Insightful Investor Podcast interviewed Andrew Sheiner: Private Equity, Selectivity, Discipline on Apr. 29, 2025

《洞見投資者》播客專訪安德魯·謝納：私募股權、精選策略與投資紀律（2025 年 4 月 29 日）
 

Welcome to the Insightful Investor Podcast, a weekly series that seeks to share industry, investment and market insights. Learn more about our show at insightfulinvestor.org. Andrew Scheiner joins us today. Andrew is founder and CEO of Altus Partners, which is a $10 billion private equity firm based in Toronto. Before launching Altus Andrew spends 17 years at on-ex Corporation. Today he leads Altus with a distinctive approach to long-term investing.
歡迎收聽《洞見投資者》播客，本系列節目每週分享產業動態、投資心法與市場洞見。更多節目資訊請見 insightfulinvestor.org。今天我們邀請到安德魯·謝納，他是多倫多百億美元私募基金 Altus Partners 的創辦人暨執行長。在創立 Altus 之前，安德魯曾於安耐仕集團任職 17 年。如今他以獨特的長期投資理念領導 Altus。

Andrew, you and I have known each other for a long time. I'm so excited we're able to sit down and have this conversation. Thanks Alex. Nice to be here and thank you for the invitation. Let me start with your background. Why did you choose to dedicate your career to investing in private companies? I've always believed Alex that this is the kind of business that would attract people that are more than anything intellectually curious. The neat thing about what we do is that we have the opportunity to look at different businesses and they're all distinctive. They're all unique. And so if you are curious about how different businesses operate, how they're organized,how they're developed to deliver whatever product or services, they're established off or it's an interesting job. And that's what certainly attracted me to this type of career early on. My first job out of undergrad was with McKinsey and Company. And I just had the opportunity to work on lots of different projects. The other thing that young people probably don't appreciate is that this is very much a people business. It's about cultivating trusting and deep relationships because we're not simply investing in the equity of a company. We have the responsibility of owning and governing these businesses. And that involves developing cultivating strong relationships with CEOs and the management teams that lead them. We've always viewed these as partnerships.
安德魯，我們認識很久了。能坐下來好好聊聊，我真的很開心。謝謝你，亞歷克斯。很榮幸受邀參加。先談談你的背景吧，為什麼選擇將職業生涯奉獻給投資私人企業？我一直認為，亞歷克斯，這種事業最吸引人的特質就是能滿足求知慾。我們這行的美妙之處在於有機會接觸形形色色的企業，每家都獨樹一幟。如果你對企業運作模式、組織架構、產品服務的開發過程充滿好奇，這份工作會非常有趣——這正是我早年入行的關鍵原因。大學畢業後我的第一份工作就在麥肯錫，當時就有幸參與各式各樣的專案。另外年輕人可能不太理解的是，這其實是門關於「人」的生意。 這關乎培養信任且深厚的關係，因為我們不僅僅是投資一家公司的股權。我們肩負著擁有和治理這些企業的責任。這需要與 CEO 及管理團隊建立並培養穩固的關係。我們始終將這些視為夥伴關係。

And so it's a job in many respects that requires interesting combination of both IQ and EQ. And I think as I can to appreciate that more and more, it is what attracted me to this particular part of the investing ecosystem. Well, you spent 17 years at Onix. Would you share your experience there and any key lessons that you learned? I was very lucky. I was hired by the founder of Onix. When it was a small firm and I was a kid. So this was 30 years and three months ago. I just had my 30th anniversary in fact in private equity.
因此從許多方面來看，這份工作需要智商與情商的有趣結合。隨著我對此體會愈深，就愈被投資生態系統中這個特殊領域所吸引。你在 Onix 度過了 17 年，能否分享那裡的經歷與學到的關鍵教訓？我非常幸運，當年 Onix 還是家小公司時，創辦人僱用了年輕的我。那是整整 30 年又 3 個月前的事——事實上我剛慶祝完從事私募股權行業的 30 週年紀念。

I joked that I got that job because there was no formal recruiting process. I passed it. I passed it the founder of Onix who at my mentor for many years. For months and I finally was able to get a job. It was a small firm. Onix was unusual in that it was established with permanent capital. The founder Jerry Schwartz condinson dusters to put a small wea. What was then a lot of money was $250 million in a holding company. The idea was to use that capital for private equity investing. When I joined it was a small team of six.
我開玩笑說我得到那份工作是因為沒有正式的招聘流程。我通過了考驗。我通過了 Onix 創始人的考驗，他多年來一直是我的導師。經過數月努力，我終於得到了這份工作。那是家小公司。Onix 的特別之處在於它是用永久資本建立的。創始人 Jerry Schwartz 將當時為數不小的 2.5 億美元資金放入控股公司，初衷是用這筆資金進行私募股權投資。我加入時團隊只有六人。

I was the only associate. I was there for the next 17 years. So what I really learned working for Jerry was how to build high quality private equity firm. I was there in a very good era for that firm because we developed it essentially from scratch and had to put all the pieces in place that it required to build and run a very high quality investing in ownership enterprise. So it was a wonderful apprenticeship in many ways in a great opportunity to learn this business working for a very talented founder and CEO. What motivated you to launch all this partners about 13 years ago and how did that transition shape your approach? I had been with Onix for 17 years. It had grown from 6 to 120 people. I joke simply by virtue of time. I was one of the three or four senior people running the firm reporting to Jerry.
我是唯一的助理。我在那裡待了接下來的 17 年。所以，我從傑瑞身上真正學到的是如何建立一個高品質的私募股權公司。我剛好在那個公司的一個非常好的時代，因為我們基本上是從零開始發展它，必須把所有必要的部分都安排到位，以建立和運營一個非常高品質的投資與所有權企業。所以，這在很多方面都是一個美妙的學徒期，也是一個學習這個行業的絕佳機會，為一位非常有才華的創始人和 CEO 工作。是什麼促使你大約 13 年前創立了 All This Partners，這個轉變如何塑造了你的方法？我在 Onix 工作了 17 年。公司從 6 人成長到 120 人。我開玩笑說，這僅僅是因為時間的關係。我是向傑瑞匯報的三、四位高層之一，負責管理公司。

I knew him so well. He was 70. I was 48. I was a birthday as precise age because we were the same birthday. I was approaching 50. It wasn't obvious when succession would happen at the firm. It might skip a generation. My view was that if I ever wanted to really have the opportunity to leave a firm and run a firm, it would be a great opportunity to run a firm. It was probably the right time to think about leaving a firm. Because succession at Onix might not happen for quite some time. I always thought it would be an interesting challenge and an opportunity to run a firm truly with a group of partners.
我對他瞭如指掌。他 70 歲時，我 48 歲。因為我們同一天生日，所以年齡計算特別精確。當時我即將邁入 50 歲。公司接班時機尚不明朗，甚至可能跳過一代。我的想法是，若真想把握離開現職、獨當一面的機會，這將是執掌公司的絕佳契機。或許正是考慮離職的適當時機，畢竟 Onix 的接班可能還要等上好些年。我始終認為，與一群合夥人共同經營公司會是既充滿挑戰又難得的經歷。

I also felt that if I didn't do it, then I crossed into my 50s, I might never leave. I knew how much energy would take to start something from scratch. I also had a real vision for what I thought it would be interesting to build. When I left in the middle of 2012, my last day was June 30th of that year. I established altists with a small number of colleagues. I think I clearly understand where the industry was, how it evolved. Having worked in another firm for 17 years, where I was keen to position our new firm within this big, complicated ecosystem.
我也意識到，若此時不行動，等跨過 50 歲門檻後恐怕再難離開。我深知白手起家需要耗費多少精力。同時對於想打造的事業，我有非常清晰的藍圖。2012 年中期離職時，最後工作日是當年 6 月 30 日。隨後我與幾位同事共同創立了 altists。我自認對產業現狀與演變有深刻理解。在前公司 17 年的工作經歷，讓我更懂得如何在這複雜生態系中定位我們的新公司。

I had the benefit of being involved in a lot of businesses over many years and was able to to take some of the positive lessons with me to leave some of the things that I wasn't interested in, including behind. We started Alex really by articulating an objective of what we were looking to achieve for our partners. When you establish a new enterprise, I always learned that when you started your firm by articulating an objective, which in many respects becomes your North Star. For us that objective, which I often say is easy to say but hard to do, is to generate strong private equity returns and to do that with the least amount of risk of the long-term for our partners. With that clearly articulated and understood, we set out to build our firm.
多年來我有幸參與許多企業，得以汲取其中的寶貴經驗，同時捨棄那些我不感興趣的事物。我們創立 Alex 的初衷，是為了明確闡述為合作夥伴實現的目標。我始終認為，當你以明確目標創立公司時，這個目標往往會成為指引方向的北極星。對我們而言，這個目標說來簡單卻難以實踐——那就是為合作夥伴創造優異的私募股權回報，同時將長期風險控制在最低程度。在清晰闡明並理解這項核心理念後，我們便著手建立公司。

Everything about we've done in the last 13 years, the strategy we pursue, the kind of businesses we looked to acquire, the type of people we attract to the firm, the norms and values and culture that we've created, how we approach ownership, our all design to you as the best chance of achieving that singular objective. It hasn't changed since day one. I think I had the benefit of having worked for a founder while we built the firm and was able to establish a new one with clearly articulated objective. The last thing I'd say is I was very lucky in that I didn't feel as if I needed to figure out as I went along. I understood very clearly having done it once before in a sense what the pieces were that we need to put in place to build a firm.
在過去 13 年裡，我們所做的一切——從追求的策略、尋求收購的企業類型、吸引加入公司的人才，到建立的規範、價值觀與文化，以及我們對所有權的態度——所有這些設計都是為了讓您有最大機會實現那個唯一目標。從第一天起，這點就未曾改變。我認為自己很幸運，曾在創辦人麾下工作並參與公司建設，這讓我能夠以清晰闡述的目標建立新事業。最後我想說的是，我感到非常幸運，因為我不必邊做邊摸索。在某種程度上，由於曾經有過一次經驗，我非常清楚要建立一家公司需要哪些要素。

The metaphor I use, it's very much like assembling a jigsaw puzzle. And what you need is for every piece of that puzzle to knit together as neatly as possible to give yourself the best chance of achieving whatever it is you're sitting up to achieve. And I suppose when you're building a business, you have to make sure you have all the right pieces to begin with. I don't believe you have all the right pieces when you begin. The fact that you have hopefully an understanding of what the pieces are that you need to assemble. We started out in a rented, regis office, we were three people with no capital, computer and idea and I joke up, poodle in the corner. We did not have many of the component pieces at the outset, but I did understand what those pieces were that we needed to put in place. Not surprisingly to get it right takes a long time. Because you don't build a high quality enterprise overnight. It's one component at a time with a vision of what those need to be. And a slow progression of building something durable and sustainable. One of the topics I'd like to cover today is leadership. So let me ask you this. What habits or routines have been most critical to your success as a leader in private equity? One that I really believe in is repetition. I'm a great believer in repeating myself.
我用的比喻是，這非常像組裝一幅拼圖。你需要的是讓每一片拼圖盡可能緊密地結合在一起，這樣才能給自己最好的機會去實現你設定的目標。我想，當你在建立一個企業時，你必須確保一開始就擁有所有正確的拼圖。我不認為你一開始就擁有所有正確的拼圖。重要的是，你希望自己了解需要組裝的是哪些拼圖。我們從一個租來的辦公室開始，只有三個人，沒有資金、電腦和想法，角落裡還有一隻貴賓犬，我常開玩笑說。一開始我們並沒有很多必要的拼圖，但我確實明白我們需要哪些拼圖來完成這幅圖。毫不意外，要把它們正確地組合起來需要很長時間。因為你不可能一夜之間建立一個高品質的企業。這是一個一個組件慢慢累積的過程，同時要對這些組件有清晰的願景，並逐步建立一個持久且可持續的事業。今天我想討論的主題之一是領導力。那麼讓我問你這個問題。 哪些習慣或日常對你作為私募股權領導者的成功最為關鍵？我深信的一點就是重複。我非常相信不斷重複自己。

