t mind, would you step away from me.” It just doesn’t happen.
這就是為什麼某種程度上你會對貨幣的未來感到擔憂，因為他們可以印鈔票。如果有政客靠承諾給予選民好處當選——這不代表他們對各種事項不真誠，但沒有哪個政客會對有錢人說：「我真的覺得你有口臭，不介意的話可以離我遠點。」這種事根本不會發生。

I think the problem of how you control revenue and expenses in government is the one that is never fully solved and has really hurt dramatically many civilizations. I don’t think we’re immune from it, and we’ve come close to it.
我認為如何控制政府收支的問題從未被徹底解決，且確實嚴重傷害過許多文明。我不認為我們能對此免疫，而且我們已經相當接近這個困境。

We’re operating at a fiscal deficit now that is unsustainable over a very long period of time. We don’t know whether that means two years or 20 years because there’s never been a country like the United States. But as Herbert Stein, the famous economist, said, “If something can’t go on forever, it will end.” We are doing something that is unsustainable, and it has the aspect to it that it gets uncontrollable to a certain point.
我們目前的財政赤字狀況長期來看是不可持續的。由於美國是史無前例的國家，我們無法確定這意味著兩年還是二十年。但正如著名經濟學家赫伯特·斯坦所言：「若某事無法永遠持續，它終將終結。」我們正在做不可持續的事，而且某種程度上它具有失控的風險。

Paul Volcker kept that from happening in the United States, but we came close. We’ve come close multiple times. We’ve still had very substantial inflation in the United States, but it’s never been runaway yet. That’s not something you want to try and experiment with because it feeds on itself.
保羅·沃爾克阻止了這種情況在美國發生，但我們曾經非常接近。我們多次瀕臨邊緣。美國仍經歷過非常嚴重的通貨膨脹，但至今尚未失控。這不是你想嘗試實驗的事情，因為它會自我強化。

I wouldn’t want the job of trying to correct what’s going on in revenue and expenditures of the United States with roughly a 7% gap when probably a 3% gap is sustainable. The further away you get from that, the more you get to where the uncontrollable begins. It’s a job I don’t want, but it’s a job I think should be done. And Congress does not seem good at doing it.
我不會想要接手這份工作——試圖糾正美國收支之間約 7%的缺口，而可能 3%的缺口才是可持續的。你偏離這個數字越遠，就越接近失控的邊緣。這不是我想要的工作，但我認為應該有人去做。而國會似乎並不擅長處理這件事。

We’ve got a lot of problems always as a country, but this is one we bring on ourselves. We have a revenue stream, a capital-producing stream, a brains-producing machine like the world has never seen. And if you picked a way to screw it up, it would involve the currency. That’s happened a lot of places.
作為一個國家，我們總是有很多問題，但這個問題是我們自己造成的。我們擁有世界前所未見的收益流、資本創造機制和人才培育體系。如果要選一種搞砸這一切的方式，那必定與貨幣有關。這種情況在很多地方都發生過。

In theory, you would make it so there was substantial downside for anybody that screwed things up, but there isn’t downside. There’s upside. It’s the problem of the most successful company in the history of the country, in the history of the world.
理論上，你會讓搞砸事情的人付出重大代價，但實際上並沒有。反而有好處。這是這個國家、乃至世界歷史上最成功企業所面臨的問題。

Audience Member (Zone 3): Hello Mr. Buffett. My name is Saskia from Germany, and first of all I want to thank you because you made such a great impact in my life and the lives of people I love, and that’s priceless.
觀眾成員（第三區）：您好，巴菲特先生。我是來自德國的 Saskia，首先我想感謝您，因為您對我和我所愛之人的生活產生了巨大影響，這是無價的。

Mr. Buffett, imagine it’s 1776 and you’re sitting alongside Benjamin Franklin helping to shape the foundation of a new nation. What core economic principles would you advocate for building a fair, resilient, and opportunity-driven capitalist society – one that supports long-term prosperity for future generations?
巴菲特先生，假設現在是 1776 年，您正與班傑明·富蘭克林並肩而坐，協助塑造一個新國家的基礎。您會提倡哪些核心經濟原則，來建立一個公平、有韌性且充滿機會的資本主義社會——一個能支持子孫後代長期繁榮的社會？

Warren Buffett: That’s a good question, but I would probably say to Ben Franklin, “You just keep thinking and don’t talk to me because you’ll come up with some better ideas than I will.” He was an incredibly remarkable person. He was almost probably the last person to almost have a grasp of every aspect of activity in the country.
華倫·巴菲特：這是個好問題，但我可能會對班傑明·富蘭克林說：「你繼續思考就好，別問我，因為你會想出比我更好的點子。」他是個非常了不起的人，幾乎可能是最後一個能掌握這個國家各方面活動的人。

He invented all kinds of things. Incidentally, we were talking about the power of compound interest – he left a will that left a sum of money to Philadelphia and another sum to Boston that would serve as an example for a couple hundred years of the power of compounding. He was so far ahead of his time that the best thing I could do if I was under that tree with him was to get out of his way and let him keep thinking.
他發明了各式各樣的東西。順帶一提，我們當時正在談論複利的威力——他留下一份遺囑，將一筆錢留給費城，另一筆留給波士頓，這些錢將作為複利力量的範例流傳數百年。他的思想遠遠超前於他所處的時代，如果當時我站在那棵樹下與他在一起，我能做的最好的事情就是不妨礙他，讓他繼續思考。

