Special Letters from Warren & Charlie RE:Past, Present and Future (2014)

華倫與查理特別信件回顧：過去、現在與未來（2014 年）
 

以下文章來自於巴菲特

Berkshire – Past, Present and Future
波克夏——過去、現在與未來

In the Beginning  初始之時

On May 6, 1964, Berkshire Hathaway, then run by a man named Seabury Stanton, sent a letter to its shareholders offering to buy 225,000 shares of its stock for $11.375 per share. I had expected the letter; I was surprised by the price.
1964 年 5 月 6 日，當時由西伯里·斯坦頓經營的波克夏·海瑟威公司向股東發出一封信，提出以每股 11.375 美元的價格回購 225,000 股股票。我早已預期這封信會來；但對這個價格感到意外。

Berkshire then had 1,583,680 shares outstanding. About 7% of these were owned by Buffett Partnership Ltd. (“BPL”), an investing entity that I managed and in which I had virtually all of my net worth. Shortly before the tender offer was mailed, Stanton had asked me at what price BPL would sell its holdings. I answered $11.50, and he said, “Fine, we have a deal.” Then came Berkshire’s letter, offering an eighth of a point less. I bristled at Stanton’s behavior and didn’t tender.
當時波克夏流通在外的股票共有 1,583,680 股。其中約 7%由我管理且幾乎投入全部淨值的投資實體「巴菲特合夥有限公司」（BPL）持有。在收購要約寄出前不久，斯坦頓曾詢問我 BPL 願意以什麼價格出售持股。我回答 11.50 美元，他說：「好，我們成交。」然而隨後波克夏的來信卻開出低八分之一點的價格。我對斯坦頓的行為感到憤怒，因此沒有參與要約出售。

That was a monumentally stupid decision.
那是個極其愚蠢的決定。

Berkshire was then a northern textile manufacturer mired in a terrible business. The industry in which it operated was heading south, both metaphorically and physically. And Berkshire, for a variety of reasons, was unable to change course.
當時的波克夏是家深陷困境的北方紡織製造商。其所處產業無論是象徵意義還是實際狀況都在「向南遷移」（指產業沒落並轉移至南方）。而波克夏基於種種原因，始終無法轉型。

That was true even though the industry’s problems had long been widely understood. Berkshire’s own Board minutes of July 29, 1954, laid out the grim facts: “The textile industry in New England started going out of business forty years ago. During the war years this trend was stopped. The trend must continue until supply and demand have been balanced.”
儘管紡織業的問題早已廣為人知，情況依然如此。波克夏 1954 年 7 月 29 日的董事會會議記錄便揭示了嚴峻事實：「新英格蘭地區的紡織產業在四十年前就開始衰退。戰爭期間這趨勢曾暫時停止。但供需平衡前，衰退趨勢必將持續。」

About a year after that board meeting, Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates and Hathaway Manufacturing – both with roots in the 19th Century – joined forces, taking the name we bear today. With its fourteen plants and 10,000 employees, the merged company became the giant of New England textiles. What the two managements viewed as a merger agreement, however, soon morphed into a suicide pact. During the seven years following the consolidation, Berkshire operated at an overall loss, and its net worth shrunk by 37%.
該次董事會約一年後，歷史可追溯至 19 世紀的波克夏精紡協會與哈薩威製造公司合併，採用現今我們熟知的名稱。合併後擁有 14 間工廠與 1 萬名員工，成為新英格蘭紡織業巨擘。然而兩家管理層原以為的聯姻協議，很快變成了自殺契約。合併後七年間，波克夏整體營運虧損，淨值縮水 37%。

Meanwhile, the company closed nine plants, sometimes using the liquidation proceeds to repurchase shares. And that pattern caught my attention.
期間公司關閉了九間工廠，有時將清算所得用於股票回購。這個模式引起了我的注意。

I purchased BPL’s first shares of Berkshire in December 1962, anticipating more closings and more repurchases. The stock was then selling for $7.50, a wide discount from per-share working capital of $10.25 and book value of $20.20. Buying the stock at that price was like picking up a discarded cigar butt that had one puff remaining in it. Though the stub might be ugly and soggy, the puff would be free. Once that momentary pleasure was enjoyed, however, no more could be expected.
我在 1962 年 12 月買進了 BPL（巴菲特合夥有限公司）首批波克夏股票，預期會有更多工廠關閉及更多股份回購。當時股價僅 7.5 美元，遠低於每股營運資金 10.25 美元與帳面價值 20.2 美元。以這個價格買進股票，就像撿起一支被丟棄、還剩最後一口的雪茄煙蒂。雖然煙屁股又醜又濕，但那一口是免費的。不過享受完這短暫的愉悅後，就別指望再有更多了。

Berkshire thereafter stuck to the script: It soon closed another two plants, and in that May 1964 move, set out to repurchase shares with the shutdown proceeds. The price that Stanton offered was 50% above the cost of our original purchases. There it was – my free puff, just waiting for me, after which I could look elsewhere for other discarded butts.
此後波克夏照著劇本走：很快又關閉了兩間工廠，並在 1964 年 5 月那波行動中，打算用關廠收益回購股份。史坦頓（Stanton）提出的收購價比我們原始成本高出 50%。這就是我的免費一口——正等著我享用，之後我就能去尋找其他被丟棄的煙屁股了。

Instead, irritated by Stanton’s chiseling, I ignored his offer and began to aggressively buy more Berkshire
然而，被史坦頓的小氣行徑激怒後，我無視他的提議，開始積極買進更多波克夏
shares.  股票。
 
By April 1965, BPL owned 392,633 shares (out of 1,017,547 then outstanding) and at an early-May board meeting we formally took control of the company. Through Seabury’s and my childish behavior – after all, what was an eighth of a point to either of us? – he lost his job, and I found myself with more than 25% of BPL’s capital invested in a terrible business about which I knew very little. I became the dog who caught the car.
1965 年 4 月前，BPL 已持有 392,633 股（當時流通股數為 1,017,547 股），並在五月初的董事會上正式取得公司控制權。由於西伯里和我幼稚的行為——畢竟，對我們兩人而言，那八分之一個百分點算什麼？——他丟了工作，而我發現自己將 BPL 超過 25%的資本投入了一個我幾乎一無所知的糟糕企業。我成了那隻咬住汽車卻不知所措的狗。

Because of Berkshire’s operating losses and share repurchases, its net worth at the end of fiscal 1964 had fallen to $22 million from $55 million at the time of the 1955 merger. The full $22 million was required by the textile operation: The company had no excess cash and owed its bank $2.5 million. (Berkshire’s 1964 annual report is reproduced on pages 130-142.)
由於伯克希爾的營運虧損與股票回購，截至 1964 財年結束時，其淨資產從 1955 年合併時的 5,500 萬美元降至 2,200 萬美元。這 2,200 萬美元全數被紡織業務佔用：公司沒有多餘現金，還欠銀行 250 萬美元。（伯克希爾 1964 年年報重印於第 130-142 頁。）

For a time I got lucky: Berkshire immediately enjoyed two years of good operating conditions. Better yet, its earnings in those years were free of income tax because it possessed a large loss carry-forward that had arisen from the disastrous results in earlier years.
有一段時間我很走運：伯克希爾立刻迎來了兩年的良好營運環境。更棒的是，那些年度的盈利無需繳納所得稅，因為公司擁有早年慘淡經營所積累的大量虧損遞延抵減額。

Then the honeymoon ended. During the 18 years following 1966, we struggled unremittingly with the textile business, all to no avail. But stubbornness – stupidity? – has its limits. In 1985, I finally threw in the towel and closed the operation.
然而蜜月期終究結束了。自 1966 年起的 18 年間，我們與紡織業務進行了不懈的鬥爭，卻徒勞無功。但固執——或者說愚蠢？——終有其極限。1985 年，我最終認輸並關閉了這項業務。

* * * * * * * * * * * *
Undeterred by my first mistake of committing much of BPL’s resources to a dying business, I quickly compounded the error. Indeed, my second blunder was far more serious than the first, eventually becoming the most costly in my career.
儘管我將 BPL 大量資源投入一個夕陽產業的第一個錯誤未能阻止我，我很快又犯下了更嚴重的第二個錯誤。事實上，這第二個失誤遠比第一個嚴重，最終成為我職業生涯中代價最高昂的教訓。

Early in 1967, I had Berkshire pay $8.6 million to buy National Indemnity Company (“NICO”), a small but promising Omaha-based insurer. (A tiny sister company was also included in the deal.) Insurance was in my sweet spot: I understood and liked the industry.
1967 年初，我讓波克夏支付 860 萬美元收購了位於奧馬哈的小型但前景看好的保險公司 National Indemnity Company（簡稱 NICO）。（交易還包含一家微型姊妹公司。）保險業正是我的專長所在：我既理解也熱愛這個行業。

Jack Ringwalt, the owner of NICO, was a long-time friend who wanted to sell to me – me, personally. In no way was his offer intended for Berkshire. So why did I purchase NICO for Berkshire rather than for BPL? I’ve had 48 years to think about that question, and I’ve yet to come up with a good answer. I simply made a colossal mistake.
NICO 的老闆傑克·林沃特是我的老友，他只想把公司賣給我個人——完全無意出售給波克夏。那麼為何我將 NICO 納入波克夏而非 BPL 旗下？48 年來我反覆思索這個問題，至今仍找不到合理解釋。這純粹是個重大決策失誤。

If BPL had been the purchaser, my partners and I would have owned 100% of a fine business, destined to form the base for building the company Berkshire has become. Moreover, our growth would not have been impeded for nearly two decades by the unproductive funds imprisoned in the textile operation. Finally, our subsequent acquisitions would have been owned in their entirety by my partners and me rather than being 39%-owned by the legacy shareholders of Berkshire, to whom we had no obligation. Despite these facts staring me in the face, I opted to marry 100% of an excellent business (NICO) to a 61%-owned terrible business (Berkshire Hathaway), a decision that eventually diverted $100 billion or so from BPL partners to a collection of strangers.
若當初由 BPL 進行收購，我和合夥人將完全持有一家優質企業，這本可成為伯克希爾日後發展的基石。更甚者，我們的成長不會因紡織業務中那些無效益的閒置資金而受阻近二十年。最後，我們後續的收購將完全由我和合夥人持有，而非讓伯克希爾原有股東（我們對其毫無義務）佔有 39%股權。儘管這些事實顯而易見，我仍選擇將一家卓越企業（NICO）的 100%股權與一家持股 61%的糟糕企業（伯克希爾哈撒韋）結合，這個決定最終導致約 1000 億美元從 BPL 合夥人流向一群陌生人手中。

* * * * * * * * * * * *
One more confession and then I’ll go on to more pleasant topics: Can you believe that in 1975 I bought Waumbec Mills, another New England textile company? Of course, the purchase price was a “bargain” based on the assets we received and the projected synergies with Berkshire’s existing textile business. Nevertheless – surprise, surprise – Waumbec was a disaster, with the mill having to be closed down not many years later.
再坦白一件事，之後我會轉向更愉快的話題：你能相信 1975 年我又收購了另一家新英格蘭紡織廠 Waumbec Mills 嗎？當然，收購價相較於我們獲得的資產及與伯克希爾現有紡織業務的預期協同效應而言是個「划算交易」。然而——意料之中地——Waumbec 成了一場災難，工廠不得不在數年後關閉。

And now some good news: The northern textile industry is finally extinct. You need no longer panic if you hear that I’ve been spotted wandering around New England.
現在來點好消息：北方的紡織業終於滅絕了。如果你聽說我在新英格蘭地區遊蕩，不必再驚慌。
 
Charlie Straightens Me Out
查理糾正我

My cigar-butt strategy worked very well while I was managing small sums. Indeed, the many dozens of free puffs I obtained in the 1950s made that decade by far the best of my life for both relative and absolute investment performance.
當我管理小額資金時，我的雪茄屁股策略非常有效。事實上，1950 年代我獲得的數十次免費抽菸機會，使那十年成為我投資表現無論相對還是絕對都是最好的一段時期。

Even then, however, I made a few exceptions to cigar butts, the most important being GEICO. Thanks to a 1951 conversation I had with Lorimer Davidson, a wonderful man who later became CEO of the company, I learned that GEICO was a terrific business and promptly put 65% of my $9,800 net worth into its shares. Most of my gains in those early years, though, came from investments in mediocre companies that traded at bargain prices. Ben Graham had taught me that technique, and it worked.
然而，即便在那時，我也對雪茄屁股策略做了少數例外，最重要的是 GEICO。多虧 1951 年我與後來成為該公司 CEO 的出色人物洛里默·戴維森的一次談話，我了解到 GEICO 是一家極好的企業，並立即將我 9,800 美元淨資產的 65%投入其股票。不過，我早年的大部分收益來自於以低廉價格交易的平庸企業投資。本·格雷厄姆教會了我這項技巧，而且它確實奏效。

But a major weakness in this approach gradually became apparent: Cigar-butt investing was scalable only to a point. With large sums, it would never work well.
但這種方法的一個主要弱點逐漸顯現：雪茄煙蒂投資法只在某個程度內具有擴展性。對於大筆資金，它永遠無法良好運作。

In addition, though marginal businesses purchased at cheap prices may be attractive as short-term investments, they are the wrong foundation on which to build a large and enduring enterprise. Selecting a marriage partner clearly requires more demanding criteria than does dating. (Berkshire, it should be noted, would have been a highly satisfactory “date”: If we had taken Seabury Stanton’s $11.375 offer for our shares, BPL’s weighted annual return on its Berkshire investment would have been about 40%.)
此外，雖然以低廉價格購買的邊緣企業可能作為短期投資頗具吸引力，但它們並非建立一個龐大且持久企業的正確基礎。選擇婚姻伴侶顯然需要比約會更嚴格的標準。（值得一提的是，波克夏原本可以是一個非常令人滿意的「約會對象」：如果我們當時接受了西伯里·斯坦頓對我們股份每股 11.375 美元的報價，BPL 對波克夏投資的加權年回報率將達到約 40%。）