And what I mean by that is there are a few philosophical approaches, perspectives that I think are very important for us to keep in mind as we go about the data of the activity of what we do. And one, for example, stems from the fact that I believe that this job is very hard, that finding businesses that fit one's framework, whatever the framework may be, and there's lots of different ways to invest is difficult in challenging. And in many respects to do that well, just naturally involves saying no to a lot of things. And our approach, as you know, is to try to find one or two businesses in each year that fit our framework and where we have eye conviction. And then on the front, and what we hope to do is see a large number of opportunities to hopefully give us the opportunity to get to that small number that makes sense to us where the intersection of the prospect of the business, the price we need to play really, really makes sense. And just to put that into context, the sourcing math that are firm today, it really involves seeing at the top of the final 300 or so businesses a year. We go deep in certain sub sectors, etc. We see about six businesses a week, top of the final 300 companies that should relevant in many respects, because many of them don't fit.
我指的是有幾種哲學性的方法與觀點，我認為在我們處理日常活動數據時必須謹記於心。舉例來說，其中一點源自於我深信這份工作極具挑戰性——要找到符合個人投資框架的企業（無論框架為何，畢竟投資方式五花八門）本就困難重重。從許多層面來看，要做得漂亮，自然就意味著必須對多數機會說不。正如你所知，我們的作法是每年試圖尋覓一兩家符合框架且令我們堅信不疑的企業。而在前端作業上，我們希望透過大量接觸投資機會，最終篩選出那少數真正契合的標的——當企業前景與我們必須支付的價格產生絕佳交集時。具體量化來說，現今我們公司的案源開發模型，每年實際需審視約 300 家企業作為初步篩選基礎，並針對特定次產業領域進行深度挖掘。 我們每週大約會接觸六家企業，這些都是從最終 300 家相關性最高的公司中篩選出來的，因為其中許多並不符合我們的標準。

And we work that down to somewhere around one and a half a month on average where we're going to go very, very deep, doing deep commercial diligence to assess these businesses. And the interesting thing of that small handful of companies that we look at each year, 15 or 18 annually, the interesting thing about our firm culturally is that we expect that 90% of those won't hold up to scrutiny. And we get under the covers, we do our work that they're either not what we had hoped or imagined or we come to conclude that the price we're going to have to pay is too high. And that's difficult, right? Because it means that we're going to look at a lot of businesses but not acquire a lot of them. And so that requires a compensation system and a type of person that is interested in the process of really getting to know companies in going very deep and understands that we're not going to buy a lot.
我們會將這個數量壓縮到平均每月約 1.5 家，並對這些企業進行極其深入的商業盡職調查。有趣的是，在我們每年審查的 15 至 18 家公司中，從公司文化角度來看，我們預期其中 90%經不起嚴格檢驗。當我們深入調查後，往往會發現它們要麼不符合我們的期望或想像，要麼我們最終認定必須支付的價格過高。這其實很困難，對吧？因為這意味著我們會審視大量企業，但最終收購的寥寥無幾。因此，這需要建立一套獎勵機制，並吸引特定類型的人才——那些真正享受深入了解企業過程的人，他們明白我們不會頻繁進行收購。

That requires, for me, to be reminding the team constantly, that our job in a sense is not to buy a company, very easy to buy a company. Sign the purchase agreement, send a wire. Our job is to figure these out. And we have a norm at our firm that if we go deep in assessing a business and we ultimately don't get to the finish line, the team is expected to go out for a celebratory dinner. And they're not celebrating buying the company obviously because we didn't, they're celebrating solving the puzzle, figuring it out. And so I find it's important for me to just over time be reinforcing these messages so that people are always reminded of what it is we're trying to accomplish, especially because we hire four or five or six young people each year and we're trying to inculcate in a sense in them the values of the firm and what we're trying to accomplish. So staying in a sense on message with people and working hard to develop every aspect of what we do around learning a development and we train people and we promote people and we reward people that reinforces what we're trying to accomplish is very, very important. And that goes back to your first days at at altis with three or four people in a regis office and having that vision and the North Star that you can refer back to and continuing that discipline and the culture setting the right incentives to reinforce that objective as you scale the business. You talk about the standards. They're so important. Right? And we know one, I believe that compensation comes in many forms. Compensation is beyond the money that people earn. Right?
這對我而言，意味著要不斷提醒團隊：在某種意義上，我們的工作不是收購公司——買下一家公司太容易了，簽署收購協議、匯出款項就完成了。我們真正的職責是釐清這些問題。公司內部有個慣例：當我們深入評估某個企業卻最終未能達成交易時，團隊反而要外出慶功。他們慶祝的顯然不是成功收購（因為並未成交），而是慶祝破解了難題、找到了答案。因此我認為，持續強化這些理念至關重要，讓人們始終銘記我們追求的目標——尤其當我們每年引進四到六名年輕新血時，更需要潛移默化地灌輸企業價值與使命。堅持核心理念並不容易，我們努力完善人才培育的每個環節：透過培訓、晉升與獎勵機制，不斷強化團隊對共同目標的認同，這點極為關鍵。 這要回溯到你在 Altis 最初的日子，當時只有三、四個人在 Regis 辦公室裡，懷抱著那份願景與北極星般的指引，讓你能不斷回望並堅持那份紀律。同時建立正確的文化與激勵機制，在業務擴張時強化這個目標。你提到的標準極為關鍵，對吧？我們都清楚，報酬形式多元——金錢絕非唯一的回報。

Compensation relates to the experience that they have. The people that want has the opportunity to work with and interact with the values at the firm that you're at. So how people are compensated comes in, so there are many elements to that. And back to your earlier question, and one thing that I often say is that you're rewarded at our firm for doing great work. And again, great work isn't defined as buying a company. The decision to buy a company will be the collective decision in many respects. So the great work at our firm is defined as really coming to know the sub sectors that you're focused on developing real insight into those sectors, cultivating deep relationships with the management teams and owners of the businesses in those sectors that we might be interested in.
薪酬與他們的經驗相關。那些渴望的人有機會與你所在公司的價值觀共事並互動。因此，人們如何獲得報酬就成為其中一環，這其中包含許多要素。回到你之前的問題，我常說的一點是，在我們公司，你會因為出色的工作而獲得獎勵。再次強調，出色的工作並不定義為收購一家公司。收購公司的決定將在許多方面是集體決策。因此，在我們公司，出色的工作定義為真正了解你所專注的子行業，對這些行業發展出真正的洞察力，並與這些行業中我們可能感興趣的企業管理團隊和所有者建立深厚的關係。

There are business with many sub sectors that we covet. And then putting ourselves in a position to be in the conversation at a moment to time where there's an opportunity to buy one of these businesses. So that's very much the upfront work that can take years the way we do it. And then once we make the decision to buy a company, being a great owner of it, because our model involves being a very engaged owner of businesses that we buy. We buy them to meanfully build and take them very much to a different level. And we do do that by being very engaged with them. So that's, you know, for us, what we're trying to establish from a cultural standpoint.
我們渴望涉足那些擁有眾多子行業的業務領域。然後讓自己處於能在適當時機參與收購這類企業的談判位置。這就是我們多年來一直在做的前置準備工作。一旦決定收購某家公司，我們就會成為優秀的所有者，因為我們的模式要求深度參與所購企業的經營。我們收購企業是為了實質性地建設它們，將其提升到全新層次。而實現這一點的方式，正是通過與企業保持高度互動。這從文化層面來說，正是我們試圖建立的核心理念。

And then the reward system needs to reinforce all of that. Right? There are firms where individual partners get extra or differentiated economics in the businesses they're involved with. And that makes sense for some firms who wouldn't make sense for hours. Right? Because investment committees in these businesses, I like their funny little Petri dishes. And in some you have partners competing with one another for capital. And the dynamic can be ice-cracked here by a few scratch more. You get more economics in your deal.
接著獎勵制度必須強化這一切。有些公司會讓參與業務的合夥人獲得額外或差異化的經濟利益，這種模式適合某些公司，但對我們行不通。這些企業的投資委員會就像有趣的小培養皿——有些情況下合夥人會彼此爭奪資金，整個動態可能因為多爭取到一點配額就發生裂變，讓你在交易中獲得更多經濟利益。

I get more in mind. So I'm not going to trouble you on yours. I'm going to give you a hard time. Or they're competing for capital. Both of those would be challenging for firm like ours where we're looking at a large number of opportunities to find a small number each year we want to create a culture where everybody is interested in focused and I'm finding that right small number each year that it makes sense for us to buy. So we establish the carried interest allocation for our team at the beginning of the year. And it's fixed for the next 12 months. And you know, one's interest is fixed and set regardless of who works on a transaction. Because what gets through our process, what gets over the finish line is going to be a function of the work that we do assessing the company. And that decision is very much a collective decision. We want to get them right. And we don't want people's judgment to be influenced by whether they're working on it or they source it originally that are somebody else did. And that requires a certain type of human being. So attracting the right type of people to our firm culturally is critically important as well. Well, we're going to get into investing in private equity in a moment. But before we do that, I wanted to ask your general outlook on the market and the economy. I don't think I personally have a distinctive or any particular insight into the economy.
我心裡有更多想法。所以我不會拿我的問題來麻煩你。我要讓你不好過。或者他們正在爭奪資金。這兩種情況對於像我們這樣的公司來說都會很有挑戰性，因為我們每年要審視大量機會，只從中挑選少數幾個來投資。我們希望建立一種文化，讓每個人都能保持專注，每年精準找到那少數幾個值得我們收購的標的。因此，我們會在年初就確定團隊的附帶權益分配方案，並在接下來 12 個月內固定不變。要知道，個人權益是固定且不受交易案參與者影響的——因為最終能通過我們審核流程、成功完成的交易，取決於我們對企業的評估工作。這個決策過程是高度集體決策的，我們必須確保判斷正確。我們不希望團隊成員的判斷力受到「是否經手該案」或「是否由自己最初開發」等因素影響。這需要特定類型的人才，所以從文化層面吸引適合我們公司特質的人，也至關重要。 好的，我們稍後會深入探討私募股權投資。但在那之前，我想先請教您對市場和經濟的整體看法。我個人認為自己對經濟並沒有特別獨到的見解。

That would be much more thoughtful for example, in yours. We're raw living through challenging times. But over the last 30 years, there have been lots of errors that have been difficult in challenging. The way we approach the question of market environment in economic outlook really is in two ways. The first is by remembering and recognizing that we are micro investors. We are investing in a business that in our case has been built, built over many years, typically as history, typically has a strong market, leadership position, there's data which is very helpful and valuable to us.
舉例來說，您的觀點會顯得更加深思熟慮。我們正經歷充滿挑戰的時期。但在過去 30 年間，其實已出現過許多艱難的錯誤與挑戰。我們審視市場環境與經濟前景的方式主要有兩個層面：首先是謹記我們屬於微觀投資者，專注投資那些經過多年打造的企業——這類企業通常具有深厚的歷史底蘊、穩固的市場領導地位，這些數據對我們而言極具參考價值。