He saw the problems that success could bring to a society as well as other problems. The problems of how to take 8 billion people – because there’s no way we can separate ourselves from the rest of the world. We can be an example to the rest of the world, and I think it behooves us since we have had all this good fortune in this country and we do have a pretty good system.
他看到了成功可能給社會帶來的問題以及其他挑戰。如何應對 80 億人口的問題——因為我們無法將自己與世界其他地區隔絕。我們可以成為世界的榜樣，我認為既然我們在這個國家擁有如此好運，並且我們確實擁有一個相當不錯的體系，我們有責任這樣做。

I don’t think you get very far by lecturing the world on how you’re the one that should tell them what they should do with their lives. I think you get a certain amount of resentment when, just a few hundred years ago, a whole different group of countries were running the world, and now you start giving them advice. I think it’s a real mistake in communication or persuasion to lecture a bunch of people when you’ve just won the game.
我認為靠著對世界說教、告訴他們該如何過生活，是走不了多遠的。當幾百年前還是完全不同的國家集團在主宰世界時，現在卻開始對他們指點江山，這只會招致某種怨恨。在剛贏得比賽後就對一群人說教，這在溝通或說服上都是個嚴重的錯誤。

I would advise Ben to figure out how to win the game and keep a certain amount of humility at the same time. And I would tell him to try and design a system that doesn’t invent too many things that can destroy the planet – that become uncontrollable once you get them out there.
我會建議班先想辦法贏得比賽，同時保持一定的謙遜。我也會告訴他，試著設計一個不會發明太多可能毀滅地球的東西的系統——那些東西一旦問世就可能失控。

There was no alternative to us developing the atom bomb, but the expansion of the number of people that have the ability from one to eight, and nine probably pretty soon with Iran – that’s a mistake that society just could not afford to make. Solving the problem with nine variables instead of simply one.
我們當年研發原子彈是別無選擇，但讓擁有這項能力的國家從一個擴增到八個——伊朗可能很快會成為第九個——這是社會根本承受不起的錯誤。這等於把問題從單一變數變成九個變數來解決。

It’s totally understandable – my dad was in Congress when the atom bomb was first used. It’s amazing how Sam Rayburn kept the House of Representatives uninformed because they were supposed to appropriate all the money. They had 435 congressmen there and they had no idea they were appropriating money for Los Alamos or what was going on in Chicago or Tennessee.
這完全可以理解——我父親在國會任職時，原子彈首次被使用。山姆·雷伯恩如何讓眾議院對此事一無所知真是令人驚奇，因為他們本應負責撥款。那裡有 435 名國會議員，他們完全不知道自己在為洛斯阿拉莫斯撥款，也不清楚芝加哥或田納西州發生了什麼。

We do have a society that is far beyond anything that Ben Franklin dreamt of. It’s moving in the right direction toward solving some problems where we made broad declarations about all men being created equal, etc. Then we did some of the things we did, but generally speaking we moved in the right direction.
我們的社會確實已經遠超班傑明·富蘭克林所能想像的。我們正朝著正確的方向前進，解決一些問題，比如我們曾廣泛宣稱人人生而平等等等。雖然我們做過一些事情，但總的來說，我們是在朝著正確的方向前進。

But we face problems – I don’t know how Ben Franklin would attack the problem of what you do once you get weapons of mass destruction in many hands, and when you essentially look at the world as something where there are winners and losers, and the winners humiliate the losers and do all kinds of things.
但我們面臨的問題——我不知道班傑明·富蘭克林會如何應對一旦大規模殺傷性武器落入多人之手的情況，以及當你本質上將世界視為有贏家和輸家，贏家羞辱輸家並做出各種事情的世界時該怎麼辦。

I’ll let the people who are a lot younger figure out the answers on that. But it’s still the most wonderful – there’s never been anything you could dream like what has happened in the United States. So it’s the best place and the best time to be alive by miles in the street.
我會讓那些年輕得多的人去思考這些問題的答案。但這仍然是最美好的——在美國發生的一切，是你做夢都想不到的。所以這裡無疑是最好、最適合生活的時代和地方。

Just think of a couple hundred years ago and somebody yanking out a few of your teeth and pouring whiskey down you. The subsistence, and particularly in this Midwest – just imagine waiting till the Missouri froze over every year just to see whether you can get your wagon across, and maybe having a pregnant woman in the back. It’s just amazing what has happened of a positive nature during my lifetime.
想想幾百年前，有人拔掉你幾顆牙齒，然後往你嘴裡灌威士忌。那時的生存條件，特別是在中西部——想像一下每年要等到密蘇里河結冰，才能看能不能把馬車渡過去，車上可能還載著一位孕婦。在我有生之年發生的這些積極變化，實在令人驚嘆。

The question is how do you keep it and how do you improve it? I do think that fundamental to all of it is having a currency that does not get debased. What that does to the stability of a society where all the people that trust their government get screwed and all the people that figure out ways to profit off of it become rich or richer – I don’t think you want a society that operates in that manner.
問題在於如何保持並改善這種狀況？我確實認為，所有這一切的基礎是擁有一種不會貶值的貨幣。當信任政府的人被坑，而那些找到從中獲利方法的人變得富有或更富有時，這對社會穩定造成的影響——我不認為你會想要一個以這種方式運作的社會。