* * * * * * * * * * * *
It took Charlie Munger to break my cigar-butt habits and set the course for building a business that could combine huge size with satisfactory profits. Charlie had grown up a few hundred feet from where I now live and as  a youth had worked, as did I, in my grandfather’s grocery store. Nevertheless, it was 1959 before I met Charlie, long after he had left Omaha to make Los Angeles his home. I was then 28 and he was 35. The Omaha doctor who introduced us predicted that we would hit it off – and we did.
是查理·蒙格打破了我的雪茄煙蒂投資習慣，並為建立一個能將龐大規模與滿意利潤相結合的企業指明了方向。查理成長的地方距離我現在的住所僅幾百英尺，年輕時也和我一樣，曾在我祖父的雜貨店工作。然而，直到 1959 年我才遇見查理，那時他早已離開奧馬哈，將洛杉磯當作自己的家。當時我 28 歲，他 35 歲。介紹我們認識的奧馬哈醫生預測我們會合得來——而事實確實如此。

If you’ve attended our annual meetings, you know Charlie has a wide-ranging brilliance, a prodigious memory, and some firm opinions. I’m not exactly wishy-washy myself, and we sometimes don’t agree. In 56 years, however, we’ve never had an argument. When we differ, Charlie usually ends the conversation by saying: “Warren, think it over and you’ll agree with me because you’re smart and I’m right.”
如果你參加過我們的年度股東會，就會知道查理擁有廣博的才華、驚人的記憶力，以及一些堅定的觀點。我自己也並非優柔寡斷之人，我們偶爾會有分歧。但在 56 年來，我們從未發生過爭執。當意見相左時，查理通常會這樣結束對話：「華倫，再想想你就會同意我的，因為你很聰明，而我是對的。」

What most of you do not know about Charlie is that architecture is among his passions. Though he began his career as a practicing lawyer (with his time billed at $15 per hour), Charlie made his first real money in his 30s by designing and building five apartment projects near Los Angeles. Concurrently, he designed the house that he lives in today – some 55 years later. (Like me, Charlie can’t be budged if he is happy in his surroundings.) In recent years, Charlie has designed large dorm complexes at Stanford and the University of Michigan and today, at age 91, is working on another major project.
關於查理，多數人所不知的是他對建築的熱愛。雖然他職業生涯初期是執業律師（每小時收費 15 美元），但查理在三十多歲時，靠著在洛杉磯附近設計並建造五處公寓項目賺到了第一桶金。與此同時，他還設計了自己至今仍居住的房子——距今已約 55 年。（和我一樣，查理若對周遭環境感到滿意，就絕不會輕易搬離。）近年來，查理為史丹佛大學和密西根大學設計了大型宿舍群，如今 91 歲高齡的他，仍在進行另一個重大專案。

From my perspective, though, Charlie’s most important architectural feat was the design of today’s Berkshire. The blueprint he gave me was simple: Forget what you know about buying fair businesses at wonderful prices; instead, buy wonderful businesses at fair prices.
然而，從我的角度來看，查理最重要的架構成就，是設計了今日的波克夏。他給我的藍圖很簡單：忘記你以絕佳價格買進普通企業的那套；反之，要以合理的價格買進絕佳的企業。
 
Altering my behavior is not an easy task (ask my family). I had enjoyed reasonable success without Charlie’s input, so why should I listen to a lawyer who had never spent a day in business school (when – ahem – I had attended three). But Charlie never tired of repeating his maxims about business and investing to me, and his logic was irrefutable. Consequently, Berkshire has been built to Charlie’s blueprint. My role has been that of general contractor, with the CEOs of Berkshire’s subsidiaries doing the real work as sub-contractors.
改變我的行為並非易事（問問我的家人就知道了）。在沒有查理建言的情況下，我也曾取得不錯的成功，那麼我為什麼要聽一個從未上過一天商學院（而我——咳咳——可是讀過三所商學院）的律師的話呢？但查理從不厭倦地向我重複他關於商業和投資的格言，而且他的邏輯無懈可擊。因此，波克夏是按照查理的藍圖建立起來的。我的角色是總承包商，而波克夏子公司的 CEO 們則是作為分包商進行實際工作。

The year 1972 was a turning point for Berkshire (though not without occasional backsliding on my part – remember my 1975 purchase of Waumbec). We had the opportunity then to buy See’s Candy for Blue Chip Stamps, a company in which Charlie, I and Berkshire had major stakes, and which was later merged into Berkshire.
1972 年是波克夏的轉折點（儘管我有時還是會故態復萌——記得我在 1975 年買下了沃姆貝克）。當時我們有機會為藍籌郵票公司買下喜詩糖果，查理、我和波克夏在這家公司都有重大持股，後來這家公司併入了波克夏。

See’s was a legendary West Coast manufacturer and retailer of boxed chocolates, then annually earning about $4 million pre-tax while utilizing only $8 million of net tangible assets. Moreover, the company had a huge asset that did not appear on its balance sheet: a broad and durable competitive advantage that gave it significant pricing power. That strength was virtually certain to give See’s major gains in earnings over time. Better yet, these would materialize with only minor amounts of incremental investment. In other words, See’s could be expected to gush cash for decades to come.
時思(See's)是西岸一家傳奇性的盒裝巧克力製造與零售商，當時每年稅前盈利約 400 萬美元，僅動用 800 萬美元的淨有形資產。此外，該公司擁有一項未顯現在資產負債表上的巨大資產：廣泛且持久的競爭優勢，賦予其顯著的定價能力。這項優勢幾乎確定能讓時思隨著時間推移實現盈利的大幅增長。更棒的是，這些增長只需投入少量增量資金即可實現。換句話說，時思可望在未來數十年持續產生大量現金流。

The family controlling See’s wanted $30 million for the business, and Charlie rightly said it was worth that much. But I didn’t want to pay more than $25 million and wasn’t all that enthusiastic even at that figure. (A price that was three times net tangible assets made me gulp.) My misguided caution could have scuttled a terrific purchase. But, luckily, the sellers decided to take our $25 million bid.
控制時思的家族當時開價 3000 萬美元出售公司，查理正確地指出這個企業值這個價。但我當時不願支付超過 2500 萬美元，甚至對這個價格也並不熱衷。（三倍於淨有形資產的價格讓我倒抽一口氣。）我這種錯誤的謹慎態度差點讓我們錯失一筆絕佳的交易。所幸，賣方最終接受了我們 2500 萬美元的報價。

To date, See’s has earned $1.9 billion pre-tax, with its growth having required added investment of only
迄今為止，時思已累計創造 19 億美元的稅前利潤，而其增長所需的追加投資僅為
$40 million. See’s has thus been able to distribute huge sums that have helped Berkshire buy other businesses that, in turn, have themselves produced large distributable profits. (Envision rabbits breeding.) Additionally, through watching See’s in action, I gained a business education about the value of powerful brands that opened my eyes to many other profitable investments.
4000 萬美元。因此，See's 能夠分配巨額資金，幫助波克夏收購其他企業，這些企業反過來又產生了大量可分配的利潤。（想像兔子繁殖的情景。）此外，通過觀察 See's 的運作，我獲得了關於強大品牌價值的商業教育，這讓我看到了許多其他有利可圖的投資機會。

* * * * * * * * * * * *
Even with Charlie’s blueprint, I have made plenty of mistakes since Waumbec. The most gruesome was Dexter Shoe. When we purchased the company in 1993, it had a terrific record and in no way looked to me like a cigar butt. Its competitive strengths, however, were soon to evaporate because of foreign competition. And I simply didn’t see that coming.
即使有了查理的路線圖，我在 Waumbec 之後還是犯了不少錯誤。最可怕的是 Dexter Shoe。當我們在 1993 年收購這家公司時，它有著出色的記錄，在我看來絕不是一支即將熄滅的雪茄。然而，由於外國競爭，它的競爭優勢很快就消失了。而我根本沒有預見到這一點。

Consequently, Berkshire paid $433 million for Dexter and, rather promptly, its value went to zero. GAAP accounting, however, doesn’t come close to recording the magnitude of my error. The fact is that I gave Berkshire stock to the sellers of Dexter rather than cash, and the shares I used for the purchase are now worth about $5.7 billion. As a financial disaster, this one deserves a spot in the Guinness Book of World Records.
因此，波克夏支付了 4.33 億美元收購 Dexter，而它的價值很快就歸零了。然而，GAAP 會計準則遠未記錄我這一錯誤的嚴重性。事實是，我給了 Dexter 的賣家波克夏的股票，而不是現金，而我用於購買的股票現在價值約 57 億美元。作為一場金融災難，這值得在《金氏世界紀錄》中佔有一席之地。

Several of my subsequent errors also involved the use of Berkshire shares to purchase businesses whose earnings were destined to simply limp along. Mistakes of that kind are deadly. Trading shares of a wonderful business – which Berkshire most certainly is – for ownership of a so-so business irreparably destroys value.
我後來犯的幾個錯誤，也涉及用波克夏股票收購那些盈利只能勉強維持的企業。這類錯誤是致命的。用一家優秀企業的股票——波克夏無疑就是——換取一家平庸企業的所有權，會不可挽回地摧毀價值。

We’ve also suffered financially when this mistake has been committed by companies whose shares Berkshire has owned (with the errors sometimes occurring while I was serving as a director). Too often CEOs seem blind to an elementary reality: The intrinsic value of the shares you give in an acquisition must not be greater than the intrinsic value of the business you receive.
當波克夏持股的公司犯下這種錯誤時（有時這些錯誤發生在我擔任董事期間），我們也遭受了財務損失。CEO 們似乎常常忽視一個基本現實：你在收購中給出的股票的內在價值，絕不能超過你獲得的企業的內在價值。
 
I’ve yet to see an investment banker quantify this all-important math when he is presenting a stock-for- stock deal to the board of a potential acquirer. Instead, the banker’s focus will be on describing “customary” premiums-to-market-price that are currently being paid for acquisitions – an absolutely asinine way to evaluate the attractiveness of an acquisition – or whether the deal will increase the acquirer’s earnings-per-share (which in itself should be far from determinative). In striving to achieve the desired per-share number, a panting CEO and his “helpers” will often conjure up fanciful “synergies.” (As a director of 19 companies over the years, I’ve never heard “dis-synergies” mentioned, though I’ve witnessed plenty of these once deals have closed.) Post mortems of acquisitions, in which reality is honestly compared to the original projections, are rare in American boardrooms. They should instead be standard practice.
我還沒見過哪位投資銀行家在向潛在收購方的董事會提出股票換股票的交易時，會量化這項至關重要的數學計算。相反地，銀行家的重點會放在描述當前收購案中「慣例」支付的市場價格溢價——這絕對是評估收購吸引力的愚蠢方式——或者交易是否會提高收購方的每股收益（這本身遠非決定性因素）。為了達到理想的每股數字，氣喘吁吁的執行長和他的「幫手們」往往會編造出虛幻的「協同效應」。（作為多年來 19 家公司的董事，我從未聽過有人提及「反協同效應」，儘管我見證過許多交易完成後出現大量此類情況。）在美國董事會中，誠實地將收購後的實際情況與原始預測進行比較的事後檢討極為罕見。相反地，這應該成為標準做法。

I can promise you that long after I’m gone, Berkshire’s CEO and Board will carefully make intrinsic value calculations before issuing shares in any acquisitions. You can’t get rich trading a hundred-dollar bill for eight tens (even if your advisor has handed you an expensive “fairness” opinion endorsing that swap).
我可以向你們保證，在我離開很久之後，波克夏的執行長和董事會在進行任何收購發行股票前，都會謹慎地計算內在價值。你不可能靠用一張百元大鈔換八張十元鈔票來致富（即使你的顧問遞給你一份昂貴的「公平性」意見書支持這項交易）。

* * * * * * * * * * * *
Overall, Berkshire’s acquisitions have worked out well – and very well in the case of a few large ones. So, too, have our investments in marketable securities. The latter are always valued on our balance sheet at their market prices so any gains – including those unrealized – are immediately reflected in our net worth. But the businesses we buy outright are never revalued upward on our balance sheet, even when we could sell them for many billions of dollars more than their carrying value. The unrecorded gains in the value of Berkshire’s subsidiaries have become huge, with these growing at a particularly fast pace in the last decade.
總體而言，波克夏的收購案表現良好——尤其是幾筆大型交易更是非常成功。我們在可交易證券上的投資也是如此。後者在我們的資產負債表上總是按市價估值，因此任何收益——包括未實現的——都會立即反映在我們的淨值中。但我們全資收購的企業在資產負債表上從未進行過向上重估，即使我們能以比帳面價值高出數十億美元的價格出售它們。波克夏子公司的未記錄價值增長已變得非常龐大，特別是在過去十年中增長速度尤為迅速。

Listening to Charlie has paid off.
聽從查理的話總是值得的。
 
Berkshire Today  今日的波克夏

Berkshire is now a sprawling conglomerate, constantly trying to sprawl further.
波克夏如今是一家業務龐雜的綜合企業集團，且不斷試圖擴張其版圖。

Conglomerates, it should be acknowledged, have a terrible reputation with investors. And they richly deserve it. Let me first explain why they are in the doghouse, and then I will go on to describe why the  conglomerate form brings huge and enduring advantages to Berkshire.
必須承認，綜合企業集團在投資者心中聲名狼藉，而這完全是咎由自取。讓我先說明它們為何不受青睞，接著再闡述為何這種企業形態能為波克夏帶來巨大且持久的優勢。