We are as far away from venture capital as one can get in our world. We're not investing in back in people, we're investing in companies that have been built over long periods of time that have real distinctive capabilities based on the services of the products that they provide. Our work is around assessing those enterprises. The metaphor that often uses young people is that a business is a machine that generates cash flow. Our job is to peel back the onion so that we can stare at its machinery. Our job through the diligence process is to assess the quality of the machinery, the durability of the machinery. As it relates to a stability machinery cash into develop a thoughtful perspective on the opportunity to enhance cash flow over time. And while we're doing that, there's no question that we are thinking about considering the broader economic forces that can impact one of these businesses. And we're influenced for sure by what is happening at a moment in time in terms of the broader economy. And then what we do, Alex, is we're creating a set of projections based on history and where the business is. It's competitive environment and what we think the opportunity is with it. That creates and generates and array of outcomes. And so we're really not building our models based on a base case point set of projections. We're building it based on array of outcomes that stems from a series of assumptions based on the potential for how a company may perform over the coming few years. And we're assessing that array to make ultimately a decision and using testing judgment whether to acquire a business and what price to pay. And the simple way I often describe it to investors is that we try to land on a base case ultimately within that array that we think is highly achievable.
在我們的世界裡，我們與風險投資的距離可說是遙不可及。我們並非投資於個人，而是投資於那些歷經長期建立、基於其所提供產品服務而具備真正獨特能力的企業。我們的工作在於評估這些企業。常對年輕人使用的比喻是：企業就像一台產生現金流的機器。我們的任務是層層剖析，直視其運作機制。透過盡職調查程序，我們的工作是評估這台機器的品質與耐用性。就穩定產生現金的機制而言，我們要形成深思熟慮的觀點，探討如何隨時間提升現金流。在此過程中，毫無疑問地，我們會考量可能影響這些企業的更廣泛經濟力量。當下的總體經濟情勢確實會影響我們的判斷。接著，亞歷克斯，我們會根據歷史數據、企業現狀、競爭環境以及我們看到的機會，建立一套預測模型。 這創造並生成了一系列結果。因此，我們實際上並不是基於一組基礎案例的預測來建立模型。我們是基於一系列假設所產生的結果陣列來建立模型，這些假設考量了公司在未來幾年可能表現的潛力。我們評估這個結果陣列，最終做出決策，並運用測試判斷來決定是否收購企業以及支付何種價格。我常向投資者簡單描述這種方式：我們試圖在該陣列中找到一個我們認為高度可實現的基礎案例。

That being intellectually honest and very rigorous in our work. We believe there's an opportunity if we do our job well as an owner. We can outperform that base case with a likelihood of doing worse than that is low, considerably worse than that is very low and importantly given our approach where the risk of impairing and losing capital is extremely remote. And that's critical for us since one thing that makes our job hard and finding businesses where we feel that's the case. And we typically have a more cautious conservative bent in terms of how we model these businesses and certainly has it relates to economic growth, exit multiples, et cetera. And then there's always a risk of that you buy a business just before COVID, right? And you've got to think about some of the external factors that could impact the business in constructing a portfolio.
在我們的工作中保持知識上的誠實和極度嚴謹。我們相信，只要我們作為所有者做好本職工作，就有機會超越基本情況，而表現比基本情況差的可能性很低，表現比基本情況差很多的可能性非常低，更重要的是，根據我們的方法，資本受損和損失的風險極其微小。這對我們至關重要，因為找到我們認為符合這種情況的企業是我們工作中困難的部分。我們通常會對這些企業的建模持更為謹慎保守的態度，尤其是在涉及經濟增長、退出倍數等方面。當然，總存在著一種風險，比如你剛好在疫情前買入一家企業，對吧？在構建投資組合時，你必須考慮一些可能影響企業的外部因素。

So I didn't really answer your question because your question is, do I have a particular perspective on where we're heading on cautious terms of where we're heading? But I'm constantly cautious. I've always been cautious. I live in a constant state of paranoia. As do I. Let me ask you a little bit different. But my sense is that we live in a highly uncertain environment and there's a wide range of potential outcomes and there's probably a heightened risk of extreme outcomes. So when you're investing for the long term, does that just generally mean that, and if you agree, does that generally mean that you're looking for even a large margin of safety given that backdrop?
所以我並沒有真正回答你的問題，因為你的問題是：我是否對我們在謹慎方面所處的位置有特定的看法？但我一直都很謹慎。我向來如此。我活在持續的偏執狀態中。我也是。讓我換個方式問你。但我的感覺是，我們處在一個高度不確定的環境中，存在著廣泛的潛在結果，而且極端結果的風險可能更高。那麼，當你為長期投資時，這是否通常意味著——如果你同意的話——在這樣的背景下，你會尋求更大的安全邊際？

Yes, it is. And that margin of safety comes in a few different forms. But it starts with the very nature of what we're buying. So give me a very, very simple example. We own a company that is, in my kids, always find our business is very boring. We want to come to me that is the largest commercial roofing contract in America. We tend to like businesses that have been built. They've been developed in what this business does Alex is it provides principally re-roofing services. And what that means is, if you look across the country, there's a large number of industrial commercial buildings that have been built in their roofs were out over time, typically every 20 or 25 years. So you can imagine that that 120th of the stock of roofs in the country needs to be re-roofed. And the way we run our firm is you've got four verticals. And within those, we look at sub-sectors that were intrigued with. And in our services, very, very clinical industrial services, we've spent a lot of time looking at facility services and that ultimately led us to this sector. And what we were intrigued about with this company is that had been built over 20 years. And what's interesting about the roofing industry in America is there's a great demand for those we roofing services each year than there are roofers. And what we came to appreciate is that if you own one roof or in one market, that's a tough position to be in, because you start the year with a bit of anxiety, but whether you'll be able to keep your cruise busy enough to do this work. But when we bought this business, it had 60 locations across the US. The sea looks to boast. It operated within 100 miles of every rooftop in America. One of their core competencies was crew mobility. So if one market is busy in another market, slower they can move cruise. And so if you think about that activity, over time these roofs will need to be removed.
是的。這種安全邊際體現在幾個不同的方面，但首先源自我們所購買資產的本質。舉個非常簡單的例子：我們擁有一家企業——我的孩子們總覺得我們的生意很無趣。這家企業是美國最大的商業屋頂工程承包商。我們偏好那些已經建立成熟的業務，這家公司主要提供屋頂翻新服務。具體來說，放眼全美，有大量工業商業建築的屋頂會隨著時間老化，通常每 20 到 25 年就需要更換。你可以想像，全國每年約有 1/20 的屋頂存量需要翻新。我們公司的運作模式分為四大垂直領域，在這些領域中，我們會深入研究感興趣的子行業。在服務板塊——非常專業化的工業服務領域——我們投入大量時間研究設施維護服務，最終引導我們進入這個行業。這家企業吸引我們之處在於，它已歷經 20 餘年的穩健發展。 而美國屋頂產業的有趣之處在於，每年對屋頂服務的需求量遠超過現有屋頂工人的供給。我們逐漸體會到，若你只擁有一個屋頂工程團隊或僅在單一市場經營，處境會相當艱難——因為每年開工時總伴隨著能否讓團隊維持足夠工作量的焦慮。但當我們收購這家企業時，它在全美擁有 60 個據點，其業務範圍覆蓋美國境內每座屋頂方圓 100 英里。該公司的核心能力之一正是施工團隊的機動調配：當某個市場繁忙而另一個市場較清閒時，他們能靈活調度團隊。試想這種運作模式——隨著時間推移，這些屋頂終究都需要進行翻修。

And you're right that there's lots of uncertainty in the economy and the global economy, there's tailrest, the financial system can be at risk. There's lots of uncertainty, but if you go down to the micro level, and you can defer this for a period of time, but ultimately if there's a home in the roof, there's to be recall. We got comfortable that this business was particularly well positioned. They've grown through small strategic acquisitions with a wonderful demonstrated ability to enhance the post acquisition operating margins, meaningfully. And despite their size when we bought their company, they had a 1% market share, 99% to go 100% hundreds of little roofers.
你說得對，經濟和全球經濟中存在許多不確定性，有尾部風險，金融體系可能面臨威脅。確實存在許多不確定性，但如果你深入到微觀層面，你可以暫時推遲這個問題，但最終如果屋頂上有個家，就必須進行修復。我們確信這家企業的定位特別優越。他們通過小型戰略收購實現增長，並展現出顯著提升收購後營運利潤率的出色能力。儘管我們收購該公司時其規模不大，市場佔有率僅 1%，但還有 99%的成長空間——數以百計的小型屋頂工程商正等待整合。

And in a business that we thought could really be taken to the next level. So in assessing that company, yes, in the back of our minds, there's lots of macro forces shaping the US economy, the global economy, the financial system. But we were able to get comfortable that this business in its market would be well positioned to grow over time despite all of that. And that's how we operate. We spent three years looking at the optical sector. And as we put in that string that led to us to a woman who was building this remarkable business that had figured out had to acquire small independent optometry practices, pull bunch of levers and take their formal unit economics to different level. And that opportunity was going to exist in a sense regardless of whether they economy grew 2% to 5% shrank for a little while.
而在我們認為真正能夠提升至更高層次的業務中。因此，在評估這家公司時，是的，我們腦海中確實浮現了許多影響美國經濟、全球經濟和金融體系的宏觀力量。但我們能夠確信，儘管存在這些因素，該業務在其市場中仍將處於有利位置，隨著時間推移持續成長。這就是我們的運作方式。我們花了三年時間研究光學領域。當我們沿著這條線索追尋時，最終遇到了一位正在打造非凡事業的女性——她發現必須收購小型獨立驗光診所，透過多種手段將這些機構的財務表現提升到全新層級。從某種意義上說，無論經濟是成長 2%至 5%或暫時萎縮，這樣的機會都將持續存在。

So we are looking at micro businesses, businesses that are operating particular domains. And then we are, for sure, thinking about how the macro environment could impact them. But we're looking for businesses that we think do something particularly well. And the question is, can we enable them and help them do that at a different level? Does that helpful? Yeah, and I guess part of the margin of safety that we discussed earlier could also be investing companies that are in effect less economically sensitive.
因此我們關注的是微型企業，那些在特定領域營運的企業。當然，我們也會思考宏觀環境對它們的影響。但我們尋找的是那些我們認為在某方面表現特別出色的企業。問題在於，我們能否協助它們將這項優勢提升到另一個層次？這樣有幫助嗎？是的，我想我們之前討論的安全邊際部分，也可能包括投資那些實際上對經濟波動較不敏感的企業。

And have competitive advantages that can sustain economic downturns. Yeah, precisely. So for example, we don't own a business. I don't think we've ever been to business. That is reliant in a sense on the consumer. Right? So businesses that manufacture products that they sell to Walmart. Can be wonderful businesses, but wouldn't have quite the margin of safety that you described that we would look for in a business. We're because, if you go back to first principles, what we're looking at is durability of cash flow, quality of cash flow, as a way to protect our capital. If we're not investing higher if the capital structure, we're not debt investors. We look to protect capital in the risk part of our framework is buying businesses that we think are very durable and very resilient in terms of what they do from a cash flow standpoint. And then the question is, can we enhance it? Right? Because the only way we're going to be able to generate good returns for investors is by mainly taking that cash flow to a different level. But to your point, we are immensely focused on the quality, quality durability of the cash flow of the business that we buy and that durability is so important.
並且擁有能夠承受經濟低迷的競爭優勢。是的，正是如此。舉例來說，我們並不擁有一家企業——我想我們從未涉足過——那種在某種程度上依賴消費者的業務。對吧？比如那些生產產品賣給沃爾瑪的企業。這些可能是很棒的企業，但它們可能不具備你所描述的那種我們在企業中尋找的安全邊際。因為如果回歸基本原則，我們關注的是現金流的持久性和質量，以此來保護我們的資本。如果我們不是在資本結構的更高層級進行投資（我們不是債務投資者），我們在風險框架中保護資本的方式，就是收購那些我們認為從現金流角度來看非常持久且韌性十足的企業。然後問題是：我們能否提升它？因為我們能為投資者創造良好回報的唯一途徑，主要是將現金流提升到另一個水平。但正如你所說，我們極度關注所收購企業現金流的質量與持久性，而這種持久性至關重要。