Becky Quick: This question is for you, Greg. It comes from a shareholder named Jay Milroy, who writes, “Mr. Buffett has a hands-off approach to managing the operating subsidiaries. How would you describe your approach?”
貝琪·奎克：這個問題是給你的，格雷格。來自一位名叫傑伊·米爾羅伊的股東，他寫道：「巴菲特先生對營運子公司採取放手管理的方式。你會如何描述你的管理方式？」

Greg Abel: Well, we’ve got our managers over there and I would say going back to 2018, it’s been very fortunate to be in this role because one, I had to learn a lot of the businesses and there’s no question as Warren bought the businesses, he had that general knowledge.
格雷格·阿貝爾：嗯，我們那邊有我們的經理們，我會說回顧 2018 年，能擔任這個角色非常幸運，因為首先，我必須學習許多業務知識，毫無疑問當華倫收購這些企業時，他已經掌握了那些基本知識。

I absolutely had to engage with each of them and they’ve been great in sharing their business models, their approach, their thoughts around where the risks and opportunities are. And I think as we went through that there’s no question I had questions and wanted to engage with them. Warren talks about curiosity being important as you go through things.
我絕對需要與他們每一位深入交流，而他們也非常樂於分享自己的商業模式、管理方法，以及對於風險與機會所在的看法。我認為在整個過程中，毫無疑問我會有疑問並希望與他們互動。華倫常說好奇心在處理事情時非常重要。

That would be my style to have questions and comments around their business, their frameworks. At the same time, they have great businesses and they run them very autonomously and that remains in place. But if there’s opportunities to see where maybe I’ve seen something in another business or an opportunity I may see in their industry, we’re going to discuss it and see if that’s something we should pursue or if we are properly addressing the risk.
這將是我的風格，圍繞他們的業務和框架提出問題和意見。同時，他們擁有出色的業務，並且以高度自主的方式運營，這一點保持不變。但如果發現機會，或許我在其他業務中看到過類似情況，或者在他們的行業中發現潛在機會，我們就會討論並評估是否應該採取行動，或是我們是否已經妥善處理了相關風險。

And I found all our managers to be absolutely engaging on that and want to have those dialogues. And I’d say that’s a reflection of my approach. I’d also say that when you think of our managers, again, very autonomous. They run their businesses. They know it better than I ever will.
我發現我們所有的經理都非常樂於參與這類對話，並希望進行這樣的交流。我認為這反映了我的一貫做法。同時，當你想到我們的經理們時，他們確實擁有極高的自主權。他們經營自己的業務，對業務的了解遠超過我。

But if I see an opportunity that it’s well worth their time to talk to another one of our managers, if it’s Geico and they’ve gone through a technology transformation, they’re not by themselves that need to be thinking that way. We want to make sure the right folks are talking and figuring out how we can benefit from the prior experiences.
但如果我看到一個機會，值得他們花時間與我們另一位經理交流，比如 Geico 經歷了技術轉型，他們並非唯一需要考慮這方面問題的。我們希望確保合適的人選能夠進行溝通，並從過往經驗中獲益。

So, I would say more active but hopefully in a very positive way, and we’ve got an exceptional group. So, it’s worked out exceptionally well as I’ve gone through that period of time.
所以，我會說更加積極，但希望是以非常正面的方式，而且我們擁有一個非凡的團隊。因此，隨著時間的推移，這一切進展得異常順利。

Warren Buffett: It’s working way better with Greg than with me because I just didn’t want to work as hard as he worked and I could get away with it because we’ve got a basically good business, very good business and I wasn’t in danger of you firing me by virtue of both ownership and the fact that we would do pretty well.
華倫·巴菲特：與格雷格合作的效果遠比與我合作時更好，因為我不像他那樣努力工作，而我能夠這樣做是因為我們基本上擁有良好的業務，非常優秀的業務，而且你們也不太可能解僱我，這既因為所有權的關係，也因為我們的表現相當不錯。

But the fact that you can do pretty well doesn’t mean you couldn’t do better. And Greg can do better at many things. Many people want to be managed, need help in being managed. Some don’t. Some you just leave alone.
但表現相當不錯並不意味著不能做得更好。格雷格在許多方面都能做得更好。許多人希望被管理，需要在管理方面得到幫助。有些人則不需要。有些人你只需要放手讓他們自己來。

We’ve had managers it would have been crazy to start giving instructions to because they just quit. And I wouldn’t blame them because I’d be the same type myself. But a lot of people really do welcome direction and help, particularly when they’re getting it from somebody like Greg that really lives the life himself and doesn’t just come down from on high and say “here’s what you do” while I do something else. A manager that behaves differently than what he’s asking the people beneath them to behave – it just doesn’t work over time.
我們曾有過一些經理人，如果開始對他們下指令簡直是瘋了，因為他們會直接辭職。而我不會怪他們，因為我自己也是這種類型的人。但確實有很多人真的樂於接受指導和幫助，尤其是當這些指導來自像格雷格這樣的人——他親身實踐著自己所倡導的生活方式，而不是高高在上地只會說「你該這麼做」，自己卻另搞一套。一個要求下屬遵循某種行為準則，自己卻背道而馳的經理人——這種模式長期來看根本行不通。