Since I entered the business world, conglomerates have enjoyed several periods of extreme popularity, the silliest of which occurred in the late 1960s. The drill for conglomerate CEOs then was simple: By personality, promotion or dubious accounting – and often by all three – these managers drove a fledgling conglomerate’s stock to, say, 20 times earnings and then issued shares as fast as possible to acquire another business selling at ten-or-so times earnings. They immediately applied “pooling” accounting to the acquisition, which – with not a dime’s worth of change in the underlying businesses – automatically increased per-share earnings, and used the rise as proof of managerial genius. They next explained to investors that this sort of talent justified the maintenance, or even the enhancement, of the acquirer’s p/e multiple. And, finally, they promised to endlessly repeat this procedure and thereby create ever-increasing per-share earnings.
自從我進入商業世界以來，企業集團曾多次極受歡迎，其中最荒謬的時期發生在 1960 年代末。當時企業集團執行長的策略很簡單：透過個人魅力、宣傳或可疑的會計手段——通常是三者並用——這些經理人將新興集團的股價推高至約 20 倍本益比，然後盡快發行股票，以收購另一家本益比約 10 倍的企業。他們立即對收購案採用「權益結合法」會計處理，這在基礎業務毫無實質變化的情況下，自動提高了每股收益，並將此增長作為管理天才的證明。接著，他們向投資者解釋，這種才能證明了收購方維持甚至提升本益比倍數的合理性。最後，他們承諾將無止境地重複這一過程，從而創造不斷增長的每股收益。

Wall Street’s love affair with this hocus-pocus intensified as the 1960s rolled by. The Street’s denizens are always ready to suspend disbelief when dubious maneuvers are used to manufacture rising per-share earnings, particularly if these acrobatics produce mergers that generate huge fees for investment bankers. Auditors willingly sprinkled their holy water on the conglomerates’ accounting and sometimes even made suggestions as to how to further juice the numbers. For many, gushers of easy money washed away ethical sensitivities.
隨著 1960 年代的推進，華爾街對這種障眼法的熱愛愈發強烈。當可疑的操作手法被用來製造每股收益增長時，尤其是這些花招能促成併購交易、為投資銀行家帶來巨額費用時，華爾街的居民們總是樂於暫時擱置懷疑。審計師們心甘情願地為企業集團的會計操作灑下聖水，有時甚至會提出如何進一步美化數字的建議。對許多人來說，輕鬆賺取的大量金錢沖淡了道德敏感度。

Since the per-share earnings gains of an expanding conglomerate came from exploiting p/e differences, its CEO had to search for businesses selling at low multiples of earnings. These, of course, were characteristically mediocre businesses with poor long-term prospects. This incentive to bottom-fish usually led to a conglomerate’s collection of underlying businesses becoming more and more junky. That mattered little to investors: It was deal velocity and pooling accounting they looked to for increased earnings.
由於擴張中的企業集團每股收益增長來自於利用市盈率差異，其執行長必須尋找以低倍數市盈率出售的企業。這些企業當然通常是長期前景黯淡的平庸業務。這種撿便宜貨的動機通常導致企業集團旗下業務組合的質量越來越差。但這對投資者來說無關緊要：他們指望的是交易速度和權益結合法會計帶來的收益增長。

The resulting firestorm of merger activity was fanned by an adoring press. Companies such as ITT, Litton Industries, Gulf & Western, and LTV were lionized, and their CEOs became celebrities. (These once-famous conglomerates are now long gone. As Yogi Berra said, “Every Napoleon meets his Watergate.”)
這場併購活動引發的風暴被一片讚美的媒體煽動得更為猛烈。像 ITT、利頓工業、海灣西方和 LTV 這樣的公司被神化，它們的執行長們也成了名人。（這些曾經著名的企業集團如今早已不復存在。正如尤吉·貝拉所說：「每個拿破崙都會遇到他的水門事件。」）

Back then, accounting shenanigans of all sorts – many of them ridiculously transparent – were excused or overlooked. Indeed, having an accounting wizard at the helm of an expanding conglomerate was viewed as a huge plus: Shareholders in those instances could be sure that reported earnings would never disappoint, no matter how bad the operating realities of the business might become.
那時候，各種會計花招——其中許多荒謬得顯而易見——都被原諒或忽視。事實上，擁有一位會計奇才來領導一個不斷擴張的企業集團被視為一大優勢：在那些情況下，股東們可以確信，無論企業的營運狀況有多糟糕，報告的盈利永遠不會令人失望。

In the late 1960s, I attended a meeting at which an acquisitive CEO bragged of his “bold, imaginative accounting.” Most of the analysts listening responded with approving nods, seeing themselves as having found a manager whose forecasts were certain to be met, whatever the business results might be.
1960 年代末，我參加了一個會議，會上一位熱衷於收購的執行長吹噓他的「大膽、富有想像力的會計手法」。大多數聆聽的分析師們以贊同的點頭回應，認為自己找到了一位無論業務結果如何都能確保達成預測的經理人。
 
Eventually, however, the clock struck twelve, and everything turned to pumpkins and mice. Once again, it became evident that business models based on the serial issuances of overpriced shares – just like chain-letter models – most assuredly redistribute wealth, but in no way create it. Both phenomena, nevertheless, periodically blossom in our country – they are every promoter’s dream – though often they appear in a carefully-crafted disguise. The ending is always the same: Money flows from the gullible to the fraudster. And with stocks, unlike chain letters, the sums hijacked can be staggering.
然而，時鐘終究敲響了十二下，一切化為南瓜與老鼠。這再次證明，建立在連續發行溢價股票基礎上的商業模式——如同連鎖信模式——確實能重新分配財富，卻絲毫無法創造財富。這兩種現象仍會周期性地在我們國家綻放——它們是每個推銷者的美夢——儘管常披著精心設計的外衣。結局總是相同：金錢從輕信者流向詐騙者。而與連鎖信不同的是，股票所竊取的財富規模可能極為驚人。

At both BPL and Berkshire, we have never invested in companies that are hell-bent on issuing shares. That behavior is one of the surest indicators of a promotion-minded management, weak accounting, a stock that is overpriced and – all too often – outright dishonesty.
無論是在 BPL 還是波克夏，我們從未投資於那些熱衷於發行股票的公司。這種行為是最能顯示管理層推銷心態、會計薄弱、股票定價過高——且往往——徹頭徹尾不誠實的明確指標之一。

* * * * * * * * * * * *
So what do Charlie and I find so attractive about Berkshire’s conglomerate structure? To put the case simply: If the conglomerate form is used judiciously, it is an ideal structure for maximizing long-term capital growth.
那麼，查理和我為何如此看好波克夏的綜合企業結構？簡而言之：若能明智運用綜合企業形式，它便是最大化長期資本成長的理想架構。

One of the heralded virtues of capitalism is that it efficiently allocates funds. The argument is that markets will direct investment to promising businesses and deny it to those destined to wither. That is true: With all its excesses, market-driven allocation of capital is usually far superior to any alternative.
資本主義被歌頌的優點之一，在於它能有效配置資金。論點是市場會將投資導向有前景的企業，而拒絕那些注定凋零的。這確實如此：儘管存在種種過度行為，市場驅動的資本配置通常遠優於任何替代方案。

Nevertheless, there are often obstacles to the rational movement of capital. As those 1954 Berkshire minutes made clear, capital withdrawals within the textile industry that should have been obvious were delayed for decades because of the vain hopes and self-interest of managements. Indeed, I myself delayed abandoning our obsolete textile mills for far too long.
然而，資本的理性流動往往存在障礙。正如 1954 年波克夏會議記錄所明確顯示的，紡織業內本應顯而易見的資本撤出，卻因管理層的虛妄希望與自身利益而延宕數十年。事實上，我自己也過於遲遲未能放棄我們那些過時的紡織廠。

A CEO with capital employed in a declining operation seldom elects to massively redeploy that capital into unrelated activities. A move of that kind would usually require that long-time associates be fired and mistakes be admitted. Moreover, it’s unlikely that CEO would be the manager you would wish to handle the redeployment job even if he or she was inclined to undertake it.
一位將資本投入衰退業務的執行長，很少會選擇大規模將這些資本重新配置到不相關的活動中。此類行動通常需要解雇長期共事的夥伴並承認錯誤。此外，即使這位執行長有意承擔這項工作，他或她也不太可能是你希望負責重新配置工作的管理者。

At the shareholder level, taxes and frictional costs weigh heavily on individual investors when they attempt to reallocate capital among businesses and industries. Even tax-free institutional investors face major costs as they move capital because they usually need intermediaries to do this job. A lot of mouths with expensive tastes then clamor to be fed – among them investment bankers, accountants, consultants, lawyers and such capital-reallocators as leveraged buyout operators. Money-shufflers don’t come cheap.
在股東層面，當個人投資者試圖在不同企業和行業間重新配置資本時，稅收和摩擦成本對他們造成沉重負擔。即使是免稅的機構投資者，在調動資本時也面臨重大成本，因為他們通常需要中介機構來完成這項工作。許多品味昂貴的嘴巴隨即吵嚷著要分一杯羹——其中包括投資銀行家、會計師、顧問、律師以及槓桿收購運營商等資本再分配者。資金搬運工的服務可不便宜。

In contrast, a conglomerate such as Berkshire is perfectly positioned to allocate capital rationally and at minimal cost. Of course, form itself is no guarantee of success: We have made plenty of mistakes, and we will make more. Our structural advantages, however, are formidable.
相比之下，像波克夏這樣的綜合企業集團，處於能夠以最低成本理性配置資本的完美位置。當然，形式本身並不能保證成功：我們犯過許多錯誤，未來也還會再犯。然而，我們的結構性優勢是巨大的。

At Berkshire, we can – without incurring taxes or much in the way of other costs – move huge sums from businesses that have limited opportunities for incremental investment to other sectors with greater promise. Moreover, we are free of historical biases created by lifelong association with a given industry and are not subject to pressures from colleagues having a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. That’s important: If horses had controlled investment decisions, there would have been no auto industry.
在波克夏，我們能夠在不產生稅負或太多其他成本的情況下，將大筆資金從投資機會有限的企業轉移到前景更佳的其他領域。此外，我們不受終身與特定產業連結所產生的歷史偏見影響，也不受那些有既得利益維持現狀的同僚壓力所左右。這點至關重要：如果由馬匹來掌控投資決策，汽車工業就永遠不會出現。
 
Another major advantage we possess is the ability to buy pieces of wonderful businesses – a.k.a. common stocks. That’s not a course of action open to most managements. Over our history, this strategic alternative has proved to be very helpful; a broad range of options always sharpens decision-making. The businesses we are offered by the stock market every day – in small pieces, to be sure – are often far more attractive than the businesses we are concurrently being offered in their entirety. Additionally, the gains we’ve realized from marketable securities have helped us make certain large acquisitions that would otherwise have been beyond our financial capabilities.
我們擁有的另一項主要優勢，是能夠買進優秀企業的股權——也就是普通股。這對大多數管理階層而言並非可行選項。在我們的歷史中，這項策略選擇已被證明極具助益；廣泛的選項總能讓決策更為精準。股市每日提供給我們的企業——雖然只是小部分股權——往往比同時期整體收購的企業更具吸引力。此外，我們從可交易證券實現的收益，幫助我們完成了幾筆原本財力無法負擔的大型收購案。

In effect, the world is Berkshire’s oyster – a world offering us a range of opportunities far beyond those realistically open to most companies. We are limited, of course, to businesses whose economic prospects we can evaluate. And that’s a serious limitation: Charlie and I have no idea what a great many companies will look like ten years from now. But that limitation is much smaller than that borne by an executive whose experience has been confined to a single industry. On top of that, we can profitably scale to a far larger size than the many businesses that are constrained by the limited potential of the single industry in which they operate.
實際上，世界就是波克夏的牡蠣——這個世界提供給我們的機會遠比大多數公司實際能接觸到的要廣泛得多。當然，我們僅限於能夠評估其經濟前景的企業。這是一個嚴格的限制：查理和我對許多公司十年後的樣貌毫無頭緒。但這個限制比起那些經驗僅限於單一行業的高管要小得多。除此之外，我們能夠獲利地擴展到比許多受單一行業有限潛力所束縛的企業更大的規模。

I mentioned earlier that See’s Candy had produced huge earnings compared to its modest capital requirements. We would have loved, of course, to intelligently use those funds to expand our candy operation. But our many attempts to do so were largely futile. So, without incurring tax inefficiencies or frictional costs, we have used the excess funds generated by See’s to help purchase other businesses. If See’s had remained a stand-alone company, its earnings would have had to be distributed to investors to redeploy, sometimes after being heavily depleted by large taxes and, almost always, by significant frictional and agency costs.
我先前提到，相較於其適度的資本需求，喜詩糖果創造了巨大的收益。我們當然希望能明智地運用這些資金來擴展我們的糖果業務。但我們多次嘗試這樣做，大多徒勞無功。因此，在不產生稅收效率低下或摩擦成本的情況下，我們利用喜詩產生的多餘資金來幫助收購其他企業。如果喜詩一直是一家獨立公司，其收益將不得不分配給投資者重新配置，有時在稅收大幅減少後，幾乎總是伴隨著顯著的摩擦和代理成本。

* * * * * * * * * * * *
Berkshire has one further advantage that has become increasingly important over the years: We are now the home of choice for the owners and managers of many outstanding businesses.
伯克希爾還有一個隨著歲月變得越來越重要的優勢：我們現在是許多優秀企業的擁有者和經理人的首選歸宿。

Families that own successful businesses have multiple options when they contemplate sale. Frequently, the best decision is to do nothing. There are worse things in life than having a prosperous business that one understands well. But sitting tight is seldom recommended by Wall Street. (Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.)
擁有成功企業的家庭在考慮出售時有多種選擇。通常，最好的決定是什麼都不做。生活中比擁有一家自己了解且繁榮的企業更糟糕的事情還有很多。但華爾街很少推薦保持現狀。（不要問理髮師你是否需要理髮。）