We are very privileged to be very significant shareholder to a company called HUB International, which is one of the leading insurance brokers in America. And that business is very, very durable. Right? Yeah. The people in businesses that have insurance, they're going to pay their premiums each here. Right? Because the moment they don't, something bad is going to happen. Right.
我們非常榮幸能成為 HUB International 的重要股東，該公司是美國領先的保險經紀商之一。這項業務具有極高的持久性。對吧？企業和個人只要有保險需求，每年就必須支付保費。因為一旦中斷繳納，意外隨時可能發生。沒錯。

So when we look back at history over 20 years, at what has happened to premium payments in the time of economic decline, remain quite stable. Right? So the volume of business, the number of businesses, could fall, and that will reduce premiums. But historically, the premium income within the insurance industry in periods of recession, where economic activity has fallen, that this business has fairer better. And then the way they've grown this business is by building a capability to acquire small brokers, roll them into the family where one plus one is much more than two. And this is a company that has tripled its equity value every five years from more than a quarter century. Because they have created a most trapped that is durable and very repetitive. Well, one observation that I've had over the years, talking to a lot of public equity and private equity investors that tend to be micro, like you described, where they're looking at companies, is that oftentimes what happens is they're investing in things that are more economically sensitive. And because they're micro, then they don't pay much attention to the macro. And every once in a while, the macro is the only thing that matters.
因此，當我們回顧過去 20 年的歷史，觀察經濟衰退時期的保費支付情況，會發現其保持相當穩定。對吧？業務量、企業數量可能會下降，這將導致保費減少。但從歷史上看，在經濟活動下滑的衰退期，保險業的保費收入表現相對較好。而他們發展業務的方式，是通過建立收購小型經紀商的能力，將其納入體系，實現一加一大於二的效應。這家公司超過 25 年來，每五年股權價值就增長三倍，因為他們打造了一個持久且高度可重複的營運模式。多年來我觀察到一個現象：在與許多像你描述的微觀型公開市場及私募股權投資者交流時，發現他們往往投資於經濟敏感度較高的標的。正因為專注微觀層面，他們通常不太關注宏觀經濟走勢。 而偶爾，宏觀環境就是唯一重要的事。

And they can make great micro calls, but get wiped out by the macro. And so I guess part of what you're describing is just an appreciation of that. And recognizing that the macro is very difficult to predict, and you want to have much greater predictability with your selection of companies in investment. For sure, I think I'm fortunate to have been at this for a long time. You know, having started in 1995, I've had the good fortune to have looked at lots of businesses acquired and invested in a significant number. And you know, there is muscle memory in a sense with with with with this business. So you're constantly refining that understanding of durability, risk and for us, you're absolutely right. That the macro overlay is something that you have to be mindful of. Always understanding we're investing in a dedicated unique business. We have to be very mindful of the macro overlay. And given that we're not looking to find 10 or 15 businesses a year. But one or two in 2018, we bought three. The bar is very high for us. But because we don't have the pressure of having to deploy capital, having to buy a lot large number, it allows us to take the time to think about these things and to try to be mindful of the various forces that play that can impact these businesses.
他們可能做出出色的微觀決策，卻被宏觀趨勢擊垮。我想你描述的部分正是對這種情況的體認——理解宏觀極難預測，因此必須在企業選擇與投資上追求更高的可預測性。確實，我很幸運能在這行累積多年經驗。自 1995 年入行以來，我有幸審視過無數企業，並實際投資收購了相當數量。可以說這行當存在某種肌肉記憶，讓我們能持續精進對企業韌性與風險的理解。你說得完全正確，宏觀背景是必須時刻警惕的層面。我們始終清楚自己投資的是獨特的個體企業，但同時必須高度關注宏觀環境的影響。考慮到我們每年目標不是找到 10 到 15 家企業，而是 1 到 2 家（2018 年我們收購了 3 家），我們的篩選標準自然極其嚴苛。 但因為我們沒有必須配置資金的壓力，也沒有必須大量購買的負擔，這讓我們有時間去思考這些問題，並試著留意可能影響這些企業的各種力量。

That perhaps our lower probability. You obviously take a very highly selective approach to private equity acquiring only one or two companies per year. Many of your peers tend to have broader diversification. What are the advantages of this concentrated strategy and why do you believe it's a better approach for altists than having a more diversified approach? Most fundamentally, I just don't think over the long term we will perform as well if we try to buy five companies here. The likely had of us finding a larger number of businesses that fit our framework and where we have equally high conviction, I think it's just very low. And so I think we will be well-served to continue to remain selective and disciplined. And my view is that if we can generate midteens or better, what we set out to do and then we work hard to to exceed that. Over the long term and we can keep impairments low and our loss ratio low, then we're delivering our end of the market. We see our job, Alex is investing a dollar, and turning that into two, three, four, five dollars time and time again, and limiting the number of times that there's an impairment of capital. And for us, the way to do that isn't to buy a lot of companies because I think then you end up with inevitably portfolio whose returns are somewhere around you know centered around the mean. Or the medium in the industry, if one to do better than that, I think being more disciplined and more selective will serve us well.
或許我們的機率較低。顯然你們對私募股權採取高度篩選的策略，每年僅收購一兩家公司，而許多同業傾向更廣泛的分散投資。這種集中策略的優勢為何？為何你認為對另類投資者而言，這比分散策略更佳？最根本的是，我認為長期來看，若試圖收購五家公司，我們的表現不會那麼好。我們找到符合框架且具備同等高度信心的企業數量，可能性非常低。因此，我認為保持篩選與紀律對我們最有利。我的觀點是，若能創造 15%或更高的報酬，達成目標後努力超越，長期維持低減損與低損失率，我們就實現了市場期待。我們視自身工作為投入一元，反覆將其轉化為兩元、三元、四元、五元，同時限制資本減損的發生次數。 對我們而言，實現這個目標的方式不是大量收購公司，因為我認為那樣最終必然會得到一個回報率大約落在行業平均水平左右的投資組合。如果想要做得比這更好，我認為保持更高的紀律性和選擇性會對我們更有利。

And that has been our approach when we started in R5 people and it's approached today and we're 75 people still looking for this small number of businesses each year. And the other thing that I think our investors understand is that they are well well diversified. In a many very investors would be invested with 20 managers and if you look through the funds down to the line items of the individual companies, they own a lot of businesses. And so I've always believed that they don't need us for more diversification. They're well diversified. We are in the rifle shop business. We're in the business of finding one company at a time, small number each year, we're over time will build a portfolio, businesses where we have very high conviction and we think can collectively generate returns that achieve our objective.
這一直是我們自創立 R5 以來的策略，如今我們雖已擴展到 75 人，仍堅持每年只尋找少量優質企業。另一點是我們的投資者都明白，他們本身已充分分散投資——許多投資者會同時委託 20 位基金管理人，若細究各基金底層的個別公司持股，會發現他們已持有大量企業。因此我始終認為，投資者不需要我們提供更多元化配置。我們專注於「精準狙擊」模式：每年精挑少量標的，逐步建構一個由我們極具信心、且整體能達成目標回報率的企業組成的投資組合。

Because our objective is to generate strong private equity returns with least amount of risk and private equity returns need to exceed the other markets. Over the long term, otherwise you shouldn't do it. Because we're giving up liquidity and liquidity is very precious. So if we're going to give up liquidity as an investor and owner of a company, my goodness, we better achieve better returns otherwise, nobody should give us their capital. So understanding what that objective was in the strategy flowed from the objective. So that's how I think about it. And how do you manage risk with a concentrated portfolio, especially given the potential impact of one bad investment on the entire fund?
因為我們的目標是以最低風險創造強勁的私募股權回報，而私募股權回報必須超越其他市場的長期表現，否則就不該投入。畢竟我們放棄了流動性，而流動性極為珍貴。既然我們以投資者與企業主的身份放棄流動性，天啊，我們非得創造更優異的回報不可，否則誰願意把資金託付給我們？這項策略的設計正是源自對目標的認知。我的思考邏輯便是如此。至於如何管理集中式投資組合的風險？特別是當單一不良投資可能衝擊整個基金時，您會採取哪些措施？

We manage that risk by being incredibly careful around the nature of the businesses that we acquire. And today by putting six seven or eight businesses in a portfolio where we think the risk of losing all of our capital in anyone of those is extraordinarily remote. We can withstand a body blow, an unexpected body blow in our portfolio. But when I look at the combination of businesses that we acquire, the likelihood of some number of them, taking together being impaired to cause the return on the entire portfolio to be poor is very, very low. So I suppose one way to create diversification is that a bunch of holdings. Another way is to have fewer holdings, but each of those have different sensitivities to different factors.
我們通過對收購企業的性質極其謹慎來管理這種風險。如今，將六、七或八家企業納入投資組合，我們認為在其中任何一家企業損失全部資本的風險極其渺茫。我們能夠承受投資組合中突如其來的重大打擊。但當我審視我們收購的企業組合時，其中部分企業整體受損導致整個投資組合回報不佳的可能性非常、非常低。因此，我認為實現多元化的一種方式是持有多項資產。另一種方式是持有較少資產，但每項資產對不同因素具有不同的敏感度。

And you can diversify by those, especially if they're not all economically sensitive, then you can effectively have sufficient diversification with fewer number of holdings at a higher conviction. Exactly right, because we're not, we don't invest in one sector. Our businesses aren't subject to the same economic forces to the same risks because each one is independent and subject to the forces that are impacting their unique sub-sectors. The interesting thing is there are many similarities between our businesses from an attribute perspective, characteristically. We know what we like in terms of the nature of the machine using the analogy, the businesses of the machine that generates cash flow, however each machine is different, right?
你可以透過這些方式實現多元化，特別是當它們並非全都對經濟敏感時，就能以較少的持股數量、更高的投資信念，有效達到足夠的分散配置。完全正確，因為我們並非只投資單一產業。我們持有的企業不會受到相同的經濟因素或風險影響，因為每家企業都是獨立的，各自承受所屬次產業領域的特殊衝擊。有趣的是，從本質特徵來看，這些企業之間存在許多相似之處。用比喻來說，我們清楚自己偏好的「現金流生成機器」該具備何種特質，但每台機器的運作方式其實各不相同，對吧？