And people want a manager that they admire and they’re not going to admire them if those people profess to behave in one manner and behave in another manner. It’s easier – this is a sad thing, but it’s easier for an organization to see its quality move downward than it is upward.
人們希望追隨自己敬佩的經理人，而如果這些人嘴上說一套、實際做一套，員工就不會敬佩他們。可悲的是，對一個組織而言，品質下滑往往比提升來得容易。

I mean, if the boss behaves badly, it causes everybody to behave badly. That is really catching. It’s not as catching on the way up in upper management. But if the manager is doing a lot of little things to grease his own situation, pretty soon, let’s say you’re running a retail establishment, pretty soon all the employees or a lot of the employees are telling their friends that they get a discount with the retail operation and if they want something they’ll put it on their account and then get the discount.
我是說，如果老闆行為不端，會導致每個人都跟著行為不端。這種影響力真的很大。這種影響在高層管理中往上蔓延的情況較少。但如果經理為了自身利益做了許多小動作，很快地，假設你經營一家零售店，很快所有員工或許多員工就會告訴他們的朋友，說他們在這家零售店有折扣，如果想要什麼東西，他們會記在自己的帳上然後享受折扣。

Once you start deviating downward, it is really contagious and it is hard to rebuild. So, you really need someone that behaves well on top and is not playing games for their own benefit. And we get a lot of managers that bend over backwards not to do that sort of thing. And then we get a few that bend over forwards. And if you get enough companies, you’re going to get a lot of different forms of behavior, and Greg does something about it and I’ve generally been lax in doing something about it, but he’s done a way better job at that than I have.
一旦你開始向下偏離標準，這種行為真的會像傳染病一樣蔓延，而且很難重建。所以，你真的需要一個行為端正、不為自己利益玩手段的高層。我們有很多經理會極力避免做那種事。然後我們也有少數人會反其道而行。如果你擁有足夠多的公司，你會看到各種不同的行為模式，而格雷格會對此採取行動，而我通常對此比較寬鬆，但他在這方面做得比我好得多。

Audience Member (Zone 4): Hello, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Abel. My name is Kansas Lomire. I am a junior at Elkhorn South High School and was born and raised in Omaha. My question is directed to Greg Abel.
觀眾（第四區）：您好，巴菲特先生和亞伯先生。我是堪薩斯·洛米爾，就讀於埃爾克霍恩南高中三年級，在奧馬哈出生長大。我的問題是想請教格雷格·亞伯。

Berkshire Hathaway is the second largest utility provider in the United States and a 2025 Reuters investigation found that its coal fleet is the dirtiest in the nation. There is currently no concrete plan to retire coal and fully transition to renewable energy. I’m 17 years old. Considering that, what do you have to say to young people like me who will live with the consequences of climate change caused by companies like Berkshire?
波克夏·海瑟威是美國第二大公用事業供應商，而 2025 年路透社的調查發現其燃煤發電廠是全美污染最嚴重的。目前尚無具體計劃淘汰燃煤並完全轉型至再生能源。我今年 17 歲。考慮到這點，對於像我這樣將承受由波克夏等企業造成氣候變遷後果的年輕人，您有什麼想說的？

Greg Abel: Thank you for both your question and your comments because it is important to understand Berkshire Hathaway Energy but also how they operate. Maybe using Iowa as a starting example because I think that was one of the states cited in the report.
格雷格·亞伯：感謝您的提問和意見，因為了解波克夏·海瑟威能源公司及其運作方式非常重要。或許可以從愛荷華州作為起始範例，因為我認為該州是報告中提及的其中一州。

One of the important things that I’d say early in us acquiring our energy companies – I go back to when we acquired Mid American in 1999, Berkshire purchased Mid-American in 2000. One thing that became very clear to myself and our teams was that what we do within our utilities is really driven in two fronts. One, we absolutely have to meet the requirements and the law that’s laid out federally, but most importantly, we had to recognize we implement public policy across these states.
我想在我們收購能源公司初期就強調一件重要的事——回溯到 1999 年收購中美能源時，波克夏於 2000 年正式收購。我和團隊深刻體認到，公用事業的運作實質上受兩大面向驅動：其一，我們必須絕對遵守聯邦法規要求；但更重要的是，我們必須認知到這些業務本質是在各州落實公共政策。

And that was an interesting conversation when I go back to Iowa. Again, the report cited that as a significant problem. It was early in the 2000s when for the first time in Iowa we were going to as a utility be short of power. So, we didn’t have the energy and we entered into a significant discussion with our governor at the time and really sat down and said, “Where do you want us to go as Mid-American and what resources do you want as a state?”
這讓我想起在愛荷華州一次耐人尋味的對話。當時報告指出電力短缺將成嚴重問題，那是 2000 年代初，愛荷華州公用事業首次面臨供電不足。我們沒有足夠能源，於是與時任州長展開重要討論，實質上就是坐下來問：「作為中美能源，州政府希望我們朝什麼方向發展？本州真正需要哪些能源資源？」