When one part of a family wishes to sell while others wish to continue, a public offering often makes  sense. But, when owners wish to cash out entirely, they usually consider one of two paths.
當家族中部分成員希望出售持股，而其他人想繼續經營時，公開發行往往是合理的選擇。但當所有權人想完全變現時，他們通常會考慮兩種途徑。

The first is sale to a competitor who is salivating at the possibility of wringing “synergies” from the combining of the two companies. This buyer invariably contemplates getting rid of large numbers of the seller’s associates, the very people who have helped the owner build his business. A caring owner, however – and there are plenty of them – usually does not want to leave his long-time associates sadly singing the old country song: “She got the goldmine, I got the shaft.”
第一種是出售給競爭對手，這些買家對合併兩家公司可能產生的「協同效應」垂涎三尺。這類買家總盤算著要裁撤賣方大批員工——正是這些夥伴協助原業主建立事業。然而，有良知的業主（這類人其實不少）通常不願讓長期共事的夥伴淒涼地唱起那首鄉村老歌：「她得了金礦，我挨了悶棍。」

The second choice for sellers is the Wall Street buyer. For some years, these purchasers accurately called themselves “leveraged buyout firms.” When that term got a bad name in the early 1990s – remember RJR and Barbarians at the Gate? – these buyers hastily relabeled themselves “private-equity.”
賣方的第二種選擇是華爾街買家。多年來，這些收購者自稱「槓桿收購公司」。當這個名詞在 1990 年代初因 RJR 案與《門口的野蠻人》事件而污名化後，他們急忙改貼「私募股權」的標籤。

The name may have changed but that was all: Equity is dramatically reduced and debt is piled on in virtually all private-equity purchases. Indeed, the amount that a private-equity purchaser offers to the seller is in part determined by the buyer assessing the maximum amount of debt that can be placed on the acquired company.
名稱或許改變了，但本質依舊：在幾乎所有的私募股權收購中，權益被大幅削減而債務卻層層堆疊。事實上，私募股權買家向賣方提出的收購金額，部分取決於買方評估被收購公司所能承受的最大債務負擔。
 
Later, if things go well and equity begins to build, leveraged buy-out shops will often seek to re-leverage with new borrowings. They then typically use part of the proceeds to pay a huge dividend that drives equity sharply downward, sometimes even to a negative figure.
之後，若進展順利且權益開始累積，槓桿收購公司往往會尋求透過新的借款再次槓桿化。接著，它們通常會將部分收益用於支付巨額股息，這會使權益急劇下降，有時甚至會變成負數。

In truth, “equity” is a dirty word for many private-equity buyers; what they love is debt. And, because debt is currently so inexpensive, these buyers can frequently pay top dollar. Later, the business will be resold, often to another leveraged buyer. In effect, the business becomes a piece of merchandise.
實際上，對許多私募股權買家來說，「權益」是個骯髒的字眼；他們鍾愛的是債務。而且，由於當前債務成本極低，這些買家往往能出價最高。之後，企業通常會被轉售給另一個槓桿買家。實際上，企業變成了一件商品。

Berkshire offers a third choice to the business owner who wishes to sell: a permanent home, in which the company’s people and culture will be retained (though, occasionally, management changes will be needed). Beyond that, any business we acquire dramatically increases its financial strength and ability to grow. Its days of dealing with banks and Wall Street analysts are also forever ended.
伯克希爾為有意出售企業的業主提供了第三種選擇：一個永久歸屬的家園，公司的人員與文化將得以保留（儘管偶爾仍需進行管理層調整）。除此之外，任何我們收購的企業都將大幅提升其財務實力與成長能力。與銀行及華爾街分析師打交道的日子也將永遠終結。

Some sellers don’t care about these matters. But, when sellers do, Berkshire does not have a lot of competition.
有些賣家不在乎這些事。但當賣家在乎時，伯克希爾幾乎沒有競爭對手。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Sometimes pundits propose that Berkshire spin-off certain of its businesses. These suggestions make no sense. Our companies are worth more as part of Berkshire than as separate entities. One reason is our ability to  move funds between businesses or into new ventures instantly and without tax. In addition, certain costs duplicate themselves, in full or part, if operations are separated. Here’s the most obvious example: Berkshire incurs nominal costs for its single board of directors; were our dozens of subsidiaries to be split off, the overall cost for directors would soar. So, too, would regulatory and administration expenditures.
時有評論人士建議伯克希爾分拆旗下某些業務。這些提議毫無道理。我們的企業作為伯克希爾的一部分，其價值遠高於獨立實體。原因之一在於我們能夠即時且免稅地在各業務間調動資金或投入新事業。此外，若將業務分拆，某些成本將完全或部分重複產生。最明顯的例子是：伯克希爾單一董事會的運作成本極低；若將數十家子公司拆分，整體董事成本將暴增。監管與行政支出同樣會大幅攀升。

Finally, there are sometimes important tax efficiencies for Subsidiary A because we own Subsidiary B. For example, certain tax credits that are available to our utilities are currently realizable only because we generate huge amounts of taxable income at other Berkshire operations. That gives Berkshire Hathaway Energy a major advantage over most public-utility companies in developing wind and solar projects.
最後，由於我們擁有子公司 B，子公司 A 有時能獲得重要的稅務效率。例如，我們的公用事業目前能夠實現某些稅收抵免，僅是因為我們在其他波克夏業務中產生了巨額應稅收入。這使得波克夏海瑟威能源公司在開發風能和太陽能項目時，相較於大多數公共事業公司具有重大優勢。

Investment bankers, being paid as they are for action, constantly urge acquirers to pay 20% to 50% premiums over market price for publicly-held businesses. The bankers tell the buyer that the premium is justified for “control value” and for the wonderful things that are going to happen once the acquirer’s CEO takes charge. (What acquisition-hungry manager will challenge that assertion?)
投資銀行家們由於是按行動收費，不斷敦促收購方為公開上市企業支付比市場價格高出 20%至 50%的溢價。銀行家們告訴買家，這樣的溢價是合理的，因為「控制權價值」以及一旦收購方的 CEO 接手後將會發生的美妙事情。（哪個渴望收購的經理會質疑這種說法呢？）

A few years later, bankers – bearing straight faces – again appear and just as earnestly urge spinning off the earlier acquisition in order to “unlock shareholder value.” Spin-offs, of course, strip the owning company of its purported “control value” without any compensating payment. The bankers explain that the spun-off company will flourish because its management will be more entrepreneurial, having been freed from the smothering bureaucracy of the parent company. (So much for that talented CEO we met earlier.)
幾年後，銀行家們又板著臉出現，同樣認真地建議將早先收購的業務分拆出去，以「釋放股東價值」。當然，分拆會讓母公司失去所謂的「控制權價值」，卻得不到任何補償。銀行家們解釋說，分拆後的業務將會蓬勃發展，因為其管理層將更具創業精神，擺脫了母公司窒息般的官僚體制。（這讓我們不禁想起之前那位才華橫溢的 CEO。）

If the divesting company later wishes to reacquire the spun-off operation, it presumably would again be urged by its bankers to pay a hefty “control” premium for the privilege. (Mental “flexibility” of this sort by the banking fraternity has prompted the saying that fees too often lead to transactions rather than transactions leading to fees.)
如果後來剝離業務的公司想要重新收購被分拆的業務，銀行家們很可能又會慫恿它支付一筆可觀的「控制權」溢價。（銀行業這種心理上的「靈活性」，讓人們常說：往往是費用導致交易，而非交易導致費用。）

It’s possible, of course, that someday a spin-off or sale at Berkshire would be required by regulators. Berkshire carried out such a spin-off in 1979, when new regulations for bank holding companies forced us to divest a bank we owned in Rockford, Illinois.
當然，監管機構將來也可能要求波克夏進行分拆或出售。1979 年，波克夏就曾因銀行控股公司的新規定，被迫剝離了我們在伊利諾州羅克福德擁有的銀行。
 
Voluntary spin-offs, though, make no sense for us: We would lose control value, capital-allocation flexibility and, in some cases, important tax advantages. The CEOs who brilliantly run our subsidiaries now would have difficulty in being as effective if running a spun-off operation, given the operating and financial advantages derived from Berkshire’s ownership. Moreover, the parent and the spun-off operations, once separated, would likely incur moderately greater costs than existed when they were combined.
然而，自願性的分拆對我們來說毫無意義：我們將失去控制權價值、資本配置的靈活性，以及在某些情況下重要的稅務優勢。目前出色管理我們子公司的 CEO 們，在分拆後的業務中將難以保持同樣的效率，因為他們將無法再享有來自波克夏所有權帶來的營運與財務優勢。此外，母公司與分拆後的業務一旦分離，可能會產生比合併時略高的成本。

* * * * * * * * * * * *
Before I depart the subject of spin-offs, let’s look at a lesson to be learned from a conglomerate mentioned earlier: LTV. I’ll summarize here, but those who enjoy a good financial story should read the piece about Jimmy Ling that ran in the October 1982 issue of D Magazine. Look it up on the Internet.
在我結束分拆這個話題之前，讓我們從之前提到的一個綜合企業 LTV 中吸取一個教訓。我在這裡做個總結，但喜歡精彩金融故事的人應該讀一讀 1982 年 10 月《D 雜誌》上關於吉米·林的文章。可以在網上查閱。

Through a lot of corporate razzle-dazzle, Ling had taken LTV from sales of only $36 million in 1965 to number 14 on the Fortune 500 list just two years later. Ling, it should be noted, had never displayed any managerial skills. But Charlie told me long ago to never underestimate the man who overestimates himself. And Ling had no peer in that respect.
通過大量的企業花招，林在 1965 年僅有 3600 萬美元銷售額的 LTV，僅兩年後就躋身《財富》500 強第 14 位。應該指出的是，林從未展現過任何管理才能。但查理很久以前就告訴我，永遠不要低估那些高估自己的人。而在這方面，林無人能及。

Ling’s strategy, which he labeled “project redeployment,” was to buy a large company and then partially spin off its various divisions. In LTV’s 1966 annual report, he explained the magic that would follow: “Most importantly, acquisitions must meet the test of the 2 plus 2 equals 5 (or 6) formula.” The press, the public and Wall Street loved this sort of talk.
林氏將其策略命名為「專案重新部署」，即收購一家大公司後，再將其各部門部分分拆。在 LTV 1966 年的年度報告中，他解釋了隨之而來的魔法：「最重要的是，收購必須符合 2 加 2 等於 5（或 6）的公式。」媒體、公眾和華爾街都熱愛這種說法。

In 1967 Ling bought Wilson & Co., a huge meatpacker that also had interests in golf equipment and pharmaceuticals. Soon after, he split the parent into three businesses, Wilson & Co. (meatpacking), Wilson Sporting Goods and Wilson Pharmaceuticals, each of which was to be partially spun off. These companies quickly became known on Wall Street as Meatball, Golf Ball and Goof Ball.
1967 年，林氏收購了威爾遜公司（Wilson & Co.），這是一家大型肉類加工企業，同時還涉足高爾夫器材和製藥業務。不久後，他將母公司拆分為三家企業：威爾遜公司（肉類加工）、威爾遜體育用品和威爾遜製藥，每家企業都計劃部分分拆。這些公司很快在華爾街被戲稱為「肉丸」、「高爾夫球」和「糊塗球」。

Soon thereafter, it became clear that, like Icarus, Ling had flown too close to the sun. By the early 1970s, Ling’s empire was melting, and he himself had been spun off from LTV . . . that is, fired.
不久之後，情況變得明朗，林氏就像伊卡洛斯一樣，飛得離太陽太近了。到了 1970 年代初，林氏的帝國開始瓦解，而他本人也被從 LTV「分拆」出來……也就是被解僱了。

Periodically, financial markets will become divorced from reality – you can count on that. More Jimmy Lings will appear. They will look and sound authoritative. The press will hang on their every word. Bankers will fight for their business. What they are saying will recently have “worked.” Their early followers will be feeling very clever. Our suggestion: Whatever their line, never forget that 2+2 will always equal 4. And when someone tells you how old-fashioned that math is --- zip up your wallet, take a vacation and come back in a few years to buy stocks at cheap prices.
金融市場偶爾會與現實脫節——這一點你可以放心。更多的吉米·林之流將會出現。他們看起來和聽起來都很有權威性。媒體會對他們的一言一行緊追不捨。銀行家們會爭相與他們合作。他們所鼓吹的理論近期內會「奏效」。早期的追隨者會覺得自己非常聰明。我們的建議是：無論他們推銷什麼，永遠別忘記 2 加 2 永遠等於 4。而當有人告訴你這種算法有多麼過時時——趕緊摀緊錢包，去度個假，等幾年後再回來以低價買進股票。

* * * * * * * * * * * *
Today Berkshire possesses (1) an unmatched collection of businesses, most of them now enjoying favorable economic prospects; (2) a cadre of outstanding managers who, with few exceptions, are unusually devoted to both the subsidiary they operate and to Berkshire; (3) an extraordinary diversity of earnings, premier financial strength and oceans of liquidity that we will maintain under all circumstances; (4) a first-choice ranking among many owners and managers who are contemplating sale of their businesses and (5) in a point related to the  preceding item, a culture, distinctive in many ways from that of most large companies, that we have worked 50  years to develop and that is now rock-solid.
今日的波克夏擁有：(1) 無與倫比的企業組合，其中大多數目前享有良好的經濟前景；(2) 一群優秀的經理人，除少數例外，他們對所經營的子公司及波克夏都異常忠誠；(3) 收益的非凡多樣性、頂尖的財務實力以及我們在任何情況下都將維持的大量流動性；(4) 在許多考慮出售業務的所有者與經理人中，我們是首選；(5) 與前一點相關的是，我們花了 50 年時間建立的文化，在許多方面與大多數大公司截然不同，如今已堅如磐石。

These strengths provide us a wonderful foundation on which to build.
這些優勢為我們提供了建立未來的絕佳基礎。
 