And the ecosystem that they're involved with are different in the forces that impact them are different. So to your point, they're each subject to different macro considerations. And that form of verification is what gives me comfort to invest in this manner. What are the key ways you add value post acquisition and help portfolio companies create long-term value? So I think that's one of the genuinely interesting things about the way we're able to invest as compared to investing in a widely held public company, which is that we're looking to invest in businesses where we have the responsibility of ownership, the responsibility of governing these businesses. And we buy businesses where we have a clear perspective on the thesis on what is required to be put in place, to take this wonderful enterprise and take it to the next level. And philosophically, our view is that the most important decision that we make and its our responsibility is who the CEO will be that will run this business. In venture capital, the often talk about backing a team, in a sense, when we're not backing a team, we're buying a business and it's real capabilities that we can underrate in the CS. And then the most important job is who the CEO will be that process company often the CEO is in place. But from time to time, we'll acquire a business where the plan is to either elevate somebody to that job or bring somebody new. And that's the most important decision because they're going to be running the business day-to-day. And we need to understand that. With that CEO, we then need to align on the vision for the business so that we're very clear together on where we want to take it. And with that under stud Alex, we then are focused with the CEO on three things. What are the key priorities from one year to the next that we want and the CEO agrees it's important for the senior leadership to think to focus on over the course of the next 12 months? And those are going to evolve over time. So one of the key priorities and then they're going to cascade priorities throughout the organization. What are the capabilities that are required to execute on those priorities? Now come back to capabilities in a minute and then lastly, who are the people that we need within the organization to achieve all that? Of those three in many respects, I believe the most important is the team, the talent agenda because if we get the right team in place, then we're going to land on the right priorities and we're going to put the capabilities in place to execute on all of that. If we have the wrong team, we're going to stop optimize for sure. So where we're very focused is on the question of what capabilities are required and those can be built internally, those can be brought to bear externally, or we can deliver those capabilities at our firm. And we have built over the course of the last many years a group at Altus, which we refer to as PSG, which is not a very famous French soccer team, the resenge of that. It's our portfolio solutions group.
而他們所處的生態系統不同，影響他們的勢力也不同。所以正如你所說，它們各自受到不同的宏觀因素影響。這種形式的驗證正是讓我放心以這種方式投資的原因。收購後，你透過哪些關鍵方式創造價值，並幫助投資組合公司建立長期價值？我認為這正是我們這種投資方式與投資於廣泛持有的上市公司相比，真正有趣的一點——我們尋求投資於那些我們擁有所有權責任、需要承擔治理責任的企業。我們收購那些對其發展論點有清晰見解的企業，知道需要落實哪些措施才能讓這些優秀的企業更上一層樓。從哲學層面來看，我們認為最重要的決策（也是我們的責任）在於選擇將由誰來擔任執行長經營這項事業。在風險投資領域，人們常談論支持團隊；某種程度上，我們並非支持團隊，而是收購一家企業及其真實能力，這些我們可以在 CS 中低估。 而最重要的工作就是決定誰來擔任這家流程公司的執行長——通常原任 CEO 會留任。但偶爾我們收購企業時，計畫會是提拔內部人員或引進新血來接掌這個職位。這是最關鍵的決策，因為他們將負責企業的日常營運，我們必須充分理解這點。與這位 CEO 達成共識後，我們接著要確立企業的發展願景，確保雙方對目標方向有清晰共識。在此基礎框架下，我們會與 CEO 共同聚焦三項要務：首先釐清年度關鍵優先事項——從當年到隔年，哪些是我們與 CEO 都認同、需要高階主管團隊在未來 12 個月專注推動的重點？這些重點會隨時間演變。確立首要任務後，這些優先事項將在組織內層層貫徹。其次是評估執行這些優先事項所需的關鍵能力——關於能力建設我稍後會再說明。最後則是盤點：要達成所有目標，組織內需要哪些核心人才？ 在這三個方面中，我認為最重要的是團隊與人才策略，因為如果我們擁有合適的團隊，就能確立正確的優先事項，並建立執行這一切所需的能力。若團隊配置錯誤，我們肯定會偏離最佳化。因此，我們非常關注的問題是：需要哪些能力？這些能力可以內部培養、外部引進，或由我們公司直接提供。過去多年來，我們在 Altus 建立了一個稱為 PSG 的團隊——這可不是某支著名的法國足球隊（笑）——而是我們的「投資組合解決方案小組」。

And in that team is focused on working with our management teams, on very important key needs, need of moving initiatives that can really make a big difference. At the company and we built a team that sort of knows how to do that well. And we are extraordinarily focused with our businesses on the effort to upgrade their executive teams to give us the best chance of accelerating the development of the company. So our head of talent at Altus is a woman, pretty easily. The diamond she started her career has an organizational assessment affecting this consultant at BCG in a branding all of BCG's talent enterprise. BCG Canada joined us to focus on the talent at our team, but very much to be focused with our CEOs and the heads of the company's on the talent agenda businesses. So our philosophy is let's put the various key pieces in place at the businesses.
而這個團隊專注於與我們的管理團隊合作，處理極其關鍵的需求，推動那些能真正帶來重大改變的舉措。在公司內部，我們建立了一支擅長此道的團隊。我們與旗下企業高度聚焦於提升其高管團隊的素質，以最大程度加速公司的發展進程。Altus 的人才主管是位女性——這相當順理成章。她職業生涯起點是在 BCG 擔任組織評估顧問，後來主導了 BCG 加拿大區整個人才體系的品牌重塑工作。她加入後不僅專注於我們團隊的人才建設，更與各企業 CEO 及高層緊密協作，共同推進人才戰略議程。因此我們的理念是：在企業中逐一落實各項關鍵要素。

Let's add value on the talent side and on key capabilities. And then make sure we're well aligned. And the other thing that's important is it goes back to one of your very first questions, which is why I always found this job interesting. Which is that the decisions that we make on who the leaders will be these businesses are critically important because we need to develop effective and trusting relationships with them. And what I often explain to young people is that yes, while we control these businesses, for a practical standpoint, we are in the moral swation business. We're in the business of having to develop these trusted relationships that we can align at what we're trying to accomplish. It's no different than a sports team.
讓我們在人才和關鍵能力方面增加價值，然後確保我們能夠良好協調。另一件重要的事情是，這又回到了你最初提出的問題之一，這也是我一直覺得這份工作有趣的原因。那就是我們決定誰將成為這些企業的領導者至關重要，因為我們需要與他們建立有效且信任的關係。我經常向年輕人解釋的是，雖然我們控制這些企業，但從實際角度來看，我們從事的是道德關係的業務。我們必須建立這些信任關係，才能與我們試圖實現的目標保持一致。這與一支運動團隊沒有什麼不同。

It starts with the owner, down to the GM, down to the press, into the coach and the players, let's all get aligned. We're the team owner in many respects. We're going to be across sports. There's some great owners, there's some less good owners, and teams that have great owners tend to do well over time and have bad owners. They make bad decisions and end up with bad outcomes. That's the analogy for how I think about this. One thing that makes the job interesting. The last thing I'd say is, one of the things that we've worked hard to be good at is to really be able to assess what is required to really take these businesses to the next level around people, systems, processes, capabilities, which is different for each company. And then how effectively and at what pace can we put those in place to really start to see outcomes. Because the business is that we buy them not to simply hold them for two years, but four or five, six, seven years, because it takes time to really grow the operating income of these companies, which ultimately is the the sureest way to create equity value. And I guess going back to our, how we began our conversation, if you're trying to help these companies solve the puzzle to take it to the next level, you have to make sure they have all the right pieces to solve that puzzle.
這一切從老闆開始，向下延伸到總經理，再到媒體，接著是教練和球員，我們必須全體達成共識。在很多方面，我們就是球隊的老闆。我們將跨足多項運動領域。有些老闆非常出色，有些則不那麼理想，而擁有優秀老闆的球隊往往能長期表現良好，反之則會做出糟糕決策並導致不良後果。這就是我對此的比喻，也是讓這份工作有趣的原因之一。最後我想說的是，我們努力培養的一項能力，就是真正評估這些企業需要什麼才能將業務提升到更高水平——無論是在人才、系統、流程還是能力方面，這對每家公司都不同。然後我們要考量的是，如何有效地、以何種速度實施這些改變，才能真正看到成果。因為我們收購這些企業不是為了短期持有兩年，而是四、五、六甚至七年，因為真正提升這些公司的營運收入需要時間，而這最終是創造股權價值最可靠的方式。 我想回到我們對話開始時提到的，如果你想幫助這些公司解決難題、提升到下一個層級，就必須確保他們具備解決這個難題所需的所有正確要素。

Right. My mental math is very simple. We buy these businesses where we have conviction that there's not something to grow there, EBIT. And the way to generate financial returns in our business is to do two things. One, we want to grow operating income, well above the rate of inflation, organically. And then we look for businesses' Alex, because we're very focused. We typically buy services companies, they're not terribly capital intensive.
沒錯。我的計算方式很簡單：我們收購這些企業時，確信它們在 EBIT 方面沒有成長空間。而在我們這行要創造財務回報，關鍵在兩件事：首先，我們希望營運收入能以遠高於通膨的速度自然增長；其次我們會尋找像 Alex 這樣的企業，因為我們非常專注——通常收購服務型公司，這類企業資本密集度不高。

They tend to be highly cash flow generators. And we're interested also in businesses that not only generate strong cash flow, but have the ability to reinvest that cash flow on an ongoing basis and attract it on the lower rate of return. And if we can do that, very powerful way to grow equity value. So we're looking to grow operating income and to enhance that rate of growth organically, well above the rate of inflation, and then to be able to hopefully have the opportunity to reinvest cash flow, organically and attractive rate of return. And it's very important to us that our management teams understand and understand what we're trying to accomplish, are very aligned with it.
它們往往是現金流生成能力極強的企業。我們同時也對那些不僅能產生強勁現金流，還能持續將這些現金流以較低回報率進行再投資的業務感興趣。若能實現這點，將是提升股權價值的極有效方式。因此我們致力於提升營運收入，並以有機方式加速增長率，使其遠高於通膨水平，同時期望能有機會以有機且具吸引力的回報率對現金流進行再投資。對我們而言，管理團隊是否理解並認同我們試圖達成的目標，具有高度一致性，這點至關重要。