At that time, we were predominantly a coal based state. We recognize that obviously and fundamentally personally viewed it as a risk, but we needed to have that conversation with our state as to how we would manage that going forward. The interesting thing was that as we had that conversation in the early 2000s again with the leadership of our state, it was clearly decided we wanted to continue to be long power, i.e. not be short for our customers.
當時，我們主要是一個以煤炭為基礎的州。我們認識到這顯然從根本上被視為一種風險，但我們需要與州內進行對話，討論未來如何管理這一問題。有趣的是，當我們在 2000 年代初再次與州領導層進行這一對話時，明確決定我們希望繼續長期支持電力發展，也就是說，不會讓我們的客戶處於短缺狀態。

We discussed the type of resource and I remember a very clear conversation around we wanted to stay balanced across a variety of energy sources. At that time it was really coal and natural gas, and at that time we made the decision to build the largest wind project in the US in Iowa.
我們討論了資源類型，我記得有一個非常明確的對話，關於我們希望保持多種能源來源的平衡。那時主要是煤炭和天然氣，就在那時我們決定在愛荷華州建設美國最大的風力發電項目。

So we undertook an effort to build three resources, a coal plant, a gas plant, and what was the first wind project we owned in Mid-American. Again, it was very consistent with what the state wanted. But we also laid some important groundwork there because we started to define the importance of renewable energy, non-carbon resources, but it has to be consistent with what the state wanted.
因此，我們著手建設三種資源：一座燃煤電廠、一座燃氣電廠，以及我們在 Mid-American 擁有的第一個風力發電項目。這再次與該州的願望非常一致。但我們也在那裡奠定了一些重要的基礎，因為我們開始定義可再生能源和非碳資源的重要性，但這必須與該州的意願相一致。

And we’ve gone on over the since that period of time to deploy $16 billion into Iowa associated with renewable energy. Again, very consistent with what our state wanted us to do, i.e. the underlying policy. We don’t get to make that decision and just spend 16 billion. It’s done in conjunction with our governors, our legislators, our regulators.
自那時以來，我們已投入 160 億美元於愛荷華州的再生能源項目。這完全符合我們州政府的政策方向——我們無權自行決定動用這 160 億資金，所有決策都是與州長、立法機關及監管單位共同協作的結果。

And at the same time, we’ve had the opportunity to retire five of the 10 coal units. Now, as the report highlighted, I understand people would like those other five coal units retired at this time, but to think we deployed 16 billion to retire five and it’s a very good outcome for our customers.
與此同時，我們已順利關停 10 座燃煤機組中的 5 座。報告中特別提到，雖然民眾希望其餘 5 座機組也能立即退役，但請理解——我們投入 160 億才達成關停 5 座的成果，這對客戶而言已是相當理想的進展。

We’ve been able to maintain our rates. They’re some of the lowest in the country. So, it’s been done very efficiently. But the reality is we still need those five coal units to keep the system stable. We cannot have a Spain Portugal situation.
我們成功維持了全美最低的電費水準之一，轉型過程極具效率。但現實是：剩餘 5 座燃煤機組對維持電網穩定仍不可或缺，我們絕不能重蹈西班牙葡萄牙電網危機的覆轍。

So we absolutely respect the input. We absolutely respect the process and will continue to work with each of our states to identify the path they would like to chart and we work hard to ensure there’s good balanced outcomes because we recognize the challenges associated with others’ desires. So, I think you’ll continue to see our utilities implement policy consistent with the needs of their stakeholders, their customers, and at the same time always respecting what’s required by any of the federal standards.
因此我們絕對尊重各方意見，也絕對尊重程序，並將持續與各州合作，找出他們希望規劃的路徑。我們努力確保能達成良好平衡的結果，因為我們理解他人訴求所伴隨的挑戰。所以，我想你會繼續看到我們的公用事業單位實施符合其利益相關者、客戶需求的政策，同時始終尊重任何聯邦標準的要求。

Becky Quick: This question comes from Billy D. Ross. He writes, “Mr. Buffett, as a nurse from New York State, I’ve spent years struggling to secure good health insurance for myself, even while working on the front lines to save lives. In New York, accessing insurance means navigating a confusing state-run system that feels like it’s designed to overwhelm.”
貝琪·奎克：這個問題來自比利·D·羅斯。他寫道：「巴菲特先生，作為一名紐約州的護士，多年來即使在前線拯救生命，我仍難以為自己爭取到良好的健康保險。在紐約，獲得保險意味著要應對一個令人困惑的州營系統，感覺它設計出來就是為了讓人不知所措。」

“I’m curious what ultimately led to the end of your healthcare venture with JP Morgan and Amazon and given your commitment to value and long-term thinking, would you ever consider taking another look at health insurance reform in the US?”
「我很好奇最終是什麼導致您與摩根大通和亞馬遜的醫療保健合資企業結束？考慮到您對價值和長期思考的承諾，您是否會考慮再次審視美國的健康保險改革？」

Warren Buffett: We’re spending close – it’s hard to get the precise figure, but close to 20% of GDP on health. And if you go back to 1960, there were a number of countries that were each spending around 5%. And then the lines began to diverge dramatically. But the mathematical fact that there are only 100 percentage points in the equation didn’t change.
華倫·巴菲特：我們在醫療上的支出接近——雖然很難獲得精確數字，但接近 GDP 的 20%。如果回顧 1960 年，當時有許多國家的醫療支出都在 5%左右。之後這些數據線開始大幅分化。但數學事實是，這個等式中的百分比總和始終只有 100 個點，這一點從未改變。