The Next 50 Years at Berkshire
波克夏的下一個 50 年

Now let’s take a look at the road ahead. Bear in mind that if I had attempted 50 years ago to gauge what was coming, certain of my predictions would have been far off the mark. With that warning, I will tell you what I would say to my family today if they asked me about Berkshire’s future.
現在讓我們展望未來之路。請記住，如果我在 50 年前試圖預測未來，某些預測可能會大錯特錯。在此警告下，我將告訴你，如果我的家人今天問我關於波克夏的未來，我會說些什麼。

‹ First and definitely foremost, I believe that the chance of permanent capital loss for patient Berkshire shareholders is as low as can be found among single-company investments. That’s because our per-share intrinsic business value is almost certain to advance over time.
首先且絕對最重要的是，我相信對於有耐心的波克夏股東而言，發生永久性資本損失的機率在所有單一公司投資中是最低的。這是因為我們每股的內在商業價值幾乎肯定會隨著時間增長。

This cheery prediction comes, however, with an important caution: If an investor’s entry point into Berkshire stock is unusually high – at a price, say, approaching double book value, which Berkshire shares have occasionally reached – it may well be many years before the investor can realize a profit. In other words, a sound investment can morph into a rash speculation if it is bought at an elevated price. Berkshire is not exempt from this truth.
然而，這樂觀的預測伴隨著一項重要警告：如果投資者以異常高的價格買入波克夏股票——例如接近帳面價值兩倍的價格，波克夏股票偶爾會達到這個水平——那麼投資者可能需要許多年才能實現盈利。換句話說，即使是穩健的投資，如果以過高的價格買入，也可能變成魯莽的投機。波克夏也不例外。

Purchases of Berkshire that investors make at a price modestly above the level at which the company  would repurchase its shares, however, should produce gains within a reasonable period of time. Berkshire’s directors will only authorize repurchases at a price they believe to be well below intrinsic value. (In our view, that is an essential criterion for repurchases that is often ignored by other managements.)
然而，如果投資者以略高於公司回購股票的價格買入波克夏，應該能在合理的時間內獲得收益。波克夏的董事會只會在他們認為價格遠低於內在價值時授權回購。（在我們看來，這是回購的基本準則，但其他管理層經常忽略這一點。）

For those investors who plan to sell within a year or two after their purchase, I can offer no assurances, whatever the entry price. Movements of the general stock market during such abbreviated periods will likely be far more important in determining your results than the concomitant change in the intrinsic value of your Berkshire shares. As Ben Graham said many decades ago: “In the short-term the market is a voting machine; in the long-run it acts as a weighing machine.” Occasionally, the voting decisions of investors – amateurs and professionals alike – border on lunacy.
對於那些計劃在買入後一兩年內賣出的投資者，無論入場價格如何，我都無法提供任何保證。在這般短暫的期間內，整體股市的波動對您投資結果的影響，很可能遠比波克夏股份內在價值的同期變化來得重要。正如班傑明·葛拉漢數十年前所言：「短期來看，市場是一台投票機；長期而言，它則是一台秤重機。」有時，投資者——無論是業餘還是專業人士——的投票決策近乎瘋狂。

Since I know of no way to reliably predict market movements, I recommend that you purchase Berkshire shares only if you expect to hold them for at least five years. Those who seek short-term profits should look elsewhere.
由於我不知有何方法能可靠預測市場走勢，我建議您只有在打算持有波克夏股份至少五年的情況下才買入。追求短期利潤者應另尋他處。

Another warning: Berkshire shares should not be purchased with borrowed money. There have been three times since 1965 when our stock has fallen about 50% from its high point. Someday, something close to this kind of drop will happen again, and no one knows when. Berkshire will almost certainly be a satisfactory holding for investors. But it could well be a disastrous choice for speculators employing leverage.
另一項警告：伯克希爾的股票不應該用借來的錢購買。自 1965 年以來，我們的股票已經有三次從高點下跌約 50%。將來某天，類似程度的下跌會再次發生，沒有人知道是什麼時候。伯克希爾對投資者來說幾乎肯定會是一個令人滿意的持有標的。但對於使用槓桿的投機者來說，它很可能會是一個災難性的選擇。

‹ I believe the chance of any event causing Berkshire  to experience  financial  problems  is essentially  zero. We will always be prepared for the thousand-year flood; in fact, if it occurs we will be selling life jackets  to the unprepared. Berkshire played an important role as a “first responder” during the 2008-2009 meltdown, and we have since more than doubled the strength of our balance sheet and our earnings potential. Your company is the Gibraltar of American business and will remain so.
我相信任何事件導致伯克希爾遭遇財務問題的可能性基本上為零。我們總是為千年一遇的洪水做好準備；事實上，如果這種情況發生，我們將向毫無準備的人出售救生衣。在 2008-2009 年的金融危機期間，伯克希爾作為「第一響應者」發揮了重要作用，自那以來，我們的資產負債表實力和盈利潛力已經增加了一倍以上。您的公司是美國企業的直布羅陀，並將繼續如此。

Financial staying power requires a company to maintain three strengths under all circumstances: (1) a large and reliable stream of earnings; (2) massive liquid assets and (3) no significant near-term cash requirements. Ignoring that last necessity is what usually leads companies to experience unexpected problems: Too often, CEOs of profitable companies feel they will always be able to refund maturing obligations, however large these are. In 2008-2009, many managements learned how perilous that mindset can be.
財務持久力要求一家公司在任何情況下都保持三項優勢：(1) 龐大且可靠的收益流；(2) 大量的流動資產；以及 (3) 沒有重大的近期現金需求。忽視最後一項需求通常是導致公司遭遇意外問題的原因：太多時候，盈利公司的執行長們認為他們總能再融資到期債務，無論這些債務有多大。在 2008 至 2009 年間，許多管理層學到了這種心態可能帶來的危險。

Here’s how we will always stand on the three essentials. First, our earnings stream is huge and comes from a vast array of businesses. Our shareholders now own many large companies that have durable competitive advantages, and we will acquire more of those in the future. Our diversification assures Berkshire’s continued profitability, even if a catastrophe causes insurance losses that far exceed any previously experienced.
以下是我們將如何始終堅守這三項基本要素。首先，我們的收益流龐大且來自於眾多業務。我們的股東現在擁有許多具有持久競爭優勢的大型企業，未來我們還將收購更多這樣的企業。我們的多元化保證了波克夏的持續盈利能力，即使發生災難導致保險損失遠超以往任何經歷。
 
Next up is cash. At a healthy business, cash is sometimes thought of as something to be minimized – as an unproductive asset that acts as a drag on such markers as return on equity. Cash, though, is to a business as oxygen is to an individual: never thought about when it is present, the only thing in mind when it is absent.
接下來談談現金。對於一家健康的企業來說，現金有時被視為應最小化的東西——作為一種非生產性資產，會拖累諸如股本回報率等指標。然而，現金之於企業，猶如氧氣之於個人：當它存在時從不被想起，一旦缺席便成為唯一牽掛。

American business provided a case study of that in 2008. In September of that year, many long-prosperous companies suddenly wondered whether their checks would bounce in the days ahead. Overnight, their financial oxygen disappeared.
2008 年的美國商界為此提供了典型案例。當年 9 月，許多長期繁榮的公司突然擔憂起未來幾天他們的支票是否會跳票。一夜之間，它們的財務氧氣消失了。

At Berkshire, our “breathing” went uninterrupted. Indeed, in a three-week period spanning late September and early October, we supplied $15.6 billion of fresh money to American businesses.
在波克夏，我們的「呼吸」從未間斷。事實上，在 9 月底至 10 月初的三週內，我們向美國企業注入了 156 億美元的新資金。

We could do that because we always maintain at least $20 billion – and usually far more – in cash equivalents. And by that we mean U.S. Treasury bills, not other substitutes for cash that are claimed to deliver liquidity and actually do so, except when it is truly needed. When bills come due, only cash is legal tender. Don’t leave home without it.
我們能做到這一點，是因為我們始終保持至少 200 億美元——通常遠多於此——的現金等價物。這裡指的是美國國庫券，而非那些聲稱能提供流動性、卻在真正需要時失靈的其他現金替代品。當帳單到期時，只有現金才是法定償付手段。出門切記隨身攜帶。

Finally – getting to our third point – we will never engage in operating or investment practices that can result in sudden demands for large sums. That means we will not expose Berkshire to short-term debt maturities of size nor enter into derivative contracts or other business arrangements that could require large collateral calls.
最後——談到我們的第三點——我們永遠不會從事可能導致突然需要大筆資金的營運或投資行為。這意味著我們不會讓波克夏面臨大額短期債務到期，也不會簽訂可能要求大量擔保追繳的衍生性合約或其他商業安排。

Some years ago, we became a party to certain derivative contracts that we believed were significantly mispriced and that had only minor collateral requirements. These have proved to be quite profitable. Recently, however, newly-written derivative contracts have required full collateralization. And that ended our interest in derivatives, regardless of what profit potential they might offer. We have not, for some  years, written these contracts, except for a few needed for operational purposes at our utility businesses.
幾年前，我們成為某些衍生性合約的一方，當時我們認為這些合約定價明顯錯誤，且僅需少量擔保。這些合約後來證明相當有利可圖。然而，近期新簽訂的衍生性合約已要求全額擔保。這讓我們對衍生性商品失去興趣，無論它們可能帶來多少利潤潛力。多年來我們已不再簽訂這類合約，除了公用事業業務營運所需的少數合約外。

Moreover, we will not write insurance contracts that give policyholders the right to cash out at their option. Many life insurance products contain redemption features that make them susceptible to a “run” in times of extreme panic. Contracts of that sort, however, do not exist in the property-casualty world that we inhabit. If our premium volume should shrink, our float would decline – but only at a very slow pace.
此外，我們不會簽訂允許保單持有人自行選擇贖回權的保險合約。許多人壽保險產品包含贖回條款，這使得它們在極度恐慌時期容易遭遇「擠兌」。然而，這類合約在我們所處的財產意外險領域並不存在。如果我們的保費收入縮減，我們的浮存金將會減少——但下降速度會非常緩慢。

The reason for our conservatism, which may impress some people as extreme, is that it is entirely predictable that people will occasionally panic, but not at all predictable when this will happen. Though practically all days are relatively uneventful, tomorrow is always uncertain. (I felt no special apprehension on December 6, 1941 or September 10, 2001.) And if you can’t predict what tomorrow will bring, you  must be prepared for whatever it does.
我們這種可能被某些人視為極端的保守態度，其原因是人們偶爾會恐慌這一點完全可以預見，但恐慌何時發生卻完全無法預測。儘管幾乎所有日子都相對平靜，但明天永遠充滿不確定性。（我在 1941 年 12 月 6 日或 2001 年 9 月 10 日並未感到特別憂慮。）既然你無法預測明天會發生什麼，就必須為任何可能性做好準備。

A CEO who is 64 and plans to retire at 65 may have his own special calculus in evaluating risks that have only a tiny chance of happening in a given year. He may, in fact, be “right” 99% of the time. Those odds, however, hold no appeal for us. We will never play financial Russian roulette with the funds you’ve entrusted to us, even if the metaphorical gun has 100 chambers and only one bullet. In our view, it is madness to risk losing what you need in pursuing what you simply desire.
一位 64 歲且計劃在 65 歲退休的執行長，在評估那些每年僅有極小概率發生的風險時，可能有其獨特的計算方式。事實上，他可能「正確」了 99%的時間。然而，這樣的機率對我們毫無吸引力。我們絕不會用您託付給我們的資金玩財務俄羅斯輪盤，即使那把比喻性的槍有 100 個彈膛且僅有一發子彈。在我們看來，為了追求單純的慾望而冒險失去所需之物，實屬瘋狂。

‹    Despite our conservatism, I think we will be able every year to build the underlying per-share earning power of Berkshire. That does not mean operating earnings will increase each year – far from it. The U.S. economy will ebb and flow – though mostly flow – and, when it weakens, so will our current earnings. But we will continue to achieve organic gains, make bolt-on acquisitions and enter new fields. I believe, therefore, that Berkshire will annually add to its underlying earning power.
儘管我們持保守態度，我認為我們每年都能提升伯克希爾每股的基礎盈利能力。這並不意味著營業收益每年都會增長——遠非如此。美國經濟會有起伏——儘管主要是上升——當經濟疲軟時，我們當前的收益也會隨之減少。但我們將持續實現有機增長，進行追加收購並進軍新領域。因此，我相信伯克希爾每年都會增加其基礎盈利能力。

In some years the gains will be substantial, and at other times they will be minor. Markets, competition,  and chance will determine when opportunities come our way. Through it all, Berkshire will keep moving forward, powered by the array of solid businesses we now possess and the new companies we will purchase. In most years, moreover, our country’s economy will provide a strong tailwind for business. We are blessed to have the United States as our home field.
在某些年份，我們的收益會相當可觀，而在其他時候則可能微不足道。市場、競爭和機遇將決定機會何時降臨。無論如何，伯克希爾都將憑藉我們現有的穩健業務組合及未來收購的新公司持續向前邁進。此外，在大多數年份裡，美國經濟將為企業提供強勁的順風。我們很幸運能將美國作為我們的主場。
 
‹    The bad news is that Berkshire’s long-term gains – measured by percentages, not by dollars – cannot be dramatic and will not come close to those achieved in the past 50 years. The numbers have become too big. I think Berkshire will outperform the average American company, but our advantage, if any, won’t be great.
壞消息是，伯克希爾的長期收益——以百分比而非美元計算——不可能再出現戲劇性增長，也遠不及過去 50 年所達成的成就。數字已經變得太大。我認為伯克希爾仍將超越美國企業的平均表現，但我們的優勢（如果有的話）不會太顯著。