And then we set about enhancing team, people, system processes. But it's all in the service of that objective. How do we take this machine that's been built? It's a wonderful durable machine. But we need to have a conviction that there's levers that we can pull either because it's not being optimized or it's under profuming relative to its potential that can allow us to accelerate that, intrive, operating, and organically, and that's ultimately how you're able to make money over time. And in general, it's strong returns over time in this activity in my view. What are the types of things that can go wrong with the approach? You're saying, you know, as with a particular company, just, you know, in terms of when you're thinking about investing in these companies and adding value, what types of things can derail the derail that success that either is unpredictable or maybe it's bad underwriting or what, what are the types of things? Sure. So one of the big areas of risk and uncertainty these days that we are determined to hopefully get right. But certainly, is an area where things can go wrong. Is around how this technology can disintermediate a business that has had a durable history? Based on how it's been built and how its ecosystem has operated to this point. And certainly with the advent of gender AI industries are going to be disrupted. And so it is incredibly important for us when we look at a company to be thoughtful around the question of whether that capability, this emerging technology, for like a better term, will be something that enables the company or impose as risk on it. And we're very lucky we have in our orbit and on our advisory board, an old friend, you may know named David Lawi, who was early team member at Google, ran a lot of marketing through Google, led business development from many years. And then around the same time we founded the firm to create something called capital, the originally Google capital and capital G, which is Google's growth equity investing arm, retired last year in spending it fast in a year, just learning about AI at Stanford. And David is in our orbit. So whenever we look at a business and there's this question, we're spending time with him and people in his world asking ourselves this question about whether AI will will pose a threat for the company and this business or will enable it and allow us to infect, grow it. You could get that wrong for sure, but it's something we're very focused on trying to get right. I think of that as an area of risk these days when we're looking at a business. The way we try to mitigate these types of things after we own a company, which we've made the decision, is we believe in the importance of trying to return capital along the way as a way to de-risk our investments. You back to the earlier conversation, we own a small number. It is not uncommon for us two or three years in and we've done this three or four times now where we have sold 25 or 30 percent of the company in return 50 percent or 100 percent or more of the capital. In some of our investors said, "Well, why did you do that?" You're giving away a bunch of upside. My view is if I can sell 30 percent and return more than 100 percent of our basis, I will do that all day long. Back to my natural state of paranoia. We did a homework project and education that led us unexpectedly to ultimately have the opportunity to acquire the leading international medical school in the world, remarkable business. I didn't know existed for so many years in this sub-sacitor that had been built from one to 115 of e.b. in 38 years.
接著我們著手強化團隊、人員與系統流程。但這一切都是為了服務那個核心目標——我們該如何駕馭這台已建構完善的機器？這是台卓越且經久耐用的機器，但我們必須確信存在可操作的槓桿，無論是因當前運作尚未達最佳化，或是相較於其潛力仍處於低度發揮狀態，這些槓桿能讓我們加速推進，驅動營運有機成長，而這正是長期創造獲利的根本途徑。以我的觀點來看，這項活動通常能帶來持續強勁的回報。這種方法可能面臨哪些潛在風險？您提到，就像對待特定企業時，當考量投資這些公司並創造附加價值之際，有哪些因素可能導致成功偏離軌道？無論是難以預測的變數，抑或是承保評估失誤？具體而言會是哪些類型的問題？確實如此。當前其中一個充滿風險與不確定性的重大領域——我們雖力求精準掌握，但無疑仍是可能出錯的環節——便在於：這項科技如何可能瓦解一門具備悠久穩健歷史的商業模式？ 基於它至今的建構方式及其生態系統的運作模式。毫無疑問，隨著生成式 AI 的興起，各產業都將面臨顛覆。因此，當我們評估一家公司時，極其重要的是要深思熟慮這個問題：這項新興技術的能力，姑且稱之為更先進的技術，究竟是會賦能這家公司，還是對其構成風險。我們非常幸運，在我們的圈子及顧問委員會中，有一位你可能認識的老朋友——大衛·拉維，他是谷歌的早期團隊成員，曾負責谷歌的大量市場營銷工作，多年來領導業務發展。大約在我們創立公司的同一時期，他創立了名為 Capital 的公司，最初是谷歌資本，後來成為 Capital G，即谷歌的成長型股權投資部門，去年退休後，他在史丹佛大學花了一年時間快速學習 AI。大衛現在就在我們的圈子裡。 因此每當我們評估一家企業時，這個問題就會浮現——我們花時間與企業主及其團隊相處，不斷自問：人工智慧究竟會對這家公司構成威脅，還是能成為助力讓我們進一步推動成長？當然判斷可能出錯，但這正是我們極力想釐清的關鍵。在我看來，這已成為當代企業評估中必須正視的風險領域。 至於收購後的風險控管，我們的做法是堅持「階段性返還資本」的策略來降低投資風險。延續先前的討論，我們持股數量精簡，經常在投資兩三年後——至今已執行三、四次——出售 25%至 30%股權，藉此回收 50%甚至 100%以上的原始投資。有些投資人會質疑：「這樣做不是放棄潛在獲利嗎？」但我的原則是：只要能賣出 30%股權並回收超過 100%成本，我隨時都願意執行。這又回到我與生俱來的風險戒備本能。 我們完成了一個家庭作業專案和教育歷程，意外地讓我們最終有機會收購全球頂尖的國際醫學院，這是一項非凡的事業。多年來我竟不知在這個次領域中，存在著這樣一個在 38 年間從 1 家發展到 115 家 EB 規模的機構。

We were very fortunate to take it from 115 to 240 with a new team we put in place over six years. But along the way, again, we sold a 30 percent stake to another private equity return for the last two times. We've done that with our insurance brokerage company. It's one of the things that we like to do as a way to mitigate risk because to your point, there are no risks, there's unknown risks and if we can reduce those, the best way to reduce risk is to return everybody's money. Then the risk of capital loss is removed. Hopefully it's helpful. Private companies, especially successful ones, oftentimes have a choice of PE firms to partner with. How does your long-term orientation position you as an owner of choice for a private company? Let me describe how I think about time arising, which is that we're buying businesses not to simply own for one or two years. And that's because we buy businesses to really take their operating income to a different level that takes time from a practical standpoint. I think we will own most businesses for four or five six, seven years. And that's because we buy them. We have a clear thesis. We set out to execute on a plan. The orientation in a sense, because we're looking to build these into more durable, more business, valuable businesses that we can be built for the long-term. Our part of the journey will typically in my mind before five, six, seven years. That said, when we set out on this journey, my hope was that if we're lucky, once or perhaps twice a decade, we might find ourselves only a remarkable business that is sort of the gift that keeps on giving, where the first chapter leads to a second chapter and could lead to a third chapter. And we might own it longer, which would be wonderful. And we want to have that orientation and the flexibility to do that.
我們非常幸運能在六年間透過新組建的團隊將業績從 115 提升到 240。但在此過程中，我們又兩度將 30%股權出售給另一家私募股權機構。這種做法我們在保險經紀公司也實施過——這正是我們偏好的風險緩釋策略，正如您所言，風險無處不在，而降低風險的最佳方式就是確保所有投資人都能收回本金，如此資本損失的風險自然消除。希望這個觀點能有所啟發。對於私有企業（特別是成功企業）而言，往往能自主選擇私募合作夥伴。你們的長期持有策略如何確立自身成為企業首選合作方？請容我闡述對持有周期的思考：我們收購企業從不只為短期持有一兩年，而是真正要將其營運收益提升至新高度——這從實務角度必然需要時間。多數情況下，我們會持有企業四到七年，因為每筆收購都有明確的價值主張，我們會嚴格執行既定的營運計劃。 某種意義上的定位，因為我們希望將這些企業打造成更具持久性、更具商業價值的企業，能夠為長期發展奠定基礎。在我看來，我們參與的這段旅程通常會持續五、六、七年。話雖如此，當我們踏上這段旅程時，我的期望是如果運氣好的話，每十年或許會有一兩次機會，我們能發現自己僅擁有一家非凡的企業，就像是持續給予的禮物，第一章節引領出第二章節，甚至可能迎來第三章節。這樣我們或許能持有更長時間，那將會非常美好。而我們希望保持這種定位與靈活性來實現這個目標。

But we understand that those are very few and far between. Understanding that most businesses were going to have a thesis and that second chapter may not emerge or somebody may come along, one of our businesses in the first few years, that strategic came along and offered what we thought was a very high price that allowed us to pull forward several years of work. Or where we think that the industry landscape is changing, you know, a bit of our job is to look down the road and around the corner. And you have to be willing to sell things as to hold them. Every year we're, you know, being the second year we do this thorough re-indirecting of each business because it's isn't a hold. It is, you know, as a result, instead of a re-investment decision.
但我們明白這種情況極為罕見。我們理解大多數企業都會有一個投資論點，而第二篇章可能不會出現，或者可能有人介入——比如我們早期投資的一家公司，就有戰略買家提出我們認為極高的報價，這讓我們能提前實現數年的工作成果。有時我們認為產業格局正在變化，要知道，我們的部分職責就是前瞻未來、洞察轉折。你必須同時具備出售與持有的意願。每年我們都會——現在是第二年——對每項業務進行徹底的重新評估，因為這不是單純的持有，而是一個需要重新決策的再投資過程。

So it's going to be rare that we own a company longer. To answer your question, if somebody's just interested in the highest price, they don't care about who the next owner is, we're typically not the right partner. But if, if there's a stakeholder that cares, a management team shareholder that's going to continue to own an interest in the business and they're looking for an owner or a partner investor that can add value and has this orientation of really meaningfully building a business. And that's what they care about and when they pass the baton, we're a good choice. Because also we don't own 50 companies.
因此我們長期持有一家公司的情況會很罕見。回答您的問題，如果有人只對最高價格感興趣，不在乎下一位所有者是誰，我們通常不是合適的合作夥伴。但如果存在關心此事的利益相關者，比如將繼續持有業務股份的管理團隊股東，他們正在尋找能夠增值並具有真正有意義建設企業導向的所有者或合作投資者。這正是他們所關心的，當他們交接時，我們是一個不錯的選擇。因為我們也不擁有 50 家公司。

You know, today we own eight. And each one is like a child, which would you care, you know, we're caring, be care about them, we're nurturing them, you know, the, you know, we're carefully feeding and watering them. And so, you know, because that involvement is a little different. And we're often attracted. It's owners and managing teams that are interested in that type of engagement, but they're attracted to us. You discussed investing in CEOs. Are there any qualities of great leaders that are counterintuitive or broadly underappreciated?
您知道，目前我們擁有八家。每一家都像一個孩子，您會關心，我們也在關心、照料它們，我們在精心地餵養和澆灌它們。因此，這種參與方式有些不同。我們經常吸引那些對這種互動感興趣的所有者和管理團隊，他們也被我們所吸引。您談到了投資 CEO 的問題。偉大領導者有哪些反直覺或普遍被低估的特質嗎？

So I don't know if these are underappreciated, but I think great CEOs are ones that can articulate a very clear vision to their teams and throw their organizations are great judges of character, right? Because businesses are built and run by teams of people, not by single individuals. So if a CEO is a great judge of character, can express a clear vision that they can articulate. And that can inspire trust and confidence. That, in my view, consistently is what makes a wonderful leader. And the ability both inspire trust and confidence in your team and also hold them accountable at the same time is difficult and hugely valuable.
所以我不確定這些特質是否被低估，但我認為優秀的執行長是那些能向團隊清楚闡述願景，並且善於識人的人，對吧？因為企業是由團隊建立和運作，而非單一個體。因此，若一位執行長具備卓越的識人能力，又能表達清晰的願景，這將能激發信任與信心。依我之見，這正是造就傑出領導者的關鍵。同時具備激發團隊信任與信心，並要求他們負起責任的能力，這相當困難卻極具價值。

And I think Mark Cohen, who's the CEO of Hobbit International, he started as a insurance broker in an office 30 years ago. And he is as detail oriented as anyone I've ever met as a CEO, which means that he really understands every element of the business and can hold his team accountable. But he also has the ability to inspire them based on a clear vision for where the business is going and what their channel accomplish. That dual ability to be detail oriented in a way that allows you to hold people accountable because you really know the business and at the same time be able to inspire into developing relationships. I think is an element of traits or combination of traits that I often see in great CEOs. Conversely, are there characteristics of great leaders that are often viewed as important that you don't value as much? Probably presence.
而我認為 Hobbit International 的執行長 Mark Cohen，他 30 年前從一間辦公室的保險經紀人做起。他是我見過最注重細節的執行長，這意味著他真正了解業務的每個環節，並能要求團隊負起責任。但他同時也具備根據清晰的企業願景來激勵團隊的能力，讓他們明白公司發展方向與自身能達成的成就。這種既能深入細節要求問責（因為真正懂業務），又能激勵人心建立關係的雙重能力，我認為是優秀執行長常見的特質組合。反過來說，有哪些被普遍重視的領導者特質是你不太看重的？大概是「存在感」吧。