So we tried that experiment with JP Morgan and Amazon and we had three people that didn’t think they knew the answer, but thought that in my case I use the term that it was a tapeworm in the economy. We also found out that the tapeworm was alive in every part of the country. I mean the hospitals liked it. The hospitals had prominent people working with people. People generally like their doctor, didn’t like the system. I mean all kinds of things, but in the end, JP Morgan and Amazon and Berkshire were not going to have any effect on changing that 20%.
所以我們與摩根大通和亞馬遜進行了這項實驗，我們有三個人並不認為自己知道答案，但在我看來，我用了一個比喻——它是經濟體內的絛蟲。我們還發現這條絛蟲在全國各地都活躍著。醫院喜歡它。醫院裡有重要人物與人們合作。人們通常喜歡自己的醫生，但不喜歡這個系統。各種各樣的情況，但最終，摩根大通、亞馬遜和波克夏都無法改變那 20%的現狀。

Now that 20% – there are only 100 percentage points available and other countries spend six or 7% and perhaps use our system to their advantage which is also very true. That is an enormous percentage of an economy and we simply – it was too entrenched to really do much in the way of change.
現在這 20%——畢竟總共只有 100 個百分點可供分配，其他國家只花費 6%或 7%，甚至可能利用我們的體系為自己謀利，這點也千真萬確。這在經濟中佔據了巨大比例，而我們根本——這個體系根深蒂固到難以進行實質性變革。

And we spent some money on it and we did some work and we learned a good bit about our own systems and we saw the degree to which the present system was ingrained in so many people’s lives, whether the health care providers or whether everybody. And these aren’t evil people. I mean, they’re just going about something and trying to save lives.
我們投入了一些資金，做了一些工作，對自身體系有了更深的了解，也看到了現行制度如何深植於人們的生活中，無論是醫療服務提供者還是普通大眾。這些人並非惡徒，他們只是各司其職，努力挽救生命。

But we found that whether it was in Canada or France or Britain or wherever it might be, that if you looked at our costs that they were just far higher and to some extent we were subsidizing the rest of the world. And people would come to the United States to do the really unusual or challenging aspects of health in terms of operations and that sort of thing.
但我們發現，無論是在加拿大、法國、英國或其他地方，我們的醫療成本都遠高於這些國家，某種程度上我們正在補貼世界其他地區。人們會專程來美國進行那些異常複雜或具挑戰性的醫療手術等相關治療。

But we made no progress and there comes a point where the government – and I mean it’s so involved in the situation and health is so important to most to everybody, and we couldn’t – as I said to Jamie and Jeff, I said well the tapeworm won.
但我們毫無進展，當政府介入程度如此之深——而健康對幾乎所有人又如此重要時，終究會來到一個臨界點。正如我對傑米和傑夫說的：『看來絛蟲贏了這場仗。』

There are problems of society when you get 20% of your GDP going into a given industry, the degree of enthusiasm for changing that industry, the political power that the industry will have, and that doesn’t mean they’re evil. It’s just everybody – they just end up there.
當一個產業佔據 GDP 的 20%時，社會就會出現問題——無論是改革該產業的熱忱程度，或是該產業所獲得的政治影響力。這並非意指他們邪惡，只是所有人最終都會陷入這種處境。

So I don’t know – we came to the conclusion we didn’t know the answer, the three of us, and we had the money to do it and we didn’t know how to change how 330 million people felt about their doctor, felt about our healthcare, what they felt entitled to.
所以我們三人得出結論——我們不知道答案。我們擁有資金實力，卻不知如何改變三億三千萬人對醫生的看法、對醫療體系的認知，以及他們認為自己應享有的權利。

It won’t change by itself and government is the only one that can change it and the only people in government that can change it are getting majority of 435 people and 100 people. And my dad lost one election in his life in 1948 and he was a very strong Republican and in 1950 he went back and beat the guy that beat him in 1948 and he got the doctors behind him. And they believe 100% in what they’re doing. They’re helping people every day.
這不會自行改變，政府是唯一能改變它的機構，而政府中能改變它的只有獲得 435 人和 100 人多數支持的人們。我父親一生中只輸過一次選舉，那是在 1948 年，他是個堅定的共和黨人，到了 1950 年，他回去擊敗了 1948 年擊敗他的那個人，並獲得了醫生們的支持。他們百分之百相信自己正在做的事情。他們每天都在幫助人們。

And during the pandemic, the sacrifices made by people to save other people – just incredible. Can you imagine working in something where they’re bringing in people that are going to die by the dozens and dozens and dozens and you try to somehow keep your own morale up and keep working with them. So, you can’t argue about the importance of it.
在疫情期間，人們為拯救他人所做的犧牲——簡直難以置信。你能想像在一個環境中工作，那裡不斷有數十、數十、數十的人被送進來，他們即將死去，而你卻要試圖保持自己的士氣，繼續與他們一起工作嗎？所以，你無法質疑這件事情的重要性。

But our costs are so different than any country in the world that it’s a huge element and we’re a very rich country. So we can do things other countries can’t do. And through our elected representatives and a whole variety of things over time, we’ve developed a system that is enormously resistant to any kind of major change and it’s important in every community that it’s in.
但我們的成本與世界上任何國家都大不相同，這是一個巨大的因素，而且我們是一個非常富裕的國家。所以我們可以做其他國家做不到的事情。通過我們的民選代表和隨著時間推移的各種各樣的事情，我們已經發展出了一個對任何重大變化都具有極強抵抗力的系統，這在它所處的每一個社區中都很重要。