Eventually – probably between ten and twenty years from now – Berkshire’s earnings and capital resources will reach a level that will not allow management to intelligently reinvest all of the company’s earnings. At that time our directors will need to determine whether the best method to distribute the excess earnings is through dividends, share repurchases or both. If Berkshire shares are selling below intrinsic business value, massive repurchases will almost certainly be the best choice. You can be comfortable that your directors will make the right decision.
最終——很可能在未來十到二十年內——波克夏的盈利和資本資源將達到一個管理層無法明智地再投資公司所有收益的水平。屆時，我們的董事將需要決定分配超額收益的最佳方式是通過股息、股票回購還是兩者兼施。如果波克夏的股價低於其內在商業價值，大規模回購幾乎肯定會是最佳選擇。您可以放心，您的董事會做出正確的決定。

‹    No company will be more shareholder-minded than Berkshire. For more than 30 years, we have annually reaffirmed our Shareholder Principles (see page 117), always leading off with: “Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership.” This covenant with you is etched in stone.
沒有任何一家公司會比波克夏更以股東為中心。三十多年來，我們每年都會重申我們的《股東原則》（見第 117 頁），開篇總是寫道：「雖然我們的形式是公司，但我們的態度是合夥。」這與您的約定鐫刻於石，永不改變。

We have an extraordinarily knowledgeable and business-oriented board of directors ready to carry out that promise of partnership. None took the job for the money: In an arrangement almost non-existent elsewhere, our directors are paid only token fees. They receive their rewards instead through ownership of Berkshire shares and the satisfaction that comes from being good stewards of an important enterprise.
我們擁有一支極具商業智慧且經驗豐富的董事會團隊，他們已準備好履行這份合作承諾。沒有人是為了金錢而擔任此職：在幾乎其他地方都不存在的安排中，我們的董事僅領取象徵性酬金。他們的回報來自於持有波克夏股份，以及作為重要企業優秀管理者的滿足感。

The shares that they and their families own – which, in many cases, are worth very substantial sums – were purchased in the market (rather than their materializing through options or grants). In addition, unlike almost all other sizable public companies, we carry no directors and officers liability insurance. At Berkshire, directors walk in your shoes.
他們及其家族所持有的股份——在許多情況下價值相當可觀——都是在公開市場上購入（而非通過期權或贈予獲得）。此外，與幾乎所有其他大型上市公司不同，我們不為董事和高階主管投保責任險。在波克夏，董事們與股民同舟共濟。

To further ensure continuation of our culture, I have suggested that my son, Howard, succeed me as a non- executive Chairman. My only reason for this wish is to make change easier if the wrong CEO should ever be employed and there occurs a need for the Chairman to move forcefully. I can assure you that this problem has a very low probability of arising at Berkshire – likely as low as at any public company. In my service on the boards of nineteen public companies, however, I’ve seen how hard it is to replace a mediocre CEO if that person is also Chairman. (The deed usually gets done, but almost always very late.)
為了進一步確保我們文化的延續，我已建議由我的兒子霍華德接替我擔任非執行董事長。我這個願望的唯一原因是，如果將來僱用了錯誤的執行長，且有必要讓董事長強力介入時，這樣的安排能使變革更容易進行。我可以向你們保證，這種問題在波克夏發生的機率非常低——可能和任何上市公司一樣低。然而，在我擔任十九家上市公司董事的經驗中，我見過如果執行長同時兼任董事長，要替換一位平庸的執行長是多麼困難。（這種事通常最終會完成，但幾乎總是非常遲。）

If elected, Howard will receive no pay and will spend no time at the job other than that required of all directors. He will simply be a safety valve to whom any director can go if he or she has concerns about the CEO and wishes to learn if other directors are expressing doubts as well. Should multiple directors be apprehensive, Howard’s chairmanship will allow the matter to be promptly and properly addressed.
如果當選，霍華德將不會獲得任何報酬，除了所有董事都必須投入的時間外，他也不會在這份工作上花費任何時間。他將僅僅是一個安全閥，任何董事如果有關於執行長的疑慮，並希望了解其他董事是否也表達了同樣的擔憂，都可以去找他。如果多位董事感到擔憂，霍華德的董事長職位將使問題能夠迅速且妥善地得到解決。

‹ Choosing the right CEO is all-important and is a subject that commands much time at Berkshire board meetings. Managing Berkshire is primarily a job of capital allocation, coupled with the selection and retention of outstanding managers to captain our operating subsidiaries. Obviously, the job also requires the replacement of a subsidiary’s CEO when that is called for. These duties require Berkshire’s CEO to be a rational, calm and decisive individual who has a broad understanding of business and good insights into human behavior. It’s important as well that he knows his limits. (As Tom Watson, Sr. of IBM said, “I’m no genius, but I’m smart in spots and I stay around those spots.”)
選擇合適的執行長至關重要，這也是波克夏董事會會議上耗費大量時間討論的主題。管理波克夏主要是資本配置的工作，再加上挑選並留住優秀的經理人來領導我們的營運子公司。顯然，當需要時，這份工作還包括替換子公司的執行長。這些職責要求波克夏的執行長必須是一位理性、冷靜且果斷的人，對商業有廣泛的理解，並對人性行為有深刻的洞察力。同樣重要的是，他必須清楚自己的極限。（正如 IBM 的老湯姆·華生所說：「我不是天才，但我在某些方面很聰明，而且我會待在我擅長的領域。」）

Character is crucial: A Berkshire CEO must be “all in” for the company, not for himself. (I’m using male pronouns to avoid awkward wording, but gender should never decide who becomes CEO.) He can’t help but earn money far in excess of any possible need for it. But it’s important that neither ego nor avarice motivate him to reach for pay matching his most lavishly-compensated peers, even if his achievements far exceed theirs. A CEO’s behavior has a huge impact on managers down the line: If it’s clear to them that shareholders’ interests are paramount to him, they will, with few exceptions, also embrace that way of thinking.
品格至關重要：波克夏的執行長必須「全心投入」公司，而非為自己。（我使用男性代名詞是為了避免措辭尷尬，但性別絕不應決定誰能成為執行長。）他不可避免地會賺取遠超過任何可能需求的財富。但重要的是，既不讓自我也不讓貪婪驅使他追求與那些薪酬最豐厚的同儕相匹配的報酬，即使他的成就遠超過他們。執行長的行為對下屬管理層有巨大影響：如果他們清楚股東利益對他而言至高無上，那麼他們也將在極少例外下接受這種思維方式。
 
My successor will need one other particular strength: the ability to fight off the ABCs of business decay, which are arrogance, bureaucracy and complacency. When these corporate cancers metastasize, even the strongest of companies can falter. The examples available to prove the point are legion, but to maintain friendships I will exhume only cases from the distant past.
我的繼任者還需要另一項特殊能力：抵禦企業衰敗的 ABC，即傲慢（Arrogance）、官僚（Bureaucracy）和自滿（Complacency）。當這些企業癌症擴散時，即使是最強大的公司也可能動搖。能證明這一點的例子不勝枚舉，但為了維持友誼，我只會挖掘遙遠過去的案例。

In their glory days, General Motors, IBM, Sears Roebuck and U.S. Steel sat atop huge industries. Their strengths seemed unassailable. But the destructive behavior I deplored above eventually led each of them to fall to depths that their CEOs and directors had not long before thought impossible. Their one-time financial strength and their historical earning power proved no defense.
在它們的輝煌時期，通用汽車、IBM、西爾斯百貨和美國鋼鐵公司曾雄踞龐大產業的頂端。它們的優勢看似無懈可擊。但我在上文所譴責的破壞性行為最終導致每一家公司都跌入了它們的 CEO 和董事們不久前還認為不可能的深淵。它們曾經的財務實力和歷史盈利能力證明並非防禦之道。

Only a vigilant and determined CEO can ward off such debilitating forces as Berkshire grows ever larger. He must never forget Charlie’s plea: “Tell me where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there.” If our non- economic values were to be lost, much of Berkshire’s economic value would collapse as well. “Tone at the top” will be key to maintaining Berkshire’s special culture.
隨著伯克希爾規模日益龐大，只有一位警覺且堅定的 CEO 才能抵禦這些削弱企業的勢力。他絕不能忘記查理的要求：「告訴我我會在哪裡死去，這樣我就永遠不會去那裡。」如果我們非經濟的價值觀喪失，伯克希爾大部分的經濟價值也將隨之崩潰。「高層的基調」將是維持伯克希爾特殊文化的關鍵。

Fortunately, the structure our future CEOs will need to be successful is firmly in place. The extraordinary delegation of authority now existing at Berkshire is the ideal antidote to bureaucracy. In an operating sense, Berkshire is not a giant company but rather a collection of large companies. At headquarters, we have  never had a committee nor have we ever required our subsidiaries to submit budgets (though many use them as an important internal tool). We don’t have a legal office nor departments that other companies take for granted: human relations, public relations, investor relations, strategy, acquisitions, you name it.
幸運的是，我們未來的執行長們要取得成功所需的架構已經穩固就位。目前伯克希爾所擁有的非凡授權體系，正是對抗官僚主義的理想解藥。就營運層面而言，伯克希爾並非一家巨型企業，而是一系列大型企業的集合體。在總部，我們從未設立過委員會，也從未要求子公司提交預算（儘管許多子公司將其作為重要的內部工具）。我們沒有法律辦公室，也沒有其他公司視為理所當然的部門：人力資源、公共關係、投資者關係、策略、收購等等，應有盡有。

We do, of course, have an active audit function; no sense being a damned fool. To an unusual degree, however, we trust our managers to run their operations with a keen sense of stewardship. After all, they were doing exactly that before we acquired their businesses. With only occasional exceptions, furthermore, our trust produces better results than would be achieved by streams of directives, endless reviews and layers of bureaucracy. Charlie and I try to interact with our managers in a manner consistent with what we would wish for, if the positions were reversed.
當然，我們確實擁有活躍的審計功能；沒有理由做個十足的傻瓜。然而，我們異常地信任我們的經理人，讓他們以強烈的管理意識來經營業務。畢竟，在我們收購他們的企業之前，他們就是這樣做的。而且，除了偶爾的例外，我們的信任所產生的結果，比通過一連串指令、無休止的審查和多層官僚機構所能達到的效果要好。查理和我試圖以我們希望的方式與我們的經理人互動，如果位置互換的話。

‹    Our directors believe that our future CEOs should come from internal candidates whom the Berkshire board has grown to know well. Our directors also believe that an incoming CEO should be relatively young, so that he or she can have a long run in the job. Berkshire will operate best if its CEOs average well over ten years at the helm. (It’s hard to teach a new dog old tricks.) And they are not likely to retire at 65 either (or have you noticed?).
我們的董事們相信，我們未來的 CEO 應該來自內部候選人，這些候選人波克夏董事會已經逐漸深入了解。我們的董事們還認為，新任 CEO 應該相對年輕，這樣他或她就能在這個職位上長期任職。如果波克夏的 CEO 們平均任職時間遠超過十年，公司將運作得最好。（教老狗新把戲是很難的。）而且他們也不太可能在 65 歲退休（或者你注意到了嗎？）。

In both Berkshire’s business acquisitions and large, tailored investment moves, it is important that our counterparties be both familiar with and feel comfortable with Berkshire’s CEO. Developing confidence of that sort and cementing relationships takes time. The payoff, though, can be huge.
無論是波克夏的企業收購或大型客製化投資行動，交易對手熟悉並信任我們的執行長至關重要。建立這種信心與鞏固關係需要時間，但其回報可能極為可觀。

Both the board and I believe we now have the right person to succeed me as CEO – a successor ready to assume the job the day after I die or step down. In certain important respects, this person will do a better job than I am doing.
董事會與我皆相信，我們已找到合適人選接任執行長職位——這位繼任者已準備好在我離世或卸任次日即刻上任。在某些重要層面，他將表現得比我更出色。

‹    Investments will always be of great importance to Berkshire and will be handled by several specialists. They will report to the CEO because their investment decisions, in a broad way, will need to be  coordinated with Berkshire’s operating and acquisition programs. Overall, though, our investment managers will enjoy great autonomy. In this area, too, we are in fine shape for decades to come. Todd Combs and Ted Weschler, each of whom has spent several years on Berkshire’s investment team, are first- rate in all respects and can be of particular help to the CEO in evaluating acquisitions.
投資始終是波克夏的重要環節，將由多位專業人士負責。由於投資決策需與公司營運及收購計畫宏觀協調，他們將向執行長匯報。但整體而言，我們的投資經理將享有高度自主權。這方面我們同樣已為未來數十年做好完善準備。托德·康布斯與泰德·韋施勒在波克夏投資團隊任職多年，各方面表現一流，尤其能協助執行長評估收購案。

All told, Berkshire is ideally positioned for life after Charlie and I leave the scene. We have the right  people in place – the right directors, managers and prospective successors to those managers. Our culture, furthermore, is embedded throughout their ranks. Our system is also regenerative. To a large degree, both good and bad cultures self-select to perpetuate themselves. For very good reasons, business owners and operating managers with values similar to ours will continue to be attracted to Berkshire as a one-of-a-kind and permanent home.
總的來說，在查理和我離開舞台後，波克夏已處於理想位置。我們擁有合適的人選——合適的董事、經理人以及這些經理人的潛在繼任者。更重要的是，我們的文化已深植於他們的階層之中。我們的體系也具有再生能力。在很大程度上，無論好壞文化都會自我選擇以延續自身。基於充分理由，與我們價值觀相似的企業主和營運經理人將繼續被波克夏所吸引，視其為獨一無二且永久的歸宿。
 
‹    I would be remiss if I didn’t salute another key constituency that makes Berkshire special: our shareholders. Berkshire truly has an owner base unlike that of any other giant corporation. That fact was demonstrated in spades at last year’s annual meeting, where the shareholders were offered a proxy resolution:
如果我不向另一個使波克夏與眾不同的關鍵群體致敬，那就是我的疏忽：我們的股東。波克夏確實擁有一個與其他巨型企業截然不同的股東基礎。這一點在去年的年度股東大會上得到了充分展現，當時股東們提出了一項代理決議：