Often times people think of CEOs as the leading man in a Western movie. I don't think that presence is anywhere near as important as knowledge and thoughtfulness. I've worked with CEOs that are quite soft spoken but are still remarkably talented CEOs. They can be even killed and soft spoken but because they engender trust and confidence they can be very effective. That's probably one attribute that people may overestimate. The ability to walk into a room and command a room. Lessness is there. I'd say. Not unnecessary, but lessness is there. You've demonstrated a strong commitment to giving back, particularly through your efforts to educate and mentor the next generation of leaders. Would you share what motivates this passion and how you help programs like both scholars and make an impact? The Wolf Scholars Program is a program that was named after my grandfather. My late maternal grandfather, Wolf Cooper, who came to this country as an immigrant and was incredibly grateful for what North America could offer. For the system that had built in because he fled year after the Second World War having survived, he had a great appreciation for the value of free society and liberal democratic system. The program which we've established in partnership with the University of Toronto is focused on creating a generation of innovators, builders and leaders in Canada. I live in Canada, our firm, we operate from Toronto no different than if we're in Boston, New York, and I'm Cisco, New York, but home from Toronto. So many young college, high school seniors these days feel immense pressure to go to study commerce and undergrad, certainly in Canada as a way to hopefully create a path to an interesting job. I think that we'll be better serve to train kids that have a bit of a more multi-disciplinary approach thinking about the world and that can learn how to be critical thinkers and thoughtful problems all of us. And for that I'd like them to have the opportunity to learn about history how the world has evolved over time to be exposed to leaders in business and otherwise in an era where critical thinking is as valued as perhaps it has been in times past and so we created this program that is determined to hopefully train a generation of young people that will tackle the opportunities facing their generation with both a multi-disciplinary understanding of the world, an appreciation for history and a framework that will allow the tackle problem stothily. And this is something that's been in the works for many years that we've actually just launched a few weeks ago that will be fun to build in. I like building stuff, I've enjoyed building the firm and I'm excited to build this and hopefully you know we'll wake up 20 years from now and have graduated to a pretty interesting leaders. We'll see. That's great. So I end up having good news for you. You've been appointed private equity king for a day and the power that you have is you can change one thing about the private equity industry. What would that be in and why? Thank you for the appointment. So one day it would be fantastic Alex. If investors would have the ability to invest in and out of private equity portfolios in an easy way at an AV. So that for folks like us we wouldn't have to spend a massive amount of time every three or four years trying to raise the next fund.
人們常把執行長想像成西部片裡的領銜男主角。我認為那種氣場遠不如知識與深思熟慮來得重要。我曾共事過幾位說話輕聲細語卻才華非凡的執行長。他們甚至可以內斂寡言，但由於能激發信任與信心，反而極具領導效能。這或許是人們容易高估的特質之一——那種走進房間就能掌控全場的能力。重要性確實存在，但沒那麼關鍵。您展現了對回饋社會的強烈承諾，特別體現在培育新一代領袖的教育與指導上。能否談談這份熱情的動機，以及您如何透過像「沃爾夫學者計劃」這樣的項目發揮影響力？「沃爾夫學者計劃」是以我的外祖父命名。我已故的外祖父沃爾夫·庫珀當年以移民身份來到這個國家，對北美所能提供的一切心懷無盡感激。 對於這個他因二戰後倖存而逃離多年後建立的體系，他對自由社會和自由民主制度的價值有著極大的欣賞。我們與多倫多大學合作建立的計劃，專注於在加拿大培養一代創新者、建設者和領導者。我住在加拿大，我們的公司在多倫多運營，與在波士頓、紐約或紐約的思科無異，但家在多倫多。現今許多大學生和高中畢業生感到巨大壓力要去學習商科和本科，特別是在加拿大，希望這能為他們開創一條通往有趣工作的道路。我認為，我們更應該培養那些對世界有多學科思維方式的孩子，讓他們學會如何成為批判性思考者和深思熟慮的問題解決者。 為此，我希望他們有機會學習歷史，了解世界如何隨時間演變，接觸商界及其他領域的領袖——在這個批判性思維或許與過往時代同等受重視的時代。因此我們創立了這項計畫，旨在培養一代年輕人，讓他們以跨學科的世界觀、對歷史的體悟，以及能系統性解決問題的框架，來應對屬於他們世代的挑戰。這是籌備多年的計畫，我們幾週前才剛啟動，未來建設過程會很有趣。我喜歡建構事物，創建公司的過程令我樂在其中，而現在我也很期待打造這個計畫。希望二十年後醒來時，我們已培育出相當出色的領導者。且拭目以待。 （主持人：）這太棒了。現在有個好消息要告訴你——你被任命為「一日私募股權之王」，擁有的權力是可以改變私募股權產業的一件事。你會改變什麼？為什麼？ （Andrew：）感謝這項任命。Alex，若真有這一天就太美妙了—— 如果投資者能夠以簡單的方式在 AV 進出私募股權投資組合，那麼對於像我們這樣的人來說，就不必每三四年花費大量時間籌集下一筆基金。

It is a part of my job. So every few years we have to go raise a public capital that provides us with a capital for us to then go invest and I don't know if we'll get there but if we could simply go about our job of buying businesses at the right time selling and reinvesting that capital without having every few years to take this detour in a sense to have to raise a whole bunch of capital to do it again. That would certainly free up a whole bunch of energy and time to allow us to simply do our job of researching industries underwriting businesses and owning them. For that to happen the industry needs to create a mechanism to give investors confidence that they can invest in and then get liquidity from reasonable time frame and at net asset value. They're interested in those portfolios. If you can buy into and get out of a portfolio of property at an AV and you could trust that and trust someone you want your money back within reason you can get it that would be fantastic for this industry. It hasn't really been created. I can leave that to you to figure out if if folks could figure that out it would certainly make my life a lot easier because I could focus on doing my job well. So that would be great for this industry. I don't know if we'll ever get there.
這是我工作的一部分。每隔幾年我們就必須去籌集公共資本，這些資本讓我們得以進行投資。我不知道我們是否能達到目標，但如果我們能單純地做好我們的工作——在適當的時機買入企業、賣出並再投資這些資本，而不必每隔幾年就繞這麼一個彎，去籌集大量資金來重複這個過程。那肯定能釋放出大量的精力和時間，讓我們單純地做好研究產業、承保企業並持有它們的工作。要實現這一點，這個行業需要建立一個機制，讓投資者有信心他們可以在合理的時間框架內投資並以資產淨值獲得流動性。他們對這些投資組合感興趣。如果你能以資產淨值買入和退出一個房地產投資組合，並且你能信任這一點，信任某個人，在合理的範圍內你想要回你的錢時就能拿回來，那對這個行業來說將是非常棒的。這樣的機制還沒有真正建立起來。我可以把這個問題留給你們去思考，如果有人能解決這個問題，那肯定會讓我的生活輕鬆很多，因為我可以專注於做好我的工作。 這對該產業來說會是件好事。雖然我不確定我們是否真能達到那個境界。

I know people are thinking about it so it would be on my pay grade but that would be interesting. Well Andrea I've had a lot of fun with this conversation. I learned a lot I hope our listeners did as well. Thank you so much for joining us. Thank you. Great to see you. Appreciate the opportunity. Thanks for listening. We hope you enjoyed this episode. Please visit our website at insightfulinvestor.org to access past shows and learn more about our podcast.
我知道有人在考慮這件事，這雖然超出我的職權範圍，但確實很有意思。安德莉亞，這次對談讓我獲益良多，希望聽眾們也是。非常感謝妳的參與。謝謝。很高興見到妳。感謝給予這個機會。感謝收聽，希望您喜歡本集節目。歡迎造訪我們的網站 insightfulinvestor.org 收聽過往節目，了解更多播客資訊。

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20250506讀後重點摘要（尚未消化咀嚼）

（討論到私募股權投資）年輕人可能不太理解的是，這其實是門關於「人」的生意。 這關乎培養信任且深厚的關係，因為我們不僅僅是投資一家公司的股權。我們肩負著擁有和治理這些企業的責任。這需要與 CEO 及管理團隊建立並培養穩固的關係。我們始終將這些視為夥伴關係。

對我們而言，這個目標說來簡單卻難以實踐——那就是為合作夥伴創造優異的私募股權回報，同時將長期風險控制在最低程度。

我們從一個租來的辦公室開始，只有三個人，沒有資金、電腦和想法，角落裡還有一隻貴賓犬，我常開玩笑說。一開始我們並沒有很多必要的拼圖，但我確實明白我們需要哪些拼圖來完成這幅圖。毫不意外，要把它們正確地組合起來需要很長時間。因為你不可能一夜之間建立一個高品質的企業。這是一個一個組件慢慢累積的過程，同時要對這些組件有清晰的願景，並逐步建立一個持久且可持續的事業。今天我想討論的主題之一是領導力。那麼讓我問你這個問題。 哪些習慣或日常對你作為私募股權領導者的成功最為關鍵？我深信的一點就是重複。我非常相信不斷重複自己。

我指的是有幾種哲學性的方法與觀點，我認為在我們處理日常活動數據時必須謹記於心。舉例來說，其中一點源自於我深信這份工作極具挑戰性——要找到符合個人投資框架的企業（無論框架為何，畢竟投資方式五花八門）本就困難重重。從許多層面來看，要做得漂亮，自然就意味著必須對多數機會說不。正如你所知，我們的作法是每年試圖尋覓一兩家符合框架且令我們堅信不疑的企業。而在前端作業上，我們希望透過大量接觸投資機會，最終篩選出那少數真正契合的標的——當企業前景與我們必須支付的價格產生絕佳交集時。具體量化來說，現今我們公司的案源開發模型，每年實際需審視約 300 家企業作為初步篩選基礎，並針對特定次產業領域進行深度挖掘。 我們每週大約會接觸六家企業，這些都是從最終 300 家相關性最高的公司中篩選出來的，因為其中許多並不符合我們的標準。我們會將這個數量壓縮到平均每月約 1.5 家，並對這些企業進行極其深入的商業盡職調查。有趣的是，在我們每年審查的 15 至 18 家公司中，從公司文化角度來看，我們預期其中 90%經不起嚴格檢驗。當我們深入調查後，往往會發現它們要麼不符合我們的期望或想像，要麼我們最終認定必須支付的價格過高。這其實很困難，對吧？因為這意味著我們會審視大量企業，但最終收購的寥寥無幾。因此，這需要建立一套獎勵機制，並吸引特定類型的人才——那些真正享受深入了解企業過程的人，他們明白我們不會頻繁進行收購。這對我而言，意味著要不斷提醒團隊：在某種意義上，我們的工作不是收購公司——買下一家公司太容易了，簽署收購協議、匯出款項就完成了。我們真正的職責是釐清這些問題。公司內部有個慣例：當我們深入評估某個企業卻最終未能達成交易時，團隊反而要外出慶功。他們慶祝的顯然不是成功收購（因為並未成交），而是慶祝破解了難題、找到了答案。因此我認為，持續強化這些理念至關重要，讓人們始終銘記我們追求的目標——尤其當我們每年引進四到六名年輕新血時，更需要潛移默化地灌輸企業價值與使命。堅持核心理念並不容易，我們努力完善人才培育的每個環節：透過培訓、晉升與獎勵機制，不斷強化團隊對共同目標的認同，這點極為關鍵。

在我們公司，你會因為出色的工作而獲得獎勵。再次強調，出色的工作並不定義為收購一家公司。收購公司的決定將在許多方面是集體決策。因此，在我們公司，出色的工作定義為真正了解你所專注的子行業，對這些行業發展出真正的洞察力，並與這些行業中我們可能感興趣的企業管理團隊和所有者建立深厚的關係。


我們審視市場環境與經濟前景的方式主要有兩個層面：首先是謹記我們屬於微觀投資者，專注投資那些經過多年打造的企業——這類企業通常具有深厚的歷史底蘊、穩固的市場領導地位，這些數據對我們而言極具參考價值。在我們的世界裡，我們與風險投資的距離可說是遙不可及。我們並非投資於個人，而是投資於那些歷經長期建立、基於其所提供產品服務而具備真正獨特能力的企業。我們的工作在於評估這些企業。常對年輕人使用的比喻是：企業就像一台產生現金流的機器。我們的任務是層層剖析，直視其運作機制。透過盡職調查程序，我們的工作是評估這台機器的品質與耐用性。就穩定產生現金的機制而言，我們要形成深思熟慮的觀點，探討如何隨時間提升現金流。在此過程中，毫無疑問地，我們會考量可能影響這些企業的更廣泛經濟力量。當下的總體經濟情勢確實會影響我們的判斷。接著，我們會根據歷史數據、企業現狀、競爭環境以及我們看到的機會，建立一套預測模型。 這創造並生成了一系列結果。因此，我們實際上並不是基於一組基礎案例的預測來建立模型。我們是基於一系列假設所產生的結果陣列來建立模型，這些假設考量了公司在未來幾年可能表現的潛力。我們評估這個結果陣列，最終做出決策，並運用測試判斷來決定是否收購企業以及支付何種價格。我常向投資者簡單描述這種方式：我們試圖在該陣列中找到一個我們認為高度可實現的基礎案例。