So, I wish we had an answer for you, but I was somewhat pessimistic going in and I was a little more pessimistic when we came out. But I’m glad we did what we did and we learned something about our own failings in the process. So, Berkshire in effect got its money’s worth, but we didn’t kill the tapeworm.
所以，我希望我們能給你一個答案，但我進去時就有些悲觀，出來時更悲觀了一點。不過我很高興我們做了該做的事，在這個過程中我們也學到了自己的一些不足。因此，波克夏實際上得到了它付出的代價，但我們沒有消滅掉那條絛蟲。

Trying to change things in government is an interesting proposition in the country because you get self-selection in terms of the people that go into government and continue in it. And to some extent they keep having to make decisions that they don’t like as they go along and they learn to accept them or rationalize them or whatever it may be.
在這個國家試圖改變政府事務是個有趣的命題，因為你會看到人們自我選擇進入政府並持續留在其中。在某種程度上，他們一路上不斷做出自己不喜歡的決定，並學會接受、合理化這些決定，或採取其他應對方式。

But it’s still – this country’s worked out better than any country in the world. So you can’t argue it was a failure, but you can’t argue that there are certain problems that are terribly tough to figure out ways to solve. And of course, one of them gets back to the fiscal problem I mentioned before because it’s easy to spend money and it’s hard to cut people’s receipts.
但這個國家仍然運作得比世界上任何國家都好。所以你不能說它是失敗的，但也不能否認有些問題確實非常難以找到解決方法。當然，其中之一就是我之前提到的財政問題，因為花錢容易，削減人們的收入卻很難。

And if you get elected, you’re going to say to yourself, well, I can do more good if I stay, and then if I really vote my conscience on this sort of thing. So, you give away a little bit here and a little bit there and a little bit there and finally you don’t recognize yourself in the mirror anymore. And that’s – I grew up in a political family, but I watched how people behaved and they behave like human beings which is what you have to expect and I behave like human beings.
而如果你當選了，你會對自己說，好吧，如果我留下來，我可以做更多好事，然後如果我真心按照良知來投票這類事情。所以，你在這裡讓步一點，那裡讓步一點，最後你再也認不出鏡中的自己了。這就是——我在一個政治家庭長大，但我觀察人們的行為，他們表現得像人類，這是你必須預期的，而我也表現得像人類。

We still manage to keep moving forward in dramatic way. It’s so much better to live here than it was 100 years ago or 200 years ago. It’s dramatic. So you can’t say the system’s a failure, but you can say that it is very difficult to make major changes in it.
我們仍然設法以戲劇性的方式持續前進。生活在這裡比 100 年前或 200 年前要好得多。這是戲劇性的。所以你不能說這個系統失敗了，但你可以說要在其中做出重大改變是非常困難的。

Audience Member (Zone 5): Hi Warren Greg. My name is Pig Huang Chen. I’m from Taiwan. This is my seventh time here. First of all, I want to thank you Warren for your generosity of sharing your wisdom and lesson. You changed my life and you are my role model and my hero. And my question is, Warren, you mentioned that Greg will be in charge of capital allocation in the future and I’d like to know your perspective on is it easier for business operator to be an investor or for investor to be a business operator. Thank you.
觀眾（5 區）：嗨，華倫、葛瑞格。我是黃陳小豬，來自台灣。這是我第七次參加會議。首先，我想感謝華倫慷慨分享你的智慧和教誨。你改變了我的人生，你是我的榜樣和英雄。我的問題是，華倫，你提到未來葛瑞格將負責資本配置，我想知道你的觀點是：企業經營者轉型投資人比較容易，還是投資人轉型企業經營者比較容易？謝謝。

Warren Buffett: No, that’s a good question. I see we call him Greg even. Thank you. And I’ll – you’ll take it and it’s a lot tougher to be an operator. I mean it is. It’s easier to sit in a room like I do and play around with money. It’s just an easier life. That doesn’t mean it’s a more admirable life. It doesn’t, but it’s actually been a pleasant life for me. So, I don’t complain in the least.
華倫·巴菲特：不，這是個好問題。看來我們都叫他葛瑞格了。謝謝。我會——你會接手這個問題，當經營者困難多了。真的。像我這樣坐在房間裡擺弄資金容易多了。這樣的生活比較輕鬆。這不代表這樣的人生更值得敬佩，但對我來說確實是愉快的人生。所以我一點都不抱怨。

And I’ve been able to choose my friends, which has made an enormous difference in my life. I’ve never had to work for anybody that I really didn’t admire. I mean, that’s a luxury in life. I had five different people I worked for and they were fantastic, whether it was the manager of the local Penneys which used to be located a couple miles from here, and newspaper managers, everything. I have never been really disappointed by any teacher I’ve had.
而我能夠選擇自己的朋友，這對我的生活產生了巨大的影響。我從不需要為任何我不真正敬佩的人工作。我的意思是，這在生活中是一種奢侈。我有五位不同的上司，他們都非常出色，無論是曾經位於這裡幾英里外的本地彭尼百貨經理，還是報社經理等等。我從未對任何一位教過我的老師感到真正失望。