RESOLVED: Whereas the corporation has more money than it needs and since the owners unlike Warren are not multi billionaires, the board shall consider paying a meaningful annual dividend on the shares.
決議：鑒於公司資金遠超過其所需，且股東們不像華倫那樣是億萬富翁，董事會應考慮每年支付一筆有意義的股息。

The sponsoring shareholder of that resolution never showed up at the meeting, so his motion was not officially proposed. Nevertheless, the proxy votes had been tallied, and they were enlightening.
該決議案的提案股東並未出席會議，因此他的動議未被正式提出。然而，代理投票已經統計完成，結果頗具啟發性。

Not surprisingly, the A shares – owned by relatively few shareholders, each with a large economic interest
不出所料，A 股股東——由相對少數、每位持有大量經濟利益的股東組成
– voted “no” on the dividend question by a margin of 89 to 1.
——在分紅問題上以 89 比 1 的懸殊比例投下了「反對」票。

The remarkable vote was that of our B shareholders. They number in the hundreds of thousands – perhaps even totaling one million – and they voted 660,759,855 “no” and 13,927,026 “yes,” a ratio of about 47 to 1.
令人矚目的是我們 B 股股東的投票結果。他們人數達數十萬——甚至可能總計一百萬——並且以 660,759,855 票「反對」對 13,927,026 票「贊成」，比例約為 47 比 1。

Our directors recommended a “no” vote but the company did not otherwise attempt to influence shareholders. Nevertheless, 98% of the shares voting said, in effect, “Don’t send us a dividend but instead reinvest all of the earnings.” To have our fellow owners – large and small – be so in sync with our managerial philosophy is both remarkable and rewarding.
我們的董事會建議投「反對」票，但公司並未試圖影響股東。然而，98%的投票股份實際上表示：「不要給我們發放股息，而是將所有收益再投資。」能讓我們的大小股東夥伴們與我們的管理理念如此同步，既令人驚嘆又倍感欣慰。

I am a lucky fellow to have you as partners.
能有你們作為夥伴，我真是個幸運的傢伙。

Warren E. Buffett  華倫·E·巴菲特

 

 

以下文章來自於查理孟格

Vice Chairman’s Thoughts – Past and Future
副董事長的思考——過去與未來

To the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致波克夏·海瑟威公司全體股東：

I closely watched the 50-year history of Berkshire’s uncommon success under Warren Buffett. And it now seems appropriate that I independently supplement whatever celebratory comment comes from him. I will try to do five things.
我密切關注了波克夏在華倫·巴菲特領導下五十年來非凡成功的歷史。現在看來，由我獨立補充他可能提出的任何慶祝性評論是恰當的。我將嘗試完成五件事。

(1)    Describe the management system and policies that caused a small and unfixably-doomed commodity  textile business to morph into the mighty Berkshire that now exists,
(1) 描述使一家規模小且注定失敗的商品紡織企業轉變為如今強大的波克夏的管理體系與政策，

(2)    Explain how the management system and policies came into being,
(2) 解釋該管理體系與政策是如何形成的，

(3)    Explain, to some extent, why Berkshire did so well,
(3) 在一定程度上解釋波克夏為何表現如此出色，

(4)    Predict whether abnormally good results would continue if Buffett were soon to depart, and
(4) 預測如果巴菲特不久後離開，異常優異的業績是否會持續，以及

(5)    Consider whether Berkshire’s great results over the last 50 years have implications that may prove useful elsewhere.
(5) 思考波克夏過去 50 年的卓越成果是否具有可應用於其他領域的啟示。

The management system and policies of Berkshire under Buffett (herein together called “the Berkshire system”) were fixed early and are described below:
巴菲特領導下的波克夏管理體系與政策（以下統稱「波克夏體系」）早期即已確立，其描述如下：

(1)    Berkshire would be a diffuse conglomerate, averse only to activities about which it could not make useful predictions.
(1) 波克夏將成為一個分散的綜合企業集團，僅對無法做出有用預測的活動持保留態度。
(2)    Its top company would do almost all business through separately incorporated subsidiaries whose CEOs would operate with very extreme autonomy.
(2) 其頂層公司幾乎所有業務都將通過獨立註冊的子公司進行，這些子公司的 CEO 將享有極高的自主權。
(3)    There would be almost nothing at conglomerate headquarters except a tiny office suite containing a Chairman, a CFO, and a few assistants who mostly helped the CFO with auditing, internal control, etc.
(3) 集團總部幾乎不會有任何設施，除了一個小型辦公室套間，裡面設有一位董事長、一位財務長及少數主要協助財務長進行審計、內部控制等工作的助理。
(4)    Berkshire subsidiaries would always prominently include casualty insurers. Those insurers as a group would be expected to produce, in due course, dependable underwriting gains while also producing substantial “float” (from unpaid insurance liabilities) for investment.
(4) 波克夏的子公司將始終顯著包含意外傷害保險公司。這些保險公司作為一個整體，預計最終將產生可靠的承保收益，同時也為投資產生大量的「浮存金」（來自未支付的保險負債）。
(5)    There would be no significant system-wide personnel system, stock option system, other incentive system, retirement system, or the like, because the subsidiaries would have their own systems, often different.
(5) 將不會有全系統統一的重要人事制度、股票選擇權制度、其他激勵制度、退休制度等，因為各子公司會有自己的制度，且往往各不相同。
(6)    Berkshire’s Chairman would reserve only a few activities for himself.
(6) 波克夏的董事長只會為自己保留少數幾項職責。

(i)    He would manage almost all security investments, with these normally residing in Berkshire’s casualty insurers.
(i) 他將管理幾乎所有的證券投資，這些投資通常存放在波克夏的意外險公司中。

(ii)    He would choose all CEOs of important subsidiaries, and he would fix their compensation and obtain from each a private recommendation for a successor in case one was suddenly needed.
(ii) 他將挑選所有重要子公司的執行長，並決定他們的薪酬，同時從每位執行長那裡獲得一份私人推薦的繼任者名單，以備不時之需。

(iii)    He would deploy most cash not needed in subsidiaries after they had increased their competitive advantage, with the ideal deployment being the use of that cash to acquire new subsidiaries.
(iii) 他會將子公司提升競爭優勢後不需要的大部分現金進行配置，理想的配置方式是使用這些現金來收購新的子公司。

(iv)    He would make himself promptly available for almost any contact wanted by any subsidiary’s CEO, and he would require almost no additional contact.
(iv) 他會讓自己幾乎隨時準備好接受任何子公司 CEO 所需的聯繫，並且幾乎不需要額外的聯繫。

(v)    He would write a long, logical, and useful letter for inclusion in his annual report, designed as he would wish it to be if he were only a passive shareholder, and he would be available for hours of answering questions at annual shareholders’ meetings.
(v) 他會撰寫一封長篇、邏輯清晰且實用的信件，納入年度報告中，這封信的設計會如同他僅是被動股東時所希望的那樣，並且他會在年度股東大會上花數小時回答問題。

(vi)    He would try to be an exemplar in a culture that would work well for customers, shareholders, and other incumbents for a long time, both before and after his departure.
(vi) 他會努力成為一種文化的典範，這種文化將長期為客戶、股東和其他在職人員帶來良好運作，無論是在他離開之前還是之後。

(vii)    His first priority would be reservation of much time for quiet reading and thinking, particularly that which might advance his determined learning, no matter how old he became; and
(七) 他的首要任務是保留大量時間用於靜心閱讀與思考，特別是那些能促進他堅定學習的事項，無論年紀多大；以及
 
(viii)    He would also spend much time in enthusiastically admiring what others were accomplishing.
(八) 他也會投入大量時間熱情讚賞他人所取得的成就。
(7)    New subsidiaries would usually be bought with cash, not newly issued stock.
(7) 新收購的子公司通常會以現金支付，而非發行新股。
(8)    Berkshire would not pay dividends so long as more than one dollar of market value for shareholders was being created by each dollar of retained earnings.
(8) 只要每保留一美元盈餘能為股東創造超過一美元的市場價值，波克夏就不會發放股息。
(9)    In buying a new subsidiary, Berkshire would seek to pay a fair price for a good business that the Chairman could pretty well understand. Berkshire would also want a good CEO in place, one expected to remain for a long time and to manage well without need for help from headquarters.
(9) 在收購新子公司時，波克夏會以公平價格收購主席能大致理解的好企業。同時也會希望該公司已有優秀的執行長在位，且預期能長期留任，並在無需總部協助的情況下妥善管理公司。
(10)    In choosing CEOs of subsidiaries, Berkshire would try to secure trustworthiness, skill, energy, and love for the business and circumstances the CEO was in.
(10) 在選擇子公司執行長時，波克夏會力求確保其具備可信賴度、專業技能、充沛精力，以及對所處業務與環境的熱愛。
(11)    As an important matter of preferred conduct, Berkshire would almost never sell a subsidiary.
(11) 作為重要的行為準則，波克夏幾乎從不出售子公司。
(12)    Berkshire would almost never transfer a subsidiary’s CEO to another unrelated subsidiary.
(12) 波克夏幾乎從不將子公司執行長調任至其他不相關的子公司。
(13)    Berkshire would never force the CEO of a subsidiary to retire on account of mere age.
(13) 波克夏絕不會僅因年齡因素強制子公司執行長退休。
(14)    Berkshire would have little debt outstanding as it tried to maintain (i) virtually perfect creditworthiness under all conditions and (ii) easy availability of cash and credit for deployment in times presenting unusual opportunities.
(14) 波克夏將維持極低負債水平，以確保：(i) 在任何情況下都擁有近乎完美的信用評級；(ii) 在出現特殊投資機會時能隨時動用充足現金與信貸額度。
(15)    Berkshire would always be user-friendly to a prospective seller of a large business. An offer of such a business would get prompt attention. No one but the Chairman and one or two others at Berkshire would ever know about the offer if it did not lead to a transaction. And they would never tell outsiders about it.
(15) 波克夏對有意出售大型企業的賣方始終保持友善態度。此類收購提案將獲得即時關注。若交易未成立，除董事長及一兩位波克夏高層外，無人會知曉提案內容，且他們絕不會對外透露。

Both the elements of the Berkshire system and their collected size are quite unusual. No other large corporation I know of has half of such elements in place.
波克夏體系的組成要素及其整體規模皆非比尋常。據我所知，沒有任何其他大型企業能具備其中半數特質。

How did Berkshire happen to get a corporate personality so different from the norm?
伯克希爾是如何形成與眾不同的企業性格的？

Well, Buffett, even when only 34 years old, controlled about 45% of Berkshire’s shares and was completely trusted by all the other big shareholders. He could install whatever system he wanted. And he did so, creating the Berkshire system.
當時年僅 34 歲的巴菲特已掌控伯克希爾約 45%的股份，並獲得其他大股東的完全信任。他能夠建立任何他想要的體系，而他確實這麼做了，創立了伯克希爾體系。

Almost every element was chosen because Buffett believed that, under him, it would help maximize Berkshire’s achievement. He was not trying to create a one-type-fits-all system for other corporations. Indeed, Berkshire’s subsidiaries were not required to use the Berkshire system in their own operations. And some flourished while using different systems.
幾乎每個要素的選擇都是因為巴菲特相信，在他的領導下，這些要素能幫助伯克希爾實現最大成就。他並非試圖為其他企業創建一套放諸四海皆準的體系。事實上，伯克希爾的子公司並未被要求在自身營運中採用伯克希爾體系，有些甚至在採用不同體系的情況下蓬勃發展。

What was Buffett aiming at as he designed the Berkshire system? Well, over the years I diagnosed several important themes:
巴菲特在設計伯克希爾體系時追求的目標是什麼？多年來，我歸納出幾個重要主題：
(1)    He particularly wanted continuous maximization of the rationality, skills, and devotion of the most important people in the system, starting with himself.
(1) 他特別希望系統中最重要的成員（從自身開始）能持續最大化理性、技能與奉獻精神。
(2)    He wanted win/win results everywhere--in gaining loyalty by giving it, for instance.
(2) 他追求處處實現雙贏局面——例如透過給予忠誠來換取忠誠。
(3)    He wanted decisions that maximized long-term results, seeking these from decision makers who usually stayed long enough in place to bear the consequences of decisions.
(3) 他要求決策必須極大化長期效益，並由通常會長期在位、需承擔決策後果的決策者來達成。
(4)    He wanted to minimize the bad effects that would almost inevitably come from a large bureaucracy at headquarters.
(4) 他致力於將總部龐大官僚體系幾乎無可避免的負面影響降至最低。
(5)    He wanted to personally contribute, like Professor Ben Graham, to the spread of wisdom attained.
(5) 他希望像班傑明·葛拉漢教授那樣，親自貢獻於所獲智慧的傳播。

When Buffett developed the Berkshire system, did he foresee all the benefits that followed? No. Buffett stumbled into some benefits through practice evolution. But, when he saw useful consequences, he strengthened their causes.
當巴菲特建立波克夏體系時，是否預見了隨之而來的所有益處？沒有。巴菲特是在實踐演進中偶然發現了一些好處。但當他看到有益的結果時，便強化了這些結果的成因。
 
Why did Berkshire under Buffett do so well? Only four large factors occur to me:
為什麼巴菲特領導下的波克夏表現如此出色？我想到的只有四個主要因素：
(1)    The constructive peculiarities of Buffett,
(1) 巴菲特獨特的建設性特質，
(2)    The constructive peculiarities of the Berkshire system,
(2) 波克夏系統的建設性特質，
(3)    Good luck, and  (3) 祝好運，以及
(4)    The weirdly intense, contagious devotion of some shareholders and other admirers, including some in the press.
(4) 某些股東及其他仰慕者（包括部分媒體人士）那種異常強烈且具感染力的忠誠。