因此我們關注的是微型企業，那些在特定領域營運的企業。當然，我們也會思考宏觀環境對它們的影響。但我們尋找的是那些我們認為在某方面表現特別出色的企業。問題在於，我們能否協助它們將這項優勢提升到另一個層次？這樣有幫助嗎？是的，我想我們之前討論的安全邊際部分，也可能包括投資那些實際上對經濟波動較不敏感的企業。並且擁有能夠承受經濟低迷的競爭優勢。是的，正是如此。舉例來說，我們並不擁有一家企業——我想我們從未涉足過——那種在某種程度上依賴消費者的業務。對吧？比如那些生產產品賣給沃爾瑪的企業。這些可能是很棒的企業，但它們可能不具備你所描述的那種我們在企業中尋找的安全邊際。因為如果回歸基本原則，我們關注的是現金流的持久性和質量，以此來保護我們的資本。如果我們不是在資本結構的更高層級進行投資（我們不是債務投資者），我們在風險框架中保護資本的方式，就是收購那些我們認為從現金流角度來看非常持久且韌性十足的企業。然後問題是：我們能否提升它？因為我們能為投資者創造良好回報的唯一途徑，主要是將現金流提升到另一個水平。但正如你所說，我們極度關注所收購企業現金流的質量與持久性，而這種持久性至關重要。

顯然你們對私募股權採取高度篩選的策略，每年僅收購一兩家公司，而許多同業傾向更廣泛的分散投資。這種集中策略的優勢為何？為何你認為對另類投資者而言，這比分散策略更佳？最根本的是，我認為長期來看，若試圖收購五家公司，我們的表現不會那麼好。我們找到符合框架且具備同等高度信心的企業數量，可能性非常低。因此，我認為保持篩選與紀律對我們最有利。我的觀點是，若能創造 15%或更高的報酬，達成目標後努力超越，長期維持低減損與低損失率，我們就實現了市場期待。我們視自身工作為投入一元，反覆將其轉化為兩元、三元、四元、五元，同時限制資本減損的發生次數。 對我們而言，實現這個目標的方式不是大量收購公司，因為我認為那樣最終必然會得到一個回報率大約落在行業平均水平左右的投資組合。如果想要做得比這更好，我認為保持更高的紀律性和選擇性會對我們更有利。

私募股權回報必須超越其他市場的長期表現，否則就不該投入。畢竟我們放棄了流動性，而流動性極為珍貴。既然我們以投資者與企業主的身份放棄流動性，天啊，我們非得創造更優異的回報不可，否則誰願意把資金託付給我們？這項策略的設計正是源自對目標的認知。我的思考邏輯便是如此。

我們清楚自己偏好的「現金流生成機器」該具備何種特質，但每台機器的運作方式其實各不相同，對吧？而他們所處的生態系統不同，影響他們的勢力也不同。所以正如你所說，它們各自受到不同的宏觀因素影響。這種形式的驗證正是讓我放心以這種方式投資的原因。收購後，你透過哪些關鍵方式創造價值，並幫助投資組合公司建立長期價值？我認為這正是我們這種投資方式與投資於廣泛持有的上市公司相比，真正有趣的一點——我們尋求投資於那些我們擁有所有權責任、需要承擔治理責任的企業。我們收購那些對其發展論點有清晰見解的企業，知道需要落實哪些措施才能讓這些優秀的企業更上一層樓。從哲學層面來看，我們認為最重要的決策（也是我們的責任）在於選擇將由誰來擔任執行長經營這項事業。在風險投資領域，人們常談論支持團隊；某種程度上，我們並非支持團隊，而是收購一家企業及其真實能力，這些我們可以在 CS 中低估。 而最重要的工作就是決定誰來擔任這家流程公司的執行長——通常原任 CEO 會留任。但偶爾我們收購企業時，計畫會是提拔內部人員或引進新血來接掌這個職位。這是最關鍵的決策，因為他們將負責企業的日常營運，我們必須充分理解這點。與這位 CEO 達成共識後，我們接著要確立企業的發展願景，確保雙方對目標方向有清晰共識。在此基礎框架下，我們會與 CEO 共同聚焦三項要務：首先釐清年度關鍵優先事項——從當年到隔年，哪些是我們與 CEO 都認同、需要高階主管團隊在未來 12 個月專注推動的重點？這些重點會隨時間演變。確立首要任務後，這些優先事項將在組織內層層貫徹。其次是評估執行這些優先事項所需的關鍵能力——關於能力建設我稍後會再說明。最後則是盤點：要達成所有目標，組織內需要哪些核心人才？ 在這三個方面中，我認為最重要的是團隊與人才策略，因為如果我們擁有合適的團隊，就能確立正確的優先事項，並建立執行這一切所需的能力。若團隊配置錯誤，我們肯定會偏離最佳化。因此，我們非常關注的問題是：需要哪些能力？這些能力可以內部培養、外部引進，或由我們公司直接提供。過去多年來，我們在 Altus 建立了一個稱為 PSG 的團隊——這可不是某支著名的法國足球隊（笑）——而是我們的「投資組合解決方案小組」。

最後我想說的是，我們努力培養的一項能力，就是真正評估這些企業需要什麼才能將業務提升到更高水平——無論是在人才、系統、流程還是能力方面，這對每家公司都不同。然後我們要考量的是，如何有效地、以何種速度實施這些改變，才能真正看到成果。因為我們收購這些企業不是為了短期持有兩年，而是四、五、六甚至七年，因為真正提升這些公司的營運收入需要時間，而這最終是創造股權價值最可靠的方式。 我想回到我們對話開始時提到的，如果你想幫助這些公司解決難題、提升到下一個層級，就必須確保他們具備解決這個難題所需的所有正確要素。

我們這行要創造財務回報，關鍵在兩件事：首先，我們希望營運收入能以遠高於通膨的速度自然增長；其次我們會尋找像 Alex 這樣的企業，因為我們非常專注——通常收購服務型公司，這類企業資本密集度不高。它們往往是現金流生成能力極強的企業。我們同時也對那些不僅能產生強勁現金流，還能持續將這些現金流以較低回報率進行再投資的業務感興趣。若能實現這點，將是提升股權價值的極有效方式。因此我們致力於提升營運收入，並以有機方式加速增長率，使其遠高於通膨水平，同時期望能有機會以有機且具吸引力的回報率對現金流進行再投資。對我們而言，管理團隊是否理解並認同我們試圖達成的目標，具有高度一致性，這點至關重要。接著我們著手強化團隊、人員與系統流程。但這一切都是為了服務那個核心目標——我們該如何駕馭這台已建構完善的機器？這是台卓越且經久耐用的機器，但我們必須確信存在可操作的槓桿，無論是因當前運作尚未達最佳化，或是相較於其潛力仍處於低度發揮狀態，這些槓桿能讓我們加速推進，驅動營運有機成長，而這正是長期創造獲利的根本途徑。以我的觀點來看，這項活動通常能帶來持續強勁的回報。

當前其中一個充滿風險與不確定性的重大領域——我們雖力求精準掌握，但無疑仍是可能出錯的環節——便在於：AI這項科技如何可能瓦解一門具備悠久穩健歷史的商業模式？ 基於它至今的建構方式及其生態系統的運作模式。毫無疑問，隨著生成式 AI 的興起，各產業都將面臨顛覆。因此，當我們評估一家公司時，極其重要的是要深思熟慮這個問題：這項新興技術的能力，姑且稱之為更先進的技術，究竟是會賦能這家公司，還是對其構成風險。因此每當我們評估一家企業時，這個問題就會浮現——我們花時間與企業主及其團隊相處，不斷自問：人工智慧究竟會對這家公司構成威脅，還是能成為助力讓我們進一步推動成長？當然判斷可能出錯，但這正是我們極力想釐清的關鍵。在我看來，這已成為當代企業評估中必須正視的風險領域。 至於收購後的風險控管，我們的做法是堅持「階段性返還資本」的策略來降低投資風險。延續先前的討論，我們持股數量精簡，經常在投資兩三年後——至今已執行三、四次——出售 25%至 30%股權，藉此回收 50%甚至 100%以上的原始投資。有些投資人會質疑：「這樣做不是放棄潛在獲利嗎？」但我的原則是：只要能賣出 30%股權並回收超過 100%成本，我隨時都願意執行。正如您所言，風險無處不在，而降低風險的最佳方式就是確保所有投資人都能收回本金，如此資本損失的風險自然消除。希望這個觀點能有所啟發。對於私有企業（特別是成功企業）而言，往往能自主選擇私募合作夥伴。你們的長期持有策略如何確立自身成為企業首選合作方？請容我闡述對持有周期的思考：我們收購企業從不只為短期持有一兩年，而是真正要將其營運收益提升至新高度——這從實務角度必然需要時間。多數情況下，我們會持有企業四到七年，因為每筆收購都有明確的價值主張，我們會嚴格執行既定的營運計劃。 某種意義上的定位，因為我們希望將這些企業打造成更具持久性、更具商業價值的企業，能夠為長期發展奠定基礎。在我看來，我們參與的這段旅程通常會持續五、六、七年。話雖如此，當我們踏上這段旅程時，我的期望是如果運氣好的話，每十年或許會有一兩次機會，我們能發現自己僅擁有一家非凡的企業，就像是持續給予的禮物，第一章節引領出第二章節，甚至可能迎來第三章節。這樣我們或許能持有更長時間，那將會非常美好。而我們希望保持這種定位與靈活性來實現這個目標。

您談到了投資 CEO 的問題。偉大領導者有哪些反直覺或普遍被低估的特質嗎？我不確定這些特質是否被低估，但我認為優秀的執行長是那些能向團隊清楚闡述願景，並且善於識人的人，對吧？因為企業是由團隊建立和運作，而非單一個體。因此，若一位執行長具備卓越的識人能力，又能表達清晰的願景，這將能激發信任與信心。依我之見，這正是造就傑出領導者的關鍵。同時具備激發團隊信任與信心，並要求他們負起責任的能力，這相當困難卻極具價值。而我認為 Hobbit International 的執行長 Mark Cohen，他 30 年前從一間辦公室的保險經紀人做起。他是我見過最注重細節的執行長，這意味著他真正了解業務的每個環節，並能要求團隊負起責任。但他同時也具備根據清晰的企業願景來激勵團隊的能力，讓他們明白公司發展方向與自身能達成的成就。這種既能深入細節要求問責（因為真正懂業務），又能激勵人心建立關係的雙重能力，我認為是優秀執行長常見的特質組合。

人們常把執行長想像成西部片裡的領銜男主角。我認為那種氣場遠不如知識與深思熟慮來得重要。我曾共事過幾位說話輕聲細語卻才華非凡的執行長。他們甚至可以內斂寡言，但由於能激發信任與信心，反而極具領導效能。這或許是人們容易高估的特質之一——那種走進房間就能掌控全場的能力。重要性確實存在，但沒那麼關鍵。

我認為，我們更應該培養那些對世界有多學科思維方式的孩子，讓他們學會如何成為批判性思考者和深思熟慮的問題解決者。 為此，我希望他們有機會學習歷史，了解世界如何隨時間演變，接觸商界及其他領域的領袖——在這個批判性思維或許與過往時代同等受重視的時代。因此我們創立了這項計畫，旨在培養一代年輕人，讓他們以跨學科的世界觀、對歷史的體悟，以及能系統性解決問題的框架，來應對屬於他們世代的挑戰。