But I have to admit that I’ve been able to choose what I do with my day to an extraordinary degree compared to being a business operator. And in many cases, I wouldn’t like to compete to be a top-notch business operator in terms of some of the behavior that might be forced upon me.
但我必須承認，與作為一名企業經營者相比，我能夠在很大程度上選擇自己每天要做的事情。在許多情況下，我不願意為了成為頂尖的企業經營者而被迫採取某些行為來競爭。

I am the master. I mean, I’ve found myself in this position where I can run the kind of company I want to run and that’s an extraordinary luxury.
我是主人。我的意思是，我發現自己處於這樣一個位置，可以經營我想經營的那種公司，這是一種非凡的奢侈。

Warren Buffett: I have a five-minute warning, so I would like to turn to a subject that I want to discuss with you for a few minutes.
華倫·巴菲特：我有五分鐘的預警時間，所以我想轉向一個我想與你們討論幾分鐘的話題。

Tomorrow we’re having a board meeting of Berkshire and we have 11 directors. Two of the directors who are my children, Howie and Susie, know of what I’m going to talk about. The rest of them – this will come as news to them.
明天我們將召開波克夏董事會，共有 11 位董事。其中有兩位是我的孩子——豪伊和蘇西，他們已經知道我接下來要談的內容。至於其他董事，這對他們來說會是個新聞。

I think the time has arrived where Greg should become the chief executive officer of the company at year-end. I want to spring that on the directors effectively and then give that as my recommendation. Let them have the time to think about what questions or what structures or anything that they want, and then the meeting following that, which will come in a few months, we’ll take action on whatever the view is of the 11 directors. I think they’ll be unanimously in favor of it.
我認為時機已經成熟，葛瑞格應該在年底成為公司的執行長。我想有效地向董事們提出這個建議，讓他們有時間思考任何問題、結構或其他事項。幾個月後的下一場會議上，我們將根據 11 位董事的意見採取行動。我相信他們會一致支持這項決定。

That would mean that at year-end Greg would be the chief executive officer of Berkshire. I would still hang around and could conceivably be useful in a few cases. But the final word would be what Greg said, in operations, in capital deployment, whatever it might be.
這意味著到年底時，葛瑞格將成為波克夏的執行長。我仍會留在公司，在某些情況下可能還派得上用場。但最終決定權將掌握在葛瑞格手中，無論是營運、資本配置或其他任何事務。

I could be helpful, I believe, in certain respects if we ran into periods of great opportunity or anything. I think that Berkshire has a special reputation that when there are times of trouble for the government, we are an asset and not a liability, which is very hard to have because usually the public and government get very negative on business if there’s a time like that.
我相信在某些方面我能有所幫助，特別是當我們遇到重大機會或類似情況時。伯克希爾擁有獨特的聲譽，當政府面臨困境時，我們是資產而非負債，這非常難得，因為通常在那種時期公眾和政府對企業會非常負面。

But Greg would have the tickets. Whether it’s acquisitions – I think the board would be more welcome to giving him more authority on large acquisitions probably if they knew I was around. But Greg would be the chief executive, period.
但格雷格會掌握主導權。無論是收購案——我想董事會可能會更樂意授予他在大型收購上更多權限，特別是如果他們知道我仍在參與。但格雷格將是無可爭議的執行長。

The plan is – and Greg doesn’t know anything about this until what he’s hearing right now – that the board will be able to ask me questions tomorrow about more of the specifics of what they should be thinking about. They’ll digest it, and then at the next board meeting after that, if they act, then obviously we have something to announce to the world as a material change and we’ll go forward with that operation.
計劃是這樣的——格雷格直到此刻聽到之前對此一無所知——董事會明天將能向我詢問更多關於他們應考慮事項的具體細節。他們會消化這些資訊，然後在接下來的董事會會議上，如果他們採取行動，那麼顯然我們就有重大變動需要向外界宣布，並將依此推進運作。

I will play with the ouija board or whatever comes out in terms of doing things. But I have no intention, zero, of selling one share of Berkshire Hathaway – it will get given away.
我會玩通靈板或任何出現的東西來做決定。但我完全沒有意願賣出任何一股波克夏的股票——它們將會被捐贈出去。

I would add this – the decision to keep every share is an economic decision because I think the prospects of Berkshire will be better under Greg’s management than mine. There may come a time when we get a chance to invest a lot of money, and if that time comes, I think it may be helpful with the Board that they know I’ve got all my money in the company and I think it’s smart. And I’ve seen what Greg has done. So that’s the news hook for the day. And thanks for coming.
我想補充這一點——保留每一股股票的決定是一個經濟決策，因為我認為在葛瑞格的管理下，波克夏的前景會比在我管理下更好。可能會有一個時機讓我們有機會投資一大筆錢，如果那個時刻到來，我認為董事會知道我將所有資金都投入公司是有幫助的，而且我認為這是明智的。我已經見證了葛瑞格的作為。所以這就是今天的新聞焦點。謝謝大家前來。

The enthusiasm shown by the audience’s response can be interpreted in two ways. But I’ll take it as positive. Thank you.
觀眾反應所展現的熱情可以有兩種解讀。但我會把它當作正面的。謝謝。