I believe all four factors were present and helpful. But the heavy freight was carried by the constructive  peculiarities, the weird devotion, and their interactions.
我相信這四個因素都存在且有所助益。但真正承擔重責大任的是那些建設性特質、異常的忠誠，以及它們之間的相互作用。

In particular, Buffett’s decision to limit his activities to a few kinds and to maximize his attention to them, and to keep doing so for 50 years, was a lollapalooza. Buffett succeeded for the same reason Roger Federer became good  at tennis.
特別是巴菲特決定將自己的活動限制在少數幾種類型，並最大化對它們的關注，且持續這樣做 50 年，這簡直是驚人之舉。巴菲特之所以成功，原因與羅傑·費德勒在網球上的成就如出一轍。

Buffett was, in effect, using the winning method of the famous basketball coach, John Wooden, who won most regularly after he had learned to assign virtually all playing time to his seven best players. That way, opponents always faced his best players, instead of his second best. And, with the extra playing time, the best players improved more than was normal.
實際上，巴菲特採用了著名籃球教練約翰·伍登的致勝方法，伍登在學會將幾乎所有上場時間分配給他的七名最佳球員後，贏得了最穩定的勝利。這樣一來，對手總是面對他的最佳球員，而不是次佳的。而且，由於額外的上場時間，這些最佳球員的進步比平常更為顯著。

And Buffett much out-Woodened Wooden, because in his case the exercise of skill was concentrated in one person, not seven, and his skill improved and improved as he got older and older during 50 years, instead of deteriorating like the skill of a basketball player does.
而巴菲特在某種程度上超越了伍登，因為在他這裡，技能的運用集中在一個人身上，而不是七個人，而且他的技能隨著年齡的增長而不斷提升，持續了 50 年，而不是像籃球運動員那樣隨著年齡增長而退化。

Moreover, by concentrating so much power and authority in the often-long-serving CEOs of important subsidiaries, Buffett was also creating strong Wooden-type effects there. And such effects enhanced the skills of the CEOs and the achievements of the subsidiaries.
此外，通過將如此多的權力和權威集中在重要子公司那些往往長期任職的 CEO 身上，巴菲特也在那裡創造了強烈的伍登式效應。這些效應不僅提升了 CEO 們的技能，也增強了子公司的成就。

Then, as the Berkshire system bestowed much-desired autonomy on many subsidiaries and their CEOs, and Berkshire became successful and well known, these outcomes attracted both more and better subsidiaries into Berkshire, and better CEOs as well.
隨後，隨著波克夏體系將備受期待的自主權賦予眾多子公司及其執行長，加上波克夏本身取得顯著成功與知名度，這些成果吸引了更多優質子公司加入波克夏陣營，同時也吸引了更優秀的執行長人才。

And the better subsidiaries and CEOs then required less attention from headquarters, creating what is often called a “virtuous circle.”
而這些更優質的子公司與執行長團隊，反過來需要總部投入的管理精力也更少，從而形成了所謂的「良性循環」。

How well did it work out for Berkshire to always include casualty insurers as important subsidiaries? Marvelously well. Berkshire’s ambitions were unreasonably extreme and, even so, it got what it wanted.
波克夏始終將意外險公司納入核心子公司體系的策略成效如何？簡直好得驚人。即便波克夏的目標設定得近乎不切實際地高，最終仍如願以償地達成了預期成果。
Casualty insurers often invest in common stocks with a value amounting roughly to their shareholders’ equity, as  did Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries. And the S&P 500 Index produced about 10% per annum, pre-tax, during the last 50 years, creating a significant tailwind.
意外險公司通常會將約當股東權益總額的資金投入普通股，波克夏旗下的保險子公司亦然。而過去五十年間，標普 500 指數年均稅前報酬率約達 10%，這股強勁的順風為投資表現提供了顯著助力。

And, in the early decades of the Buffett era, common stocks within Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries greatly outperformed the index, exactly as Buffett expected. And, later, when both the large size of Berkshire’s stockholdings and income tax considerations caused the index-beating part of returns to fade to insignificance (perhaps not forever), other and better advantage came. Ajit Jain created out of nothing an immense reinsurance business that produced both a huge “float” and a large underwriting gain. And all of GEICO came into Berkshire, followed by a quadrupling of GEICO’s market share. And the rest of Berkshire’s insurance operations hugely improved, largely by dint of reputational advantage, underwriting discipline, finding and staying within good niches, and recruiting and holding outstanding people.
在巴菲特時代的早期幾十年間，波克夏保險子公司持有的普通股表現大幅超越指數，完全符合巴菲特的預期。後來，當波克夏持股規模龐大與所得稅考量使得超越指數的報酬部分逐漸變得微不足道（或許並非永遠如此），其他更佳的優勢隨之浮現。阿吉特·賈恩從無到有打造出龐大的再保險業務，創造出巨額「浮存金」與可觀的承保收益。GEICO 全數納入波克夏旗下，其市佔率隨後成長四倍。波克夏其餘保險業務也大幅改善，主要憑藉聲譽優勢、承保紀律、發掘並堅守利基市場，以及招募並留住優秀人才。
 
Then, later, as Berkshire’s nearly unique and quite dependable corporate personality and large size became well known, its insurance subsidiaries got and seized many attractive opportunities, not available to others, to buy privately issued securities. Most of these securities had fixed maturities and produced outstanding results.
後來，隨著波克夏幾乎獨特且相當可靠的企業性格與龐大規模廣為人知，其保險子公司獲得並把握了許多其他公司無法取得的機會，購買私人發行的證券。這些證券多數具有固定到期日，並創造出卓越的成果。

Berkshire’s marvelous outcome in insurance was not a natural result. Ordinarily, a casualty insurance business is a producer of mediocre results, even when very well managed. And such results are of little use. Berkshire’s better outcome was so astoundingly large that I believe that Buffett would now fail to recreate it if he returned to a small base while retaining his smarts and regaining his youth.
波克夏在保險業的非凡成就並非自然結果。通常，即使管理得當，意外保險業務也只能產生平庸的業績，而這樣的業績用處不大。波克夏的優異表現如此驚人，以至於我相信即使巴菲特帶著他的智慧重返年輕時代，從一個小基礎重新開始，也難以再現這樣的輝煌。

Did Berkshire suffer from being a diffuse conglomerate? No, its opportunities were usefully enlarged by a widened area for operation. And bad effects, common elsewhere, were prevented by Buffett’s skills.
波克夏是否因為是一個分散的綜合企業而受損？不，其機會因經營範圍的擴大而實質性增加。而巴菲特的能力防止了在其他地方常見的不良影響。

Why did Berkshire prefer to buy companies with cash, instead of its own stock? Well, it was hard to get anything in exchange for Berkshire stock that was as valuable as what was given up.
為什麼波克夏更傾向於用現金而非自身股票收購公司？嗯，因為很難用波克夏的股票換取到與所放棄的價值相當的東西。

Why did Berkshire’s acquisition of companies outside the insurance business work out so well for Berkshire shareholders when the normal result in such acquisitions is bad for shareholders of the acquirer?
為什麼波克夏收購保險業以外的公司對其股東如此有利，而此類收購通常對收購方的股東不利？

Well, Berkshire, by design, had methodological advantages to supplement its better opportunities. It never had the equivalent of a “department of acquisitions” under pressure to buy. And it never relied on advice from “helpers” sure to be prejudiced in favor of transactions. And Buffett held self-delusion at bay as he underclaimed expertise while he knew better than most corporate executives what worked and what didn’t in business, aided by his long experience as a passive investor. And, finally, even when Berkshire was getting much better opportunities than most others, Buffett often displayed almost inhuman patience and seldom bought. For instance, during his first ten years in control of Berkshire, Buffett saw one business (textiles) move close to death and two new businesses come in, for a net gain of one.
嗯，波克夏在設計上擁有方法論上的優勢，以補充其更好的機會。它從未設立過一個被迫進行收購的「收購部門」。它也從不依賴那些肯定對交易持有偏見的「幫手」的建議。而且，巴菲特在自欺欺人方面保持克制，他雖然比大多數企業高管更清楚什麼在商業中行得通、什麼行不通，這得益於他作為被動投資者的長期經驗，但他卻謙稱自己缺乏專業知識。最後，即使波克夏獲得的機會比大多數其他公司好得多，巴菲特也常常表現出近乎非人的耐心，很少出手購買。例如，在他掌控波克夏的前十年裡，巴菲特目睹了一個業務（紡織業）走向衰亡，並引入了兩個新業務，淨增了一個。

What were the big mistakes made by Berkshire under Buffett? Well, while mistakes of commission were common, almost all huge errors were in not making a purchase, including not purchasing Walmart stock when that was sure to work out enormously well. The errors of omission were of much importance. Berkshire’s net worth would now be at least $50 billion higher if it had seized several opportunities it was not quite smart enough to recognize as virtually sure things.
波克夏在巴菲特領導下犯過哪些重大錯誤？雖然決策失誤時有所聞，但幾乎所有巨大錯誤都來自錯失收購機會，包括未能趁沃爾瑪股票勢必帶來巨額回報時買進。疏忽造成的錯誤影響更為深遠。若當時能把握幾個幾乎確定獲利、卻因智慧不足未能識破的投資良機，波克夏現在的淨值至少會多出 500 億美元。

The next to last task on my list was: Predict whether abnormally good results would continue at Berkshire if Buffett were soon to depart.
我清單上的倒數第二項任務是：預測若巴菲特不久後離開，波克夏能否持續保持異常優異的表現。

The answer is yes. Berkshire has in place in its subsidiaries much business momentum grounded in much durable competitive advantage.
答案是肯定的。波克夏旗下子公司擁有基於持久競爭優勢的強勁業務動能。

Moreover, its railroad and utility subsidiaries now provide much desirable opportunity to invest large sums in new fixed assets. And many subsidiaries are now engaged in making wise “bolt-on” acquisitions.
此外，其鐵路與公用事業子公司目前提供大量投資新固定資產的理想機會。許多子公司正進行明智的「補強型」收購。

Provided that most of the Berkshire system remains in place, the combined momentum and opportunity now present is so great that Berkshire would almost surely remain a better-than-normal company for a very long time even if
只要波克夏體系的大部分架構維持不變，當前結合的動能與機會如此巨大，即使巴菲特明天就離開、他的繼任者僅具備中等能力，且波克夏再也不收購大型企業，該公司幾乎肯定能在很長一段時間內保持優於一般企業的水準。
(1) Buffett left tomorrow, (2) his successors were persons of only moderate ability, and (3) Berkshire never again purchased a large business.
（1）巴菲特明日離職，（2）其繼任者僅具中等能力，以及（3）波克夏不再進行大型企業收購的情況下。

But, under this Buffett-soon-leaves assumption, his successors would not be “of only moderate ability.” For instance, Ajit Jain and Greg Abel are proven performers who would probably be under-described as “world-class.” “World-leading” would be the description I would choose. In some important ways, each is a better business executive than Buffett.
但若根據「巴菲特即將離任」的假設，他的繼任者絕不會「僅具中等能力」。例如，阿吉特·賈恩和格雷格·阿貝爾都是經過驗證的績效創造者，用「世界級」來形容可能還嫌不足，我會選擇「世界領先」這樣的描述。在某些重要方面，他們每位都是比巴菲特更出色的企業管理者。

And I believe neither Jain nor Abel would (1) leave Berkshire, no matter what someone else offered or (2) desire much change in the Berkshire system.
而且我相信，無論他人開出什麼條件，賈恩和阿貝爾都不會（1）離開波克夏，也不會（2）希望對波克夏體系做出重大改變。
 
Nor do I think that desirable purchases of new businesses would end with Buffett’s departure. With Berkshire now so large and the age of activism upon us, I think some desirable acquisition opportunities will come and that Berkshire’s $60 billion in cash will constructively decrease.
我也不認為在巴菲特離開後，收購優質新業務的機會就會終止。鑑於波克夏現今規模龐大，加上股東積極主義時代來臨，我相信仍會出現值得把握的收購機會，而公司 600 億美元的現金儲備也將因此得到建設性的減少。

My final task was to consider whether Berkshire’s great results over the last 50 years have implications that may prove useful elsewhere.
我的最終任務是思考波克夏過去 50 年的卓越成績，是否蘊含著可供他處借鑒的意義。

The answer is plainly yes. In its early Buffett years, Berkshire had a big task ahead: turning a tiny stash into a large and useful company. And it solved that problem by avoiding bureaucracy and relying much on one thoughtful leader for a long, long time as he kept improving and brought in more people like himself.
答案顯然是肯定的。在巴菲特執掌初期，波克夏面臨重大挑戰：如何將微薄資本轉化為龐大而具影響力的企業。其解決之道在於摒棄官僚主義，長期仰賴一位深謀遠慮的領導者持續精進，並引進更多與其理念相符的人才。

Compare this to a typical big-corporation system with much bureaucracy at headquarters and a long succession of CEOs who come in at about age 59, pause little thereafter for quiet thought, and are soon forced out by a fixed retirement age.
試將此與典型大企業體制相比：總部官僚氣息濃厚，CEO 更迭頻繁——接任者年約 59 歲就職，鮮少靜心思考，旋即因固定退休年齡被迫離任。

I believe that versions of the Berkshire system should be tried more often elsewhere and that the worst attributes of bureaucracy should much more often be treated like the cancers they so much resemble. A good example of bureaucracy fixing was created by George Marshall when he helped win World War II by getting from Congress the right to ignore seniority in choosing generals.
我認為伯克希爾體系的不同版本應該更常在其他地方嘗試，而官僚主義最糟糕的特質更應該被視為它們所極其相似的癌症來對待。喬治·馬歇爾在幫助贏得第二次世界大戰時，通過從國會獲得在選擇將領時忽略資歷的權利，創造了一個官僚主義修正的好例子。

Sincerely,  此致

Charles T. Munger  查理·T·蒙格